CHAIRPERSON: This is a sitting of the Amnesty Committee at the Central Methodist Church, Johannesburg. The panel is chaired by myself, Denzil Potgieter. I am assisted by Adv de Jager and Adv Gcabashe. We will be hearing the Amnesty Applications of J C Coetzee, Amnesty Reference AM4210/96, A Grobbelaar Amnesty Reference AM4143/96, W.F. Schoon Amnesty Reference AM 4396/96 and E.T. Mfalapitsa Amnesty Reference AM3592/96A I am going to ask the parties to put themselves on record. Adv Visser, would you start off.
MR VISSER: Yes Chairperson, may it please you and members of your Committee. My name is Louis Visser. I am instructed by Attorneys Wagener Muller of Pretoria. I don’t think there’s much point in placing on record, perhaps I should. In the first application before you we will be appearing for Schoon, Coetzee and Grobbelaar.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you Mr Visser. Mr Knight, or is it Adv Jansen.
MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Adv Jansen on instructions of Julian Knight Attorneys. We act for Mr Mfalapitsa in the initial hearing relating to the Cosas Members.
Thank you.
MS VAN DER WALT: Meneer die Voorsitter, daar is een aspek. Ek het die Waarheidskomissie daarvan in kennis gestel maar dit blyk dat dit wil vir my voorkom of u bundels nie volledig is nie, want daar is nog ‘n applikant, Mnr C. Rorich. Sy aansoek is deur die Komissie as Aanhangsel "A" ingebund. So syne moet net bykom, ek het nou nie sy verwysingsnommer by my.
CHAIRPERSON: 5011/97
MS VAN DER WALT: Ek is L van der Walt. Ek verskyn saam met Adv H.J. Prinsloo.
CHAIRPERSON: Goed, dankie Adv van der Walt.
For the victim.
MR TSHABALALA:: Thank you Mr Chairman. My name is Tshabalala, initials T.Z. I am for the victims Mr Musi and the other family, Madikela family, Madagwane and Thlapo.
CHAIRPERSON: Is it on behalf of Mr Musi and the next of kin of the other three deceased?
MR TSHABALALA: That’s correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Tshabalala. Ms Thabethe.
MS THABETHE: I am Ms Thabethe, the evidence leader for the TRC. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you very much. Adv Jansen, your client Mr Mfalapitsa is apparently not physically present at the proceedings. We have been given an indication that you don’t have any difficulty with us starting off the proceedings. Would you just deal with that?
MR JANSEN: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman, I actually omitted to place that on record, that I have that problem at the moment. Arrangements are apparently being made at present to bring him here as soon as possible. We don’t have a problem if, subject to your arrangements, the proceedings proceed with the other witnesses and that if something unexpected is said during evidence or so on that affects my position I will certainly let you know, but I don’t foresee any such problems as far as the applicants themselves are concerned. Thank you Mr Chairman.
May I also place another matter on record? There was an affidavit drafted for Mr Mfalapitsa two or three weeks ago in accordance with an agreement we made with various parties at the round table meeting we had with Mr Justice Wilson and unfortunately that affidavit, basically just confirming the Amnesty Application and giving some background, was apparently not circulated to the other parties. I have done so this morning, circulated unsigned copies. I don’t think there’s anything contentious or new in them other than some background and I will be handing that to yourselves as soon as is necessary. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Jansen. Yes, I assume that if there were any difficulty in regard to the arrangement concerning the presence of Mr Mfalapitsa, the other parties would raise it. I assume that there is no problem with that. Under those circumstances we would proceed in the temporary absence of Mr Mfalapitsa, who will join us as soon as he is available. We have also noted the issue around the affidavit, Mr Jansen.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Knight, you told us that Mr Mfalapitsa would probably only be available tomorrow but we’d like the people to make arrangements to see whether we could have him here by lunch-time.
MR JANSEN:: I believe that is taking place already. The witness protection people have gone to fetch him.
MR TSHABALALA: With regard to the unsigned affidavit, I haven’t received it.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes I think Mr Jansen is furnishing one to you now. And for the Evidence Leader as well. I assume the other parties are in possession of it. Very well.
MR JANSEN: Chairperson before we start may we ask an indulgence to remove our jackets if you don’t mind.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I assume there’s no problem with that.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, we are aware that the Amnesty Committees, before which we have appeared in the past, have appreciated all efforts that we could make in order to facilitate matters and to expedite matters. In the past, Mr Chairperson, and this is the first time I am appearing before you, in the past what we have done was for every witness in every application to have prepared a fairly extensive document which included background of the applicant, the political background, the conflict of the past and matters related thereto. We have discovered, Chairperson, that much of that has by passage of time, become common cause. We all know of the conflict of the past and we have all now heard, including you I am certain Mr Chairperson, of what the position of the security force members was during those times.
With that in mind we have decided, Chairperson, that instead of burdening the records with a repetition of evidence for each and every applicant, we have taken the liberty of drafting one document which we call Algemene Agtergrond and which I will ask you to accept as an exhibit. At this stage may I be permitted just to say that what the document purports to do is to give a general background and it is hoped that in the case of most of the applicants it would apply to them. We undertake, when we start leading the evidence of every applicant which we will call as a witness, that he will indicate to you if there is anything in that document which he feels does not apply to him and in that process we hope, Chairperson, that we might be able to contribute to accelerating the process a little more. If I may then ask you to accept the document which we have prepared, it is some twenty-two pages, twenty-one pages, Chairperson, and if you are satisfied with the background which I have sketched, to accept this document. I would ask you to mark this document "Exhibit A". All my witnesses will refer to this document. I might scan through the document with you once you’ve got it before you. They will not repeat the evidence, but they will incorporate this into their evidence.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Visser. I have no objection to my receiving this as "Exhibit A". It will then be "Exhibit A", the document headed 'Algemene Agtergrond tot Amnestie Aansoeke'.
MR VISSER: As it pleases the Committee. Chairperson, may I take you through this document very briefly? It will take a few minutes but it will save a lot of time later on. The document starts with a reference. I am just wondering whether the sound engineer can’t turn the sound a little bit down. Anyway, Chairperson, it starts with a reference to other evidence which the Amnesty Committee, or various Amnesty Committees have heard since the inception of the Amnesty proceedings. It refers to the Stigting vir Gelykheid voor die Reg which you are well aware of. That’s the document which was handed in by us already in the beginning of 1997 and it was marked an Exhibit P45. The reason for that Chairperson was precisely in order to attempt to avoid reproduction of the document for every single application in which we would appear.
