TRC Final Report

Volume 6

Section 3

Chapter 1

Subsection 28

PART FOUR: ACCOUNTABILITY, DISCIPLINE AND THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP

ACCOUNTABILITY

308. In theory, the Commanding Officer of Security Branch Headquarters was accountable to the Commissioner of Police. However, because he had direct access to the Minister, he had considerable autonomy in authorising operations.⁹⁴ For example, in Operation Zero Zero (1985), the bombings of Cosatu House (1987) and Khotso House (1988) and the ‘Cry Freedom’ incident (1988), communication seems to have taken place directly between the Minister and the Officer Commanding the Security Branch.

309. The Officer Commanding’s second in command could authorise operations when his superior was not present. Thus, Brigadier Jan du Preez, second in command in the early 1980s, is said to have authorised several operations, including the entrapment operation in which three COSAS youths were killed in February 1982. According to Brigadier Schoon, Brigadier du Preez was functionally senior to the divisional commanders with whom he shared the same rank.

310. Where both the Officer Commanding and his second in command were unavailable, it appears that in certain circumstances Brigadier Schoon, head of Group C (counter-terrorism) and one of the most senior officers at Headquarters, was able to issue such authorisation. He appears to have provided a crucial line of communication and authorisation, and several applicants in divisional offices cite him as their line of communication. Following the killing of the Ribeiro s⁹⁵, General Coetzee testified that, as Commissioner of Police, he telephoned Brigadier Schoon directly following allegations of security force complicity and instructed him to make enquiries of Brigadier Cronje, the Divisional Commander in whose jurisdiction the killing had taken place, and to report back to him and the Security Branch chief.

311. During the execution of an operation, operational commanders were allowed considerable discretion. According to applicants, it was not always possible to set guidelines and standing orders because decisions frequently had to be made quickly. Brigadier van der Merwe told the Amnesty Committee that planning was usually done:

on the ground level by members who knew the circumstances and who were involved with the execution. [He] … just accepted that the people who were involved were experienced, competent and that they would have the ability to manage and execute it.^{9 6}

312. Extrajudicial killings formed part of a counter-revolutionary strategy authorised by the state at the highest level.⁹⁷ Targets included civilians who were either political opponents or supporters of the liberation movements.

313. Applicants in numerous hearings testified that those who assisted MK operatives by providing logistical support such as finance and transport and safe houses w e re also regarded as legitimate or justifiable targets .

314. It would appear that most internal targets for elimination were decided at a divisional level, as emerged at the ‘Pebco Three’ and Ribeiro hearings. Lieutenant Jacques Hechter told the Committee that targets for elimination were decided on ‘an ad hoc basis’, particularly those who were high-profile activists or ‘untouchables’ who could not be prosecuted in a court of law.⁹⁸

3 1 5 . H o w ever, such decisions were made within a broader national context: the former in response to an instruction from the Minister of Law and Order to ‘stabilise the Eastern Cape by all means’ and the latter in response to an instruction by Security Branch Headquarters to work with Special Forces .

316. Colonel de Kock and other applicants said that, because external operations put operatives in a far more vulnerable position, they always sought approval for these from Security Branch Headquarters. Major Williamson testified at the Pretoria hearing on 15 September 1998:

the impression that I probably got at the time … was that if one was carrying out an operation which was on behalf of the State ... if a problem arose we would have the backing of the State. I never got the impression that it was like the movies you see where James Bond or somebody gets called in and the Minister says to him: ‘I want you to go and kill somebody in the Bahamas but if you are caught we don’t know who you are.’ I had the feeling that we had the backing of the State and that if necessary they would take the necessary pain.

317. Many applicants testified that they worked in a culture where information about clandestine and covert activities was tightly guarded and details were not widely circulated beyond those requiring specific knowledge. Adherence to the ‘need to know’ principle was re g a rded as essential in order to maintain the integrity of intelligence gathered and to ensure that operations were not compromised. This was especially so in covert operations, where every attempt was made to ensure that actions could not be traced back to their origins. Unlike clandestine acts, where the aim was to prevent information leaking prior to an operation, secrecy surrounding covert operations had to be maintained in perpetuity. In this context then, asking questions of commanders and colleagues was regarded as taboo. Major Craig Williamson told the Committee that anyone asking questions ‘on an ongoing basis … would definitely have been moved out of security branch headquarters’.

3 1 8 . The ‘need to know’ principle extended to reporting on operations. Again, according to Major Williamson: ‘what the commanders at that level and the politicians needed to know was the result of the operation and nothing further’. Applicants made it clear that their commanders expected to be told very little. But, said Williamson, ‘the General had the right to know and the prerogative of using the right to know was the General’s .⁹⁹

319. However, said Williamson, there was ‘a tendency in a social environment for lapses to occur’. Captain van Jaarsveld of the Northern Transvaal Security Branch pointed out that:

one of those anomalies in the Police … (the) need to know was sustained on an official level, but when people met informally, like at a braaivleis, they discussed these matters. (Pretoria hearing, 5 May 1999.)

320. The ‘need to know’ principle helped prevent knowledge emerging as to who was responsible for covert operations. At another level, however, it appears to have operated together with another well-known security principle, that of ‘plausible deniability’. Testimony to the Amnesty Committee on a number of matters clearly revealed that, in deciding ‘who needed to know’, there was a tendency to try to protect those higher up the command chain. At the Stanza Bopape hearing in Johannesburg (23–27 February 1998), General van der Merwe was asked why he had not informed his minister. He responded :

You must remember I was head of the security branch and the head security adviser and General Erasmus was head of the most important – and I think the burning point in South Africa – and we would have placed him in an impossible situation. They would not have had any other choice to comply with what we did. It would have been disadvantageous to them and it would have made them vulnerable and we would have used them as a rubber stamp and it would have been unethical. And because of that reason I took the decision on my own. And in all honesty I believed that it was in the best interest of the Minister and the government and the whole situation …

… let’s just look at what would have happened in the practice if I decided to approach the Minister. Would he have been able to handle this on his own? Wouldn’t it have been put to him that he should advise the President and the President would have approached the State Security Council. Where would all of this have ended? The Minister had no more capacity in order to decide about this issue than me. I was responsible for the maintaining of law and order. The Minister was purely the political head. So his capacities were more restricted … So the Minister by knowing about this, could not have attributed to improve the situation as far as I’m concerned. But if I asked him to help with this, in order to maintain the smokescreen he would have had to answer questions to Parliament and he would have made himself guilty of telling untruths. And right through the whole issue he would have followed the same behaviour we did, and for him and the government it could have been very dangerous. You must re member that we were willing to do this in the interest of that which we tried to achieve, which was public order. Something we considered very heavily at that stage. And also to protect the interest of the government. And if the Minister himself would have become involved it would have meant that those interests we want ed to protect, we would have jeopardised them.

321. In line with the above principles, orders were almost always verbal and tended to be conducted on a one-to-one basis. Written reports contained the barest detail. A lexicon of euphemisms, shrugs and winks developed. Discussions were brief, heavily dependent on body language and on a shared sense of purpose. Thus verbal, one-to-one commands ensured an absence of witnesses and documentary evidence, while obscure language allowed commanders to claim that they had misunderstood or misinterpreted a communication, providing enormous scope for denial of involvement and/or authorisation.