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Content
A listing of transcripts of the dialogue and narrative of this section.
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Structure
The list provides the transcript, info about the text, and links to references contained in the text.
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Special Report
Transcripts for Section 2 of Episode 48
| Time | Summary | | | 02:05 | ‘Soft Targets and Civilians’ // Wasn’t this blurring of a distinction between hard and soft targets in direct contravention of those subsections of the Geneva convention? // What we did was to recommit ourselves to intensifying the struggle, to saying that some of the restraints that we had placed on ourselves as to how we conduct the struggle would need to be relaxed and in particular I would say then that where a military installation was in a commercial or civilian area, that restraint that we’d placed on ourselves had to be relaxed. The tactics of the apartheid regime were drawing us into a morass where the rules of the games were reducing, or were likely to reduce an honourable struggle and besmear it and we tried to avoid it. // In fact in waging the armed struggle we broke very few eggs to make a huge omelette. | Full Transcript and References | | 03:18 | ‘Church Street Bomb Pretoria, May 1983.’ // It was the Air Force target. Had that bomb gone off at 4:30, it would have caught the majority of people … the overwhelming majority would have been from that place. But it went off prematurely and it had been carefully reconnoitred, so there was our problem. And the target was selected, not directed at the civilian population but at the security force members. | Full Transcript | | 04:05 | ‘Magoo’s Bar Durban, June 1986.’ // There was a mistake that occurred. That particular evening it wasn’t as filled with the security force members as had been seen in previous reconnaissance. They believed that the bar would be full which was very often the occasion. So, what we have been consistent with is the targeting of the security forces in the same way as Church Street, but in war, in conflict of course one can’t always be a 100 percent efficient, effective in an operation. | Full Transcript and References | | 04:52 | The African National Congress unreservedly apologises to all civilians who lost their lives, whether in crossfire or any other circumstance; our aim has never been to attack civilians and whatever the intensity of the struggle, where civilians have died we believe that it is appropriate that in our country today in the interest of reconciliation and unity that we should apologise for that. And we do so. | Full Transcript | | 05:25 | ‘Landmines.’ // How does the ANC justify the usage of landmines on public roads in view of it having signed the Geneva protocol? // Landmines were used in areas that were extensively patrolled by the South African Defence Force and also by the Area Protection Units known by the term ‘commandoes.’ Most of those operations, landmine operations, were in the border areas, the areas that were patrolled very, very effectively. I think it is common knowledge to the Commission here that part of the fence was electrified and in most instances it was on the lethal mode and there were gaps. And where they didn’t have the fence, that’s where most of the patrolling took place. The idea was to try and impede, reduce the intensity of these patrols. The African National Congress realized that after the few incidents where civilians were caught the President called us in and asked us to put a stop to this method of operation. I gave the instructions to all our forces to stop using the ...more | Full Transcript and References | | 07:34 | ‘Necklacing.’ // With our necklaces we shall liberate this country! // If necklacing was at any stage part of the struggle doesn’t it in itself defeat the idea of a just war? // On hindsight, if we delayed in the judgement of any person too long, in appealing for the end of this practice and to condemn it, then on hindsight yes, we made a mistake. We should have done it earlier. It had to be reacted to as something that the masses had taken up under conditions of extreme brutalization and repression. And then you sought to channel that energy into proper forms of political action and unity with the armed actions that we were undertaking. So that explains the approach that we had to take. It would be an extremely foolhardy leader of the ANC of 1984, ’85 – ’85 I think is the period of the first necklacing – to have stood up and said this is wrong, out with it. // Was Mrs. Mandela acting as an ANC member during the 1980s and if so, was she subject to any organisational ...more | Full Transcript and References | | 09:44 | ‘Kill the Boer, Kill the Famer.’ // We need to talk about African tradition. This was not a statement. It’s not a statement of any kind and wouldn’t be read by any of this African youth as a statement. In Xhosa, this particular form of art is called ‘igwijo’ and igwijo is not a statement, is not a political statement, it’s a chant. For instance, ‘amaKwenkwe,’ [young men] when they’re going over long distances they would be doing this thing. It’s not a statement. You see part of the problem with this is that somebody who comes from outside of that African culture interpreted it and indeed when you write there. Peter Mokaba said, ‘kill a Boer, kill a farmer,’ he didn’t in the sense of a statement which represents policy and it would not have been taken as a statement that represents policy. So, there’s no ANC policy which says, ‘kill a farmer, kill a boer’ and all that. But there would be amagwijo of all sorts. You have a Zulu song, not quite igwijo but ...more | Full Transcript | | 13:10 | ‘ANC / IFP Conflict’ // There was a plan by the ANC, at that stage to assassinate Dr Buthelezi. With regard to that particular issue it is true that a unit of the ANC did at some point take a decision to carry out an operation of that kind. When the ANC headquarters found that out it counter mandate that decision and that operation was never carried out. It is also true Chairperson that especially the department of Military Intelligence made it its business to sustain the story that in fact there was an ANC decision to assassinate Dr Buthelezi when there wasn’t and did all manner of things to make sure that Dr Buthelezi was convinced of this so that they could take particular measures in response to what was then seen as a threat but which as I say Chairperson, a threat which in fact did not exist. I’m making the point Chairperson that we didn’t regard the IFP, its members as legitimate military targets and therefore at no stage were any decisions taken to attack the IFP as ...more | Full Transcript |
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