That has been summarised in a book "The Other Side of the Story" by Herman Stadler, which I am sure you are well acquainted with. Then there is a presentation which was made by Gen van der Merwe which was Exhibit P46 and a statement by ex-Commissioners of the South African Police which was attached to P46 but we’ve marked that P47. Those documents are not before you today but as I say, and I say again, it is voluminous and we cannot expect the TRC to reproduce that volume of documents every time that we appear for applicants before you.
Then there was the evidence in Paragraph 4 of General van der Merwe, delivered before the original Amnesty Committee on 21 October and 27 February and in his evidence in the Stanza Bopape hearing, where Commissioner Gcabashe was in fact a Commissioner, I believe that Commissioner De Jager may also have been involved there, although I can’t remember.
And then in, most importantly, point 5, the evidence of Gen van der Merwe and ex-Minister of Law and Order, Mr Adriaan Vlok, in the Amnesty Applications regarding the Cosatu House, Khotso House and Cry Freedom. Again its quite voluminous Chairperson, but what you have in 22 pages before you now really contains extracts from those various portions of written and oral evidence and we wanted to make a point, Chairperson, we gave you an exact extract quotation from those documents so that it won’t really be necessary to study the documents in detail.
Chairperson, we then go on at page 2, dealing with the background and experiences of policemen. Here we are in the fortunate position that in the Amnesty Decision of the original Amnesty Committee at page 2, most of what we have argued before under this heading has been summarised and we give you the summary where the Amnesty Committee said, at page 2 "almost all policemen giving evidence before us etc. etc" and we will all rely on that passage to page three.
Chairperson, the typical experience of members of the police during the conflict of the past is set out from paragraph 8 onwards, it speaks for itself.
Again the Amnesty Committee at page 5 summarised accurately and concisely what the applicants up to now have been trying to tell the Amnesty Committees before whom they appeared. Also at page 6 there’s a reference to van der Merwe, it speaks for itself. And then as far as the question of the political background is concerned, we have given you at page 7 an extract of Adriaan Vlok’s evidence and we will not read that, it is there for you to read, it also is self-explanatory.
Chairperson, it goes on up to page 10 where we deal very concisely with the conflict of the past, the four pillars of the struggle and we give certain extracts of quotations, which we believe you will find helpful and which we believe are relevant to this issue. One of the quotations is fairly long and it deals with how the communistic danger was viewed, as expressed by Mr Adriaan Vlok.
Chairperson, I am sorry, I am mistaken, I am referring to the Amnesty Decision in Brig Cronje’s case, where the background is dealt with and where reference is made actually to the evidence of Mr Adriaan Vlok and Gen van der Merwe and where it is clear from the decision of the original Amnesty Committee, in our respectful submission Mr Chairperson, that it was intended to bind future Amnesty Committees in their hearings of applications.
If I may pause here for a moment. I don’t want to indulge in an argument on the stare decisis doctrine, but we know that in a commission of inquiry there is no such thing as stare decisis, but we would like to believe Chairperson, that where the original Amnesty Committee under the chairmanship and vice-chairmanship of Justices Moore and Wilson, invited applicants in future not to give a full account of the issues which they refer to but merely to refer to that evidence of Gen van der Merwe and Mr Vlok, that you will also accept and hold yourself bound to that decision.
Chairperson, the rest of this document you will find if you read it in your own good time, contains nothing which I really need to refer you to. As I said before, it really contains extracts from the evidence. I didn’t give cross-references for every single paragraph, but all of this comes out of the evidence which I have just referred to and where we do want to draw your attention, such as at the bottom of page 14, to particular evidence, we did so. In that case was, the one that I referred to just earlier of the Groot Gevaar, the communist expansionism and how South Africans viewed it.
Chairperson, at the bottom of page 15 we dealt with the role which was played by the neighbouring countries around South Africa and the influence that that had on the conflict of the past from the point of view of the security forces and we deal in turn with Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho. In Swaziland also there is included Mozambique.
Chairperson, in the present hearings Botswana will again feature when we come to take five (¼ indistinct) each of these and Swaziland will feature and Mozambique will feature, but we have done this in the sense that it is here before you if you want to refer to the other countries, we have made a very brief synopsis just to say how the applicants experienced the role and importance of those countries.
Chairperson now if I may, just on the question of these topics, say that of course there is far more evidence available regarding activities in our neighbouring countries during the conflict of the past than what we have placed before you. It was not intended that what you should get now before you to be exhaustive. For example, Commissioner de Jager will confirm that in the last hearings which we had in April there were incidents concerned with infiltration and weapon smuggling from Botswana in which we handed in documentation of voluminous format. When we realised that we were again going to talk about Botswana before you today, Chairperson, we just felt that it is just too unreasonable to expect that those documents be reproduced every time and what we have done is, therefore, given you a very brief synopsis. We believe Chairperson that most of this is also common cause. We know that the neighbouring countries were used as springboards and we know that the South African Police had no jurisdiction to act against activists in those countries. That is the reason also why there are applicants before you applying for amnesty in regard to what they did across the borders in our neighbouring countries.
Chairperson, we briefly deal at page 20 with the importance of information. The reason for that is that in many applications one finds that applicants will tell you that the acts, omission or offence which they committed had to do with the protection of identity, identities rather, of informers and it speaks for itself. Many applicants have told the Amnesty Committee that without information they were not able to effectively resist the revolutionary attack. We just made a few points for consideration under that last heading.
Chairperson, thank you for having listened to me. We hope that this may facilitate matters. The applicants will simply refer to that document, Exhibit A, insofar as it is applicable to them.
Chairperson, what we have also done, and I must say it was a very brief time which we had to prepare for the hearing, is to commence with drawing written notes of the evidence which the applicants will give before you. We believe that it will also accelerate matters. We have reached a point where we can now already give you the statements of today and the rest of the week will probably be available as well. What we have seen fit to do at this stage, just to facilitate your record holding of the exhibits, was to draw a preliminary list of exhibits. Not all these exhibits will be handed in to you straight away but they will be handed in to you as time goes on and as we have discussed it and confirmed it with the applicants. Chairperson, may I hand that up, its just a list of exhibits, nothing turns on it, if you’re not happy with it we
can change it, its not a problem.
By way of introduction that’s all I have to say at this stage, Chairperson, and if you’re satisfied so far, I would call Lieut Col Coetzee. I don’t think I’ve handed in his written statement to you, may I do so as well? That will now be Exhibit A as marked on the list. Exhibit B. Yes B.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Is Lieutenant Colonel Coetzee available? Thank you. Won’t you please stand? Can you give your full names for the record please.
JAN CAREL COETZEE: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, I am going to address you as Mr Coetzee. Your rank, or the last rank that you had was Lieutenant Colonel.
