Amnesty Hearings

MR VISSER: We go to the next witness but before we do so, may I refer you to a bundle which we compiled, which is before you. It starts with the cover page of the Shell Bomb. Might I suggest that this be called Bundle 5. We will not immediately refer to it, the only reason why I mention it now is by virtue of certain questions that have been asked regarding Vlakplaas.

Just to draw your attention to the fact that at page 54 of bundle 5, right through to the end, which is page 88, you will find documentation relating to Vlakplaas, dealing with its establishment and its development and what was considered the purpose of Vlakplaas. It is not really important now, but the second point is that at page 54 you’ll see a P J Coetzee there. I just want to draw your attention to the fact that that is not the previous witness, that is General Petrus Johannes Coetzee.

Apart from that, and placing that on record Chairperson, I then call Brig Schoon. We have in his case also drawn a statement which will be C1 and we beg leave to hand that up to you. Brig Schoon will give his evidence in Afrikaans Chairperson.

W F SCHOON: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: They are not in possession of Exhibit C1, Mr Visser.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: They’ve got it right in front of them, Chairperson.

Mr Schoon, you are the applicant in this matter where you ask for amnesty in the incident of the death of three Cosas members and the injury to one other. Is that correct?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Your written application appears in Bundle 1 at page 10 and following. And this particular incident is found on page 72 of Bundle 1, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the contents of your written application as true and correct?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you would ask that this be incorporated into your evidence.

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And before you, you also have Exhibit C1 and this is a statement which was drawn up for you which you would use as a basis for your evidence, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: On page 1 you refer to relevant testimony, you refer to Exhibit A and the evidence mentioned in Exhibit A, you want to incorporate that into your evidence, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And then in C you refer to evidence which was rendered by yourself.

ADV DE JAGER: Just for the record, in paragraph 8 the exhibit was not numbered. I want to draw your attention to that.

MR VISSER: Thank you Commissioner de Jager. That would be Exhibit a, small a and small b. We did not know at that stage what the order of the exhibits would be.

From C onwards you refer to your own evidence. The first was on 19 November 1996 after a Subpoena which you received in terms of Section 29 of the TRC Act when you gave evidence before the Human Rights Commission. Is that correct?

MR SCHOON : That is correct.

MR VISSER: And at that instance you made a written submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And this, Chairperson, one finds in bundle 5, the new bundle 5, from page 36 and following. At this stage we are not going to refer to that further, this will be relevant later when we get to the Mnege Application.

And in E you mentioned that there also appeared in the armed forces hearing before the Human Rights Committee in October 1997 and as well in the COSATU House and KHOTSO House and the Amnesty Application of the attempted murder of Mr Marius Schoon in Botswana. You have also given evidence there, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Our current application deals with the murder of 3 Cosas members, their names are mentioned in paragraph 1 on page 2. Where did you get these names from?

MR SCHOON: From the pieces of the previous witness, Col Coetzee.

MR VISSER: And with regard to the date, is it the same?

MR SCHOON: Yes, it’s the same.

MR VISSER: Could you please tell us Brigadier, excuse me, Mr Schoon, you retired with the rank of Brigadier?

MR SCHOON: That’s correct.

MR VISSER: And in 1982 when this incident took place, what was your position then?

MR SCHOON: I was a colonel and in command of Group C at security headquarters in Pretoria.

MR VISSER: Group C, what did this include?

MR SCHOON: This dealt with the combating of terrorism, handling of arrested terrorists, the Askaris.

MR VISSER: And were you also in command in that capacity of Vlakplaas?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Very well. Can we then just arrive at the current incident. If you have regard for page 3 and paragraph 3, would you please inform the

Committee from there onwards? This is in Exhibit C1.

MR SCHOON: Paragraph 2 on page three, 1982, Col J.C. Coetzee, then Captain, was the Commander of Vlakplaas at this stage. Early in 1982 he was busy with investigation work and the finding of terrorists in the Soweto region. He received information from a new Askari who handed himself over to the police after he received training abroad.

MR VISSER: Please just go a touch slower.

