TRC Final Report

Volume 6

Section 3

Chapter 1

Subsection 14

JOINT OPERATIONS OF THE SECURITY BRANCH AND SPECIAL FORCES: EXAMPLES OF CASES WHERE SPECIAL FORCES DID NOT APPLY FOR AMNESTY

135. Members of the SADF did not seek amnesty for any external operations, even w here the planning of such operations took place inside South Africa. In a number of cases, however, applications were received from Security Branch operatives for their role in operations conducted with or by Special Forces operatives. In other words, we learn about the following cases from applications by the Security Branch and not from the SADF itself.

Nat Serache

136. On 13 February 1985, a Special Forces team attacked the house of Mr Nat Serache in Gaborone, Botswana. According to applicants, MK members infiltrating South Africa used Mr Serache’s home as a transit facility. Several days before the attack, a planning meeting attended by General Stanley Schutte, then head of the Security Branch and General AJ ‘Kat’ Liebenberg, then head of Special Forces, was held at a Security Branch safe house in Ottoshoop, Transvaal. The attack was launched that night, injuring Mr Serache and another person.

Vernon Nkadimeng

137. On 14 May 1985, Ve rnon Nkadimeng (aka Rogers Mevi), a senior ANC/SACTU official ,^{6 5} was killed in a car bomb explosion in Gaborone, Botswana. The divisional commander of the Western Transvaal Security Branch, Brigadier Wickus Loots, and the commander of the Zeerust Security branch, Captain Rudi Crause, applied for amnesty for their role in providing target intelligence on Mr Nkadimeng and MK Jackie Molefe to Commandant Charl Naude, then operational commander of Barnacle, approximately one month before the operation.

The Gaborone raid, 1985

138. On the night of 14 June 1985, the eve of the ANC’s consultative conference in Kabwe, Zambia, Special Forces conducted a government-sanctioned cross border raid into Gaborone, Botswana, killing twelve people. Security Branch operatives from Security Branch Headquarters and the Western Transvaal and Soweto divisions applied for amnesty for identifying targets and supplying intelligence. The applicants testified to attending high-level meetings at Security Branch and Special Forces Headquarters at which generals from the SAP and SADF were present. One operative testified to accompanying Military Intelligence and Special Forces personnel to Cape Town to brief Ministers le Grange and Malan several days before the raid.

139. A Special Forces operations centre was set up at Nietverdiend near the Botswana borde r, and SADF forces were assembled to strike at Botswana should the Batswana Defence Force retaliate.

Aubrey Mkhwanazi and Sadi Pule

140. On 31 December 1986, the We stern Transvaal Security Branch heard from a source that two MK operatives, Aubrey Mkhwanazi (aka Take Five) and Sadi Pule, were staying in a house in Ramoutse, Botswana. Acting immediately on this information, they were authorised by Security Branch Headquarters to approach Special Forces with a view to conducting an operation. A raid was launched that night, leading to the death of a 72-year-old Batswana national, Maponyana Thero Segopa. Both of the intended targets had apparently been warned of an impending attack and were not in the house at the time.

The McKenzie car bomb

141. On 9 April 1987, Ms Mmaditsebe Phetolo, a Batswana national, and two children were killed when a car bomb exploded outside their home in Gaborone , Botswana. The explosion was the result of a failed operation undertaken jointly by the Northern and Weste rn Transvaal Security Branches and Special Forces / Barnacle operatives. The bomb had been placed in a secret compartment in a vehicle belonging to a Northern Transvaal Security Branch source, Charles McKenzie. McKenzie, who had successfully infiltrated MK Special Operations in Botswana, had transported arms into South Africa for MK.

142. According to applicants, the intended targets of the operation were Messrs Johannes Mnisi (aka Victor Molefe), Lester Dumakude and Ernest Lekoto Pule, all Special Operations operatives. The plan was to deliver the vehicle to the MK operatives and to detonate it by remote control while they were in the vehicle. Alternatively the bomb would detonate when the secret compartment in which the arms were stored was opened. However, McKenzie was already suspected of being a spy and was apprehended by MK on his arrival in Bostwana. McKenzie was allegedly not aware of the bomb. His vehicle was parked in a street in Gaborone, Botswana, where it exploded several days later, killing Ms Phetolo, her seven-year-old daughter and infant niece.

143. As Special Forces operatives were responsible for the Botswana leg of the operation, it is not known whether the explosion happened accidentally or whether Special Forces detonated the bomb.

144. Amnesty applications were received from Brigadier Cronje and two Section A⁶⁶ operatives, from two members of the Western Transvaal Security Branch who assisted with the operations, and from General Johan van der Merwe, who authorised it.