MR COETZEE:: That’s correct.
MR VISSER: You apply for amnesty for an incident where four Cosas members were involved close to Krugersdorp and in which three of them were killed and one of them was injured. Is that correct?
MR COETZEE:: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Your Amnesty Application appears in bundle one, on page 202, Chairperson. Have you gone through the Amnesty Application on page 202 and are you satisfied that it is correct.
MR COETZEE: Yes, I have gone through it.
MR VISSER: And except for some elaborations and aspects which we will point out, do you confirm the correctness of it?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And in paragraph 7(a) there is a question which leads "if you were a member or office bearer or supporter of any political organisation, please mention the name" and on your form the letters not applicable appear, is that correct, or is that wrong? Were you a supporter of a political party?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
MR VISSER: Which party?
MR COETZEE: National Party.
MR VISSER: And you were a supporter?
MR COETZEE: That’s correct.
MR VISSER: If we go to Exhibit B you asked the Committee to incorporate the contents of Exhibit A into you evidence, is that correct? Are there any aspects in Exhibit A which are not applicable to you?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, the whole document is applicable to me and also the evidence which is referred to in Exhibit A. That is correct.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, perhaps I should leave for Argument in each case paragraph 1 because it deals with the various offences which may be involved. I don’t see much point in going through that with the witness, it’s a matter of argument really.
Page 2 at paragraph 2. Can you just start there and tell us what your role was and what the background was to this incident? May I just put it to you by introduction that, is it correct that in February 1992 you were the newly appointed commander of Vlakplaas?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Operational Commander, Chairperson. And one of the first tasks you performed was to move with the Askaris in the vicinity of Soweto and the surrounding areas where you attempted to identify terrorists. Is that correct?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And once again, just by way of introduction, the manner in which you acted, can you
tell the Committee briefly how the Askaris acted in order to perform this task.
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, the Askaris and the black members of the force traveled in different vehicles in these areas specifically taxi ranks, railway stations etc. and the white members were stationed at other places in our own vehicles and in radio contact with them.
MR VISSER: And if they had noted anyone and they wanted to execute an arrest, what would be the position?
MR COETZEE: If it was possible, Chairperson, they would call us and we would assist them.
MR VISSER: Yes, and was it true that because black members of the police were there they could execute arrests?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well. And in your Amnesty application Mr Coetzee, there is a reference to Joe Mamasela and Mfalapitsa.
MR COETZEE: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Who were they at that stage in February 1992.
MR COETZEE: They formed part of that specific group at that stage in that area, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Were they members of the police or the Askaris?
MR COETZEE: They were both Askaris. I’m not sure of Mfalapitsa.
MR VISSER: Just give us some background to Mr Mfalapitsa, but you mention this on page 3 paragraph 4.
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, Mfalapitsa was earlier an ANC terrorist who received military training in Eastern Europe and after he returned to South Africa he handed himself over to the security forces and became a member of my unit at Vlakplaas.
MR VISSER: And that would be as an Askari?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Continue please.
MR COETZEE: Mr Mfalapitsa was back in the country and this was not generally known to the public and to the people who knew him and this was advantageous from the viewpoint as to the role which he could play at the security branch, in other words he could act anonymously.
MR VISSER: People thought that he was still a supporter of the ANC?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VISSER: At the start of paragraph 6 the story begins with how this incident took place. Can you please mention in to the Committee.
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, on a certain day Mfalapitsa reported the following to me, that a certain Zandile Musi, that he had met this person and that he had known him from a previous occasion. This Musi had two brothers with whom Mfalapitsa received military training abroad and I understand that they left the country together. Musi’s two brothers, who were also trained terrorists, were at that stage not back in South Africa and Musi approached Mfalapitsa and told him that he and three of his friends who were members of the Congress of South African Students, Cosas members, that they wanted to kill Warrant Officer Nkosi.
MR VISSER: May I just interrupt you here? Will you please just go a little slower to allow the interpretation to take place.
CHAIRPERSON: His evidence is just about the same as what he gives here but he does not read the sentences in that order. I know that the interpreters have these documents before them and interpret from there and if he feels that he doesn’t want to give it in this manner he must just give his evidence but when (¼ indistinct) with the documents it would be easier, but otherwise he has to say that he is diverting from the document.
MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson. I agree and comprehend. Would you just stick to the document and if you want to add anything there, please tell us so, but please stick to the document.
You had spoken of W/O Nkosi whom they wanted to kill. Is that correct?
MR COETZEE: That is correct Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Where was he stationed?
MR COETZEE: He was stationed at Security Branch, Krugersdorp.
MR VISSER: And what was the request from Musi according to your report, with the request to Mfalapitsa?
MR COETZEE: It was in the last sentence of paragraph 6. His request was that Mfalapitsa had to train them in weaponry and that he had to supply them with weapons. Do I continue?
MR VISSER: Yes please.
MR COETZEE: This was a time of large scale violence directed at police officers and Black Council members which included the burning down of houses and several murders of members and their family members. My attention was drawn to the fact that Mfalapitsa had applied for Amnesty and that he has also spoken of the plans of the group to kill one Matsibitso who was a teacher and member of the Council. I cannot recall it but I would accept that it was so.
MR VISSER: Chairperson it really starts at page 237 at the bottom and it runs over the page, where you will find that evidence. Please continue with paragraph 9 on page 4.
MR COETZEE: I then decided to discuss the problem with Brig Willem Schoon, the Commander of C Unit at
Headquarters. I gave him the information and I explained the problem to him.
MR VISSER: Can you just pause here. For the members who do not know Brig Willem Schoon was the overall Commander of Vlakplaas, was that not so?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And that is the reason why you went to him?
MR COETZEE: Yes, he was my immediate Commander.
MR VISSER: He was your Commander?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Please continue. Paragraph 10.
MR COETZEE: He instructed me to tell Mfalapitsa to convince the members of Cosas not to go through with their plans and I executed this instruction and gave the necessary instructions to Mfalapitsa. A day later Mfalapitsa reported back to me that these Cosas members did not want to forego their plan and that they were quite serious and they still had a sketched plan whereby certain houses were marked for attacks and they wanted to do something for the struggle. It seemed that there was nothing to do about the situation and that Nkosi’s life was in real danger. I discussed the matter with Brig Schoon. The problem that we had was that if these youths had been arrested this would lead to the exposure of Mfalapitsa. Not only would it mean that Mfalapitsa would be of no use or little use to the police, but it would also place his life and the lives of his family members in danger. The security branch’s success was dependent on information. Askaris played a valuable role in the identification of ANC supporters. Without the help of Askaris and informants the security branch would not be able to stop the revolutionary onslaught and the circumstances therefore was a dilemma for us. The plans – we discussed a few possibilities which included arrest. This could not be executed because of the following reasons and considerations
To arrest him immediately would necessarily mean that Mfalapitsa had to be a state’s witness and the Cosas members would be aware of the fact that he was working with the security forces and even if he disguised himself while giving evidence, the Cosas members would be able to deduce his identity from his evidence.
