LODEWIKUS DE JAGER: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr de Jager, you are an application in this matter and you request amnesty for any unlawful offence or delict which might flow from the attack on the 14th of June 1985, in Botswana.
MR DE JAGER: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Your application appears in volume 1 on page 89. Do you confirm the contents of your amnesty application which you submitted at the TRC, as correct, according to your knowledge and subject of course to the evidence that you will give here today?
MR DE JAGER: That's correct.
MR VISSER: You studied a document called General Background, are there parts of that document that you cannot confirm and that you do not have direct knowledge and experience of?
MR DE JAGER: No, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And do you then request that that document be incorporated in your evidence?
MR DE JAGER: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: We have heard what the situation was that you were a Commander in command of Coetzee and Pretorius, at the Intelligence Division of Soweto's Security Branch of the Police.
MR DE JAGER: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And that your direct Commander was Brigadier Muller.
MR DE JAGER: That's correct.
MR VISSER: He is deceased now.
MR DE JAGER: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Mr de Jager, I do not want to waste too much time with you, with reference to page 91 where you deal with these events, can you once again confirm that that was evidence of your memory of this incident?
MR DE JAGER: That's correct.
MR VISSER: Can you confirm what Pretorius and Coetzee did with regard to the collection of information and the conveyance of such information, took place under your instructions?
MR DE JAGER: That's correct.
MR VISSER: Did you report to Muller?
MR DE JAGER: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And did it have his approval and authorisation?
MR DE JAGER: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Can you briefly summarise for the Committee what you say in your amnesty application.
MR DE JAGER: I will do that gladly. In January 1985 I arrived at Soweto, a threat analysis was done with regard to the collection of information and it was quite clear that Botswana, that the infiltration escalated from there and then internally there was an escalation with regard to ANC activities.
I spoke to Pretorius and Coetzee, among others, and gave instruction that our intelligence capacities had to be expanded in Botswana.
MR VISSER: And was that sharpened successfully?
MR DE JAGER: Yes, that's correct Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Did you at some stage, or were there any court directed actions because of this information of persons who were arrested, who came from Botswana with arms, propaganda and so forth?
MR DE JAGER: Although I cannot recall any specific instances, it was undoubtedly so. It was dealt with by the Sowetan Security Branch, because of information which we supplied.
MR VISSER: Were you at some stage asked to attend a meeting at Speskop?
MR DE JAGER: That's correct, Chairperson, under the instruction of Muller.
MR VISSER: And did you hear from there to what you refer to as a witch-hunt operation, but an operation in Botswana that was planned?
MR DE JAGER: Yes, it was confirmed there for me, although previously during conversations at West Transvaal, I had the impression that such operations were in the planning phases or in the concentration phases.
MR VISSER: Very well. Were requests directed to you for further intelligence?
MR DE JAGER: The intelligence gathering liaison part of the Soweto Intelligence Unit, I delegated to Pretorius, who directly liaised with operatives from the South African Defence Force, Special Forces, and it was my instruction to give my full co-operation to them.
MR VISSER: Do you in your position work with case studies, or was that left to Pretorius and Coetzee to just bring reports to you?
MR DE JAGER: It was left to them and from time to time they reported to me.
MR VISSER: You have listened to the evidence of Pretorius.
MR DE JAGER: Yes, I have.
MR VISSER: Is there anything in his evidence with regard to the meetings and the intelligence gathering, that what happened afterwards, that you do not agree with?
MR DE JAGER: No.
MR VISSER: Was it your conviction that what you did was expected to be done by you, given the circumstances of the time?
MR DE JAGER: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Were you at Nietverdiendt during the attack in Botswana?
MR DE JAGER: Yes, I was.
MR VISSER: Were you in the operations tent?
MR DE JAGER: No, Col Hills did not want us there.
MR VISSER: And do you have any knowledge of what exactly which persons was killed or injured there and what properties were damaged?
MR DE JAGER: No.
MR VISSER: We know now that it was an out and out an Army operation.
MR DE JAGER: That is correct, yes.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
MR COETSER: I have no questions, thank you.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR COETSER
MR CORNELIUS: I have not questions, thank you Chair.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Mr de Jager, what did you actually do in respect of which you seek amnesty?
MR DE JAGER: I was the Commanding Officer of the Intelligence operatives who supplied intelligence, that I believed certain target identifications were done based on this intelligence and which led to this attack and where persons were killed and property damaged, as well as that I supplied authority that Mr Manual could indeed assist and accompany the Army, and I gave approval for it. Although I received it from Brig Muller, I also accorded with it.
MR BERGER: Mr Manuel?
MR DE JAGER: Mr Manuel Olifant, I beg your pardon.
MR BERGER: So you gave instructions that information should be gathered, you didn't gather that information, you didn't process that information, that information was then made available ultimately, to the Defence Force, as a result of which they launched their attack?
MR DE JAGER: Ultimately, yes Sir.
MR BERGER: You had no part in processing that information?
