Amnesty Hearings

MR BRINK: Yes, Mr Chairman, this is the resumed hearing of the application of Mr Geoffrey Benzien. I did place on your desk Mr Chairman last week, five copies of a psychologist’s report relating to Mr Benzien for distribution to the Committee, I don’t know whether you have that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we’ve received those, thank you. Mr Cook?

I would like please the photographers to desist from doing that whilst we are proceeding the evidence, I would appeal to you not to do that please.

JUDGE WILSON: Will you please move from in front.

CHAIRPERSON: You’ll have ample time photographing people you want to when they are walking out. Mr Cook? Yes, Mr Cook?

MR COOK: Thank you Chairperson, may I continue?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR COOK: Firstly, I am going to hand in the psychologist’s report, I believe copies have been made. I’ve placed it into neat volumes and then we’d like to deal with that. There are five copies, one for each member of the Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, proceed.

MR COOK: Thursday we had the pre-trial meetings and then Mr Robin Brink indicated that it was not necessary to call the psychologist, in any event the psychologist wouldn’t have been available to testify today. If we look at the certain relevant issues and I’d like to emphasise certain points - if you turn to page 2 at the bottom, I’d like to read you the quote there, it’s the second last sentence

"He still suffers from nightmares with contents that relate to his work in the security branch, in example the interrogation of people"

Please just turn the page.

"It is my professional opinion that he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder as a direct result of the work he did in the security branch, in example the methods he used in the interrogation of people in order to obtain information from them"

The second paragraph which is of importance here is in the centre:

"He cannot recall important features or detail about the events"

The third paragraph in the middle:

"Typical of patients with PTSD"...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Cook, you’re going a little bit too fast, where’s the second paragraph to which you referring?

MR COOK: It’s in brackets, numbered (2) on page 3(2) and then the first, second and third sentence of that specific paragraph reads

"He cannot recall"

And the third paragraph in the middle starts with the sentence:

"Typical of patients with PTSD"

Do you have that?

"He had tunnelled memories, that is he could only remember certain aspects of the situation and had no recollection of other aspects of the situation. He brought out many memories because of the traumatic nature of these incidents. This was specifically true of his memories regarding the interrogation of people".

The next paragraph:

"It is my professional opinion that Mr Benzien is not being intentionally vague about detail regarding his work in the security branch. I am convinced that his weak memory is due to PTSD and major depression, as I encounter this phenomena almost daily in my work with such patients"

The last paragraph at the bottom, second line from the bottom:

"He expressed remorse and self loathing and wished that he was never appointed to the task"

Next page, page 4(3):

"The patient had at least two of the following symptoms of hyper-arousal that were not present before the traumatic events or events"

A list is then mentioned there. Please turn to page 5, the paragraph which reads:

"Concentration: Mr Benzien has severe impairment of concentration and memory for detail. Other symptoms are indecisiveness and difficulty in thinking clearly. This symptom is also a main feature of PTSD and has been disclosed more fully in 6.1"

Paragraph 7 - The Conclusion:

"Mr Benzien suffered from severe PTSD and a major depressive episode caused by the events he experienced in the course of his duties"

The next paragraph:

"In my professional opinion Mr Benzien does not suffer from a personality disorder which includes anti-social personality disorder also known as psychopathic"

Page 6, right at the top:

"His personal life therefore does not evidence the aggression showed in the execution of his duty. Both PTSD and major depression impairs a patients memory and it becomes evident during therapy that Mr Benzien has blocked out large areas of experience.

When exposed to unpleasant circumstances of severe trauma, patients block out negative experiences. Sometimes people will even block out even positive experiences together with negative events in an unconscious effort to forget unpleasant detail. It is in this light that Mr Benzien’s recall - ability should be seen.

In my opinion he’s not untruthful in his effort because I was witness to the painful process he underwent to make the decision to apply for amnesty. He is a person that has always considered himself loyal to the South African police and his colleagues and a decision to appear before the TRC has been traumatic.

This has been a painful process which started long before the act of applying for amnesty and after seeing his suffering during the last six months. I do not believe that he will make a mockery of the process he is presently participating in, the toll his work has taken from him and his family has been too great.

He was a good detective who had an excellent record in breaking crime and because of his success he was recruited to a position that has broken him mentally and physically".

It was signed by Ria Kotze who is a psychologist. I’ll hand this in as an exhibit, as you please. The next exhibit which I’d like to hand in if I may continue, that is the documents relating to the inquest, number 314 ...[intervention]

JUDGE WILSON: Sorry, the last exhibit you handed in, what exhibit is that?

MR BRINK: I think it’s D Mr Chairman.

JUDGE WILSON: D?

MR COOK: D. The inquest procedures would be E, the documentation regarding it. At this stage I hand in the entire proceedings of the inquest, you will be handed a copy - Mr Brink will give it to you but at this stage what I would like to give you is the final conclusion of the inquest on the prescribed form, perhaps I can hand that in now.

Paragraph C contains the finding of the Magistrate who sat with assessors and he said that the cause of death was a pistol shot accidentally - which happened accidentally and that was the final result of the inquest. I’m handing in the entire inquest proceedings because it will be necessary during argument stage to refer to certain pages.

CHAIRPERSON: What is the name of the Magistrate, can you tell us?

MR COOK: Mr Schagen.

CHAIRPERSON: How do you spell that?

MR COOK: It is on the paper I gave you - Exhibit E, the second ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: I beg your pardon, thank you.

JUDGE WILSON: But it’s signed by Hoffman?

MR COOK: If we look at the inquest proceedings then Schagen actually made the findings but perhaps Hoffman just signed the document but I will still hand in the entire documentation, there’s nothing sinister about it.

I continue then to hand in the next exhibit, that is the Amnesty Application of Superintendent Liebenberg. I have one copy which I will hand in at this stage - his application should be before you at this stage but this could be Exhibit F.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Cook, are you aware of the fact that that application is on the role for hearing now?

MR COOK: Yes, that is why I’m not going to give each one of you a copy, I just want to hand it in my client’s application so that it isn’t later said: "Yes, but on a technical point you haven’t handed in exhibits yet".

CHAIRPERSON: There’s now fear of that technicality being raised by this Commission.

MR COOK: My problem is not with you and I trust your bona fides, I just don’t want kind of surprises might be sprung by my colleagues sitting next to me.

I would like to call General J L Griebenauw, that is the General which as I promised last time I would call to testify and he will testify now. I would like to ask that he sit next to me because as far as the questions that might be asked of him are concerned, he might need legal advice to answer these questions. I really don’t think it’s necessary for him to sit in front.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Cook, I don’t understand what you mean when you say that he will have to get legal advice before he answers certain questions - if he’s a witness, he’s a witness and a witness does not get legal advice regarding his evidence as such.

MR COOK: I don’t know what the procedure is because he’s not an applicant, he can refuse to answer certain incriminating questions and he has to answer only as far as it is relevant to Captain Benzien’s application and if the questioning is too wide, then he can refuse to answer.

ADV DE JAGER: But when it gets to that, you can actually object.

MR COOK: Yes, I have no problem with that, I would have liked him however to sit next to me but the General says he has no problem to sit in the front.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cook, you better take the stand where

witnesses take please.

MR COOK: While the witness is walking to his seat I could perhaps just hand in a copy, these are copies of General Griebenauw’s statement.

ADV DE JAGER: Your full names?

JOHANNES LODIWIKUS GRIEBENAUW: (sworn states)

MR COOK: Thank you. Could you perhaps give your rank at this stage and what the situation is - where are you at this stage?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I’m a retired Major General in the South African police. On the 31st of July 1992, I retired with the rank of Major General.

MR COOK: You don’t have to write that down, that is all part of the document which I’ve just given you - page 1, paragraph 1.

Where were you stationed at that stage - just before you retired?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I was in Pretoria.

MR COOK: You were at head office - Crime Information Service, is that correct?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes.

MR COOK: Now Paragraph 2, could you explain your period in office?

MR GRIEBENAUW: For the largest part of my period in office I was attached to the security branch and in that capacity I served in the following posts

Windhoek, from 1964 to 1974 as an investigating officer in the security branch.

1975 - East London as commanding officer of that investigating unit, once again security branch.

1982 - Paarl, second in command, security branch in the Boland.

1983 to 1985 in Cape Town as commanding officer of the investigative unit in Cape Town.

1986 - May to 1989 as the commanding officer of the security branch in Border, East London.

1989 - May to December 1989, second in command security branch Western Cape.

December 1989 to December 1990, regional commanding officer, security branch Western Cape.

January 1991 to July 1992, in Pretoria - Crime Investigation and Information.

From the 1st of August 1992 to May 1993, I was seconded to the Qwandabele Government where I acted as the commissioner of police.

MR COOK: Do you know Superintendent Liebenberg and Captain Benzien?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, indeed. Superintendent Liebenberg during my first period in office in Cape Town, fell under my direct command and during my second period of office, I was his overall commanding officer. During my second period of office in Cape Town, I was Captain Benzien’s overall commanding officer.

MR COOK: Is it correct that you’ve read both these gentlemen’s amnesty applications?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is correct.

MR COOK: And arising from that and also certain documents which you’ve perused and to which you will refer quite soon, could you try to place their applications in the proper perspective?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes. Unfortunately I have to take it quite far back, as far back as 1961 where the ANC/SACP Alliance and other organisations but in particular the ANC, changed their struggle to an armed struggle. I’m sorry, may I just look at my document, I think it’s incomplete - my apologies.

The Government of the day in whose service each and every member of the South African police was, they determined policy and expected of it’s officials to actually carry out policy. And it was common cause that the liberation organisations were striding for the toppling of the South African Government and that that Government expected of the security forces to avert the so-called "total onslaught".

ADV DE JAGER: Are you now reading on page 2, paragraph five?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is correct. I’d like to emphasise that this onslaught was not limited to certain areas but that it was aimed against the Republic as a whole. We therefore can’t judge issues and incidents in the Western Cape in isolation and we also can’t judge the actions of members of the security branch in the Western Cape, in isolation. There was a line of command which went from the most junior member to the commissioner of police.

There was legislation and departmental regulations and provisions determined exactly how a detainee should be dealt with in terms of Section 29 of Act 74 of 1982 - The Internal Security Act. This legislation and regulations placed certain obligations on the inspector of detainees, district surgeons, magistrates and commanding officers on various levels and attached to other divisions of the police.

From time to time it also necessitated reporting to certain bodies. There was a register which had to be kept up to date and visitors to the detainees would have to fill in this register during their visits to the detainees and have to sign it. There was a prescribed procedure to be followed should a Section 29 detainee lay a complaint.

Allegations of assault inter alias had to be investigated by a senior officer in the detective branch and not by an officer attached to the security branch. By means of Advocate Cook, I requested the police to place at my disposal the relevant Section 29 detainee files but I was told that it couldn’t be traced.

In respect of the armed struggle against the RSA, as I’ve already said, it was necessary to go back to that issue to 1961 when the ANC/SACP Alliance committed themselves to an armed struggle. As the armed struggle escalated, it was expected of the police more and more to become involved in situations which fell outside the normal boundaries of policing functions.

The South African police was since 1967 used to do border duty in Zimbabwe and obviously they had to receive special training for that and in this way they were introduced to conventional warfare. This exposure resulted in the fact that principle of minimum of violence was severely prejudiced and to a certain extent was actually just swept aside. Border duty for the police was later extended to Namibia and also in relation to our own borders with our neighbouring countries, which brought about more and more exposure to conventional warfare.

Even later the battle which was being waged on our borders moved to within our country and this condition and situation and how it developed was discussed by the former Commissioner of Police, General van der Merwe, in a statement which he handed in the amnesty application of Brigadier Jack Cronje and others and a copy has been attached to this statement in front of you now.

I’d like to refer to specific portions in this statement because it deals with a period and circumstances which has an influence on or an effect of the application of these two members. And if you just look at these portions, paragraph - page 3, paragraph 5:

"Amongst other things the principles of minimum violence and the bringing of perpetrators before criminal courts was to be seriously effected and even eroded".

MR COOK: That’s the second last paragraph from the bottom.

MR GRIEBENAUW: Page 8, paragraph 10 - three quarters of the way down the page the dates are set out

"Other channels which were to be used included sympathetic organisations, the distribution of pamphlets and the establishment of revolutionary themes for the ensuing years, themes included

1979 - The Year of the Spear

1985 - The Years of the Cadre

1986 - The Year of Umkhonto weSizwe, The People’s Army

1987 - The Year of Advance to People’s Power

1988 - The Year of United Action for People’s Power

1989 - The Year of mass action for People’s Power"

Page 9, paragraph 10:

"The people’s war strategy was described as a war in which the entire nation is engaged, Umkhonto weSizwe, The People’s Army, workers, the rural masses, women, intellectuals, the religious community selectively in groups or as organised individuals were used in all forms of revolutionary warfare, armed or non-combat. Legal and illegal means to attack and destroy all symbols and structures and organs of apartheid power, including all those who manned them.