If Mfalapitsa could not be used as a state witness they would be found guilty of illegal possession of weapons, ammunition and explosives. This offence was not so serious that it would be sure that they would be removed from the community for a long time.
MR VISSER: You mean that they would not be sent to jail for a long time?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
There was also the danger that if they were to be charged with a crime, they could mention or name Mfalapitsa as the person whom they received the weapons from and this would necessarily lead to the exposure of the fact that he was an Askari. I then suggested that there was just one option and this was to kill them. I suggested that weapons and/or explosive devices be given to them and that I find a suitable place at some mine where this instruction would take place and that an explosion be orchestrated which would point to the fact that they had blown themselves up.
Brig Schoon undertook to receive instructions to this and that he would inform me at a later stage.
Brig Schoon contacted me later and informed me that the matter would be considered properly to eliminate these youths and he gave me the authorisation to continue with my plan.
I have said in my Amnesty Application, as I have understood this instruction it was correct because this pointed to the safeguarding of a police officer and his family. By that I did not mean to give notice that I acted legally, justified would be a better word to use. I was aware that this action would be a crime and is an irregular action and in co-operation with an explosives expert from the SAP at that stage, it was Lieut C Rorich, explosives were placed in the room where the training of these youths would take place.
MR VISSER: If I could just interrupt you there.
On page 203 of your Amnesty Application you referred to the date as 15 February. How do you know that this is the date, 15 February 1982?
MR COETZEE: I cannot recall the date, Chairperson. This incident took place 17 years ago. I read the date in the newspaper.
MR VISSER: Would you please continue with paragraph 20 on page 7.
MR COETZEE: Joe Mamasela transported the youths and Mfalapitsa to this house where the explosives were. There were two or three F1 Russian hand grenades which I had found at Vlakplaas and these I gave to Mfalapitsa to hand to Cosas members. There could have been a pistol.
MR VISSER: You refer to the pistol.
MR COETZEE: Once again because in newspaper reports a pistol was mentioned. That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR COETZEE: These Cosas members and Mfalapitsa were in the room busy with their training in weapons and at some stage Mfalapitsa came outside and Lieut Rorich executed the explosion while Col Grobbelaar and I and one of his staff members observed the premises and after the explosion we left the scene immediately.
MR VISSER: To prevent any identification, the member to which you refer was not identified here, who is it?
MR COETZEE: It was W/O van Tonder, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, we refer to paragraph 22, and where is Mr van Toner today?
MR COETZEE: He has died in a motor vehicle accident.
MR VISSER: Very well, continue.
MR COETZEE: And after the explosion we immediately left the scene to prevent any identification. It seemed later that the three youths, B Madikela, N Matabane and S Mohlapo were killed in this explosion and that Sandile Musi was injured.
MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, where did you get these names from?
MR COETZEE: Once again from a report, but the name of Musi I can remember.
The act, this was to the instructions of members of security branch at headquarters and the following day I reported to Brig Schoon that the incident had been concluded and that three of the Cosas members had been killed and one had escaped, but it has to be that one had survived, Chairperson.
Post mortem inquests were carried out, normal inquests were carried out by the other branches of the force and as it appears in 1P47 later, I request that my amnesty be granted to me for my role in this tragic event on the grounds of the considerations as it is put here and in the general background document. I want to emphasise that my action took place during the struggle of the past, that it was aimed at the supporters of the liberation struggle in the safeguarding and maintenance of the previous government and that I bona fide believed that my action was part of my task as a police officer and in the execution of my tasks as a police officer and request that amnesty be granted to me for my actions in this incident.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: For no other reason than logistical, I’ll start with you Ms van der Walt, you are right next to Mr Visser.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS VAN DER WALT: Mr Coetzee, Mr Rorich who is my client, his Amnesty Application is filed under Annexure A and these applications were not bound in a bundle. I want to know if you have seen this application.
MR COETZEE: No I have not, Chairperson.
MS VAN DER WALT: I would just like to point out certain aspects to you. According to Mr Rorich he was stationed at Ermelo’s security branch. Is that correct?
MR COETZEE: That is correct, Chairperson.
MS VAN DER WALT: Why did you approach him?
MR COETZEE: The first reason was because I trusted him. The second reason was because I did not have the means to cause an explosion and I was aware of the fact that he could.
MS VAN DER WALT: Is it correct that he is an explosives expert?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MS VAN DER WALT: And is it correct, because in his application in Annexure A9 he was not tasked with the investigation to these youths, the only purpose for which you approached him was to execute this explosion?
MR COETZEE: Correct, Chairperson.
MS VAN DER WALT: You also mention in paragraph 23 and it was put to you where you got these names from and you said it was from a newspaper report, I would like to put it to you that Mr Rorich has only taken note of the names now in your application.
No further questions, Chairperson, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Ms van der Walt.
Adv Jansen.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman.
Mr Coetzee just a few aspects which I want you to confirm as to the practice of Vlakplaas. Is it so that the members of Vlakplaas, when they undertook this identification of insurgents of the ANC, did they work in groups?
MR COETZEE: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR JANSEN: And these groups were to some extent territorial in the sense that some of them worked in the Eastern Transvaal, some of them in the Western Transvaal, depending on where they had knowledge of the area.
MR COETZEE: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR JANSEN: And it was logical that a person like Mr Mfalapitsa who knew Botswana, would be deployed to a group who worked in Western Transvaal and on the West Rand?
MR COETZEE: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR JANSEN: I would assume that, except for the work of this person so as to identify a person who would be an insurgent from Botswana to South Africa, this was also part, to identify people who wanted to go out for training abroad who were supporters of the ANC or were otherwise actively involved in ANC activities.
MR COETZEE: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR JANSEN: I don’t know if you have had regard for the Affidavit of Mr Mfalapitsa but there is one aspect where he differs from you in the sense that he cannot remember something that you have mentioned. You mentioned that you gave him instructions to convince the four Cosas members not to continue with their plan to kill the policeman. He says that he has no recollection of that instruction and I just put it to you, would you like to comment?
