TRC Final Report

Volume 5

Part minority_position

Subsection 7

■ APARTHEID’S SHIFT TO SECURITY RULE

41 Security legislation, initially adopted in the early 1960s, and vesting ever-increasing discretionary emergency powers, became institutionalised, both in South Africa and in the homelands.

42 By the late 1970s, it was clear to most in power that the policy framework was inadequate, that it was simply not working, and a policy of reform developed. The purpose of the new approach was clearly to attain stability and political accommodation, but there was no frame within which this was to be achieved.

43 The 1980s were marked by the dismantling of the structures of apartheid built during the 1950s. Whether this was a result of reform or collapse, or a combination of the two factors, is a matter of opinion.

44 The Tricameral Parliament, with its total exclusion of black Africans, led to spiralling conflict. The politics of the ruling party proved totally inadequate to deal with the demands flowing from the emergence of the United Democratic Front. Further emergency powers were conferred on the government.

45 From evidence that emerged during the life of the Commission, it is clear that activists were being abducted and killed under the protection of emergency legislation and regulations. This coincided with policy changes by the liberation movements with regard to legitimate targets, which led to attacks on community councillors, police, landmines, the killing of so-called collaborators generally and the phenomenon of necklacing. What fed on what during this stage of upward spiralling of the conflict will also remain a matter of opinion and debate.

46 The assassination of activists is distinguished from gross human rights violations committed in the name or on behalf of the liberation movements by its clandestine nature. It did not happen in the public domain of the ruling party’s body politic. The sense of horror and even betrayal expressed by the support base of the National Party and most of its leadership and even by the body politic of the then system politics in response to the revelations, is a strong indication of a

secret agenda or agendas. Neither the government nor the state or any of its

operatives ever accepted responsibility for the assassinations.

47 Everything points to some measure of license given to or assumed by some within security and intelligence agencies. Actions by this establishment clearly militated against the efforts of (some) politicians of reform.

48 Amnesty applications have already shown the cover-up of some of these activities by superiors. The question of the (level of) involvement of politicians and senior officials is at issue. We failed to address this matter adequately. There are several reasons for this.

49 In my opinion, the first reason is that, against the backdrop of apartheid as a crime against humanity, the dominant perception within the Commission, at least sub-consciously, was of a criminal state.

50 Secondly, there was clearly some agreement to treat former President PW Botha differently – not to involve him directly in the processes of the Commission. Consequently, vital understandings of his mind and his perceptions were lost to the Commission. His written responses to questions came too late for proper analysis and integration into our understanding of the conflicts of the past. Questions that needed to be asked were lost in the subsequent legal tussles.

51 Thirdly, the chickens of the myths of Afrikaner nationalism and Afrikaner unity came home to roost. There was very little understanding of the struggle experienced within the Afrikaner. The Afrikaner and the state were approached as a single entity. When the National Party was recalled to the Commission, FW de Klerk was asked to account for the commissioning of assassinations. As an active politician and symbol of the old order, he was seen as fair game. Collective cabinet responsibility under Botha was interpreted as the collective intent of his government.

52 We as Commissioners made the mistake of not looking for simplicity on the other side of complexity. We simply stepped into the trap created by the myths of Afrikaner nationalism.

53 It is extremely difficult to believe that some operatives could get away for so long without some kind of shielding by at least some of their superiors and at least some politicians in government. At the same time, it is not at all plausible to assume a grand conspiracy of all members of government and senior bureaucrats, let alone by the National Party or the Afrikaner.

54 The question of whether and where such a shield existed unfortunately remains unanswered. Further amnesty applications may shed some light on the subject, which could be included in the further report on completion of the amnesty process.