MR SCHOON: Namely one Ephraim Mfalapitsa. I was aware that Ephraim Mfalapitsa had handed himself over to the SAP when he returned to the country. The fact that he was back in South Africa was not generally known and this had certain advantages from the viewpoint of the role that he could play for the security branch. The information which was conveyed to Col Jan Coetzee by Mfalapitsa was that he was, he had met with a certain Musi. This Musi had two brothers with whom Mfalapitsa had left the country to receive military training. Musi’s two brothers were not back in the R S A. Musi approached Mfalapitsa to inform him that he (that he and three other Cosas members) wanted to kill one W/O Nkosi who was stationed at Krugersdorp security branch. Musi asked Mfalapitsa to assist them with the supply of weapons and training in these weapons to execute this intention of killing Nkosi.

My attention was drawn to the fact that Mfalapitsa had also applied for amnesty and that he had spoken of this intention of this group to kill a black Council member, a teacher Matsidisa. This is in Bundle 1, page 231.

Because the incident came from a new Askari member who had to be protected at all costs, Col Coetzee decided to discuss the matter with me at my office.

MR VISSER: Very well Mr Schoon. The incident there should be information.

MR SCHOON: This is information received from the new Askari. That’s correct.

During February 1982 a discussion took place where Coetzee explained the problem with regard to the intended attack on Nkosi and his family and he asked me for my guidance. The incident also included the protection of Mfalapitsa’s identity.

After I discussed the incident with Col Jan Coetzee, I then suggested that he give Mfalapitsa instruction to speak to the four Cosas members to dissuade them from their plan. A few days later Col Jan Coetzee once again had discussion with me at my office. He told me that he had told Mfalapitsa about the instruction and that Mfalapitsa reported back to him that the Cosas members did not want to stop with their plan and that they were quite serious, that they had already drawn up a sketch plan. Certain houses were marked for attack and that they wanted to do something for the struggle and it had seemed then that there was nothing to do in the situation and that Nkosi’s life was in real danger.

I considered the matter seriously. The security branch’s success was dependent on information. Askaris played a valuable role in the identification of ANC supporters. Without the help of informants and Askaris, the security branch would not be able to stop the revolutionary onslaught.

Mfalapitsa’s participance with the security branch was not known to the Cosas members. This made him a very valuable person because he was not under suspicion from the ANC supporters. These circumstances then led to a dilemma and the options which we discussed was firstly the possibility of an arrest. This was not possible because of the following reasons and considerations. To arrest them immediately would mean that Mfalapitsa had to be a state witness and then the Cosas members would be made aware of the fact that he worked for the security branch. Even if he was disguised the Cosas members would deduce from the evidence that it was Mfalapitsa.

If Mfalapitsa couldn’t be applied as a state witness they would have been found guilty of illegal possession of either weapons, ammunition or explosive devices. This offence did not mean that they could be removed from the community.

MR VISSER: Meaning that they could not be sent to jail for a long period of time.

MR SCHOON: No, except for that if they were to be charged with some offence they would name Mfalapitsa as the person whom they received the weapons from and this would lead to the exposure of the fact that he was an Askari.

Col Jan Coetzee then proposed that there was just one option and this was to kill them. He suggested that weapons and/or explosive devices be given to them and that an explosion be established which would point to the fact that they had blown themselves up with weapons which they had in their possession.

I undertook to discuss the matter with a higher authority and he then left. I had discussion with Brig Jan du Preez and explained the whole matter to him. He was second in command of security branch at Headquarters. He did not need much convincing to give authorisation and to continue with the plan as it was suggested by Col Jan du Preez. The three of us reached consensus that this action was necessary to prevent that the ANC SACP Alliance by means of the four Cosas members, could exploit the situation surrounding Nkosi and to safeguard the lives of Nkosi and his family and to protect the identity and life of Mfalapitsa at all costs. If the four Cosas members were arrested, such action would expose Mfalapitsa’s identity and would place his life and the lives of his family members in danger.