MR COETZEE: Chairman, my comment is that the statement that I had made is the truth as I recall it. I know that I have had sleepless nights because of this and I have done everything in my power to prevent that these persons who undertook this training and committed the murder, I had indeed told Mfalapitsa that he had to try to convince them and I told him, mention it that your brothers are still abroad and they must wait till the Cadres come back, and must reconsider it. They are children, they don’t know anything of these activities.
MR JANSEN: I would like to take it up with you. Can you recall where this discussion took place?
MR COETZEE: No I cannot.
MR JANSEN: No further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Tshabalala?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR TSHABALALA: Thank you Mr Chairman.
Mr Coetzee, when Mfalapitsa reported to you the Cosas wanted to go ahead with their plan, did you have any alternative plan?
MR COETZEE: My alternative plan was to eliminate them, Chairperson.
MR TSHABALALA: You mentioned that you took into account the family and the life of W/O Nkosi in taking out the instructions that the deceased should be eliminated. Did you ever think about the deceased and their families at the time?
MR COETZEE: I did and this matter weighed very heavily upon me and today, with great humility, I would like to express my sincere sympathy to the next of kin of the victims because this is not something that I would have wanted.
MR TSHABALALA: I take it that the security laws at the time were tough and efficient for the State. It provided wide powers for the security police at the time to keep people in custody. Was it not possible for yourself to use these powers provided by the law?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, I have already stated in my evidence why that route wasn’t followed. I don’t know whether or not I could elaborate any further about that.
MR TSHABALALA: Well, I would like you to elaborate.
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, I mentioned the options which were considered. In the first place there was arrest, detention without trial, all these options would have led to Mfalapitsa’s exposure and for us it was a dilemma.
MR TSHABALALA: Did you ever think that he would be exposed at any time?
MR COETZEE: At that stage I didn’t think so.
MR TSHABALALA: At the time did you think that eliminating the deceased, was it proportional to your duties at the time?
MR COETZEE: At that stage as a result of the terrible conditions under which this country was, I felt that it was justifiable.
MR TSHABALALA: Will you still think the same today?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, as a result of the political changes since that time, we are no longer under the same conditions and for that reason I don’t have the same opinion as what I held in 1982.
MR TSHABALALA: Did you ever find out whether you were dealing with highly politically matured persons or with youths who were caught in the political situation at the time?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, at that stage the youth, especially from 16 June 1976 when the RSA started burning, the youth especially was used effectively by the ANC SACP Alliance by means of various organisations namely the U D F, Cosas, the Civics, the Defence Units and so forth. They were used to promote the objectives of the ANC, to topple the government of the day by means of violence and to create chaos in the country, with the effect that the security forces would then not be able to execute their duties and that would render the country ungovernable. I could carry on.
MR TSHABALALA: This is probably what made you to want to convince Mfalapitsa to convince again the deceased not to go ahead with their plan.
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR TSHABALALA: Yet you knew that these people are being used by the liberation movement.
MR COETZEE: That is correct, Chairperson, and I couldn’t do anything about that personally.
MR TSHABALALA: What was the response of your superiors after you carried out your plan?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, do you mean superiors such as Brig Schoon or somebody else?
MR TSHABLALA: The top of the security forces or whoever you are reporting to.
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, the only person at head office with whom I had a discussion regarding this matter was Brig Schoon and nobody else. When I informed him about what had happened afterwards, I don’t believe that he had anything to say, I can’t recall what his reaction was.
MR TSHABALALA: What remuneration did you get for executing the plans.
MR COETZEE: Absolutely nothing. Zero.
MR TSHABALALA: Another question. You mentioned that you found out about the names of the other deceased in the papers but Musi you knew. Why did you know Musi and the others you don’t know?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, for several years I was stationed at Krugersdorp in the security branch before 1982 and thereafter once again and I was up to date with the circumstances of the Musi family. I was aware of the fact that two brothers namely Benjamin and Wellington had left the country and underwent military training abroad. At Krugersdorp there were files of these persons for illegal
defection and terrorist training, there were files about them which I studied and, in other words, I was completely aware of their circumstances. It was not strange to me, and I knew that there were other brothers at that house because now and then we would visit the premises in order to determine whether or not these persons had returned home.
MR TSHABALALA: I put it to you that the youth and including Zandisile Musi, were not planning to kill W/O Nkosi.
MR COETZEE: That’s incorrect.
MR TSHABALALA: Thank you Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Tshabalala.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR TSHABALALA
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Tshabalala.
Ms Thabethe.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Thank you Mr Chair, just one aspect.
Mr Coetzee, I don’t know whether I heard you correctly, did you say you made the decision yourself, you took that decision yourself to kill the victims?
MR COETZEE: Let me put it as follows: It does not matter which decision I would have taken in this regard, the decision which was conveyed to me from Head office by Brig Schoon, was the decision that I would have stuck by.
MS THABETHE: I am saying you didn’t make that decision yourself, you were given orders from Head office.
MR COETZEE: That’s correct.
MS THABETHE: Okay, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS THABETHE
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms Thabethe
Mr Coetzee, is it correct to say that you are the person who proposed the plan. You were the source of the idea to kill these persons.
MR COETZEE: That’s true.
CHAIRPERSON: What information did you have surrounding
the persons against whom action had to be taken?
MR COETZEE: Information that I had about them was everything which Mfalapitsa, who was the middleman, had told me. I never dealt with them personally, I didn’t know who they were.
CHAIRPERSON: So in your work situation you have never dealt with any one of the deceased or the survivor?
MR COETZEE: I had absolutely nothing to do with the three deceased. As I have mentioned, there were times that I went to the house of this Musi and I recall that I saw him there and understood that he was one of the children of that home.
CHAIRPERSON: But you had no reason to pay any attention to him within the context of your duties as a security police officer?
MR COETZEE: No, not at that stage.
CHAIRPERSON: What did Mfalapitsa tell you with regard to these four persons?
MR COETZEE: He said that these four persons, or at least firstly Musi, approached him alone.
CHAIRPERSON: I am sorry I am going to interrupt you now. I don’t want you to explain the plans that they had, I want you to tell us what he told you about those four persons, who they were and what the situation was. What did he inform you about? You said that all that you knew about these four persons was what Mfalapitsa had told you.
MR COETZEE: That’s correct. He mentioned to me that they were youths and I was aware of the fact that Cosas members were youths. So that wasn’t new to me.
CHAIRPERSON: And what else did he say? He mentioned that they were youths.
MR COETZEE: Yes he said they were youths and that they had certain objectives as a group, certain actions that they were going to execute. However, that they were not sufficiently trained to execute this alone and that they did not have suitable weaponry to do so. They were aware of the fact that Mfalapitsa was a trained ANC terrorist and they wanted him to help them with their plans.
