| Time | Summary | |
| 16:12 | And then on Wednesday it was the turn of the National Party. FW de Klerk started off with what Desmond Tutu later called a handsome apology and a conditional acceptance of responsibility for the actions of the security forces. | Full Transcript and References |
| 16:29 | Apartheid was wrong. I apologise in my capacity as leader of the National Party to the millions of South Africans who suffered the wrenching disruption of forced removals in respect of their homes, businesses and land; who over the years suffered the shame of being arrested for pass law offences; who over the decades, and indeed centuries suffered the indignities and humiliation of racial discrimination; who for a long time were prevented from exercising their full democratic rights in the land of their birth; who were unable to achieve their full potential, because of job reservation; and who in any other way suffered as a result of discriminatory legislation and policies. Let me state clearly that the National Party and I accept full responsibility for all our policies, decisions and actions. We stand by our security forces who implemented such policies and decisions and all reasonable interpretations thereof. | Full Transcript |
| 17:44 | But what exactly was De Klerk taking responsibility for? That became the real question. | Full Transcript |
| 17:50 | I think it would have pleased everybody if I said it was our official policy, but I can’t speak an untruth to satisfy the call for blood which there is. I can only speak the truth as I know it. | Full Transcript |
| 18:05 | ‘Ambush and Killing: Cradock 4’ // It has never been the policy of the government, the National Party that people should be murdered, should be assassinated. I’ve said that clearly. Such instruction is in conflict with the policy as it has been at all times within my knowledge. | Full Transcript |
| 18:52 | ‘Abduction and Killing: Pebco 3.’ // Once again, depending who issued the orders. It would definitely be unauthorized and mala fide. | Full Transcript |
| 19:05 | ‘Torture and Killing: Stanza Bopape.’ // I would firstly like to emphasize on this question as with the others that obviously that is absolutely unacceptable, it falls outside the parameters of anything which was ever authorised or intended by government policy, government decisions, or any reasonable interpretation. Surely when people commit a crime they try to cover it up and if it wasn’t for amnesty these people, if these facts are true should have been charged. | Full Transcript |
| 19:56 | ‘Booby-trapped Hand grenades.’ // Senior members of the South African Police implicating also senior SADF officers have applied for amnesty for a number of murders committed by SAP operatives when they supplied faulty hand grenades to COSAS members in the course of 1985. At least eight persons were killed and seven maimed. This operation was authorised and approved by the former Commissioner of Police and the Minister. // Whoever authorized that was guilty of a very gruesome and totally unacceptable decision. It was wrong, it wasn’t part of the policy and whoever authorized it was mala fide and was acting against the interests of South Africa. Can I say however that I don’t know whether this allegation that a minister ordered it was tested? We are dealing here once again with allegations made by people in amnesty applications who are trying to pass the buck. | Full Transcript |
| 21:19 | ‘Third Force: Operation Marion.’ // I really can’t give you a very informed opinion. My recollection of that was as I can remember, a case was made out that then Chief Minister Buthelezi’s life was under threat, many of his leading figures had been targeted. There’s need for well trained VIP protection to effectively ensure that the ANC would not succeed in strategies to assassinate, murder him and other leading figures and that on that basis permission was given for an operation which would entail the expenditure of funds to train such people to perform that duty. | Full Transcript |
| 22:19 | The people who took part in the KwaMakhutha killing were not members of the VIP unit, they were members of the offensive unit and they were not involved in a war situation as you earlier described. They attacked a house and they killed 13 people, most of whom were women and children. // Therefore they were guilty of a heinous crime. I’m not defending them. | Full Transcript and References |
| 22:43 | In November 1989 Dirk Coetzee informed the world and I suppose De Klerk of the existence of Vlakplaas, a police unit on a farm outside Pretoria which specialized in assassinating government opponents. | Full Transcript and References |
| 22:58 | Look your position if I understand it correctly is that Vlakplaas is an aberration like a lot of these other things that were debated this morning. And the explanation, as I understand it, that you were proffering was that it must have been an officer or two or whatever, lower down the hierarchy, somewhere below these generals who were doing this exercise, this Vlakplaas exercise entirely on their own bat. // That is my impression. // How reasonable is that explanation, that a lowly officer, somewhere below these generals was responsible for this entire aberration that led to all these things that we know are being disclosed? // There’s nothing reasonable in crime. It’s unreasonable. I believe what the generals say to me and therefore I don’t offer it as an explanation, I offer it as an example where I have reason to believe, based on the accounts of four people to me that specifically in the case of Vlakplaas fundamental information with regard to totally unacceptable things ...more | Full Transcript |
| 24:39 | The most obvious generals De Klerk would have asked about Vlakplaas are Generals Basie Smit, Krappies Engelbrecht, Johan van der Merwe, Nick van Rensburg and Johan le Roux. We have learned from the affidavits of several Vlakplaas men that General Basie Smit was a regular visitor to Vlakplaas. They even had to keep his personal bottle of Chivas Regal whiskey for him. General Krappies Engelbrecht we know has a long history of helping Vlakplaas cover up their legal problems and Johan van der Merwe was involved in at least one Vlakplaas operation. The head of the ANC’s legal department, Mathews Phosa remarked afterwards that De Klerk sat in Pretoria and knew everything that went on in the ANC’s Quatro camp in faraway Angola but nothing about Vlakplaas ten kilometres from him. In the days of PW Botha the State Security Council was the highest decision making body, made up of cabinet ministers and generals. Goosen showed De Klerk minutes of a State Security Council meeting in 1986 ...more | Full Transcript |
| 26:10 | There was never any reference after that meeting at any time of the third force in any discussion that I can recall except for this continued discussion on do we establish another overt force or not. There was never any reference that I can recall in any way whatsoever of our policy using terrorist methods. Yes firm action, yes using and applying extraordinary measures, yes going underground, yes spying, yes having covert actions, having a state of emergency, putting people in camps without trial, all that yes. But not murdering people, not assassination; it was never part of the policy. // How would a reasonable person interpret those directives, those statements? Would a reasonable person, member of the security forces who is enjoined to use the strongest possible methods to combat the revolution, not interpret what was being said to authorise killings and assassinations, and that’s the question. // As far as I know, not having been directly involved then, there were at all times ...more | Full Transcript and References |
| 28:24 | Afterwards two truth commissioners expressed their deep disappointment with the National Party attitude. // To make that apology and then to negate it by the way that … I feel sorry for him, I mean maybe he didn’t know, but … I told him that people were killed, we went and told them. I mean to tell me that he didn’t know. I’m sad. I’m sad because I had hoped that … maybe he didn’t know, maybe he didn’t know. | Full Transcript |