Page 10, right at the bottom - it is actually page 11, yes it is page 11, the second last paragraph:

"By July 1985, it was reported that only 5 of the 38 Black Government structures had survived and 396 innocent people had already been murdered. In destroying these structures the ANC was creating the necessary prerequisites for liberated zones".

Then on page 15, paragraph 13:

"Another organ of people’s power was the so-called: "people’s courts". They were originally regarded as instruments whereby the so-called: "concept of people’s war", could be upheld and defended. Their task was to ensure healthy revolutionary and democratic inter-relations within society and to serve the interests of the people in general".

And at the bottom of that very same page, we continue - last line:

"It was very often quite sufficient to be merely suspected of being a sell-out of collaborator in order to pay the ultimate price in the most dreadful manner".

And then page 18, which refers certain statistics regarding necklace murders, and here I would like to point out the following:

1986 - The number of people killed, the total number along with injured - people injured, in relation to the others you will see that in that year it reached it’s height.

On the next page where it deals with: "Setting alight of persons", once again we have the same position there. Paragraph 16 on page 19:

"As a direct result of this particular revolutionary climate, the South African police and the South African defence force were compelled to pool their various resources to combat the ever increasing tide of unrest and violence.

Joint planning was undertaken in terms of the various structures of the National Management System which functioned of the authority of the State Security Council and which also incorporated the constitutional, economic and Social Affairs Cabinet Committees. All Government departments were eventually drawn into the National Management System in an all out effort to find solutions to the ever increasing security problem".

Back on page 3, paragraph 8.1:

"Since the ANC/SACP Alliance and other organisations decided to topple the Government by means of violence, the South African police and more specifically the security branch, were actually facing a super human task. On the one hand they were supposed to maintain law and order according to normal legal principles and on the other hand they were supposed to protect the Government and society against violence and acts of terror in circumstances in which the other party was not bound by any rules"

JUDGE WILSON: Sorry, what page and paragraph?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Page 3 Mr Chairperson, down paragraph 8.1.

CHAIRPERSON: We’ve gone back to your statement?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That’s right.

"in circumstances which the other party wasn’t bound by any rules. Apart from this the view of the Government of the day was that the Republic was waging a war for all practical purposes and that the enemy had to be defeated at all costs. The armed struggle was characterised by several phases.

Initially, Umkhonto weSizwe, MK and other organisations directed their actions mainly against Government buildings and the sabotage of those buildings and other property. The Soweto unrest during 1976, placed the Black youth in the forefront of the battle and the ANC/SACP Alliance exploited the situation and utilised the youth in it’s revolutionary battle.

With the establishment of the United Democratic Front in 1983, a new phase was entered. Many organisations joined the UDF country-wide and although it could never be determined exactly in what respect the ANC/SACP Alliance controlled the UDF, there was close co-operation between them.

And under leadership of the UDF, the defiance against the Government and Government institutions escalated quite sharply and this was followed by a civil disobedience with a view to making the country ungovernable.

During 1985, the ANC Consultative Conference in Kobwe, Zambia took place, during which it was decided that the distinction between so-called hard and soft targets no longer applied. Violence escalated and many civilians, including defenceless women and children were cruelly killed, injured or maimed.

The SACP/ANC Alliance, UDF and other organisations who were all striving for the same objective, used everything in their power to make the country ungovernable and especially to alienate the Black community from the police and Government. Intimidation was used on a large scale to force members of the Black community to work with them.

Defiance and treason was very brutally punished and when there was the slightest suspicion that a person was actually collaborating with the police led to a person being killed by means of the necklace method and that is crueller than most of the methods used by the Nazi’s.

Members of the security forces and in particular South African police, were regarded as so-called hard targets and could be killed at random and at will and became more and more the victims of violence. Black members in Black townships lived in fear of their lives and property day by day.

To avert this violent onslaught, the previous Government mustered all the forces at it’s disposal and joined together it’s structures under the auspices of the state security council. The National Security Management System also had a significant influence on the police culture"

And in this respect I’d like to refer to pages 151 and 152 of a book entitled: "The Other Side of the Story", written by Major General H D Stadler and published during February of 1997. This has also been attached to the statement in front of you, it’s the very last section. According to this you will see that the police commanding officers right down to the lowest level, had participation in some way or another in this system, a system which had the State President and Cabinet right at the top.

Once again it must be pointed out that there was a chain of command or a line of communication from grassroots level right to the highest levels of command, and it would therefore not have been too far fetched to assume that an instruction coming from a commanding officer sitting in a system, was actually an instruction coming from the highest level of authority.

The objective of these different structures was - in respect of the Government, the security forces and the different State departments, to actually join them together in a cohesive unit. The structures succeeded to a large extent to actually carry out this object.

The South African police and more particularly the security branch or rather from the point of view of the South African police and in particular the security branch, the interest were to ensure the effective maintenance of law and order and also to guarantee the safety of the community. And this was so closely interwoven with the activities of the police that the police in this respect and in the circumstances which obtained at the time, was necessarily seen as an ally of Government.

In the past time, members of the then Security Council have testified before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and I would like to refer very briefly to certain quotations as it appeared in "Die Burger", namely "Die Burger, Wednesday, 15 October 1997 - I quote:

"But according to Botha, not one of use who were in the previous Government can say today that there was no suspicion from our side that members of the South African police were involved in certain irregular activities".

The other heading: "Use of Language Leads to Illegal Conduct", in the same newspaper he, Botha said that it was unfortunate that certain sentences in State Security Council Minutes are now being taken out of the context in which they were used, for instance reference to: "eliminate".

In reality it is followed by explanations which amount to detention without trial and it is a fact that our country has been placed into a certain war psychosis where such words and expressions which were gained for military usage, has now become part of our vernacular and I now realise with a sense of shock that this terminology apparently gave rise to illegal conduct by policemen - that is what Mr Vlok said.

What is of importance here is what the consequences were of this interpretation by policemen of terms used by the State Security Council and according to them, had an innocent connotation or interpretation. If it led to the torture or even the killing of persons in respect of whom those words were used, you would then expect that the State Security Council would immediately take suitable steps to prevent a repetition.

If correctly reported, then it’s hard to understand how Mr Vlok has now with a sense of shock learnt that this terminology and use of language, has apparently led to illegal conduct to policemen. "Die Burger, Thursday, 16th of October 1997, Wessels said that he does not believe the political defence of: "I did not know", he didn’t believe that he could actually rely on this.

In many instances he didn’t want to know - each and every person in this country knew that people were being tortured. Perhaps that’s putting it a bit too broadly, perhaps Mr Wessels meant here that each politician knew that people were being tortured. During my term in office in Cape Town, extreme pressure was placed by the Joint Security Management System on the security branch, in particular to stem the tide of murder and violence.

And obviously I gave members under my command instructions to do everything in their power to apprehend people who were guilty of these things and to extract as much information as possible from the detainees so that the entire network operative in the country could be disrupted in time to prevent further loss of life. This was the only way in which we could protect lives and properties.

I never gave any member an instruction to place a wet bag over anybody’s head or to torture them in any other way. I was however very much aware of the fact that members’ success could be ascribed to the use of unconventional questioning or interrogation methods. It would have been naive of me to believe that they would extract information in any other way from a well trained terrorist and to do so quite quickly.

Anybody who in any way had responsibility in respect of a Section 29 detainee and of whom it is here alleged that he was assaulted or tortured in any other way, must have been aware or must have suspected that unconventional interrogation methods were being used. And their silence in this regard can be interpreted as at least a condemnation of it, if not approval.

The applications before you deal with acts or omissions committed during a period when revolution was at it’s height. The situation which existed during this heated armed battle from the ANC/SACP Alliance who have the same objectives and in which the masses involved in different ways. On the other hand you had the security forces and more specifically the security branch as part of a National Security Management System established by a Government which was clinging to it’s power and was using everything at it’s disposal to fight the enemy because the enemy was actually trying to topple the Government.

Perhaps a better word which I’d like to buy from Mr Meyer, is "eliminate" rather that to stem. This situation, speeches and addresses by leading figures and politicians regarding the killing and destruction of property ensured that their was a total situation of war. The South African police and more in particular the security branch, was placed in a totally untenable situation, they had to avert the onslaught in terms of the normal rules of the combating of crime And it was this impossible task and constant pressure exerted by the Government and obvious condemnation of abuses and even an admission or rather a commendation, an encouragement for services rendered in the act or in the battle of terrorism, this all led to the fact that the people in the so-called: "engine room", did not have direct - didn’t need direct instructions to commit certain wrongful acts but they had a bona fide belief that that was virtually the only criterion.

I have no doubt that if these members believed that they could rely on the protection of their seniors and politicians and if this was not the case, these specific acts would never have been committed. I also have no doubt in my mind that as investigations continue, politicians must assume more and more responsibility for that which happened during their reign. It is ultimately a fact that the police was one of the instruments used to achieve their purpose. Thank you Chairperson.

MR COOK: At this stage General, the document - The Foundation for Equality before the Law document, that was also discussed during the drafting of this report?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is so. And large portions of the other book to which I referred: "The Other Side of the Story", was also taken from this and the Security Council mechanism is discussed in more detail there, what the purpose of it was and how it was put together for the first time.

ADV DE JAGER: What exactly is this document that you’re referring to now?

MR GRIEBENAUW: This was a submission Chairperson, made by the Foundation for Equality before the Law and this was a submission made to the Truth Commission.

MR COOK: And then we have the statement by the General, that will be Exhibit G and the Foundation for Equality before the Law will also be handed in and that can be Exhibit H.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

JUDGE WILSON: Sorry, can you just explain to me - Exhibit G, is that the statement that we read certain passages from?

MR COOK: That is indeed so, Exhibit G is the entire document of General Griebenauw - the one which you have in front of you in the red cover, the entire document. And H is then the document relating the document relating to the Foundation for Equality before the Law and their submission. But I’ve been told that most of the Judges have actually dealt with this submission of the Foundation for Equality before the Law at amnesty applications of Mr Cronje and so forth - this document was handed in I believe.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR COOK: Thank you Chairperson, that then concludes my leading of evidence on behalf of General Griebenauw, so he can now be cross-examined.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR COOK

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Papier, are there any questions you wish to put to this witness?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PAPIER: Thank you Honourable Chair, just a few questions. With you leave, could I just clarify one aspect with my learned colleague Honourable Chair? Thank you.

Thank you Honourable Chair, just before I proceed with the cross-examination of the witness, my learned colleague Advocate Cook has handed in several documents, one of which is the report from Ria Kotze, the psychologist. I would just like to place it on record at this stage that the report was handed to - made available to me on Thursday and we specifically requested this witness to be available today.

I note that the witness is not available and we also note that

the report is dated the 15th of July 1997. I would just like to place that on record at this stage. Thank you Honourable Chair. If I may now proceed with a few questions to the witness.

General, I understand from your evidence that you perused the transcript - the TRC transcript of Captain Benzien’s application, is that correct?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, I have perused the application.

MR PAPIER: And is it correct that you specifically looked at the Ashley Kriel incident as well?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I looked at that as well.

MR PAPIER: Now, were you directly involved in this incident at all - the Ashley Kriel incident?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR PAPIER: Indirectly involved in the Ashley Kriel incident?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR PAPIER: Did you have any knowledge of the Ashley Kriel incident?

MR GRIEBENAUW: As a result of conversations, yes.

MR PAPIER: Was this before the shooting - the killing of Ashley Kriel or was it after the killing of Ashley Kriel?

MR GRIEBENAUW: It was afterwards.

MR PAPIER: So if I understand your answers correctly, you had not issued any instructions whatsoever with regard to the Ashley Kriel incident, is that correct?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, most definitely not, I was not in Cape Town at the time.

MR PAPIER: The applicant Captain Benzien, also testified before this Honourable Committee that he was not instructed to arrest or to shoot - to kill Ashley Kriel. Are you able to shed any further light on that evidence?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Unfortunately not because I wasn’t here at the time.

MR PAPIER: I have no further questions, thank you Honourable Chair.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PAPIER

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Brink, are there any questions you wish to put before him?

MR BRINK: Mr Chairman, I normally come at the end.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DONAN: Thank you. Just to repeat who I am, I’m Michael Donan and I’m representing the Yengeni and the Forbes trialists and I’m batting first wicket after Mr Papier.

Mr Griebenauw, do you prefer to be called General or Mr - before we start?

MR GRIEBENAUW: You can decide for yourself.

MR DONAN: I’ll call you Mr. Why are you here today?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I’m here Chairperson, because I’m of the view that this case must be put in it’s proper perspective - the media only gave one perspective of it, and because I feel that I have a responsibility towards the members who were under my command.

MR DONAN: For you personally applied for an amnesty?

MR GRIEBENAUW: For no matter which this Commission is aware.

MR DONAN: In respect of what have you applied for an amnesty?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I prefer not to answer that.

MR DONAN: Because - are you here to, as I understand this process of amnesty, the idea is that the whole story will be told and on that basis people will be forgiven. Are you here to tell the truth and help in that process?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Absolutely yes.

MR DONAN: Now insofar as Mr Benzien is concerned, there is a certain difficulty and that is you weren’t - as I understand it, in the Western Cape when Mr Benzien committed the various acts that he’s applying for amnesty for.