CHAIRPERSON: Thus the image that Mfalapitsa conveyed to you was of these four youths who had this idea that they didn’t have the personal capacity to undertake their idea, they didn’t have the weapons and they didn’t have the training. So basically you had four kids with an idea.
MR COETZEE: Yes, that’s correct, but I must mention that initially it was an idea as you have put it, but upon the next meeting when Mfalapitsa came to me and said "These guys have a sketch plan which indicates the streets and Nkosi’s house and the homes of Council members and they’re serious, they want to carry this out", I was in a dilemma really.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and still they didn’t have the personal capacity to execute this plan which they had put on paper without the assistance of Mfalapitsa.
MR COETZEE: Well Chairperson, let me put it as follows, with Mfalapitsa’s assistance they would perhaps have been able to do a best job. It was commonly known that the youths during those years would throw petrol bombs everywhere. They would have been able to apply that method without Mfalapitsa, its possible, I don’t know but for more effective elimination of Nkosi and his family by means of training and suitable weaponry would have rendered a more effective onslaught.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, so in other words there was always the possibility of petrol bombs but what they had in mind and what they held by was for Mfalapitsa to train them and to provide weaponry for them to execute this plan.
MR COETZEE: That’s correct.
CHAIRPERSON: According to the information which you received, did these persons have any political profile?
MR COETZEE: Not that I knew of.
CHAIRPERSON: Would it be correct to say that you were motivated basically by your concerns regarding the safety of Nkosi?
MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson. I might just mention to you that this specific Nkosi was a man with whom I had worked for several years. He was a highly respected figure in the community. He was the best black security member in Krugersdorp. I knew him very well personally as well as his family and that year had been the first occasion upon which black members had been allocated a housing subsidy.
He built a beautiful brick house for himself in Kagiso and I could really not see why I should sit still and watch this man and his family be murdered and see his home torched and so forth. It weighed very heavily upon me.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but do I understand you correctly that this was the basic consideration which you held for your actions, the protection of Nkosi and his family?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Was there no other way in which you could protect Nkosi and his family except for the killing of these four youths.
MR COETZEE: No Chairperson. I know it sounds very strange to say that one murder is committed in order to prevent another. I understand that many people struggle to accept this, but unfortunately that was the genuine state of play.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you consider anything else? Did you try to think of other plans or ways in which you could protect Nkosi and his family, placing guards or removing them from that residential area?
MR COETZEE: I warned Nkosi, I told him that I had information that these guys wanted to get him. I told him to be careful.
CHAIRPERSON: But did you still deem it necessary to kill the deceased?
MR COETZEE: Yes, that was my reasoning.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Has the panel got any other questions?
ADV DE JAGER: You approached Rorich to offer assistance. What rank did you have and what rank did he have?
MR COETZEE: At that stage I was a Captain and I am not certain whether or not he was a Warrant Officer or a lieutenant.
ADV DE JAGER: But you occupied a higher rank than he did?
MR COETZEE: Yes, that’s correct.
ADV DE JAGER: And if you requested or gave him orders, was he to obey you?
MR COETZEE: Yes, under normal circumstances, but this was not a legal order.
ADV DE JAGER: Yes I understand that but under normal circumstances with normal commands or orders,
He would have to obey you?
MR COETZEE: Yes, that’s correct.
ADV GCABASHE: Just a follow-up on that aspect. Would you have to inform his Commander that you had a task for him, Rorich’s Commander?
MR COETZEE: It would be appropriate for his Commander to be informed.
ADV GCABASHE: Did you do that?
MR COETZEE: I did not. I did not contact his Commander or any other person with regard to this matter.
ADV GCABASHE: Therefore did he come and assist you where his own command structure did not know about the task on hand?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, because the order came from Brig. Schoon who was the overall Commander of the security office. There is an old saying which says that the less you know about something, the better for you. So in other words there were no wide discussions about these matters with every Tom, Dick and Harry.
ADV GCABASHE: Did you tell him that Brig Schoon had authorised this particular operation?
MR COETZEE: I did.
ADV GCABASHE: And you explained to him that this involved the killing of certain people?
MR COETZEE: No, that’s correct.
ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.
Can I come to Brig Schoon. Do you know who he got his orders from?
MR COETZEE: I don’t know.
ADV GCABASHE: And was it not your business to find out either?
MR COETZEE: Not at all. We also had a restriction of work.
ADV GCABASHE: Did he question you on your recommendation that these four youths were dangerous, just to summarise the whole matter.
MR COETZEE: Yes, we did discuss that. I presented all the possibilities to him. He asked me whether I couldn’t do this or couldn’t do that. We had a discussion about it, that is correct.
ADV GCABASHE: You were at the scene and, correct me if I’m wrong, when Mfalapitsa and Mamasela arrived with the youths. You were somewhere in the vicinity?
MR COETZEE: That’s correct.
ADV GCABASHE: But you obviously couldn’t be seen by them.
MR COETZEE: No.
ADV GCABASHE: Can you recall how long it was before Mfalapitsa came out of the mine area, when he came back, time?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, I cannot tell you with regard to the course of time because at that stage I was moving back to the vehicle which had been parked in the bushes, so Mfalapitsa was not within my sight, I couldn’t see him.
ADV GCABASHE: As I understand the general evidence, as soon as he came out the idea was that the explosives would then be detonated?
MR COETZEE: That is correct and Rorich was the person who could see Mfalapitsa, not me.
ADV GCABASHE: Then one last aspect. You say in paragraph 23 of I think this is Exhibit B, your statement, that it later turned out that these particular youths, three had died and one had been injured.
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
ADV GCABASHE: How much later was that?
MR COETZEE: The following day.
ADV GCABASHE: Out of the police contingent that came to do I’ll call it a clearing up job, you did not come then?
MR COETZEE: Not at all.
ADV GCABASHE: Were those policemen instructed by you at all to go to this particular scene? Just explain those circumstances as far as you know of those.
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, regarding that matter, the local police handled it as they would have handled any regular explosion and any other unnatural death and so forth. With regard to that matter, my group and I had nothing to do with it. The cover was that these people had blown themselves up in other words. I hope you understand.
CHAIRPERSON: I don’t think you understand the question. How did the police come to hear of it?
MR COETZEE: I don’t know.
CHAIRPERSON: You did not notify them?
MR COETZEE: No.
ADV DE JAGER: And a previous question you were asked, how long after they arrived there did Mamasela come out of the house. Did you hear the explosion?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
ADV DE JAGER: How long after their arrival did the explosion take place?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, you’re asking me about something which took place 17 years ago and if I had to give you an accurate time, I would be lying. Really, I hope you can accept that.