If Nkosi or Mfalapitsa or any member of their family had died or been injured, it would, in my opinion, have led to the fact that it would have been used as propaganda to further the revolutionary struggle. This could lead that there would be separation between the members of the security branch and the black community in that community.

The situation would then lead to further suspense and conflict which would further the climate of unrest and revolution. It was therefore necessary to avoid this situation. I conveyed the decision of Brig Jan du Preez to Col Jan Coetzee.

The planning and execution of the action was not discussed by myself or Brig Jan du Preez and it was left to the operatives on the ground. I was however aware of the fact that the plan would be the following. Mfalapitsa would supply weapons to the Cosas members which came from Vlakplaas. He would then pretend to train the four Cosas members. A place was chosen close to a mine heap close to Krugersdorp where there was a pump house which was chosen for this purpose. As soon as the four Cosas members arrived with Mfalapitsa at the pump house, Mfalapitsa would find a reason to excuse himself and as soon as he exited the pump house, explosives which were planted there beforehand, would be detonated and thereby the four Cosas members would be killed.

I have studied the relevant parts of Col Coetzee’s Amnesty Application in so far as it deals with the execution of the operation and I accord therewith, specifically with regard to the role that was filled by myself.

MR VISSER: You have also heard his evidence this morning.

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And do you agree with that?

MR SCHOON: Yes I do.

MR VISSER: And three persons were killed and one was injured, we know their names, but severe damage was caused to the small building, presumably the pump house, and this happened at an abandoned mine.

I am told its between Krugersdorp and Randfontein.

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did Jan Coetzee report to you?

MR SCHOON: Yes he reported to me that three of the members had died.

MR VISSER: And you say one had escaped, but the Chairperson used the words had survived.

MR SCHOON: Yes, he had survived.

MR VISSER: And you refer to the fact that there was and Inquest held. Did you have anything to do with the Inquest?

MR SCHOON: Nothing at all, Chairperson.

I request that Amnesty be granted to me for my participation in this incident on the ground of the consideration herein, with and in the general background document as put before you. I want to emphasise that my action took place before the struggle of the past, that it was aimed at the supporters of a liberation movement and in the maintenance and protection of the previous political dispensation and that I had bona fide believed that my action was part of my duties as a policeman and that I was authorized in the execution of my duties and a request that amnesty be granted to me for my actions in this instance.

MR VISSER: Mr Schoon, you say that the instruction came from Brig. Jan du Preez.

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you agree with the instruction?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: For the reasons as you have put forward.

MR SCHOON: That’s correct.

MR VISSER: Was it suggested to you, if it was suggested to you, that the whole thing was done to protect Nkosi?

MR SCHOON: No, Nkosi was a small particle in what had to be protected. Indeed it was the South African Government that had to be protected.

MR VISSER: For the reasons you have named.

MR SCHOON: For the reasons which I have named.

MR VISSER: It is also so that police officers and black civic members or council members were targets of the ANC SACP Alliance and other liberation movements.

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: The issue with regard to reward was applicable for work that was done. It is sometimes referred to as silence money, but according to your knowledge, in which instances were such rewards paid out Mr Schoon?

MR SCHOON: There were several categories. Firstly we had the normal informant, he was rewarded for information that was conveyed to the security branch and then a written request was handed in for his remuneration which had to be recommended by his Commander and had to be approved at Head office and a month or so afterward he would receive his reward.

MR VISSER: It was the same system that police forces all over the world used?

MR SCHOON: That’s correct.

And then the Askaris, they were rewarded for work or for duties performed for example the arrests of returning terrorists or information that they had conveyed, or finding of weapons ¼(indistinct) and they were also rewarded by means of a fixed amount every month and a request was handed in which was approved that a certain amount of money would be paid to him for every month and a request was handed in which was approved that a certain amount of money would be paid to him for every month, but initially the amount was R200.00 and this gradually increased to R400.00.

MR VISSER: And Mr Coetzee who gave evidence before you said that his impression was that this was from the secret fund.

MR SCHOON: Yes I think so.

MR VISSER: And who was in charge of this secret fund at Head office in 1982?