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is so.

MR DONAN: So who would be in a better position to assist the court than you in respect of that period?

MR GRIEBENAUW: He’s direct commanding officer in those days would probably be in a better position than myself.

MR DONAN: I’d like to - who was that?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I think it was Brigadier Strydom but I stand to be corrected.

MR DONAN: You see, I’ll be brutally frank with you, my clients who I represent would really like to know who was responsible for all of this - over an above Mr Benzien. And every time we ask for a name we don’t get an answer, we get who you think or we get - in your particular case, this document which we’ve all heard before, up to about page 6.

Do you agree with me that what is recorded here up to page 6, was the regular evidence that you or Mr Stadler would give in every security trial in regard to whether witnesses should give evidence in camera ...[inaudible] the punishment of the accused?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I would agree because I have an idea that you won’t be able to change the truth.

MR DONAN: Mr Benzien’s testified that in precisely one of those trials, he lied and that was the system that him and his group did - used in the criminal procedure process, they lied about the torture. Do you know about that?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I can’t comment on his lie.

MR DONAN: Well what he says and I put it to you directly, he says that they - that he systematically tortured people and than he systematically lied about it in courts. Did you know about that?

CHAIRPERSON: In other words he denied torturing people, in court during the trial?

MR DONAN: Thank you.

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, I’ll accept that that could have been the case and that is why I also put it in my statement - in my evidence that each and every person who had a responsibility towards a Section 29 detainee and of who it is alleged that he was tortured or assaulted in some way, each one of those persons must have known what was going on. In other words, he should have followed up the lie.

MR DONAN: You’re not specific enough to say in this document that part of our process was then going to court and lying.

MR GRIEBENAUW: That would have been the necessary consequence, yes.

MR DONAN: And were you aware that the people under your command were lying about torture in courts of this land?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, indeed.

MR DONAN: They were lying both here in the Western Cape when you were in charge and in the other areas where you were in charge, according to your CV on page 1 of this document Exhibit G?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I will answer the question - yes, definitely.

MR DONAN: So there was this systematic process right throughout South Africa, firstly to torture detainees and then secondly to put them through a court process and to lie about the ...[inaudible] of their statement.

MR GRIEBENAUW: There was no laid down procedure but that was customary, yes.

MR DONAN: We’ll get to the chain of command in a little while but in the meantime, let me try and understand what you’re saying in this document that you’ve handed in - Exhibit G, which sounds very much the same and you’ve reference to what the other Generals say in their submissions - Exhibit H. You’re saying that there was a conventional war in Angola and the then South West Africa, is that correct?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I did not add Angola but that is so.

MR DONAN: That - and I think General van Loggernberg has said he was the Chief of Staff during the ECC trial which you remember or don’t you?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, I do not know of his evidence.

MR DONAN: Let me give you an idea of what he said and you can tell me whether you agree. Essentially there was a war in Angola - a conventional war and on the border of South West Africa, we’ve dealt with that. The ANC assisted SWAPO and certain other forces in Angola during this conventional war, do you agree with that?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is true Mr Chairman.

MR DONAN: The ANC infiltrated - particularly their MK members, into South Africa to continue this war?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is correct.

MR DONAN: They perpetrate - they visited and made incursions into urban and rural areas in South Africa and they set up safe bases?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is true Chairman.

MR DONAN: And at a certain stage you decided together with the South African defence force, that you were at war with the ANC?

MR GRIEBENAUW: And together with the Government, Chairman.

MR DONAN: Now when you decided that you were at war with the ANC, what you did was you then said: "We can resort to other means to those that are prescribed by the rules", such as torture.

MR GRIEBENAUW: That was not stipulated anywhere.

MR DONAN: What was stipulated?

MR GRIEBENAUW: What was stipulated was that information had to be received as soon as possible of where terrorists were, to track them down, to get information and to arrest them.

MR DONAN: And how did you interpret that?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is where this aspect comes in and what it is about. To say now that a specific person gave a command that an illegal action had to be committed, it’s very unlikely. What did happen was that over a period of time, a situation existed which people accepted as a result of pressure which was exerted upon them by the State Security Council, by the National Security Council in which the police had a say.

They were simply told that: "You will get the answer and you will stem the tide". And that they will use their own methods and it was accepted and the people looked away and this - the people accepted that what we did was correct.

MR DONAN: So what you’re saying is that the people above promulgated directions as to how people should be treated while they were detained under Section 29 or detained by you or the defence force or anybody else but while they promulgating those orders - standing orders, they were meaning that you in fact, you should torture people.

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is not true, I did not put it that way.

MR DONAN: Well, that’s why I’m asking you.

MR GRIEBENAUW: It was never so. What I said - and I cannot interpret it differently, there were a set of rules and different organisations had a responsibility to see that these rules were carried out but not one of those organisations in cases where they were not followed, accepted responsibility for this.

MR DONAN: There was a general understanding that you had to do whatever justified the end justified means and you had to do whatever was necessary?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That was so.

MR DONAN: Now, how far up did that understanding go in the pecking order - let’s start with Mr Benzien, he obviously knew that he had to torture people but who above him?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I think that words are being put into my mouth now - it is not that he knew that he had to torture people.

MR DONAN: But he got an instruction that he had to deal ...[intervention]

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes.

MR DONAN: That he had to deal with these people as quickly as possible?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That’s correct.

MR DONAN: And that meant that if necessary he had to torture them.

MR GRIEBENAUW: It could be interpreted as such but he did not have the instruction to torture people as far as I know Mr Chairman.

MR DONAN: How did he get that belief?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I’ve explained that thoroughly, if you need anymore information I’d be pleased to do so.

MR DONAN: But that must have been - that belief must have been communicated by somebody above him, he must have had a common understanding with somebody directly above him.

MR GRIEBENAUW: I gave an explanation and I said that after such things were done and one still received an award or a medal for - that it could be accepted that it was condoned. I could not have explained this more clearly.

MR DONAN: Did anybody ever say to you that these were the methods I used today?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, never.

MR DONAN: How long were you in the security police?

MR GRIEBENAUW: 25 years Mr Chairman.

MR DONAN: And in that time nobody ever said to you: "Look, this is how I got the information out of this particular detainee"?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, Chairman, it was in general discussions. Many people who said: "Look, we twisted his arm", that was the sort of term that was used and: "That’s how I got the truth out of him" but in detail what he did - a wet bag over his head, that is something which I heard about but I never knew who did it when and where.

MR DONAN: Did you ever see any of your assistants and colleagues in action torturing people?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, Chairman.

MR DONAN: You were in the Western Cape in 1985 weren’t you?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is true.

MR DONAN: Did you ever know a detainee by the name Shahieda Issel?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes.

MR DONAN: And on the 17th of November 1985 - according to instructions that I was given by her in the Yengeni trial, she was taken into a lift at Caledon Square after 1pm and after she had been abused by a certain Mr Nel she met another Mr Mostert. Were Mr Nel and Mr Mostert under your command?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is true.

MR DONAN: And Mr Mostert indecently assaulted her which you may or may not know about, do you know about that?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: That she then says that she went into a room where she sat down and there was Mr Mostert, Mr Nel, a Mr Trollop - did you know a Mr Trollop?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I knew him, he served under me.

MR DONAN: And you. You were all together and you questioned her about her personal life, do you remember that?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I cannot remember that at all.

MR DONAN: You see, we’re getting down to the nitty gritty. She said that you were abusive and you swore at her and you asked her a lot of questions.

MR GRIEBENAUW: That I could have a questions, I acknowledge that.

MR DONAN: But when she didn’t answer Mr Nel ordered her to stand up and he grabbed the collar of her dress and he pulled her up?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I do not know anything about that.

MR DONAN: And then Mr Mostert questioned her and he swore at her and he hit her on her chest and shoulder and she felt sore?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I have no knowledge of this.

MR DONAN: Do you remember appearing at an identification parade later?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is correct.

MR DONAN: And was she called upon to identify the people in the room?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is correct.

MR DONAN: And did she identify you?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Among others, yes.

MR DONAN: That’s one particular event, how many others were there that you can tell this hearing about?

MR GRIEBENAUW: The incident was investigated and they refused to go to trial.

MR DONAN: I’m sure he did but was your system to assault women if necessary, if they didn’t speak?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I never did it, I do not know the existence of such a system.

MR DONAN: But these - she was in your presence and she was - and men under your command were assaulting her.

MR GRIEBENAUW: I hear this is being alleged.

MR DONAN: Well why didn’t you stop them?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Because I did not see it happen, it did not happen in my presence.

MR DONAN: But you knew this kind of thing was going on?

CHAIRPERSON: You know I think it’s a general question, you want to know specifically on that day. You see he says he didn’t see it at that time now you say: "But you knew generally this was happening". I think that you are ...[intervention]

MR DONAN: I understand ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: You’re going from the "specific" to a general and it makes things difficult to get a sensible answer isn’t it?

MR DONAN: I quite agree, I shall try to be more specific.

June Essau was detained at that time wasn’t she?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is possibly so.

MR DONAN: And she was brutally assaulted by your men, wasn’t she?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Not that I know of.

MR DONAN: Did you hear her screaming?

JUDGE WILSON: Who was that again please?

MR DONAN: June Essau.

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: Did you know that she brought an application to the Supreme Court to stop your people ...[intervention]

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, I know.

MR DONAN: From assaulting her?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is so.

MR DONAN: You didn’t know about that?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Please repeat.

MR DONAN: Did you know that she was being assaulted?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, the allegation was made.

MR DONAN: How did you get the information - how did you think your men were getting information from her?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I believed that they possibly assaulted her but I did not know it for a fact.

MR DONAN: What exactly did you believe for example, that Shahieda Issel did wrong?

MR GRIEBENAUW: She must have been involved in the underground structures of the ANC in the Western Cape if I remember correctly.

MR DONAN: Anything - any specific physical danger that she posed involving weapons?

MR GRIEBENAUW: As part of that yes, Mr Chairman - it would have been of terrorism.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Sorry, can I interrupt here. When she launched an application, I assume it was an interdict against further assault?

MR DONAN: It was.

JUDGE NGOEPE: I see Mr Donan agrees with me. Knowing the way your men used to work, did you speak to them and say: "Hey, did you in fact assault this person"?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, I did not do that but I accepted that she was assaulted.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Did you file any affidavits to oppose that application?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, we did.

JUDGE NGOEPE: You denied the allegations of assault?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, that is correct.

JUDGE NGOEPE: But you knew that that might not have been the truth?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is so.

MR DONAN: Now Subeida Jatha, she was detained at roughly that same time wasn’t she?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is possibly so.

MR DONAN: And she too was assaulted by Mr Mostert, did you know about that?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Let us group together everything and let us deal with all the names, then I can give you a clear answer but to take them one by one - some of them I will not remember others I will.

MR DONAN: Why don’t you tell the Committee in the interests of truth, which women were assaulted at that time?

MR GRIEBENAUW: All that I can tell you is that if I can get the files - the specific administrative files, then I can give evidence - I cannot do anything without them.

MR DONAN: Let’s deal with it on another basis. Mr Benzien had a particular ability to make people talk because he could torture them or he could torture them so as to make them talk, that was his evidence. Did you know this?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I heard that.

MR DONAN: Where did you hear it?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Among the members of the staff.

MR DONAN: And what exactly did you hear?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Simply that: "He will make one talk".

MR DONAN: Did you ask for him to be transferred to the particular unit?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: How did it come about that he arrived there?

MR GRIEBENAUW: At that stage I was not stationed in the Cape.

MR DONAN: You agree with me though that his speciality was torturing men?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Possibly one of his specialities.

MR DONAN: What were his others then?

MR GRIEBENAUW: A very good investigative officer.

MR DONAN: Yes, he would be wouldn’t he. Let’s talk about Mr Mostert, he was another man under your command.

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is correct.

MR DONAN: What was his speciality?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Nothing in particular that I can remember.

MR DONAN: Isn’t it so that he made a habit of beating up woman and eliciting information from them?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I have no knowledge of that.

MR DONAN: Do you know about - where you present in the Western Cape during the Yengeni trial?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Please give me a date, then I can reply.

MR DONAN: I beg your pardon?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Can I please get a date, then I can give you an answer.

MR DONAN: Have you ever heard of Tony Yengeni?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes.

MR DONAN: Did you ever know that he was on trial?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes.

MR DONAN: Did you know that one of his co-accused was Jennifer Ann Schreiner?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes.

MR DONAN: Did you follow that trial at all?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I know of it, I had knowledge of it. I’m waiting for the next question.

MR DONAN: Do you know that serious allegations were made about abuses of Ms Schreiner by Mr Mostert?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, I have no knowledge of that.

MR DONAN: But you knew about the abuses raised by Shahieda Issel?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes.

MR DONAN: And Subeida Jaffa?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Among others yes, I think so.

MR DONAN: Eugene Essau?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I cannot remember.

MR DONAN: Isn’t so, that his speciality was beating up women?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Not that I know of.

MR DONAN: You’ve never come to that conclusion?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: How was it that Mr Mostert was let lose on a particular victim - detainee?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I never let him loose on anybody.