ADV DE JAGER: Yes, you have told us that you can’t tell us in terms of minutes, but was it quite a while, a long while, or was it a short while?
MR COETZEE: I really can’t remember. I don’t wish to compromise my evidence by saying that it was a half hour or 45 minutes, it could have been just a few minutes, I’m not sure.
ADV GCABASHE: One final aspect. Mfalapitsa had known the Musi brothers previously.
MR COETZEE: That’s correct.
ADV GCABASHE: He knew the family?
MR COETZEE: He went to school with them as far as I understood.
ADV GCABASHE: I’m just thinking broadly here. Were you sure at the time, and are you sure today, that there was nothing personal between the Musi family and Mfalapitsa that might have lead to this
particular incident? I am simply asking whether you considered that at all.
MR COETZEE: I wasn’t aware of any actions between the Musi family and Mfalapitsa. He did not mention
this to me so I could not have known about something like that.
CHAIRPERSON: Adv Visser, re-examination?
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: One aspect, Chairperson. Your leave, I think it has been dealt with but just one aspect. You have told the Committee that youths were applied by the ANC SACP Alliance in order to promote their interests in the struggle.
MR COETZEE: That’s correct.
MR VISSER: I think the question of the Chairperson was, if they did not supply weapons to these four persons, there wouldn’t really be a problem. Would you have regarded it as such?
MR COETZEE: I could not regard it as such. Nkosi could have been killed in many other ways. He could have been stabbed.
MR VISSER: And you referred to the use of petrol bombs.
MR COETZEE: That’s correct.
MR VISSER: Was that a generally common thing which appeared or was it not as regular?
MR COETZEE: It was a very common occurrence, almost on a daily basis.
MR VISSER: And with regard to the political aspect Mr Coetzee, which political sentiments do you think these persons held? Of which groups or parties were they members or supporters?
MR COETZEE: I have no doubt that the entire Musi family were either supporters of or members of the
ANC and I can motivate why I make that statement.
In terms of section 118 of the Post Office Act, all postal items to that house were intercepted by the security police. The family of a certain organisation overseas, it was Amnesty International, gave assistance to families of those who had defected and offered material assistance to them, so there was no doubt within my mind that they were members of the ANC. Regarding the other members, I cannot offer any opinion because I didn’t know.
With Cosas, an organisation which was affiliated with a political organisation or party, you will know that Cosas was an affiliate of the UDF and that the UDF was the internal wing of the ANC and one could continue as such.
MR VISSER: Is that the reason why you say that your action was committed against supporters of the liberation movement?
MR COETZEE: That’s correct.
MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes Adv Gcabashe.
ADV GCABASHE: There is just one aspect I forgot, one question I forgot to ask. The R1 000 that was paid to Mfalapitsa, what was the purpose of paying that?
MR VISSER: Chairperson, it was the policy of the government and/or the security Head office to reward black, and I emphasise the word black, members for actions that would be with the identification or arrests of insurgents and so forth. White members never received any reward in this relation according to my recollection, the reason for that being that blood is thicker than water and the rewards were offered in order to secure the loyalty of these persons towards us.
ADV GCABASHE: Would you then say, just your own opinion, that the fact that he knew that he would get this money, I mean it was general practice in the security forces, the fact that he knew he would get this money would not have motivated him to put particular things in a particular way.
MR COETZEE: He didn’t know that he would be rewarded for his actions. On the contrary Mfalapitsa had only been back in the country for a few weeks and this was the first matter, according to my knowledge, in which he was involved. I can guarantee that it was not presented to him that he would do A, B and C and receive a reward for his actions. That was not what was told to him.
ADV GCABASHE: Thank you Chair.
MR VISSER: I know that you will probably want to take an adjournment but the last question has now prompted re-examination on that issue.
CHAIRPERSON: I suspected that Mr Visser but before you do that I also have, just in that regard, a question or two and you might want to take them all together.
Would the black members who were working for you all have been aware that they were established members of this unit? Would they all have been aware of this policy of rewards for actions?
MR COETZEE: I believe so.
CHAIRPERSON: So to be specific, Mamasela, was he at that stage an established member of the units?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, I speak under correction but I would believe that on 27 February Mamasela was sworn in as a full member of the security police and that he was affiliated to Vlakplaas on a full time basis thereafter. It was a few days before the incident.
CHAIRPERSON: You are speaking of being formally sworn in, but did he work at Vlakplaas?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: For a time before this incident?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Would he have been aware of this police or rewarding black members?
MR COETZEE: I believe so, but I don’t want to say that with regard to all incidents the black members were rewarded, I wouldn’t be able to say that. It was even the policy to reward members of the public. If you provided any information about any weaponry you would receive a reward.
CHAIRPERSON: But would it be reasonable to say that the average black member who was involved with Vlakplaas knew that there was money involved in actions?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: You say that Mamasela was with Mfalapitsa on the evening or during the day of the incident?
MR COETZEE: Yes. He took him there and left the scene afterwards.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. So he transported Mfalapitsa and the Cosas members from one place to the place where the incident took place?
MR COETZEE: That is correct?
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.
Mr Coetzee you may be confused. He referred to black members and you do not distinguish between policemen and Askari members. Is there a distinction with regard to these rewards that you have mentioned or was there no distinction?
MR COETZEE: There is indeed a distinction. The opinion that black members also worked for a salary like we did and for that reason they did not receive those rewards and that only turned or rehabilitated Askaris would receive rewards.
MR VISSER: I think for that reason previous evidence may have been confusing. So policemen were not rewarded.
MR COETZEE: That’s correct. However, there were exceptional cases for which there was a procedure. Commissioner de Jager will recall that in the Northern Transvaal there was an Amnesty Application during which a black member had received a reward. He was a policeman, but there was a special procedure. In such a case the Commander would send a memo to Head office in which he would recommend a reward.
MR VISSER: And that would be for exceptional bravery or the uncommon adherence to duties. You were aware of such a situation?
MR COETZEE: Yes I heard of that.
MR VISSER: But this is not what we are talking about here. We are talking about actions during the struggle of the past and you would concur then as I understand you, that policemen were not rewarded.
MR COETZEE: That’s correct.
MR VISSER: But the Askaris were a completely different issue because they didn’t receive any salaries.
MR COETZEE: Yes, that’s correct.
MR VISSER: And mostly they received money for services rendered. In other words upon achievement.
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Now that achievement, was that the
commission of illegal acts for which they were rewarded with money or was it about arrests, about legal actions?
MR COETZEE: I would say that it was mostly about legal actions.
MR VISSER: And let it not be said that we have said something which once again creates confusion.
It is true that later, I’m not entirely sure exactly when, but later the Askaris were paid a salary.
MR COETZEE: Later some of them were sworn in as full members of the South African Police in order to overcome that problem because then they would be receiving a salary and they wouldn’t be paid these rewards any further.
ADV GCABASHE: I am sorry there is just one answer I did not get. Did you say they would be paid for legal or illegal actions, the translation didn’t quite come through.
MR COETZEE: For legal actions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Adv Jansen have you got anything ...(indistinct)
MR JANSEN: Yes Mr Chairman I do.
Mr Coetzee I would just like to remind you of a number of facts and ask you to say what you can confirm and what not. But what you knew of Vlakplaas before you took over there as the Commander, is it correct that Vlakplaas, before its division into these formal detection groups, offered accommodation for these Askaris through the years, from the beginning in the 1970’s.
MR COETZEE: Yes, that’s correct.
MR JANSEN: And the Askaris, that being ANC members who had joined the SAP or had started working for the S A P, were always registered as Head office informers and that they were paid in that way.
MR COETZEE: Yes, that’s correct.
MR JANSEN: In 1981 for example Joe Mamasela was a registered informer who worked for you in the West Rand.
MR COETZEE: Yes, that’s correct.
MR JANSEN: However, he lived at Vlakplaas for security reasons.
MR COETZEE: At a stage, yes indeed. He didn’t live there full time, intermittently, that’s correct.
MR JANSEN: And when you took over in 1982, I think it was in the beginning of January.
MR COETZEE: Yes, that’s correct.
MR JANSEN: Was that the logical consequence of your connection with Mamasela, that he would go over to Vlakplaas on a permanent basis.
MR COETZEE: Yes.
MR JANSEN: If I understand Capt. Dirk Coetzee, your predecessor’s evidence in this matter correctly, at that stage at the beginning of 1982 the policy with regard to Askaris was changing, in other words a decision was taken to have all Askaris join as full members of the S A P at some or other point after a gradual process.
MR COETZEE: Let me explain it as follows. In other words such an Askari would have to prove himself first. He would have to prove himself to be reliable and trustworthy.
MR JANSEN: Yes, I’m sorry to interrupt you. I didn’t understand that anybody would automatically join the police after being stationed at Vlakplaas.
MR COETZEE: It wouldn’t happen immediately but it would take place after a period of time.
MR JANSEN: But Head office didn’t want to continue the policy or the practice of paying Askaris a monthly amount as so-called Head office informers, they wanted them to be full members.
MR COETZEE: Chairperson my knowledge about that subject with regard to the previous practice of paying these individuals a monthly amount created problems because the police budget came from secret funds and funds were limited and so forth and in order to overcome that financial problem it was decided to make them policemen and pay them a salary and keep the reward, because those rewards would
have to be requested every month along with motivations for why these rewards were required and this was creating problems and that was the reason why, after a while when it was determined that they were reliable and trustworthy, the decision was taken to make them police members.
MR JANSEN: But would you confirm that upon the arrival of such a person at Vlakplaas, such a person would be registered as a Head office informer.
MR COETZEE: Yes, that’s correct.
MR JANSEN: And such a person would then be paid on a discreet basis with regards to information received and the practice at that stage of monthly payments and so forth.
MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson, I don’t believe that all payments signified the same amount.
MR JANSEN: But it was not an uncommon practice for a person to pay his informer a monthly amount?
MR COETZEE: If it was justifiable, it would be done in such a way.
MR JANSEN: There would be certain typical practices of payment according to which a person would be paid on a monthly basis, but there would also be practices according to which informers would be paid per occasion for their supply of information.
MR COETZEE: Yes, that’s correct. I must just mention that you must draw the distinction. There were also agents. There were agents and sources. Agents were paid a fixed salary on a monthly basis but these Askaris were not agents as far as I knew, they were sources. In other words, they were rewarded occasionally and these rewards differed according to circumstances.
MR JANSEN: At this stage I would just like to place it on record, unfortunately I don’t have the opportunity to receive instructions with regard to these rewards with Mfalapitsa. As soon as he is present I will do so. I did not foresee this Chairperson, it did not appear from the documents and I am assuming that, due to that fact I did not take it up with Mr Mfalapitsa when I was in consultation with him. It is an omission on my behalf and I ask that you understand my position, that I have not received instructions with regard to this aspect.
CHAIRPERSON: So you cannot confirm that R1 000 was paid?
MR JANSEN: No, I cannot confirm that.
MR COETZEE: Excuse me Chairperson, maybe I can be of assistance. I cannot say whether he was rewarded with R1 000 but I know that headquarters gave me an amount of money and I gave it to him. He signed a receipt. I was not under the impression that it was R1 000. I don’t know if that can be of any assistance to you.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, may I just refer you to page 225 and perhaps my learned friend could take this up with his client, you will see that there is a discrepancy of R100.00 as opposed to R1 000.00. One of the two must be wrong, so it may be R100.00.
MR JANSEN: Sorry Mr Chairman, I see that now and I actually went through this application with my client and for some or other reason it doesn’t come back to me now but I accept that that must obviously be then confirmation of that and I assume that it would seem from the context, that it refers to this specific incident and not the other one. I note the discrepancy and I’ll take that up and we’ll confirm whatever the position to be. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think we did anticipate that you might have this kind of situation developing in the absence of your client and I think that is why we felt that perhaps its advisable that they should bring him here as soon as we can, but we have noted your position and obviously if something does arise from all this which we need to put to Mr Coetzee, then you know we’ll allow you an opportunity to do so at that stage.
MR JANSEN: Yes I apologise, Mr Chairman. I think the reason why it doesn’t come back to me, why I don’t recollect, I’d never thought this aspect to be contentious as I recollect my consultation, so I don’t think it should create a problem. Thank you Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, is there anything else.
MR VISSER: Except that we might consider taking a tea adjournment now.
CHAIRPERSON: I thought we would be at a stage where we could excuse the applicant, which I assume we can do. We will excuse you Mr Coetzee. It may be that further questions will be put to you later when we have regard for Mr Mfalapitsa’s position, but unfortunately he is not present.
MR VISSER: He is going to have to stay on until my learned friend has clarified his position because Mr Coetzee is from Durban and when he leaves it will be difficult to get him back. I suggest he rather stays and not be excused.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that makes sense. Do you follow Mr Coetzee?
MR COETZEE: Yes I do.
CHAIRPERSON: We want to take a brief adjournment. We’ll stand down for 15 minutes. We’ll reconvene at 12.15.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