MR DE JAGER: The procedure normally was that sources would be debriefed, the reports would be given to me, I would then peruse them, have them typed and I would, on some occasions, depending upon circumstances, I can't name the specific instances, I would then also speak to a source to clarify certain matters that might be unclear at that moment. Although I did not have a day to day active involvement in the debriefing and the intelligence gathering process, it was my responsibility.
MR BERGER: Yes, it fell under your command, but in relation to this raid, this attack on the 14th of June 1985, did you play any role other than being the Commanding Officer, did you analyse any of the information in relation to this raid? Did you make any changes in relation to that information in relation to this raid?
MR DE JAGER: No, I did not make any changes here, but I had insights to all the reports that were sent through to Western Transvaal, that I believe at the end of the day could have formed part of the memorandum which led to the attack.
MR BERGER: Did you exercise any discretion?
MR DE JAGER: No, not with regard to specific incidents, that I can recall at this stage.
CHAIRPERSON: So in other words, you are saying these reports were sent to West Transvaal?
MR DE JAGER: Honourable Chairperson, the usual process was that a day or two after it was ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: No, but the information that you are referring to now ...(intervention)
MR DE JAGER: Before this operation ...
CHAIRPERSON: ... how long before this operation?
MR DE JAGER: Approximately 14 to 21 days, maybe a month but definitely on a continual basis. Upon my arrival in Soweto there was already a process ongoing that information would be sent through to Western Transvaal.
CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any knowledge what information was used that was sent through? That was used by the persons who took that decision to launch this attack.
MR DE JAGER: I cannot say what specific reports they were, but it is my impression if I listen to the evidence here, that some of the information that was sent through would have been used.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you find out at any stage that this attack would be launched?
MR DE JAGER: With the meeting as Speskop it was clear to me that this operation was planned.
CHAIRPERSON: Was this the meeting 14 to 21 days before the time?
MR DE JAGER: Yes, in that vicinity.
MR BERGER: Well there are two meetings, 14 to 21 days before. Are you referring to the ...
MR DE JAGER: I refer to the one at Speskop.
MR BERGER: Oh, not the one at Head Office?
MR DE JAGER: No, not the one at Head Office, I was not at that level.
MR BERGER: You say in your amnesty application at page 94, that apparently the attack was decided upon for the 14th of June, because there was information that the ANC was planning a large-scale infiltration on the 16th of June, to launch attacks within South Africa.
MR DE JAGER: Chairperson, I believe this could only be an inference from myself, that it could not be a specific fact, that the ANC usually in the vicinity of 16th of June, because of the fact that it was Youth Day, they ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: But you put it here as a fact that there's reason for you to think that the 14th of June was specifically chosen.
MR DE JAGER: It would make sense because it was two days before the 16th of June.
CHAIRPERSON: Is this an inference you draw, or is there a specific reason?
MR DE JAGER: No, there is no factual reason, Chairperson, this is just an inference from my side.
MR BERGER: Will you just bear with me for a moment.
You see, the reason I ask you that question is because what you say here, you say that what you've got here at page 94 is pure speculation on your part because June 16, as we all know, was a very important day in the history of our country and you say that the ANC, traditionally, mounted attacks to commemorate June 16, 1976. So what you say here at page 94, you say is just speculation on that basis.
MR DE JAGER: Chairperson, I cannot pertinently recall any reports that said that the ANC would send through X amount of cadres for a specific action, a specific operation.
MR BERGER: Yes, and as I understood your earlier answer, you said just because it was June 16, you inferred that the attack was launched in June 14, to head of any attacks which might come on June 16.
MR DE JAGER: Where I sit now I would say that that was a logical inference.
MR BERGER: And that's all it was?
MR DE JAGER: Because of the lack of proper information to indicate that fact.
MR BERGER: Because you see, this author again, Stiff, at page 75, page 472 of his book, talks about the conference, I'm sure you know on the 14th of June 1985 the ANC, or the 15th of June the ANC gathered for a National Consultative Conference at Kabwe in Zambia and that was the first conference since the Morogoro Conference in 1969, you're familiar with that history?
MR DE JAGER: I have no reason to doubt that you're telling the truth, Sir, with all due respect. I presume it is there and I can't recall it ...(intervention)
MR BERGER: No, I thought you would have known that history, but anyway ... He goes on to say, he says
"Delegates would come from all over Africa (this is about a third of the way down the page) and abroad and assemble in Lusaka. The venue as it turned out, was Kabwe, Zambia. The ANC's National Consultative Conference, to give it its official title, was known afterwards as the Kabwe Conference. The State Security Council was alerted to the likelihood of MK mounting a terror campaign from Botswana, to coincide with the conference and the long proposed pre-emptive strike against MK installations in Gaberone were recommended to head it off."
So according to this author there was information. You say in your amnesty application, apparently this was the reason because as I read it, there was information, but you're now saying you had no such information.
MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, with all due respect, Sir, I cannot remember, this was 15/16 years ago. I cannot pertinently, absolutely say that I read a report to that effect.
