TRC Final Report

Volume 6

Section 4

Chapter 2

Subsection 6

Outcome of audit

59. The task team established that more than 60 per cent of the exhumations had been adequately performed by the units in KwaZulu-Natal and Johannesburg.

60. However, it also established that there were certain serious corroboration problems in 20 per cent of the cases. In the case of the remaining 20 per cent, additional corroboration was required and no determination could yet be made on the accuracy of the exhumations.

61. On the basis of the EAAF report, the task team also determined that the thirteen bodies exhumed from the Boshoek Farm were not political cases, and the Commission arranged for their re-interment.

62. The task team also established that a further fifteen exhumation cases had yet to be dealt with by the Commission.

OVERVIEW OF PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED IN THE EXHUMATION PROCESS

63. A comprehensive report of the task team’s audit will be handed to the Minister of Justice when the Codicil is handed over in March 2003.

64. The task team’s report highlighted the following problems:

Inadequate investigations

65. In a number of cases, gravesite identifications were done without first corroborating the incidents concerned. Without clearly establishing the date and place of an incident, gravesite identification becomes tentative at best. Although many documents have been destroyed by the Security Branch, certain state records often remain. These include occurrence books, inquest registers, state mortuary registers, and municipal burial orders.

66. The Johannesburg IU unit established that, in the former Transvaal, those exhumed were formally buried in cemeteries as paupers. They thus passed through a number of bureaucratic processes, including the records of the judiciary, local authorities and undertakers.

67. In certain cases, these corroborative sources were not consulted. Where they were obtained, they were not always properly correlated, leading to potential errors in the location of cemeteries and grave sites and rendering the identification process questionable.

68. Further, there was a range of secondary sources that could have been used to corroborate incidents, such as contemporaneous newspaper reports and NGO publications.

Absence of forensic examination

69. In the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal exhumations, forensic examinations of the skeletal remains were carefully conducted to ascertain age, sex, cause of death and so on. However, the exhumations carried out on in the former Transvaal had not been subjected to forensic appraisal, making identification uncertain.

70. There was also insufficient and sometimes no pre-mortem investigation. The forensic examination carried out on the ‘Boshoek remains’ sharply highlighted this issue. Families and fellow-combatants could have provided accurate details of age, physical characteristics and photographs. This was done in very few cases.

71. In addition, the absence of a professional exhumation procedure probably resulted in the loss or destruction of forensic evidence. The absence of forensic examination also meant that, in cases where the version provided by the security forces is contested, no evidence exists to challenge their version of events. This has consequences for the possibility of future prosecutions where proper forensic evidence would be required.

72. While the SAPS Forensic Unit was used in certain cases, the task team discovered that they had only participated in the digging and in identification.

73. There was also a failure to make a photographic record of the exhumations and remains. Only the SAPS Forensic Unit photographs are available. Regrettably, they did not generally photograph individual remains.

Documentation

74. The task team also established that documentation was handled poorly by the Johannesburg unit.

Over-reliance on the ANC lists and information

75. The Johannesburg unit placed a great deal of reliance on two lists that the ANC gave to the Commission. These lists detailed the names of MK operatives who had died inside South Africa. The first lists only the name of the operative and the date and place of death, where known. The second list contains real names, combat MK names, place of origin and place and date of death, where known.

76. In many cases, there were several serious discrepancies regarding place and date of death between the two lists. The lists were defective in a number of instances, and this had an impact on the investigations carried out by this unit.