MR SCHOON: Gen. Coetzee was the appointed official.

MR VISSER: The accounting official?

MR SCHOON: No, the accounting official.

And the person who administered the funds was Col Piet Goosen at that stage.

MR VISSER: And the normal budget of the police, who administered that?

MR SCHOON: This was done by the Commissioner.

MR VISSER: You have heard from questions which my learned friend Mr Jansen had put to Mr Coetzee that from 1982 a standpoint was taken that Askaris become police officers instead of remaining Askaris. Is this, according to your recollection, correct?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

And for this reason the Askaris became more and the secret fund at that stage, which was not very large, this made a whole in the secret.

MR VISSER: You don’t speak of their children, you mean of new Askaris coming there.

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: With regard to normal police officers, were they rewarded for duties performed?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, to the best of my recollection no, not in the same manner as the Askaris.

MR VISSER: But there are some exceptions which you are aware of and this is the matter of and this is the matter of Griffiths Mxenge.

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: We will eventually get there, but you say that according to you police officers were not rewarded for duties performed but Askaris indeed receive incentive bonuses.

Thank you Chairperson that is the evidence-in- chief.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser. Ms van der Walt.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

EXAMINATION BY MS VAN DER WALT: Thank you Chairperson.

Mr Schoon is it correct if Mr Rorich would testify that you were in command of all the security branches from your position at Head office?

MR SCHOON: No it is not actually so. I was in charge of a certain desk and the security branches which had to report back, would report back to me and then I would channel it further.

MS VAN DER WALT: At that stage was Mr Rorich a Warrant Officer and in his application for Amnesty he mentions that he received instructions from Col Coetzee and he received instructions for Brig du Preez and he accepted that the instruction came from you?

MR SCHOON: It is possible, Chairperson, because I just told Col Coetzee that he must continue and he

had to do the necessary to conclude the operation, therefore I would accept that he would say that.

MS VAN DER WALT: Was it also true that with such instructions that were given it was on a need to know basis. Other people were not informed about it.

MR SCHOON: No it was on a need to know basis.

MS VAN DER WALT: So just the persons who would be involved would know thereof.

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MS VAN DER WALT: No further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS VAN DER WALT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms van der Walt.

Mr Jansen.

EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Brigadier, just a few aspects with which you can be of assistance.

Firstly with regard to the structure of the security police, is it correct that except for Head office which was stationed at Pretoria, it was divided into divisions which were in the regions and the regions were divided into branches?

MR SCHOON: Yes. Some regions had branches and there were divisions where they only had the one branch for example Witwatersrand, like for example the Eastern Transvaal would have a branch Ermelo.

MR JANSEN: Yes, now in Head office it was divided into the Commissioner’s office, and then the divisions A,B,C,D and E and so forth. Is that correct?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR JANSEN: You were in command of C Section.

MR SCHOON: This was at the security branch, not with the Commissioner.

MR JANSEN: Excuse me I’m wrong here. Head of the security police. When we speak of the Commissioner, there would be, the head of one of the branches of the police would be the security police and the head of the security police had these sections A,B,C under him.

MR SCHOON: ¼(indistinct) command, he was the senior staff officer.

MR JANSEN: So somebody like Johan du Preez, if he would for example have the same rank as somebody who

was the head of a division, he would be functionally his senior.

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: With regard to Cosas, for record purposes we would accept that it is general knowledge that Cosas was the Congress of South African Students.

MR SCHOON: That’s correct.

MR JANSEN: And it’s a student organisation which is affiliated to the ANC.

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: As we have student organisations like Parcel who was affiliated to the PAC and Azasco who were affiliated to Azapo so one could accept that a person who is a member of Cosas would be in all reality, or one could say with all certainty that he was a supporter of the ANC.

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: And once again, for the sake of completion, in your evidence you also say you are the source of the instruction that Mfalapitsa had to dissuade these four Cosas members and I would like to put Mr Mfalapitsa’s version to you that he does not remember this. Would you like to comment on it?

MR SCHOON: No, I have no comment.