MR DONAN: Well who made the decision to allocate Mr Mostert to a woman rather than a man?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I never made such a decision.

MR DONAN: Who made the decision to let Mr Benzien loose on Mr Yengeni and Mr Kruser?

MR GRIEBENAUW: At that stage I was not here, I cannot reply.

MR DONAN: So you can’t answer those questions?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: You can only assume that what was happening here was the same as was happening elsewhere?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Absolutely, and that’s what I’m trying to explain to the Committee. I think that the system which was valid in the Western Cape was valid throughout the country and I do not think that there will be any distinction, everywhere where I was stationed that was the position.

MR DONAN: I think the question that we are ultimately going to get to - which you can keep at the back of your mind, is how high up this understanding went but before I finish with this point, I just want to point out to you or point out to the Committee, the contradiction in what you’ve been saying and ask you whether you appreciate it. You say that you went from a position of - shall we call it peace and the laws that apply in peace, to a position of war. Is that correct?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Ultimately yes, Sir.

MR DONAN: Were you ever told or were you ever aware that in war there are rules about how you conduct war?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, vaguely I knew about.

MR DONAN: Were you told for example that there was a convention in 1949, signed by South Africa which related to internal wars ...[intervention]

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: You weren’t told that the South African Government had signed that and that specifically forbade torture of people who were injured or had been detained during the war?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: You I understand it, like Mr Stadler were an expert on the ANC, did you know that the ANC had signed the protocol to the Geneva Convention?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes.

MR DONAN: And what did that mean?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I think that they had the distinction between military signals and non-military signals.

MR DONAN: Didn’t it mean that they also regarded themselves as being at war with you?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I think this is accepted that members of the ANC/SACP who said that they were in war with South Africa and that our members - our political leaders said that, I think this well known.

MR DONAN: So both sides regarded themselves as being at war ...[intervention]

MR GRIEBENAUW: Absolutely.

MR DONAN: But your response to that is that you could then proceed to break the laws of war and there were no controls on how you detained - how you dealt with ...[intervention]

MR GRIEBENAUW: It was a matter of - our overhead function was to protect lives and property and in order to do this it was a question of we went further than we were allowed to.

MR DONAN: Now who gave the instructions? Essentially it was common cause that the methods you used were that the end justified the means, is that right?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Please repeat.

MR DONAN: It was a common understanding in the South African police force that the ends justified the means as far as your treatment of detainees was concerned?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I will concede to that.

MR DONAN: But did it make a difference who the particular detainee was? What was the criterion whether that person would talk, or whether that person had something to say about the war?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I do not understand the question.

MR DONAN: Was it a general system of interrogation used by the security police, did it involve torture systematically in respect of anyone who was detained?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, Chairman, not all.

MR DONAN: Well what was the criterion, when was torture used and when wasn’t it?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I do not know about a criteria because I did not apply it.

MR DONAN: If you didn’t know the criterion, who did?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I don’t know whether there was a criteria.

MR DONAN: So there was simply no control, there was just a general understanding that anybody ...[intervention]

MR GRIEBENAUW: Absolutely, that is how I tried to explain it.

MR DONAN: Anybody could do whatever they wanted?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That was exactly what happened.

MR DONAN: To whoever they wanted?

MR GRIEBENAUW: If one wants to put it so broadly. I do not know what the ultimate result of that question is, the people had a function to control matters and they did not take the responsibility for this.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Sorry, can I interrupt? Didn’t you start assaulting detainees once - I don’t mean you in particular, I’m talking about the system. Weren’t the detainees assaulted once it became apparent that they were withholding information?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, let me put it this way. If a detainee should have been confronted with information which we already had and he wanted to make a confession by the nature of the cause, there would be no reason to assault such a person. Only if the security branch would have information that he had information with regard to terrorism - terrorist activities or that he was involved, then I would say that to prove the argument that we had to protect lives and property, then the man would have gone further because he had to perform his duty as was expected of him. And that was to get information as fast as possible about the activities and the planning and those involved.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Going back to the question which was asked, wouldn’t one say that: "Well, a detainee would be assaulted once it appeared that he or she didn’t give the information required, wouldn’t that be ...[intervention]

MR GRIEBENAUW: I’m inclined to agree with you that that’s the criteria.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: This may a convenient stage to take the short adjournment unless you’re about to finish.

MR DONAN: As I’ve said before, there is another subject that I still have to cover, and that’s the chain of command.

CHAIRPERSON: We’ll adjourn for 15 minutes.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: You are still under your former oath.

JOHANNES LODIWIKUS GRIEBENAUW: (s.u.o)

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Donan?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DONAN: (cont)

Thank you Chairperson. Mr Griebenauw, before the adjournment we were dealing with the criteria that were used before torture was applied and we’d only established one criteria, and that was that people didn’t answer questions, was that the only criteria?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I would say so yes.

MR DONAN: The questions were asked on the basis of information which the torturers had in their possession, is that correct?

MR GRIEBENAUW: The investigating officers.

MR DONAN: And that information was sometimes also obtained by torture, wasn’t it?

MR GRIEBENAUW: It’s possible, yes.

MR DONAN: So it may well have been very unreliable information?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I don’t think so, there were many sources of information not only this one source.

MR DONAN: Or it could have come from informers?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Possibly.

MR DONAN: Who could have also not told the truth?

MR GRIEBENAUW: The probability exists that if you’re working with a person, that your information could be wrong.

MR DONAN: I’m trying to be a little systematic about the ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Donan, these possibilities exist, where are you getting?

MR DONAN: I understand that Mr Chairperson, I’m dealing with the criteria and we’re left with one.

Now let’s deal with the methods, was there any limitation or any instruction at all or any criteria for the methods of torture that could be used?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: So, just to repeat, the torturer could - or the interrogator could use any torture method he felt inclined to use?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That’s what it amounted to.

MR DONAN: Do you agree with me that there were some people who were specialised in various departments - like Mr Mostert who would deal with women?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, I can’t agree.

MR DONAN: Mr Benzien who would use very, very violent methods, did he have that reputation with you?

MR GRIEBENAUW: He had a reputation, yes.

MR DONAN: And the technique that would be used was that if he didn’t speak to the other people - the other interrogators, you would let Benzien loose?

MR GRIEBENAUW: The phrase: "let loose" is a bit of a problem for me.

MR DONAN: There has been evidence before this Commission, that Mr Benzien’s reputation was not limited to you, activists in the Western Cape knew about his reputation. And so they would be interrogated once detained, by people who could say: "Look, you can talk to me or you can talk to Benzien". Did you know about that?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: Did you know that Mr Benzien - part of his repertoire would be to ask the detainee whether he knew that Mr Benzien had killed Ashley Kriel?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: Did you know that Mr Mostert had a reputation for abusing women and the same technique would be used with him? A female detainee would be questioned by a good guy - a good cop, who would say: "Look, you can talk to me or you can talk to Mostert"?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, Chairperson.

MR DONAN: What did you know about the methods that were being used by your men?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I wasn’t aware of specific methods.

MR DONAN: Did they receive any particular training in eliciting information from detainees?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, not as far as I was aware.

MR DONAN: And Mr Benzien specifically?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Not as far as I know.

MR DONAN: Just before I leave the method, there had been evidence that for example, Tony Yengeni, Ashley Forbes, Niclo Pedro were stripped naked - he used to strip men, have you any idea why he did this?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: Was there any purpose in doing that - in your professional opinion?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, I really can’t imagine what the purpose would have been except that it could act as a humiliating experience - certainly, yes.

MS KHAMPEPE: May I interpose Mr Donan? General, are you saying that you didn’t from time to time hold discussions with your men about the various methods - unconventional methods they were using on their victims?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Please repeat the question, I don’t understand it.

MS KHAMPEPE: Didn’t you from time to time hold discussions with your men about the various methods they were using on their victims - torture methods?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MS KHAMPEPE: But surely one would have expected for those discussions to be held in view of the fact that a lot of pressure had been exerted by the politicians on the police, to contain the political situation in the country? One would have expected you to have held such discussions in order to evaluate which method would be best to use in a given situation.

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, as long I obtained successful results I didn’t ask those questions.

MR DONAN: Thank you. Now you said in your evidence that at a certain stage there was a decision to use unconventional methods, is that correct?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, that’s not so.

MR DONAN: What was exactly the situation?

MR GRIEBENAUW: The circumstances which existed at the time, these circumstances dictated that success was the only criterion.

MR DONAN: That’s very specific, when did that happen precisely?

MR GRIEBENAUW: It’s impossible for me to say.

MR DONAN: Did it happen in the ‘60’s, did it happen in the ‘70’s, did it happen in the ‘80’s?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, in ‘61, the armed struggle as such ensued and from there onwards the trend grew and developed.

JUDGE WILSON: But weren’t the police using methods which they should not have been doing - apart from the armed struggle? I think any of us who have practised in the courts of South Africa over the last 30 years, have had innumerable clients who have told us about shock treatment that they suffered at the hands of the police. Did you know that the police gave people electric shocks while questioning them?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I was aware of that.

JUDGE WILSON: Did you take part in it?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

JUDGE WILSON: Not even when you were doing the investigations yourself?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, when I was in the lower ranks circumstances were not quite like that. I was transferred from South West Africa/Namibia when I was already a senior officer.

MR DONAN: Thank you. In 1986 you were in East London, where you?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Correct.

MR DONAN: Just to finish with Judge Wilson’s point, you seem to be a man who read a lot on the subject of your enterprise. Did you ever read the book by Don Voster and Dennis Davis and Diane Sandler on: "Detention and Torture in South Africa - A Psychological Legal and Historical Study"?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: This book for what it’s worth, was published or is correct according to the authors, up to Republic Day the 31st of May 1986 as it then was and it lists 144 cases of female torture, 31 cases of - sorry, 144 cases of male, 31 cases of female and it splits it up into African, Coloured, Indian, White in total. And every form of torture that has been spoken about in this particular application was a common application within South Africa - was commonly used by this particular time, so there was nothing novel about what Mr Benzien was doing insofar as interrogation was concerned.

CHAIRPERSON: Those cases relate to matters that were non-political as well.

MR DONAN: The impression I get from glancing through the book is that it is essentially political. The point I want to make is that if the authors are correct and they’ve never been contradicted then as Judge Wilson says, these practices were going on in the early ‘80’s at least and before then.

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is so.

MR DONAN: And when did you first become aware of them?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Very early on in my career.

MR DONAN: When was that?

MR GRIEBENAUW: It’s not possible to say, I can’t get to a specific date.

MR DONAN: I don’t want a date - I put you to decades, can you identify a decade when you became aware that torture was commonly used by the South African police in political cases?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, I don’t know about commonly used - I can’t give a date.

MR DONAN: Can you identify a decade when you became aware that torture was used at all by the South African police?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I can’t.

MR DONAN: Doesn’t it ring a bell because if I understood you correctly, there were standing orders that you were not supposed to use torture?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is correct.

MR DONAN: And despite that, you can’t in your memory, think of an occasion when it suddenly dawned on you that people are not obeying the standing orders?

MR GRIEBENAUW: It is not something which happened all of a sudden, it developed gradually so for me to actually give you a specific date and say that from then onwards I became aware of it - I simply can’t.

MR DONAN: You still don’t even want to have a go at a decade?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: Okay, we’ll leave it there. I want to deal on last time with the question of orders because I understand you, the orders that were coming above - in the standing orders and the various regulations promulgated under the security legislation, required you not to torture people. Is that correct?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Correct.

MR DONAN: Was there ever to your knowledge at any stage in your career, an order or direction that you may use torture or that you should use torture?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: So then, would it be correct to say that every applicant who comes to this hearing for amnesty for torture, did not receive superior orders?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Not in a direct way but as I’ve explained the whole system to you yes, in that way because it was ignored, it was condoned and there was tacit approval.

MR DONAN: But nobody can rely on a direct superior order to use unconventional methods?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, that would be outrageous, you can’t say that because I wouldn’t in any event be aware of the circumstances of each application.

JUDGE NGOEPE: You can only say: "As far as you know"?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That’s all I’m trying to say.

MR DONAN: As far as you know - and you were the head of the investigation unit in the Western Cape between 1983 and ‘85, there was never any standing order?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, definitely not.

ADV DE JAGER: Could we perhaps make a distinction here as it’s not very clear to me. There was no standing order but where there ad-hoc orders?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, not as far as I knew. All I can say is that the commanding officers knew about the events and incidents and their conduct made it such that the sub-ordinates would assume that their conduct was being approved of.

ADV DE JAGER: If you weren’t directly involved, did you perhaps hear of a direct order, perhaps to Dirk Coetzee or to de Kock to eliminate a person?

MR GRIEBENAUW: What I heard I actually heard via the media, in no other way.

ADV DE JAGER: So you were not aware whether in some cases there might have been direct orders or not?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, it’s very surprising - I recently heard the evidence of General Gerrit Erasmus, that he in fact gave the orders for somebody to be killed. This was when he testified in Port Elizabeth, and that was very strange to me.

MR DONAN: Did you ever in the course of your career, use or hear the word: "eliminate" - in the course of your duties?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I know the word.

MR DONAN: What does it mean?

MR GRIEBENAUW: It depends on the context in which it is used. On the context which I see has caused a great ...[inaudible] regarding the interpretation of the word, it’s very simple and I have no - I don’t need a dictionary for that. If this word is used in the context where there’s a reference to an enemy who is trying to overthrow your Government by violent means, then it can mean only one thing and that is to kill him.

MR DONAN: Did you ever receive instructions to eliminate anybody?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: Did you ever give such an order to eliminate anybody?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: To go on where I said we would end off, you say in your last paragraph

"I have no doubt in my mind that if it wasn’t for the fact that these members believed that they could rely on the protection of their senior officers and the politicians, these specific acts would never have been committed"

Can you tell the Committee what indications there were that torture would be condoned or they would be protected - your members, your - members of your various units and people under you or above you?

MR GRIEBENAUW: The easiest example to perhaps give is the case of Mr Benzien. There were certain charges laid against him - administratively speaking, a medal was awarded to him for combating of terrorism with out him ever having done border duty - that is the simplest way in which I can answer the question.

MR DONAN: So that illustrates your point?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Absolutely.

MR DONAN: Who gave him the medal, whose decision was it?

MR GRIEBENAUW: It would have been the Minister.

MR DONAN: And who was the Minister at that time?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I have to guess, I think it could have been Minister Vlok.

MR DONAN: So you say if he was - if Minister Vlok was the Minister at that time, he would have both known that Mr Benzien was using torture and with that knowledge he would nevertheless have given him a medal?

MR GRIEBENAUW: He must have known because he should at least via the media have been aware of charges being laid against Benzien. Perhaps I could qualify myself here, if he - didn’t he perhaps or if he didn’t launch an investigation afterwards, he must have known.

MR DONAN: Why is that? Why must he have known?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I can’t express myself with more clarity than I have just done.

MR DONAN: Let’s deal with another person - applicant before this Committee as I understand it, a Mr F W de Klerk leader of the National Party. He says in his application - sorry, it’s a statement to the TRC, I withdraw the application part of my submission. He says

"In dealing with the unconventional strategies from the side of the Government, I want to make it clear from the outset that within my knowledge and experience, they never included the authorisation of assassination, murder, torture, rape, assault or the like. I have never been part of any decision taken by Cabinet, the State Security Council or any Committee authorising or instructing the Commission of such gross violations of human rights, nor did I individually directly or indirectly ever suggest, order or authorise any such action".

Have you heard that statement before?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, I have.

MR DONAN: I’d like your comment on it because you’ve said that Mr Vlok who was within the Cabinet - or whoever his particular Minister was at the time, must have known that torture was being used. What is your comment on Mr de Klerk’s statement insofar as torture is concerned?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I don’t think that he’s denying that he was aware of it, it sounds to me as if he’s denying that he ever gave orders in that regard or was aware that orders were given in that regard.

MR DONAN: So it’s a very carefully worded statement?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, it’s a political statement.

CHAIRPERSON: I don’t know whether this line of cross-examination is going to take us very much further.

MR DONAN: No, no, there’s one question. I just want to know whether, like Mr Vlok, Mr de Klerk must have known that torture was being used systematically or by anyone in his department?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I’m speculating now but it’s speculation based on the system which existed in those days and on the basis of that I say yes, he must have know.

MR DONAN: Let’s get on then. We’ve established that there were no superior orders but nevertheless, we would like to go through the chain of persons who were responsible for giving orders and who would have had knowledge of torture during the time - at the time that you left Cape Town.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Donan, could I perhaps interrupt? We’ve often heard about the doctrine of the need to know principle - we’ve often heard evidence about that at this Committee, namely that things were kept close and secret and it was only conveyed to a person who actually needed to know about it, otherwise it was simply not mentioned. Are you at all aware of such custom - perhaps I could put it more strongly that it was actually part of the politics of the day or the system in use at the time, was based on a need to know principle?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Certainly, that was so from my earliest days and the first time I heard this was in the time of General Hendrik van der Berg when he was head of the security police.

ADV DE JAGER: And what exactly did it mean?

MR GRIEBENAUW: It meant that if a person does not need to know something, it wouldn’t be told to him. It dealt with actions committed and directed against political opponents, purely covert operations and these things would not be discussed at a staff meeting but it would be directly conveyed to the person who needed to know about it.

ADV DE JAGER: Did it also entail that no questions would be asked about things?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Indeed, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Even by yourself who was the commanding officer of a unit who actually should have asked questions and you didn’t ask those questions?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, indeed, I was wrong in that regard, in my view in those days we thought that we were defending the sovereignty of the State but we in fact defending the political system of apartheid.

MR DONAN: May I just divert - I was going to go onto the structures, to this need to know. Did you understand that because of the need to know - was there a need to know instruction that you ever received?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I often received it.

MR DONAN: And did that instruction ever say that you don’t need to know about the torture that was being practised by your units and the personnel under you?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: And in fact you knew their methods?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Please repeat.

MR DONAN: You knew the methods, that torture was being used by the people under you?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I knew what was going on.

MR DONAN: And everybody above you should have known the same thing, that torture was being used?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, not the methods but the fact that it was being used.

MR DONAN: So the need to know is not really relevant to the questions of whether people knew because they were prevented from knowing by the need to know every body knew?

MR GRIEBENAUW: The need to know was not a written rule, when an order was given - said to you: "Remember this is going to be dealt with on a need to know basis".

MR DONAN: I’ll just put it more clearly, I’m obviously not making it clear. The need to know rule or direction is no defence to the fact that there was a system of torture being applied by the security police?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I would agree with that.

MR DONAN: You left Cape Town for East London in 1985, according to your CV, paragraph 2 of your report. It says

"Cape Town - ‘83 to ‘85, commanding officer investigating unit, Cape Town"

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, I left Cape Town in ‘86 in fact.

MR DONAN: At that stage you were in charge of the investigation unit?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That’s correct.

MR DONAN: And directly under was Willem Smit?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is correct.

MR DONAN: Did he succeed you when you left?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I’m not so sure, I think there could perhaps have been another commanding officer between the two of us, but it’s possible that it could have been him.

MR DONAN: And who would that other person have been?

MR GRIEBENAUW: It could possibly have been Brigadier Viljoen.

MR DONAN: Mr Liebenberg who’s applying for amnesty was in charge of the terrorist detective unit, did you know Mr Liebenberg at the time?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I knew him very well.

MR DONAN: And under him were - according to the evidence, Mr Benzien, Mr Nel, Mr van Zyl, Mr Nortje, Mr Piet Goosen and Mr Kotze?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I know some of them, others I don’t.

MR DONAN: There was also an intelligence unit, who was the commander at the time that you left Cape Town?

MR GRIEBENAUW: The commanding officer of which unit?

MR DONAN: Of the intelligence unit in the security police within the Western Cape.

MR GRIEBENAUW: I’m not sure, it could have been Colonel de Jager.

MR DONAN: Who was Piet Slabbert?

MR GRIEBENAUW: He was a security policeman.

MR DONAN: What was his rank and what was his function?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I don’t know what his rank was and he worked in the intelligence section.

MR DONAN: Did you know need to know?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, but perhaps if the questions could be put to me clearer.

MR DONAN: I’m sorry, I was being facetious. Attie Trollop ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Is it being put to you in he way a politician would?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, to provide for another question.

MR DONAN: I’ve just done precisely what my learned friend said I would do and I think now I will try to behave.

Attie Trollop, who was he?

MR GRIEBENAUW: He was also a security policeman.

MR DONAN: And what was his function?

MR GRIEBENAUW: He worked for the investigating unit at one stage and then also at the intelligence unit.

MR DONAN: What was his position there?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I can’t tell you.

MR DONAN: Gordon Brookbanks, do you know him?

CHAIRPERSON: What is that name again?

MR DONAN: Gordon Brookbanks.

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, not at all.

MR DONAN: You’ve never heard the name?

MR GRIEBENAUW: ...[inaudible]

MR DONAN: Now I’m instructed that the investigation unit, the terrorist detective unit and the intelligence unit reported to a commander of the security branch in the Western Cape, who was that - when you left?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Once again I’m not sure but I think it could have been Brigadier Strydom.

MR DONAN: Can you tell me what’s happened to Brigadier Strydom today?

MR GRIEBENAUW: He’s retired.

MR DONAN: And what does he do?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I don’t know.

MR DONAN: Mr Viljoen?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Also retired.

MR DONAN: Willem Smit?

MR GRIEBENAUW: He’s till serving in the South African police service.

MR DONAN: Piet Slabbert?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I don’t know.

MR DONAN: Attie Trollop?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I think he’s still serving but I’m not sure.

MR DONAN: Let me proceed in another direction then - from another direction ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Rather to another direction, from another direction would mean the same question but in a different way.

MR DONAN: I’m sorry. I’ll use a different ...[inaudible], we’ll take the scenic route if we may. How many of your associates in the security branch - the security forces, now operate in private security firms in the Western Cape.

MR GRIEBENAUW: I don’t known.

MR DONAN: Do you know - let’s go back to you, how were you linked to the National Security Management System? Did you report to them in any way?

MR GRIEBENAUW: At various stages and different levels.

MR DONAN: Could you tell the Committee please?

MR GRIEBENAUW: At one stage I was in the Eastern Cape and I was the commanding officer of the security branch, I served on the Joint Management System for the Eastern Province.

MR DONAN: What sort of decisions were you taking at that level together with them?

MR GRIEBENAUW: It consisted of discussions and joint decision making.

MR DONAN: Decisions regarding what?

MR GRIEBENAUW: About the threat facing the Republic.

MR DONAN: The Judicial Management Committees, did you have any connection with them?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: What about Vlakplaas? What was your relationship at any stage of your career with Vlakplaas?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I almost appointed as the commanding officer when I was in Pretoria but that in fact didn’t happen.

MR DONAN: And when you were in the Eastern Cape and the Western Cape?

MR GRIEBENAUW: In respect of Vlakplaas, I was very far removed from it.

MR DONAN: Yes, but were you in communication with the operatives there?

MR GRIEBENAUW: My communication was all done via the headquarters and from there onwards it would be referred to the necessary divisions.

MR DONAN: Did you ever bring the operatives to the Western Cape or were they ever used in the Western Cape?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I never brought them here but I requested them to come down here.

MR DONAN: And when was that?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I can’t remember.

MR DONAN: Why did you ask for them to be brought to the Western Cape?

MR GRIEBENAUW: To identify terrorist who had infiltrated the country.

MR DONAN: What exactly was the nature of your request?

MR GRIEBENAUW: To send people who could identify terrorists who were at that stage active in the Western Cape, that was that.

MR DONAN: What type of people?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Rehabilitated terrorists.

MR DONAN: And who was sent?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I can’t recall.

MR DONAN: What prompted you to make this request.

MR GRIEBENAUW: The information at my disposal.

MR DONAN: What was that information?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That there were terrorists present in the Western Cape.

MR DONAN: Was that the full extent of your information?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes.

MR DONAN: Did you know who the so-called terrorists were?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, if did I would have traced them and brought them before court.

MR DONAN: Why did you want to do that?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Is that not common cause, there was an Act which provided that is was an offence.

MR DONAN: So that was one law that you did obey, you had to bring them before the courts?

MR GRIEBENAUW: The was the Act in force.

MR DONAN: I’m going to end off where I started off - you brought them before the courts after detaining them under Section 29, is that right?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Not all of them.

MR DONAN: You would - if they didn’t answer your questions, torture would be used at the discretion of the person who was interrogating them?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is a generalisation, yes.

MR DONAN: So you would get whatever answers you needed from them?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Normally, yes.

MR DONAN: And then you would tell them that if they wanted to improve their situation, they would go to a Magistrate and repeat exactly what you had told them?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Not to improve their situation Sir.

MR DONAN: Well do what?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I never told him what to say, if I was doing the interrogation I would have given him the choice. If he wanted to make a confession that he could go to a Magistrate.

MR DONAN: What was the general practice among your security policeman, wasn’t it to get them to repeat to a Magistrate what they had illicited under Section 29.

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, if it amounted to a confession, they would have been taken to a Magistrate.

MR DONAN: Did people volunteer to go and repeat to a Magistrate ...[intervention]

MR GRIEBENAUW: However strange it may sound yes, that happened.

MR DONAN: And is this something that suddenly came to them after a period of detention under Section 29 - a revelation that they should go there ...[intervention]

MR GRIEBENAUW: Sometimes and sometimes earlier.

MR DONAN: Sorry?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Sometime and sometimes earlier.

MR DONAN: And then this was - this repetition of what they had been told under threat of torture, was then presented in the courts?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Not what they have been told.

MR DONAN: No, what they ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: I don’t think you’re putting the questions fairly. They had been questioned, interrogated - at some stage they decide to go to the Magistrate and make a statement. The statement they make to the Magistrate need not be what they were told by their interrogators, isn’t that what you’re really trying to get at.

