TRC Final Report

Volume 4

Chapter 2

Subsection 11

■ COULD BUSINESS HAVE DONE MORE?

124 Before dealing with this question in a more general way, attention needs to be given to two specific concerns of the critics of business – the support it gave to ‘total strategy’ and the role specifically of multinational corporations in undermining international sanctions.

Total strategy

125 The ANC submission drew attention to the way in which private business was increasingly drawn into the militarisation of South African society under the tutelage of the former state. The Carlton Conference in 1979 introduced a new form of partnership between government and business and was seen as the beginning of a ‘new era’. This is illustrated by the fact that business people were members of the ARMSCOR board and by widespread business participation in defence contracts.

126 Hundreds and probably thousands of South African private sector companies made the decision to collaborate actively with the government’s war machine. This was no reluctant decision imposed on them by coercive apartheid legislation. Many businesses, including subsidiaries of leading corporations, became willing collaborators in the creation of this war machine, which was responsible for many deaths and violations of human rights, both inside and outside the borders of our country. In addition, a variety of businesses collaborated with the state in the national security management system. Business representatives, for example, joined the government’s JMCs or their advisory structures, participated in defence manpower liaison committees or collaborated with the military in planning issues around conscription and military manpower.

127 The ANC submission also pointed to the national ‘keypoints’ system, whereby private industry was made responsible for protecting essential state installations in place of the state. Finally, it recalled the role of business in assisting in the development of nuclear weapons.

128 The AAM Archives submission reported that international firms received several of the 25 000 contracts handed out to the private sector by ARMSCOR. They were later also required to bear the cost of releasing white employees for conscription. “None refused”. Although, because of international pressure, British firms withdrew as South Africa’s main arms suppliers, French firms replaced them. Despite United Nations sanctions, “corporations played hideandseek in their attempts to circumvent and break the ban”. Equipment was used as a major loophole, because firms could argue that it had a civilian application. South Africa depended on western governments and firms for essential nuclear expertise and technology.

129 South Africa also depended on five major oil companies to break the oil ban: Shell, British Petroleum (BP), Mobil, Caltex and Total. These companies also helped finance Sasol through a levy they paid to the South African government’s Strategic Oil Fund.

130 The AAM Archives Committee noted that manufacturers argued that they were involved in constructive engagement with apartheid and raising the living standards of employees. However, “the banks had no such fig leaf. They lent directly to the apartheid government so that it could repress South African citizens, wage war against liberation movements and invade its neighbours.” The inability of the government to raise much money from overseas financial markets after 1985 “was undoubtedly one of the factors behind its decision to try to reach a political settlement”.