If it is misleading what I said, then I have to apologise, I really cannot remember that I specifically received instructions to be involved because of the fact that government might have thought it might be a good idea to attack on the 14th. The final date for the attack was in any event certainly not determined by myself or any of the people that were working with me, it was a decision that was taken much higher up than our level. And if I might just add, intelligence was gathered, as it was mentioned frequently here before by more than once instance in the intelligence community. So in conclusion, I'd like to say that I'm sure it was not Soweto Intelligence only that might have caused this decision to be made.
MR MALAN: Mr Berger, if you will excuse me just briefly coming in here.
I made a note here in my documents beforehand and I placed a question mark there at that paragraph because if I can recall correctly, there was uproar in the country about the untimely raid just before the Kabwe Conference and then with regard to the decisions taken at Kabwe which upped the spiral of conflict anyway. So now you are saying that apparently, and apparently can be an inference, exactly what it says, or it could be based upon your memory, you cannot recall why you included this paragraph?
MR DE JAGER: No, not pertinently, Chairperson, that I can say that I read it in a specific report or that a pertinent source reported it. I am once again inclined to say that it was an inference from me, it would be part of disruptive action, because the date at that stage and the attack at that stage would have been a disruptive course of action.
MR MALAN: But if I listen to the cross-examination by Mr Coetser of the other witness and I listen to Mr Berger, and exactly the Army's role and possible role, and this was just shone down, I do not know what is following down, is it possible that this was indeed done to heighten the conflict? Because I think that is what the cross-examination indicates to me. Certainly that was the consequence, or ...
MR DE JAGER: I would have to speculate.
MR MALAN: Do you have any knowledge?
MR DE JAGER: Then I would say that it was not impossible, but I do not have specific knowledge that that was the purpose of it.
MR MALAN: Thank you, Mr Berger.
MR BERGER: Thank you, Mr Malan, because that's exactly where I was going.
Mr de Jager, you were in charge of the Soweto Security Branch, am I right?
MR DE JAGER: No, Brig Muller was, I was in charge of a small component, Sir.
MR BERGER: Gathering of intelligence?
MR DE JAGER: A part of that, yes.
MR BERGER: And as such I would expect you to be familiar with this history of 1985, and particularly the Kabwe Conference. You say you can't recall the Kabwe Conference?
MR DE JAGER: I recall the Kabwe Conference, but I cannot recall that I, before the conference per se, a day or two or three, was aware, that I certainly cannot remember. The Kabwe Conference is well known as far as the history of the ANC is concerned.
MR BERGER: And also the debate at the conference about blurring the distinction between hard targets and soft targets.
MR DE JAGER: I have read that and I'm sure I read it in Setchabas and other similar material, yes.
MR BERGER: Yes, indeed. And you'll also know that the delegates to that conference were greeted, when the conference opened that morning, they were greeted with the news of the massacre in Botswana.
MR DE JAGER: I would presume that to be so.
MR BERGER: And the reason I was saving these questions for you was because of what you say at page 94, isn't it possible that the raid, the attack was launched on the 14th of June, precisely to have that effect?
MR DE JAGER: It's not impossible, although I bear no specific knowledge, but I would regard it as not impossible.
MR BERGER: That the raid was timed at that point to coincident with the conference, to escalate the conflict between the ANC and the government.
MR DE JAGER: I would once again say it's not impossible, although I do not have any intelligence or information to the fact that it was in effect so, Sir.
CHAIRPERSON: It certainly would have been an ideal tactic, isn't it? In the circumstances.
MR DE JAGER: In retrospect, Mr Chairman, yes I think so.
CHAIRPERSON: Well at the thinking of the time.
MR DE JAGER: Ja.
CHAIRPERSON: It may not today have been the wisest thing to do, but the way feelings were at the time, it was a - it's more than just a possibility that that would have been the reason, isn't it? It would fall in line with the tactics employed at the time.
MR DE JAGER: I have to agree with you, Mr Chairman.
MR BERGER: Thank you, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BERGER
CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?
MR VISSER: No re-examination, Chairperson.
JUDGE MOTATA: Just thinking quickly, that it could have - we remember that during those years, '85, there were many uprisings within the country.
MR DE JAGER: Certainly, Sir.
JUDGE MOTATA: That probably to divert even attention that people must now concentrate on Botswana, to divert that attention that was happening within the country. With hindsight again.
MR DE JAGER: With all due respect, I think witnesses have given evidence before this Commission and Committee in the last years that would point to certain unorthodox actions that might be construed as going to cause ...
JUDGE MOTATA: Thank you. Thank you, Mr de Jager.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you're excused.
MR VISSER: When you say this witness might be excused, Chairperson, might he be fully excused? Thank you.
WITNESS EXCUSED
MR VISSER: I call Mr Coetzee, Chairperson. Thank you. His evidence is in bundle 1 at page 47. He speaks Afrikaans Chairperson, and has no objection to taking the oath.