MR DONAN: No, no, with respect. Then I’m definitely not being fair and not being clear.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR DONAN: What they did in front of the Magistrates, was repeat what they had said to their interrogators under Section 29 and then that was put up in the trial as evidence.

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is correct.

MR DONAN: And the people who supported the freeness and voluntaries of that were people like Mr Benzien who systematically lied?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Everyone involved.

MR DONAN: Were all the security police involved in this system?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, I said that everyone who was involved would have given evidence there.

MR DONAN: But that is the system they would have used?

MR GRIEBENAUW: What ...[intervention]

MR DONAN: The procedure that I’ve just ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: We’ve had a lot of evidence on this really, haven’t we already?

MR DONAN: Did you participate in this particular method?

MR GRIEBENAUW: With regard to whom?

MR DONAN: In respect of presenting evidence to courts to convict people on the basis ...[intervention]

MR GRIEBENAUW: I took many people to a Magistrate who wanted to give evidence.

MR DONAN: Of evidence that had been elicited by torture?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: And that was presented untruthfully to the ...[intervention]

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR DONAN: But Mr Benzien says he has.

MR GRIEBENAUW: It is possibly so.

MR DONAN: Okay. If the Committee will just bear with me. I have no more questions thank you, for Mr Griebenauw. I’m instructed to put on record our attitude to the psychologist but that’s a separate matter.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DONAN

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Among those who had appeared on the previous occasion as victims as what had been done to them by Mr Benzien and who are opposing this application, are there any who are present here today who would like to put questions to this witness? Mr Papier what would you say, what is your information in that regard?

MR PAPIER: Honourable Chair, my learned colleague Advocate Donan appears for the victims of torture, that is my understanding thank you Honourable Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Brink, are any question you wish to put to this witness?

MR BRINK: Just one or two Mr Chairman.

Mr Griebenauw, you mentioned the question of pressure having been put upon the South African police, more particularly the security police, pressure to curb the unrest which was occurring in the Western Cape.

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is so.

MR BRINK: Was pressure put on you?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, on various opportunities. If I can just describe this, it was when hand grenades hit the Western Cape - I was told that I had to get an answer, we cannot allow this any longer.

MR BRINK: Who said that?

MR GRIEBENAUW: It was from one of the Generals at head office, I can unfortunately not remember his name.

MR BRINK: Were you reporting directly to head office in Pretoria?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is true.

MR BRINK: Did anyone at headquarters ever ask you how it was that Mr Benzien was so successful in extracting information from suspected terrorists?

MR GRIEBENAUW: No.

MR BRINK: You were told that unrest had to be brought to an end, were you given any instruction as to how that was to happen?

MR GRIEBENAUW: From time to time instructions were given among others, during the emergency situation there were emergency regulations and orders that as many as possible of the people had to be apprehended so that they cannot organise the unrest.

MR BRINK: Yes, and to get information, not just to keep them out of political activity but to get information?

MR GRIEBENAUW: Yes, that is true.

MR BRINK: And were you given a free hand by headquarters to use whatever means you wished to affect that purpose?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I understood it to be so and that’s how I conveyed it to those under me.

MR BRINK: You were given authority as you understood it, to take part if necessary in torture and/or killing?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I would have turned away if I’d heard that, I would not have become involved but it could have been interpreted as such.

MR BRINK: Because we’ve heard from witnesses at other forums

in this Commission, those are operatives who’ve indicated that they understood that they could use any means and I’m just wondering why your situation is different.

MR GRIEBENAUW: I will agree with that.

MR BRINK: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Sorry, just one other thing as a matter of interest, who would have recommended the award of the medal for combating terrorism to Mr Benzien?

MR GRIEBENAUW: His direct commanding officer.

MR BRINK: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BRINK

JUDGE WILSON: You say in your statement that you asked Advocate Cook to request the police to make the relevant Section 29 dockets available?

MR GRIEBENAUW: That is indeed so Mr Chairperson.

JUDGE WILSON: Was this of all Section 29 detainees in the district, not just one or two people?

MR GRIEBENAUW: It was reference to the victims who are involved at the moment.

JUDGE WILSON: And you were told that none of the dockets were available?

MR GRIEBENAUW: None whatsoever Sir.

JUDGE WILSON: Who told you this or do you know who said

this?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I think this was said by Advocate Booth of the SAP service, if I’m correct.

JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Mr Griebenauw, can you tell us exactly what the basis is of your saying that your juniors or any other members of the security branch for that matter, could have come to the impression that they had been authorised to torture people?

MR GRIEBENAUW: If I can take it - summarise, it briefly means that as a result of the participation of commanding officers to the lowest level in the National Information Management System which has at it’s side the National Security Council and that instructions were given to them by two lines of communication, the commanding line in the police and the other which has a say in the National Security Management, it would have been acceptable to them that if an instruction was given that no matter what we have to have the answers, that is comes from the top in the first place.

Secondly, if complaints were made that they were investigated and that no steps were taken against them and that in the case of Captain Benzien a medal was awarded to him, then this should have been condoned.

JUDGE NGOEPE: With regard to the question of the medal, wouldn’t you think that to authorities a person who has not used any torture at all but skilfully managed to get useful information, would be an appropriate candidate for a medal?

MR GRIEBENAUW: I doubt that because as far as I know and I’m speaking under correction, I might be wrong but I think that these medals were only awarded to people who did border duty - I’m under that impression. And that it will only on exception be awarded to somebody who did not do border duty and I’m also under the impression that Captain Benzien did not do border duty.

JUDGE NGOEPE: What I’m saying to you is that they might not have known that he had used that torture to obtain information otherwise they might not have given him the medal, had they known - they may argue so.

MR GRIEBENAUW: My commentary on that is that I think that there was a responsibility on the organisation who awarded the medal - after all the publication that was given to complaints against Captain Benzien, to determine what the position was before the award was made.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Thank you.

MS KHAMPEPE: General, during questioning by Mr Donan, you conceded that a Mr Mostert was used predominantly to interrogate women.

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, that is not so. I conceded that I know him and that he served under me but at that point I did not conceded, I’m not aware of that.

MS KHAMPEPE: It is an error then on my note because I thought that is what you conceded to, sorry.

MR GRIEBENAUW: No, that is not so.

CHAIRPERSON: Are there any questions in re-examination Mr Cook?

MR COOK: No cross-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

MR GRIEBENAUW: Thank you very much Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you calling any other witnesses?

MR COOK: That concludes the applicant’s evidence.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Donan?

MR DONAN: Thank you Chairperson. Perhaps I should clearly put to the Committee what my client’s attitude is to the psychologist’s report which was presented by my learned friend. They have obvious difficulties with it. The Committee has had the opportunity of reading it and we require the expert witness to attend in order to put our difficulties to that witness.

We’re instructed on expert advice that the post-traumatic stress disorder which is the alleged cause of the amnesia, is a condition which befalls people who are tortured or victims rather than perpetrators. We also have difficulties with the whole notion of post-traumatic stress disorder because the Committee will have

heard that the trauma occurred many years ago and it did not manifest itself during trials at which Mr Benzien testified - where he testified with complete knowledge, it seems to have arisen in 1994 when these particular proceedings were contemplated.

And our concern is that the cause of the amnesia is this particular hearing rather than any condition which Mr Benzien has and we should therefore like that aspect to be clarified. I’m putting my questions on the table so that my learned friend can consider his position but those are our difficulties and therefore we must insist as I said.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Donan, do I understand you correctly as saying you’re contesting the fact that there’s a memory lapse, do you not - whatever the cause may be, it’s your contention that he very well knows what it’s all about and that he’s not telling the truth or do you say: "Well, he may have a memory lapse but it’s only because of other reasons?

MR DONAN: We’re contesting the nature and extent of his amnesia, we understand Mr Benzien is human and humans do forget but we’re saying that the amnesia is not as far reaching as has been put up, it doesn’t have the cause that has been put up. And that the requirements of the legislation of full disclosure are not being met deliberately rather than because of an inability to make full disclosure.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cook, is there anything that you wish to say in that regard?

MR COOK: Yes, indeed Chairperson. There was an express request for a pre-trial conference which indeed took place on Thursday and Mr Donan saw fit not to arrive at this meeting at all, so it’s surprising today that he comes here today and now requests that the psychologist appear.

I can’t understand why he’s coming here today and says what he has said, it’s obviously part of his tactics of surprise. Mr Brink expressly said that it wasn’t necessary that the psychologist appear and to actually get her here this week, it would be totally impossible because I’ve already told her as well that it’s not necessary for her to appear this week.

MR DONAN: Is my - my learned friend is telling a half truth, I did inform the - there was a meeting, I did inform the meeting that I would not be present, I did inform Mr Papier I would not be present and I understand from Mr Papier that the concession that my learned friend is talking about has not been made.

Certainly the attitude of my clients whom I did not represent at that stage - I only represented Niclo Pedro, is that they were not there and they certainly are the ones who have seen the difficulty and have doubts about Mr Benzien’s amnesia or lack of it and the causes.

ADV DE JAGER: Were you notified of the conference?

MR DONAN: I certainly was, I have a letter somewhere here and I did give timeless notice to the person in charge that I - the day before, that I would not be able to attend, that to the extent that - I was in a part heard matter, when I came out of that matter I would come here immediately but that Mr Papier would be there and Mr Saldanha would be there. And they would represent me so to speak and they were authorised, they had my mandate to deal with whatever arose.

MR COOK: I want to place it on record that - and Mr Brink can confirm that, on Thursday there were no direct instructions from the victims to any of these gentlemen. They were expressly asked: "Are you appearing for the victims" and they said no, they don’t have any knowledge of it, so I don’t know what Mr Donan is actually saying now. We are busy wasting the Commission’s time.

I’m handing in the report and the report I will argue, must be accepted otherwise we will carry on and carry on and the thing will be postponed again and again. There was an express request by you last time that we should meet to hand in the documents - they are actually wasting the Commission’s time.

ADV DE JAGER: That is something which the Committee will have to decide upon, whether their time is actually being wasted Mr Cook. It isn’t actually for you to say the time is being wasted, we will decide that matter. You can make submissions in this regard which we will listen to but ultimately it is for us, for the Committee to decide whether there is a necessity or the justification for whatever is going to happen and whether there was no appearance on Thursday and we can only make such decisions when we have all the facts.

MS KHAMPEPE: I thought Mr Papier made it quite clear that he attended the pre-hearing conference and that no agreement was reached at all concerning the admission of the report before us.

MR COOK: I expressly told him that as far as the Ashley Kriel incident was concerned, the report did not apply to that. The inquests proceedings are handed in and the cross-examination was in 1988 and I would submit that my client had already dealt with it in a complete fashion then. If there are any deviations, I would argue that he had already dealt with it in ‘88.

As far as the victims are concerned were not dealt with Mr Papier, in other words it falls outside of his mandate, so he can’t actually make those submissions and ask that he wants to ask the psychologist certain questions because it actually has nothing to do with him - that is my submission.

ADV DE JAGER: But Mr Cook, what we are being told is that he had the mandate to represent them on that particular day.

MR COOK: Well, we can ask Mr Brink.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Sorry, I think Mr Cook, if I understand - and Mr Donan could indicate by shaking or nodding his head to save time, do I understand Mr Donan to say that by Thursday last week he was not as yet representing the other victims? Is that what you are saying?

MR DONAN: I think that’s the situation, I phoned Miss - I’ve forgotten her name, the lady Miss Mtanga - the lady in charge, to inform her specifically, one, that I had a problem - the sequence was, she phoned me and said as representative of the Yengenis and so on, would I do the following and I phoned back and said: "Look, I don’t represent them".

And I put her in touch with Mrs - sorry, Ashley Forbes in fact and - Miss Pandy, then shortly before on the day before this meeting, I informed the same person that I would have difficulty getting there because I could not be released from where I was and ...[intervention]

JUDGE NGOEPE: Sorry, I understand that but as of Thursday last week, were you already representing the victims, all the victims that you are representing today?

MR DONAN: This is the Truth Commission, I think that essentially my mandate to represent them was decided this morning in a room outside.

JUDGE NGOEPE: And by ...[intervention]

MR DONAN: I represented Niclo Pedro however.

JUDGE NGOEPE: And by Thursday - the people that you are now representing today as well, they had not seen this report?

MR DONAN: I can’t answer for them, I think ...[intervention]

JUDGE NGOEPE: In all probability they saw it maybe for the first time this morning?

MR DONAN: I think it was handed in ...[intervention]

JUDGE NGOEPE: And they can only react to it today and their reaction is as you have conveyed it to us. Now I don’t understand what problem you have Mr Cook, what is your difficulty about people saying to you they are seeing this report only for the first time today and their reaction is coming forth only today. Do you have any problem about that?

MR COOK: The problem which I have Mr Chairperson, is the fact that on Thursday they already had to have been there, whether via a legal representative or personally or otherwise they could have approached Mr Robin Brink.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Did you tell them, did you tell the individual people about the pre-trial conference last week Thursday?

MR COOK: No, it wasn’t my duty, that was the duty of ...[intervention]

JUDGE NGOEPE: Were they told, they weren’t told were they?

MR COOK: No, that was the duty of Mr Robin Brink.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Do you dispute the fact that they saw this report only today?

MR COOK: No, I can’t dispute that.

JUDGE NGOEPE: So what must we do, shouldn’t we accommodate them?

MR COOK: The problem that I have is that the witness isn’t available today.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand, the difficulty really is whether the Committee decides that this witness should be called or not. I think that you might have been misled by what you understood to be an agreement between yourself and Mr Brink, that there would be no need to call this witness. However, that decision was taken without due regard to the attitude of people who are vitally affected by the contents of that report.

It now seems that they be afforded an opportunity to test what is said in that report. All that it really means now, is for you to tell us how soon would it be possible for you to get hold of your witness. Maybe you would like to take instructions in that regard and find out, you may not be in a position to give me an answer now.

MR COOK: I will phone her and I will find out but we can continue with the rest of the proceedings even if it means that we will have to call her at some later stage, I don’t foresee that being a problem.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you calling any further witnesses?

MR COOK: No.

MR BRINK: Sorry, Mr Chairman may I come in on this question to ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Are you going to take the matter any further, I’ve already covered the position Mr Brink.

MR BRINK: I just want to make it clear what I said to Mr Cook about this report was that as far as I was concerned, the report could go in. I didn’t require the expert to give evidence but that was subject of course to the - Mr Papier was there, that was subject to his attitude.

CHAIRPERSON: We’ve covered that ground now, it does seem that in the interest of the people that were vitally affected, that they be afforded an opportunity to examine and test the contents of this report through the evidence of the party making that report.

My question to you Mr Cook is, are you calling any other evidence at this stage?

MR COOK: No further evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Donan, are you calling witnesses?

MR DONAN: I do have a witness Mr Chairperson, I don’t know whether this would be a convenient time or whether you would prefer ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Papier, are you calling witnesses?

MR PAPIER: No, Honourable Chair, our case is closed.

CHAIRPERSON: Time Mr Donan?

MR DONAN: There’s nothing wrong with the - the evidence will be broken then.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, it doesn’t matter we’ll get through as much

as we can.

MR DONAN: The witness is Niclo Pedro. The Committee will recall that last time I represented Mr Pedro and I put certain questions on his behalf to Mr Benzien, my other client’s questioned Mr Benzien themselves. And to get Mr Pedro directly involved, I must inform the Committee that he’s sensitive as the Committee well knows as every victim is and that is a difficulty which I have.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Donan, just for the sake of the recording, who are you representing today because it’s not on the record?

MR DONAN: I’m representing the Yengeni trialists, that would be Mr Yengeni - in essence, the people who cross-examined Mr Benzien on the last occasion and the Forbes trialists, Ashley Forbes, Peter Jacobs, Niclo Pedro who I represented and Anwar Dramat.

CHAIRPERSON: Please call your witness.

What are you full names?

MR PEDRO: Niclo ...[inaudible] Pedro.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you prepared to take the oath?

NICLO PEDRO: (sworn states)

MR DONAN: Mr Pedro, do you prefer to give your evidence in Afrikaans?

MR PEDRO: I’m going to try to speak both languages, I am Afrikaans speaking but if I feel to express myself in English I will

do that.

EXAMINATION BY MR DONAN: Thank you. Mr Pedro, you were arrested by the security police during August of 1987, is that correct?

MR PEDRO: That’s correct.

MR DONAN: And when ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, could somebody kindly help with witness with - he says he wants to give evidence in Afrikaans so there’s no translation at the moment, he’s not wearing earphones and I don’t know whether he knows how to use it.

CHAIRPERSON: You say you were arrested in August 1987?

MR PEDRO: That’s correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR DONAN: After you arrest you met Mr Benzien, is that correct?

MR PEDRO: Yes, I met him here in Cape Town.

MR DONAN: Could you tell the court, I beg your pardon the Committee about where you met him and how you met him and what happened. I’ll leave it up to you to tell the story.

MR PEDRO: At that stage he was a Warrant Officer and I met him here in Cape Town. I was brought from where I had been caught, near the Lesotho border and I was brought to Cape Town. When I arrived in Cape Town I was taken to Culemborg here in Cape Town, that’s in the Culemborg building. I was left in a room and a whole number of security policemen came in and out of this room to come and look at me to see what I looked like.

MR DONAN: Who were they?

MR PEDRO: Most of them were the names that you’ve referred to, Nel, Nortje, Benzien, Captain Liebenberg and there were also others whose names I didn’t know who just popped in and out just to come and have a look at me. And they said: "Oh, so you’re Jerome, we thought that you’re a big man now we see you’re a short small man".

But when the interrogation started Benzien and Nortje were present, they were the only other people in the room with me. When they started interrogating me the intimidation had already taken effect, this intimidation of me had already started when I was in this room and the security policemen came in and out to have a good look at me.

When they were alone with me they took off all my clothes and there was a mesh wire in front of the window and they tied me up against this mesh wire, that meant that I could barely stand and they started questioning me regarding several aspects. That is where I met Benzien for the first time.

MR DONAN: I’m sorry to interrupt you, could you tell the Committee more specifically who were the people present and what each one of them did as far as you can recall.

MR PEDRO: As far as I can remember, the people who were present right at the start before they actually started questioning me, I can’t remember specific names and I can’t remember who did what but it pertinently put to me firstly that nobody knew that I had been arrested, so I was basically in their hands - that I can recall very clearly. And the other thing which they said to me was that I would have to give my co-operation otherwise I would see what was going to happen.

That was the start of it and obviously at that stage I was already quite scared as to what could possibly happen to me. As I’ve said for me the real interrogation started when Benzien and Nortje started questioning me. The interrogation was such that whilst they were asking me questions, they also told me to take off my clothes because they wanted to test whether certain things which Peter Jacobs and Ashley Forbes had said - whether I had any knowledge of that and I said I didn’t have such knowledge. That’s when they told me to take off my clothes and that is when they tied me up to this mesh in front of the window.

Do you want me to continue?

MR DONAN: Yes, please.

MR PEDRO: I must mention that I was arrested on the Saturday morning the 15th of August, on the 16th of August I arrived in Cape Town - that was the Sunday because they drove me down to Cape Town overnight. I didn’t sleep at all that night, I was also a little bit hungry. Whilst I was being interrogated they also asked me whether I wanted to eat something and I said yes, I would like to eat something. They then gave me - I think if I recall correctly, chips and the reason why I’m mentioning this is that it was offered to me - the food and every time that I wanted to take something to eat they would bring it to my mouth and then pull back as soon as I wanted to bite it. So in affect I had nothing to eat.

And my further experiences as regards this interrogation were that I was hit - I was physically hit by Benzien and Nortje, more so by Benzien than by Nortje. On that specific Sunday they had already earlier on that day, asked me whether I wanted to make a statement in front of a Magistrate and I said that I didn’t want to make a statement and that I wasn’t prepared to do that.

But there was this one specific incident - in the process of giving them some information, they wanted to know from me who these people were that I was supposed to have met in Lesotho. I was given instructions to carry a letter which I should not open until such time as I had crossed the Lesotho border and then I would find out who these people were and where I was supposed to meet them. And I followed these instructions, I didn’t open the letter.

When I was arrested, I did away with the letter. When they questioned me about this I answered them and I think to my regret, I said to them that I’d eaten the letter. When I told them this, Benzien told me that he wanted to know who these people were that I was supposed to meet in Lesotho. He then took me out of that room in the Culemborg building and took me to a different place, it was somewhere at the back of a building. I can recall that we went past some steps and we went round the back and it was almost an open plan type of room.

There he told me that I should defecate because he wanted to actually get this letter out of my stomach. And whilst I was busy defecating he put plastic gloves, surgical gloves on his hands and he put his hand into my anus. When I told him what he was doing would not get the letter back - when the full knowledge that I hadn’t actually swallowed or eaten the letter, he then took a broom which was standing close by and he then pressed this into my anus to try and get hold of the letter.

There was very little which actually came out of my stomach because I hadn’t had a lot to eat and as far as I can recall yes, there wasn’t much that came out of my stomach. I can’t recall very specifically what period of time this was but from quite late that day I was really quite tired, I was very sleepy. The interrogation took place during the whole of that day and it was late that night when I started giving out information to Benzien. It was that night - if I recall correctly, that I went to point out houses belonging to my comrades.

He took me along specifically, he covered my head - that I can recall, when he was driving with me. Furthermore when I was taken to the Sea Point police cells, I was handcuffed - my feet were handcuffed to the bed and basically I fell asleep because I was so tired. I was forced to urinate and to defecate whilst I was so manacled to the bed or handcuffed to the bed. In any event, the point I’m trying to make is that in that time they brought some of my comrades in there and they told them that I’m the one that’s responsible for their arrests, that I’m the one that’s working with them.

I can clearly remember Anwar Dramat told me he was in my cell, I don’t know about that. But whenever they wanted to question me they would wake me up and take me back to Culemborg. I think that’s my experiences with this man Benzien. I developed a - he installed a fear in me. When other security policemen came to me I would feel more relaxed but when Benzien comes to me, it was difficult for me to be relaxed.

He was the type of person that - he can speak to you very nicely and he can come across as the world’s friendliest person and within a second he can change and he become and behave like an animal. That’s how I experienced him.

MR DONAN: Can ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Donan, we’ll take the short adjournment at this stage.

JUDGE WILSON: Short?

CHAIRPERSON: Rather the adjournment, we’ll resume at 2 o’clock.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

NICLO PEDRO: (s.u.o.)

EXAMINATION BY MR DONAN: (cont)

Thank you. Mr Pedro, during the course of your interrogation, did the name Ashley Kriel ever crop up?

MR PEDRO: Yes, the name did. In fact it was during my interrogation that Benzien asked me whether I know Ashley Kriel and I told him: "Yes, I know him" and he told me that he’s the one that killed Ashley Kriel and that I’m lucky to be alive still.

MR DONAN: Colonel Smith, did you ever see him during the course of your interrogation?

MR PEDRO: Colonel Smith came into the room where they unclothed me and where I was handcuffed to the window and he’s the one that asked them to remove the cuffs and to put on my clothes again, that’s where I can recall him, yes - Colonel Smith.

MR DONAN: Now there has been evidence about a sack that was used by Mr Benzien when he interrogated detainees, did you ever see or hear of a sack while you were under interrogation?

MR PEDRO: Yes, I did hear about it. He threatened to use what I can the bag, to use it on me. There was the one occasion at Culemborg and the other occasion was when we were in Loop Street when Mostert was also present. It was also when they wanted certain information from me, it was already quite late in the interrogation process and they didn’t use the bag on me but they placed the bag on my head and I think it was Mostert who said that they should take the bag off.

MR DONAN: How easily did you give information to Mr Benzien, did you offer it readily?

MR PEDRO: No, I did not. In fact, in my own mind I think I gave him the information because of the violence that he used on me and the fear that he installed in me. I think that’s why I gave him information, yes.

MR DONAN: You were sentenced to imprisonment, were you?

MR PEDRO: Yes, I was.

MR DONAN: On Robben Eiland?

MR PEDRO: That’s correct.

MR DONAN: And since the time of your trial, have you ever seen the statements which you made to the lawyers at the time of your trial?

MR PEDRO: Since after my trial?

MR DONAN: Yes.

MR PEDRO: No, I haven’t. In fact, even when I came here and I just spoke, that’s probably why I maybe might not remember all the things. During the lunch time now I requested whether I can see some of my statements again, yes.

MR DONAN: And I gave you your statement?

MR PEDRO: Yes, you gave me the one.

MR DONAN: And you’ve since refreshed your memory?

MR PEDRO: I did.

MR DONAN: Thank you, thank you Mr Pedro.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DONAN

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Papier, are there any questions you wish to illicit?

MR PAPIER: I have no questions, thank you Honourable Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cook?

MR COOK: I have a couple of questions thank you.

Mr Pedro, it seems to as if you also have a problem with your memory, is that right?

MR PEDRO: No, I don’t have a problem with my memory. I want to make something very clear and that is the following. It’s not easy for me to have taken the decision to come and talk here today. On the previous occasion, the main reason why I wasn’t here was that I didn’t want to relive all my previous experiences and I have to relive it again today.

And also for the sake of my parents because I can see that they’re also suffering a great deal of pain so I want to make it very clear today that if questions are to be put to me which I feel puts me through another interrogation process, then I will not be prepared to

answer those questions.

MR COOK: You’ve just told the Committee: "I might not remember everything in detail", so you can also not recall the finer detail, is that right?

MR PEDRO: That which I’ve testified to now, that is what I can remember. Those are the things which I can remember, the things which I’ve already spoken of.

MR COOK: How many years imprisonment did you get?

MR PEDRO: I was given 24 years of which 10 were suspended and I served 14 years effectively.

MR COOK: And you received indemnity, is that correct?

MR PEDRO: I was released.

MR COOK: No, indemnity, did you receive indemnity? Is that correct?

MR PEDRO: I don’t understand what you mean.

MR COOK: You got amnesty?

MR PEDRO: I was released as a result of the negotiations.

MR COOK: So why did you apply for amnesty?