MR JANSEN: Chairperson, thank you, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Jansen. Mr Tshabalala.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR TSHABALALA.

MR TSHABALALA: Thank you Chair.

Mr Schoon, when Mr Coetzee reported to you about the Cosas four, what was your reaction to it?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I have missed the question. I am looking for the correct channel.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you repeat the question please?

MR TSHABLALA: Mr Schoon, I will repeat my question.

When Mr Coetzee reported to you about the Cosas four, what was you reaction to the situation then?

MS THABETHE: Channel 1 is Afrikaans. Channel 2 is English.

CHAIRPERSON: Just a minute, please. Where’s the technician? Please come and assist this witness here, he wants to listen to the original question in English.

Mr Schoon, would you like to listen to the question?

MR SCHOON: I cannot hear you, I’m hard of hearing.

CHAIRPERSON: Just a minute then please.

Can I ask for order please. Look if you can’t solve the problem then I’m going to adjourn.

MR TSHABALALA: Mr Schoon, when Mr Coetzee reported to you about the Cosas four, what was your reaction to the situation then?

MR SCHOON: At first I wanted to know more and the report that he initially submitted to me was somewhat scarce. I wanted him to go back and notify the people via Mfalapitsa to not go along with their plan because this was an illegal act and he undertook to go back and convey this message to them.

MR TSHABALALA: A written report, or you just spoke?

MR SCHOON: That was the original report which Coetzee submitted to me upon which this was my reaction.

MR TSHABALALA: The question is whether the report was written or oral. Whether the report was written or oral.

MR SCHOON: I can’t hear you.

ADV DE JAGER: Was it a written or an oral report?

MR SCHOON: It was an oral report.

MR TSHABALALA: Did you ever enquire about the age of the youths.

MR SCHOON: No.

MR TSHABALALA: Did you ever talk with Mr Coetzee about the alternatives you could pursue?

MR SCHOON: Yes we did discuss this and ultimately the action which was executed was decided upon as the only alternative at our disposal.

MR TSHABALALA: Mr Coetzee, in his evidence, mentioned that there was a plan to assassinate W/O Nkosi.

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR TSHABALALA: He even mentioned that there was a sketch which was already mapped out.

MR SCHOON: The sketch was discussed upon his second visit to me not his first visit and he added that these men were very serious and that they wanted to go over into action and that they didn’t want to wait any longer.

MR TSHABALALA: Did he ever show you the sketch?

MR SCHOON: No, he had only heard about it.

MR TSHABALALA: When Mr Coetzee discussed with you about the planned assassination of Mr Nkosi, did you ever ask him whether Nkosi knows or not?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson, I didn’t ask him.

MR TSHABALALA: Will you say Nkosi’s life was more important than the Cosas four.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I accepted that he would have informed Nkosi because Nkosi was one of their men in Krugersdorp.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Schoon, that’s not the question. The question which was posed to you a few moments ago is whether you regarded Nkosi’s life as more important than the lives of the Cosas members.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, during those times I did because we had to rely heavily upon black members and if they were to be murdered we would have found less black members who were willing to work for us.

Secondly, they tried by means of their actions, to topple the dispensation of that time and it was part

of my duties as a police officer to ensure that the state’s dispensation remain in tact.

MR TSHABALALA: Did Mr Coetzee discuss his relationship with Mr Nkosi to you?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson, I simply knew that they were comrades.

MR TSHABALALA: When Mr Coetzee suggested the plan to you did you try to dissuade him from suggesting that plan?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson, he informed me that they had already discussed other possibilities and the only conclusion which they could reach, that would be him and Mfalapitsa, was the action which was ultimately planned.

MR TSHABALALA: I put it to you that the motive was not to safeguard Nkosi but to kill the Cosas four.

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson, that is not so.

MR TSHABALALA: What was your reaction when Nkosi reported to you that the job has been done?

MR SCHOON: I accepted it as a task which had been concluded. Yes, I congratulated him. I simply told him "Well done".

MR TSHABALALA: Did you report to your superior?

