TRC Final Report

Volume 6

Section 5

Chapter 4

Part Appendix1

Subsection 3

9. Volume 3, Chapter 3, first paragraph of the finding at paragraph 182 (page 220):

1 8 2 The Commission has made a comprehensive finding concerning Operation Marion. It is contained in a lengthy document which includes the full reasons for the finding and which can be found in the State Archives. The main features of the finding are as follows:

This paragraph is amended as follows:

1 8 2 The Commission has made a comprehensive finding concerning Operation Marion. It is contained in a lengthy document which includes the full reasons for the finding and which can be found in the State Archives. The Commission is mindful of the fact that senior members of the former SA Defence Force and Inkatha were acquitted in this lengthy trial on charges of murder and conspiracy to murd e r. In its findings, the Commission explains fully, in this volume as well as in volume 5 (Findings Volume), the basis upon which it found, on a balance of probabilities, that the SADF and Inkatha are nonetheless accountable for the human rights violations committed by Caprivi trainees. The main features of the finding are as follows:

10. Volume 3, Chapter 3, first sub-paragraph at paragraph 292, pages 267-268:

2 9 2 The full findings of the Commission on the event which became known as the Seven day War are recorded elsewhere in the Commission’s report. In summary, they are as follows:

This paragraph is amended as follows:

2 9 2 The Commission held public hearings relating to the Seven-Day Wa r, but did not have the benefit of the participation of members and supporters of the IFP, who chose not to participate in the hearings. The Commission did not have the benefit of hearing the IFP’s perspective of the nature and causes of this intense period of violence and its findings are based on submissions received mainly form those involved in the conflict under the ANC banner. The full findings of the Commission on the event which became known as the Seven day War are re corded elsewhere in the Commission’s report. In summary, they are as follows:

11. Volume 3, Chapter 3, the second last indented subparagraph of paragraph 294, page 270:

An informal inquest held in 1991 found that ‘persons unknown’ were responsible for the deaths. A second inquest was held in May 1995. The inquest magistrate, RA Stewart, found that former special constable Welcome Muzi Hlophe (aka ‘BigBoy’ Hlophe), SAP Lance Sergeant Peter Smith, KwaZulu government driver Abraham Shoba and a fourth unknown man were prima facie directly re sponsible for the killings. He also found that the original investigating officer, Major Joseph van Zyl, was an accessory to the killings and recommended that an investigation be opened with a view to a possible conviction of Van Zyl. He further found that the then Secretary of the KwaZulu Legislature, Mr. Robert Mzimela, KwaZulu employee Z Mkhize, and then head of the KLA Protection Unit Major Leonard Langeni had been implicated in a cover-up operation. (Mzimela and Langeni were both involved in the operations of the Esikhawini hit squad – see below)

This paragraph is amended as follows:

An informal inquest held in 1991 found that ‘persons unknown’ w e re responsible for the deaths. A second inquest was held in May 1995. The inquest magistrate, RA Stewart, found that former special constable We l come Muzi Hlophe (aka ‘BigBoy’ Hlophe), SAP Lance Sergeant Peter Smith, KwaZulu gove rnment driver Abraham Shoba and a fourth unknown man were prima facie d i rectly responsible for the killings. He also found that the original investigating office r, Major Joseph van Zyl, was an accessory to the killings and re commended that an investigation be opened with a view to a possible conviction of Van Zyl. He further recommended an investigation into the roles of senior KwaZulu G o v e rnment and Police officials who were strongly suspected of being involved in a cover-up operation.

1 2 . Volume 2, Chapter 7, paragraph 186, page 625:

1 8 6 Inkatha was found to be the foremost perpetrator of gross human rights violations in KwaZulu and Natal during the 1990s. Approximately 9 000 gros s human rights violations were perpetrated by Inkatha in KwaZulu and Natal fro m 1990 to May 1994. This constituted almost 50 per cent of all violations reported to the Commission’s Durban office for this period.

This paragraph is amended as follows:

1 8 6 Statistical evidence, based on statements made to the Commission by witnesses, indicates that the foremost perpetrators of gross human rights violations (GHRV s ) in KwaZulu and Natal for this period, were persons who were named by witnesses as being supporters and/ or members of the IFP. Approximately 9000 G H RVs were perpetrated by such persons in KZN and Natal form 1990 – 1994, which constituted 50% of all violations reported to the Commission’s Durban offic e for this period, and over 33% of the total number of GHRVs reported for the 34 year period of the Commission’s mandate. However, in the light of the fact that the vast majority of members and supporters of the IFP stayed away from the Commission, the Commission was denied the opportunity of recording the testimonies of the large numbers of IFP members and supporters who were victims of violence at the hands of supporters of the ANC or its affiliates. Accordingly, any statistical date concerning the respective culpability of the IFP and the ANC during these years, must be seen and understood in the light of the above.

13. The finding in Volume 2, Chapter 7, paragraph 195, page 626:

THE COMMISSION MADE A COMPREHENSIVE FINDING ONTHE SEVEN DAY WAR AND ON THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE PRIMARY ROLE-PLAYERS IN A CONFLICT THAT RESULTED IN THE COMMISSION OF MANY HUNDREDS OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE ROLE-PLAYERS INCLUDE: THE RIOT UNIT OF THE SAP, INCLUDING SPECIAL CONSTABLES, AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE.