| Time | Summary | |
| 09:25 | Let’s move our attention to the Eastern Cape now where the Truth Commission had a special hearing. It was September 1992. Negotiations between the ruling National Party and the ANC were fully underway. Two homelands, Transkei and Venda, sided with the ANC, but Ciskei and Bophuthatswana were digging in their heels. In protest against Ciskei leader, Brigadier Oupa Gqozo’s continued dictatorship, the ANC planned to march on Bisho on the 7th of September. They wanted to occupy Bisho for a day. Gqozo was determined to stop them. Jann Turner tries to separate fact from fiction. | Full Transcript and References |
| 10:05 | Many people died in a bloody clash between the Ciskei Defence Force and marching ANC supporters. | Full Transcript |
| 10:20 | 23 shot dead and more than 100 injured in Ciskei March. | Full Transcript |
| 10:28 | It began as a peaceful ANC march, a challenge to the Ciskei for its refusal to keep pace with the change that was sweeping the rest of South Africa. The day ended in a bloodbath with all parties pointing fingers and denying responsibility. What exactly happened? | Full Transcript |
| 10:47 | On the 7th of September there was a rumour that the Ciskeian government, there was going to be a coup, that MK was going to take over, that it’s going to take all of us. | Full Transcript |
| 11:02 | We applied to the court to forbid the march because information was received that the marchers would be armed and that they had no interest in any peaceful march to the stadium or wherever, that they were going to storm and destroy Bisho. | Full Transcript |
| 11:20 | Brigadier Gqozo and the Ciskei authorities did everything they could to stop the march. In the early hours of September 7th a magistrate gave permission for the march to proceed as far as Bisho stadium, where the marchers would be permitted to hold a rally. Razor wire fencing was rolled out across the border with South Africa. Fifty Ciskei policemen were formed up in three lines behind the blade wire. They were equipped with riot control gear. Directly behind them, units of the Ciskei Defence Force were on full alert. They were the last line of defence protecting Bisho. Brigadier Oelschig of the SADF was then in command of the Ciskei Defence Force. He was stationed in an operations room rigged up in the National Assembly building. Deputy commander, Colonel Dirk van der Bank was stationed on the roof of the legislative building. Commandant Archie Mkosana was at the head of the troops in the field. Meanwhile, a march of some 50 000 people were setting off from King Williamstown. At its ...more | Full Transcript |
| 12:30 | In some parts of South Africa our movements are just as good as banned and in this part of South Africa there’s autocratic rule, there’s tyranny and Ciskei probably is an example of the worst tyranny in our country. | Full Transcript |
| 12:48 | The intention sir was to march to an open space on the southern side of the central business district in Bisho and to hold an assembly for a minimum of 24 hours. | Full Transcript and References |
| 13:05 | My instructions were still to stop marchers from entering Bisho at all costs as that would be disastrous. | Full Transcript and References |
| 13:13 | A reconnaissance group led by Ronnie Kasrils was sent ahead of the march to find a way into Bisho. They saw that the main road was barricaded at the border and the razor wire funnel led into the stadium. Kasrils discussed the situation with police and peace monitors who were watching developments from behind the fence. | Full Transcript |
| 13:32 | The intention is actually to come here and to remain here until the Brigadier leaves. // But does that mean in the stadium or does that mean a penetration elsewhere. // Well, we’re on our way so you’ll see. I can’t say anymore than that because I’ve got to relay what we’ve seen to Cyril Ramaphosa and the regional leadership. | Full Transcript |
| 13:56 | A clash of some sort was now inevitable. | Full Transcript |
| 14:02 | We do a reconnaissance coming into the stadium, at about 50 meters along the fence that way you find 10 meters of this fence has collapsed, it’s lying flat, with very easy access, a huge gap to come through if the march decides to do so and move in that direction, west, away from where the soldiers are deployed by the road. We look at this fence, we see this is possible. We talk about it. Is it a trap? We look around. There’s no sign of any troops this side. What we then do is we proceed back in this bakkie, back to the march that’s now ten minutes down the road. We have a quick discussion, we’re reporting to the leadership on the march. We tell them what we’ve seen. We explain the possibility and the decision is then taken, we’ll take this through, this is the way to go into Bisho. // You were going to do that although you knew that was restricted by the border. // Oh of course, I mean that’s clear. | Full Transcript |
| 15:13 | Shortly after one o’clock the main march led by Ramaphosa arrived at the razor wire fence. Meanwhile, in defiance of the magistrate’s ruling that the marchers should remain in the stadium, Chris Hani and Ronnie Kasrils split off leading a small group that was to spearhead the move into Bisho city centre. | Full Transcript |
| 15:33 | Jann, we come running through the gap in the fence. We come running for 50, 60 yards. 100, 200 people behind me, many more following. We come to a situation about here at the telecommunication centre, lots of soldiers lined up there. | Full Transcript |
| 15:50 | I heard the field commander reporting to Colonel van der Bank with great concern that his position was under attack or under fire. I cannot recall his exact words. He further reported that his position was being approached at speed. He sought advice from Colonel van der Bank and asked whether he should open fire. Colonel van der Bank instructed him to hold fire and inquired from me whether I had monitored this transmission, which I confirmed. Colonel van der Bank then inquired whether the field commander could open fire. I instructed him to confirm that the field commander was being fired upon. | Full Transcript |
| 16:28 | I thought these were members of the MK because it was said that they were going to attack. I was so very confused. | Full Transcript and References |
| 16:37 | Upon confirmation by Colonel van der Bank that the crowd was firing at the field commander’s troops and was storming their position I confirmed that the troops were authorized to fire, meaning those troops who were in immediate danger. | Full Transcript |
| 16:50 | It was me who was there; I gave Major Mbina an order to make a single fire at the people who were coming towards you. | Full Transcript |