MR SCHOON: Yes I did.

MR TSHABALALA: And what was his reaction?

MR SCHOON: The same, that they were satisfied with the results.

MR TSHABALALA: Did you ever receive anything in reward for the job done?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson, except my monthly salary.

MR TSHABALALA: Will you regard your actions then as proportional to the objectives which you were pursuing at the time?

MR SCHOON: That is correct. We were in a struggle against the ANC SACP and the Communist Alliance whose objective it was to bring the Republic of that time down by means of an armed struggle by using infiltration and agents, by sowing unrest. I regarded it as my duty to attempt to avoid the emergence of anarchy and chaos in the country.

MR TSHABALALA: So is it correct to say that the issue was not Nkosi but to prevent the ANC SACP Alliance from overthrowing the government?

MR SCHOON: Nkosi was a very small pawn that had to be protected. The actual protection was aimed at the government of the day.

MR TSHABALALA: I put it to you that there was no plan to kill Nkosi.

MR SCHOON: That is not what was conveyed to me.

MR TSHABALALA: With regard to the rewards which were paid to the Askaris at the time, do you have any knowledge that the rewards were standard or were according to the job done.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I don’t know what remuneration they received. I didn’t have any knowledge of that.

MR TSHABALALA: Apart from Mr Coetzee, did you know of the other people who were involved within the security¼(indistinct)

MR SCHOON: No, he came to me with the plan, I cleared it with Brig Cronje and left it up to him to do the necessary. I did not prescribe to him what he was supposed to do. I also didn’t ask who was going to be involved in it.

MR TSHABALALA: So you were not interested to know

who were the people involved there, who will be involved in carrying out the operation?

MR SCHOON: I had no interest in that at that stage.

MR TSHABALALA: When did you tell Mr Coetzee to continue?

MR SCHOON: The second time, or the second visit that he paid to me in this regard.

MR TSHABALALA: In the first instance when you met you said he should dissuade Cosas Four from carrying out their plan. Is that correct?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR TSHABALALA: And the second time when he came back to you?

MR SCHOON: He reported to me that the Cosas members were not about to abandon their plan and that they were already in possession of plans and I undertook to clear this story up further with a higher authority. Afterwards I told him to continue, that this had been cleared.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Tshabalala, is it convenient, I want to adjourn for lunch?

MR TSHABALALA: Chair, I just have two questions.

What will you say to the families today of the deceased and the survivor himself?

MR VISSER: With respect I object to that question Chairperson. This is an Amnesty Application, it is not a hearing before the Human Rights Violation Committee and this witness ought not to be placed in a position where he has to answer that question.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, technically of course Mr Visser you are correct. It is not unheard of that some people use even this process, which is really part of a broader one, to try and reach broader objectives than simply a technical sort of inquiry, but I mean you are quite correct, it is not, strictly speaking, an issue that calls to be decided here.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson, having given myself one second to rethink the matter I think you are rather correct and I believe that seeing that this process is all geared towards national reconciliation, I withdraw my objection. You are absolutely correct.

MR TSHABALALA: With respect, Chair, I withdraw my question too.

Did you know of the involvement of the explosives expert?

MR SCHOON: No I didn’t know about that.

MR TSHABALALA: No further questions Chair.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR TSHABALALA

CHAIRPERSON: We’ll adjourn for lunch and reconvene at 2 o’clock.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Schoon I would remind you that you are still under oath.

W F SCHOON: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Mr Schoon, can you please explain why was it so important for you to protect Mr Nkosi.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, it was important to protect the policeman because he was a symbol of the government of the day and if something were to happen to him it would have been an advantage for the ANC.

MS THABETHE: If that’s the case why didn’t you consider something like moving him out of that community in order to protect him?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, he wasn’t the only target. It also came to light that there were other persons and it wouldn’t have helped simply to move or

transfer him because we’d just be transferring the problem.

MS THABETHE: Coming to that decision that was taken to kill the victims, you indicated to us that it would have been critical for you to arrest these people because then it would have meant you have to expose a lot of people. Is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson, in this regard it would have exposed the person who was involved in the case, that would have been Mfalapitsa and that would have meant that we would have lost a very important source.

MS THABETHE: Did you maybe consider detaining them without trial?

MR SCHOON: I beg your pardon?

MS THABETHE: Did you consider detaining the victims without trial?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson, it was considered and it was decided that this was not the solution.

MS THABETHE: Why?

MR SCHOON: Because it would not have put them out of circulation for long enough.

MS THABETHE: Can you also briefly explain what was political about your act of protecting Mr Nkosi, just briefly.

MR SCHOON: Could you please repeat that?

MS THABETHE: I’ll rephrase my question to be more clear. I understand that you had to protect Mr Nkosi because he formed part of the government, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MS THABETHE: Now what I want to know is that how was his protection going to advance the objectives of the government of the day?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, by protecting him we could make use of his services in the future. If he were to be exposed at that stage, his services would be lost for the government and at that time it was very difficult to obtain reliable and good agents. We didn’t want to run the risk of losing him.

MS THABETHE: Would it be correct for me to say that you committed all these acts to further the objectives of the government of that day?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MS THABETHE: No further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS THABETHE

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Schoon what happened to Jan du Preez?

MR SCHOON: I can’t hear you.

CHAIRPERSON: What happened to Jan du Preez?

MR SCHOON: He is still alive, he lives in Pretoria.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, may I come in here? I made enquiries from Ms Thabethe, Mr du Preez received notice of his implication on the 9 April and he has elected apparently not to participate in the proceedings. My Attorney just wants to tell me something. All that we do know is that he is very ill, in fact I’m just reminded, he is so ill that I just remembered, and I apologise, I should have remembered this before, General van der Merwe was asked by the TRC to serve papers on him and his doctor wouldn’t allow that to be done, but they told his wife about it.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser.

You say that he gave the order to kill these people?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You went to him and explained the position to him and according to that he gave you the order there and then to execute the plan to kill the people.

MR SCHOON: Yes, that’s correct.

CHAIRPERSON: In what position of authority was he?

MR SCHOON: He was second in command of the security branch.

CHAIRPERSON: And you say that there was a head of the security branch. Was it Mr van der Merwe?

MR SCHOON: No, at that stage it was General Johan Coetzee.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Coetzee. So there were other persons who occupied a higher position of authority that Mr du Preez?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that’s correct.

CHAIRPERSON: How did you understand from where he obtained his authority to authorise such order.

MR SCHOON: He was second in command of the security branch and normally when the Commander wasn’t there one would go to him. Even if the Commander was there, he was the senior staff officer and consequently he managed many of the commanding officer’s tasks.

CHAIRPERSON: So he had the authority to give an order to have somebody killed without consulting anybody else?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, if he felt that way he could have told me directly yes, do it, or he could have told me, I would like to consult a higher authority first. The priority was his.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that how you understood the position?

MR SCHOON: Yes. He could have told me "no, wait a minute, let’s discuss this with Gen Coetzee" or we could even go to the Commissioner or to the Minister but there and then he gave me the green light and said "go ahead".

CHAIRPERSON: And how did you understand from where that authority originated? What was his rank, was he a Brigadier?

MR SCHOON: He was a Senior Brigadier.

CHAIRPERSON: How did you understand from where his authority originated?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, it was simply a culture which developed gradually within the security branch.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it a culture?

MR SCHOON: Well that’s how I perceived it.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you uncertain whether or not he did have the authority to do this?

MR SCHOON: Well he did it and that’s why I’m assuming that he did indeed possess the authority.

CHAIRPERSON: So then we must understand that what you’re saying to us is that you’re not entirely certain but that you accepted it like that under those circumstances?

MR SCHOON: He gave me the necessary permission and for that reason I accept that he did have the authority.

CHAIRPERSON: But you never saw any documents or any written form of official authority which was given to him?

MR SCHOON: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you attempt to make enquiries as to what would happen if there was a refusal for the request regarding the youths if Mfalapitsa did not react positively to the request?

MR SCHOON: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you consider this as a possible manner in which to handle the situation?

MR SCHOON: The first time that Capt Coetzee came to me I did consider it and asked that they should try to bring these persons to other insights and then it appeared that this group of young people were very serious about this whole story, given the plan and the sketch. That is what I assumed, that they were serious, that they weren’t going to be dissuaded.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you consider it as an option to tell Mr Coetzee to give Mfalapitsa an order not to train them and not to give them any weapons, that you would see to it that Nkosi would be warned and that steps would be taken to ensure that Nkosi would be protected?

MR SCHOON: No I did not consider that.

CHAIRPERSON: You did not?

MR SCHOON: No I didn’t.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there any specific reason why you didn’t?

MR SCHOON: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Any other questions from the panel?

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you Chair. Just one aspect Mr Schoon. Mfalapitsa, you didn’t know him personally, did you?

MR SCHOON: Yes I did and I was aware that he was a person who had given himself over and offered his services.

ADV GCABASHE: That was going to be my next question. He offered his services, you say. In his affidavit on Bundle 1 page 230 line 1,2,3 it is really one sentence, right at the top he says "I was forced to join the South African Security Branch based at Vlakplaas". You see that?

MR SCHOON: I see that.

ADV GCABASHE: You would obviously disagree with that statement?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I don’t know what makes him say that but at that stage he was fully prepared to work for us.

ADV GCABASHE: Do you recall the circumstances under which he actually approached you or do you know anything about it?

MR SCHOON: What I know about him is based upon hearsay.

MR JANSEN: If I may just assist in that, that word ‘forced’ in that sense is dealt with in this additional affidavit by Mfalapitsa which you don’t have. Maybe it is an appropriate time, seeing that its been mentioned now, to hand up, we have now copies of his signed affidavit. Briefly what his version was there was when he handed himself to the South African Police at the Botswana border, he was then debriefed and visited by the Commander of the Western Transvaal region and after being debriefed, his wish officially was just to be returned to civilian life, but that that was not acceptable to the police. For obvious reasons of not knowing whether he should be trusted under those circumstances and that is what he meant by the word forced, but he will be dealing with that in his evidence. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Jansen. We will follow the list that Mr Visser had presented to us earlier which would mean that this affidavit would be Exhibit H.

ADV GCABASHE: Just to confirm, Mr Schoon, you of course know nothing of those particular circumstances.

You just understand him to have voluntarily offered to work for you.

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser have you got any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Chairperson, yes, it has already been touched on by Commissioner Gcabashe and my re-examination doesn’t flow from anything that was put, but rather from something that was not put.

At the last page of bundle 1, not the last page, page 232, Chairperson, there is a reference to the Commissioner of Police, which wasn’t the Commissioner it was the Security Chief, Gen Johan Coetzee and I just want to ask one question about that.

In the application of Mr Mfalapitsa on page 232 in bundle 1 he mentions that he drew the inference that Gen Johan Coetzee must have known about this incident. My question to you is whether you had any contact with the former security head about this.

MR SCHOON: No I did not discuss with him.

MR VISSER: Is there any reason that you could offer in terms of why he ought to have known about the incident.

MR SCHOON: Well, the only reason that I could think of is that there was a weekly security review or report that was compiled on a weekly basis and he would necessarily have seen or read about these incidents in that security review.

MR VISSER: That would depend on whether or not it had been reported during the meetings.

MR SCHOON: It would have been reported.

MR VISSER: Thank you.

MR SCHOON: Perhaps I should add that an incident would not necessarily be defined in terms of who or what initiated it.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Schoon, you are excused.

MR SCHOON: Thank you Chairperson.

MR SCHOON EXCUSED

MR VISSER: Chairperson, the next witness will be Mr Grobbelaar. He is the person sitting in the wheelchair and he will be wheeling himself into the witness box in due course. His statement has been prepared and that will be further down the list, Exhibit D. The reason why that has been done is because, this being the Schoon cycle, we intend completing further statements for Brig Schoon as well and we have made provision for them in the list of exhibits.