MR PEDRO: I didn’t apply for amnesty.

MR COOK: Did you just get it?

MR PEDRO: I was in prison and the people who represented me - my counsel, negotiated this. As far as I’m concerned I was sent to prison unfairly so I should have been released because what I did, I did in the interests of what I saw to be justice.

MR COOK: Yes, you don’t understand the amnesty procedure. I’m referring to the previous legislation of ‘92 and ‘93 in terms of which you got amnesty. To be able to obtain that amnesty you were obliged to make a list of all your misdeeds.

MR PEDRO: I don’t know what you’re referring to, I was on Robben Island and as a result of the negotiation process and the Acts enforced at the time I was released from Robben Island.

MR COOK: Who was your counsel, who was your legal representative who dealt with your amnesty application?

ADV DE JAGER: I think it was an indemnity ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Was there amnesty or was it indemnity Mr Cook?

MR COOK: Indemnity.

CHAIRPERSON: And was there not a general indemnity granted?

MR COOK: Yes, but wasn’t the case so that every person still had to lodge an individual application? You couldn’t receive indemnity without listing the incidents for which you require indemnity.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Cook, have you been able to ascertain from Mr Pedro whether he was released as a result of the Groote Schuur Minute or as a result of the indemnity process of ‘90 and ‘92 because these are different processes?

MR COOK: I asked him whether he received indemnity and he told me he was released. I’m trying to actually determine why he was released.

Let me ask you expressly ...[intervention]

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Cook, there were two processes, the first one was the Groote Schuur - in terms of the Groote Schuur Minute and the second was one in terms of the Indemnity Act of 1990 and 1992.

MR COOK: Yes.

MS KHAMPEPE: So maybe you should find out from him in terms of which process he was released.

MR COOK: That is what I’m trying to find out.

In terms of which of these two processes did you or were you released?

MR PEDRO: Actually to tell the truth, I don’t know. I can’t recall any abuses or violations which I listed because in my opinion I didn’t commit any such violations.

CHAIRPERSON: Just hold on, may we just clear it up. When were you released from prison?

MR PEDRO: I was released in April 1991.

CHAIRPERSON: After being in prison for how long?

MR PEDRO: From 1988.

CHAIRPERSON: 1988?

MR PEDRO: Yes.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Pedro, didn’t you sign any statement in which you stated the offences in respect of which you were sentenced to a term of imprisonment and sent to Robben Island?

MR PEDRO: Did I sign any statement?

MS KHAMPEPE: Yes.

MR PEDRO: I can’t really recall.

MS KHAMPEPE: In support of your release?

MR PEDRO: I know that there were certain processes but I can’t recall whether I signed any documentation in prison before my release.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, carry on.

MR COOK: Why do you have a problem recalling this?

MR PEDRO: Why do I have a problem to remember that?

MR COOK: Yes.

MR PEDRO: As I was saying, for me that was not important whether I must sign documentation to be released or not, that was irrelevant for me. In the first place I was sent wrongly to prison.

MR COOK: What do you mean when you say you were sent to prison wrongfully?

MR PEDRO: Because the laws of that time was injustice, it was not the laws - it was inhumane laws and the things that I did in my opinion was not things that was necessary for me to go to prison.

MR COOK: The period that you were in the Western Cape you were part of a cell, is that correct?

MR PEDRO: Yes, I was part of a cell.

MR COOK: Who were the other members of this cell?

MR PEDRO: My comrades who are here today.

MR COOK: And who was the leader of the cell?

MR PEDRO: My commander was Ashley Forbes.

MR COOK: What was the purpose of this cell of yours?

MR PEDRO: The objective was to carry out the policy of our organisation.

MR COOK: And what did that entail?

MR PEDRO: Our organisations policy was to destroy apartheid.

MR COOK: And what means did you use in this battle?

MR PEDRO: I was a member of MK and the means which we used was to become involved in the armed struggle.

MR COOK: So you would also make use of violence?

MR PEDRO: Obviously I think that that which I experienced during the period of the trial, that would tell you exactly what it was about and I’ve already been tried for that. I don’t actually know why you’re asking these questions.

MR COOK: Please just answer the question.

MR DONAN: I’ve listened to my learned friend’s questions, I have difficulty seeing the relevance to an application for amnesty for torture because Mr Pedro is not on trial here, it is Mr Benzien who is on trial and Mr Pedro ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Benzien is not on trial either. It’s not fair to say Mr Benzien is on trial, this is an enquiry concerning Mr Benzien.

MR DONAN: As the Chairperson pleases.

CHAIRPERSON: And I think that the questions that you put to this must have some bearing on the activities of Mr Benzien and not on his activities.

MR COOK: Yes, indeed so and I’m heading that way but all I’m trying to indicate at this point is that both sides made use of violence. Would you agree with me or would you agree with the submission that I’m making Mr Pedro, that both as far - you were concerned and the security forces, that both sides made use of violence?

MR PEDRO: I’ve already mentioned that in the period during which I stood trial under apartheid, I answered all those questions which you are now asking me and what you’re asking me now is already on record.

MR COOK: But despite that, you were convicted in that trial. Am I right?

MR PEDRO: By the apartheid courts, yes.

MR COOK: Your evidence was rejected?

MR PEDRO: What do you mean my evidence was rejected?

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] found guilty, that’s the end of the matter isn’t it?

MR COOK: You were convicted in that court, is that correct?

MR DONAN: As I remember it, there was a plea of guilty tendered and it was on that basis that the guilt established.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Yes, please proceed.

MR COOK: What weapons were used by this cell in the Western Cape or what weapons were brought in?

MR PEDRO: None.

MR COOK: No weapons?

MR PEDRO: Not where I was involved.

MR COOK: You’ve said that the comrades who are here today also formed part of that cell, isn’t it so that some of them pointed out certain weapons?

MR PEDRO: You’ve asked me whether weapons were brought in, I don’t know how those things were brought in and how they came to be here.

MR COOK: Did your cell possess weapons?

MR PEDRO: Yes.

MR COOK: Who had these weapons?

MR PEDRO: I don’t know why I have to answer all these questions again, I came here to testify ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Please just understand Mr Cook, you asked him whether the cell possessed weapons and he said yes, what is the purpose of trying to get the identity of which individuals? What purpose does that serve?

MR COOK: It’s very easy, the allegations have been made by each person who cross-examined my client, allegations that they denied that certain weapons were pointed out - especially Mr Yengeni. One of the members of the bench asked him a question and it was said that he refuses to answer the questions because he’s not under oath.

I would like to ascertain when my client says he tortured these people to extract information from them to prevent bombs and weapons or bombs exploding in the Western Cape. I’m trying to find out from Mr Pedro whether they indeed had those weapons and what they wanted to do with those weapons.

CHAIRPERSON: Well the answer is that his cell did have weapons.

MR COOK: Right.

Mr Pedro, the next question is, what did you want to do with these weapons?

MR PEDRO: I want to put it to you again, the reason why I’m here is because I read in the newspaper denies certain things - certain things which he did to me, and I felt that his application for amnesty should be counted in some way and that I should come in and tell the truth. And I don’t understand the relevance of these questions regarding the cell.

MR COOK: So are you refusing to answer the question?

MR PEDRO: I don’t see the relevance of it.

ADV DE JAGER: Did you need the weapons to make war?

MR PEDRO: I wouldn’t put it like that, not to make war. That definition of making war, I don’t know - the weapons were here for a specific purpose.

ADV DE JAGER: What specific purpose?

MR PEDRO: At that stage we had certain targets, there were electrical power stations - that was a target, Government buildings, policemen ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: I don’t think you need to answer the question if you don’t want to but the purpose was to overthrow the Government?

MR PEDRO: Yes, that was the purpose.

MR COOK: Thank you Advocate de Jager.

You knew Mr Ashley Kriel well, is that correct?

MR PEDRO: He was my friend, yes.

MR COOK: And at some point you lived together?

MR PEDRO: Correct.

MR COOK: The place where he was killed, 8 Albermaal Street in Hazendal, Athlone, is that where you lived together?

MR PEDRO: Correct.

MR COOK: Is it correct that Mr Ashley Kriel had a hand grenade in his possession amongst others - in the period that you lived together?

MR PEDRO: It’s possible, I didn’t see it.

MR COOK: You didn’t see it?

MR PEDRO: No. He didn’t tell me what he possessed or what he was walking around with.

MR COOK: Did you have a .22 pistol in your possession at that stage?

MR PEDRO: Yes.

MR COOK: Where did you get it?

MR PEDRO: From one of my co-accused.

MR COOK: Who?

MR PEDRO: Naziem Louw.

MR COOK: What did you want to do with the weapons?

MR PEDRO: To protect ourselves from the police.

MR COOK: Why did you decide to leave the country early in August of ‘87?

MR PEDRO: The police were searching for me.

MR COOK: Why?

MR PEDRO: There was a poster of me in the Mitchell’s Plein police station, apparently they were looking for me for car theft.

MR COOK: Was it armed robbery?

MR PEDRO: No, it was car theft.

MR COOK: Isn’t it true that at that stage they were also aware of you and were looking for you in connection with the activities of the cell?

MR PEDRO: I don’t know.

MR DONAN: At this stage, what relevance that has to the torture that was used?

MR COOK: I’ll get to that but I don’t want to jump the gun.

CHAIRPERSON: I wish you would get to it because I mean, we’re not in a trial as you understand, this is not a trial and he’s not applying for amnesty.

MR COOK: Yes, indeed.

CHAIRPERSON: If you’re going to attack his credibility then you’ve got to put to him that you don’t believe his evidence on this point or the other point.

MR COOK: I’m getting there, please just give me a moment.

Is it correct that Ashley Kriel at some stage was your cell leader?

MR PEDRO: Pardon me?

MR COOK: Ashley Kriel, was he the cell leader at some stage?

MR PEDRO: I don’t know if I can say he was the cell leader, I came into contact with him after Ashley Forbes had been arrested.

MR COOK: You made a statement which was handed in during the inquest proceedings, is that correct?

MR PEDRO: Yes.

MR COOK: I’m going to give you the statement and I just want to confirm that it is your signature.

It’s part of the inquest proceedings documents which I handed in, it is Exhibit C in that volume.

I’m just going to show it to you, please look at the bottom of the page. Is that your signature?

ADV DE JAGER: Have the pages of the inquest proceedings been indexed and if so, to which page are you referring?

MR COOK: Unfortunately I don’t have the original with me but I will ask that a photostat copy be made of Exhibit C, I’m only going to refer to one or two portions.

MR COOK: I asked you just now whether you know whether Ashley Kriel had a defensive hand grenade and you said you couldn’t remember. I’m going to read to you paragraph 14 of Exhibit C

"When I met the deceased in Lansdowne on that day he was in possession of an F1 defensive hand grenade in his jacket pocket. I received training in dealing with various land mines and grenades and I identified the grenade as such".

Paragraph 15:

"The deceased and I often left the house in Hazendal and he was always or often armed with this hand grenade"

Can you recall that?

MR PEDRO: Yes. I want to correct you, I said it’s possible, he did not always tell me what he had in his possession - that was my answer.

MR COOK: Yes, I very pertinently asked you about this defensive hand grenade, whether he carried it with him.

I will request copies to be made of this Exhibit C.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, if it is admitted by him that is what is said, then I don’t think it’s necessary for you to put it in.

MR COOK: As it pleases you.

Let’s go back to your evidence. When you arrived at Culemborg, who were there when you arrived there? Who did you see there first?

MR PEDRO: There were different people there, I didn’t know all their names at that stage. As I said, I afterwards learnt that Benzien and Nortje were amongst them.

MR COOK: But it wasn’t only the two of them, according to you there were lots of people?

MR PEDRO: Yes, there were other people as well.

MR COOK: Were these other people there right from the start when you arrived there? In other words, was there a whole group of people there from the start?

MR PEDRO: Culemborg is a big building ...[intervention]

MR COOK: Please answer the question.

MR PEDRO: Yes. It’s a big building, I don’t know where these people all came from, I don’t know whether they were there or whether they weren’t - I couldn’t say that exactly.

MR COOK: I would like point out to the Committee page 246 of the typed document or the record of the previous proceedings, lines one to four. There’s a statement by Advocate Donan - it was read into the record, where he says

"He was brought to Culemborg and he says that there the first security policeman that arrived there was Warrant Officer Benzien and Warrant Officer Nortje - when he arrived it was you and Nortje"

And that contradicts your evidence now.

MR PEDRO: No, not at all.

MR COOK: You say there were already a group of people there but according to this statement, only Nortje and Benzien were there and the others arrived later.

MR PEDRO: No, I’ve already said that when I arrived there, there were people - some of whose names I knew and others not and Benzien and Nortje were some of the people who were there first.

MR COOK: When were you made to undress, immediately or at a later stage?

MR PEDRO: It wasn’t immediately.

MR COOK: Who was present when you were undressed?

MR PEDRO: Benzien and Nortje.

MR COOK: Who actually took your clothes off?

MR PEDRO: They asked me to do it.

MR COOK: And is that what happened?

MR PEDRO: Yes.