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Amnesty HearingsType AMNESTY HEARINGS Starting Date 03 March 1998 Location PORT ELIZABETH Day 7 Back To Top Click on the links below to view results for: +potgieter +cg Line 51Line 53Line 55Line 57Line 59Line 61Line 63Line 65Line 67Line 69Line 71Line 73Line 98Line 100Line 102Line 104Line 106Line 108Line 110Line 112Line 115Line 117Line 138Line 140Line 143Line 145Line 505Line 507Line 509Line 605Line 608Line 610Line 612Line 614Line 616Line 618Line 620Line 622Line 625Line 766Line 768Line 770Line 1113Line 1300Line 1302Line 1304Line 1306Line 1308Line 1310Line 1312Line 1314Line 1316Line 1318Line 1320 CHAIRPERSON: Mr Taylor, you’re still under oath to speak the truth. MR BOOYENS CONTINUES WITH EXAMINATION: (cont) Mr Chairman, I think exhibit - the newspaper clipping, the copy of the newspaper clipping has now been placed in front of me member of the Committee, that will be EE if I’m not mistaken. MR BOOYENS: Mr Taylor, yesterday you referred to the fact that you retired from the police force, what was the reason? MR TAYLOR: Because of post-traumatic stress. MR BOOYENS: How do you personally find the effect of this? MR TAYLOR: My physician has warned me that because of the medication I would have problems with my memory and amongst others a lower level of concentration. MR BOOYENS: Just briefly, yesterday you referred to your experiences as a police officer. Your experience on court, in other words as a witness, can you elaborate on this? MR TAYLOR: I have to concede this is the first time that I testify in such an atmosphere, I’ve never testified in court. MR BOOYENS: Never testified in court? MR TAYLOR: I speak of inferior cases, possession of dagga and that type of situation, types of misdemeanours. MR BOOYENS: And that one year was in 19? MR BOOYENS: As a security police officer? MR BOOYENS: Just a further aspect, I’d like to take you back to - yesterday you testified to the fact of how you stopped the people at Olifants Pass. The identification of these four persons, how was this done? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, Captain van Zyl was the first one to the vehicle and he confirmed the identification of the persons. I recognised some of the persons because I have seen some photographs of them. MR BOOYENS: Can you remember who you recognised? MR TAYLOR: Definitely Mr Goniwe and Mr Mhlawuli from his photograph and a description I had of him, he was a rather large person. In discussions later on they mentioned them by name and when we sat there the four persons sat alone with me. CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying Mr Taylor, that there was nobody there to point out and say: "This is Mr Mhlawuli"? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, I was satisfied with Captain van Zyl’s information of who the persons were. CHAIRPERSON: I understand that but what I’m asking, was there anybody who knew Mr Mhlawuli personally who was able to identify at the car? MR TAYLOR: Well Mr Chairperson, on the grounds of the photographs and the descriptions that we had, this was confirmation and I accepted this, I was satisfied that these were the four persons. It was confirmed to me that those four persons would be in that vehicle. CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps you misunderstand my question. ...[indistinct] the photos and other identifying mechanisms all I want to know is, was anybody present who was able to say: "I know Mhlawuli personally, this is him"? MR TAYLOR: No, we worked according to the photos that we had. MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman. According to you personally Mr Taylor, have you personally seen any of the four persons previously? MR BOOYENS: Earlier on you asked a question - you answered the question from the Chairperson, you said that you received information of the - about the four. MR TAYLOR: What had happened was - I just have to say fist, before the operation it was the task in Cradock as well as in Port Elizabeth - we received information that they received on the VH11 that they would attend a meeting that day. At that stage there was no surely which combination of the persons that we’ve spoken about would be in the vehicle. From two sources I received information that these four persons would be in the vehicle. MR BOOYENS: If you speak about these four persons, who is this? MR TAYLOR: I speak about the four deceased persons. MR BOOYENS: When you were waiting for the car did you expect certain people in this car? MR TAYLOR: In accordance with the information that we had, and this was evaluated, we knew who to expect in the car. MR BOOYENS: You’ve said that it was previously - it was the informers task - can you just tell us about any task of these informers after you received instructions from Captain van Zyl, I’m speaking about three weeks before the incident, you said Captain van Zyl spoke to you about these people. Was there any specific sharpening of the informants? MR TAYLOR: You need to understand that these informers were already handled, these tasks were just additional tasks which they had. They had to focus specifically on the activities of Mr Goniwe and his cohorts. MR BOOYENS: And because of this, did any information come through? MR TAYLOR: Information came through. We were focused on movements. The normal flow of information continued on my desk, I just gave more intensive attention to these four persons. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Taylor, is there any reason why you’d want to protect the identity of those informers today? MR BOOYENS: Definitely Mr Chairman. I don’t know if you want me to explain why. CHAIRPERSON: I’m asking you, is there any cogent reason why the identify of informers should be protected today? MR TAYLOR: Definitely so Mr Chair. MR TAYLOR: The relationship between the informant and the handler it’s one of the lasting relationships that you can have. The contract that you had with this person, I would not want to go back on my word that I gave to these people. CHAIRPERSON: Let me ask you this, are you talking from a moral point of view or a legal point of view? MR TAYLOR: Certainly from a moral point of view. I’m not sure what the legal implications of this would be. CHAIRPERSON: If you were asked to identify them would not be willing to answer those questions? MR POTGIETER: Mr Taylor, was there any information in relation to Mr Mhlawuli that you received via informers? MR POTGIETER: What type of information? MR TAYLOR: It was specifically with reference to visits to P.E. with high profile activists. It was an issue that he regularly visited Cradock and was at Cradora meetings. If I remember correctly, at some point in time he stayed in Cradock, I just don’t want to bind myself to that fact but I think that he stayed in Cradock for some time and that in my final summary he was in the process of transferring the G Plan to the South Western districts. And at that stage the South Western Districts were relatively quiet in relation to the Eastern Cape. MR POTGIETER: And the time that you refer to now, was this two to three weeks between the instruction that you received and the incident itself? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Mhlawuli previously, I would say from the end of ‘84 until the incident in 1985 came to my attention. MR POTGIETER: To your attention? MR TAYLOR: Yes, he came to my attention. I expressed myself incorrectly now, he came under my attention Mr Chairman. MR POTGIETER: So you personally had knowledge of Mr Mhlawuli and his alleged activities long before this incident? MR POTGIETER: And definitely before the discussion that you had with Mr van Zyl? MR TAYLOR: That’s correct Mr Chairperson. MR POTGIETER: Was Mr Mhlawuli known to you? MR TAYLOR: I have to say honestly, he was less known to me than the others because he was South Western District’s responsibility but I had knowledge of him. MR POTGIETER: Did SWD have a file on Mr Mhlawuli? MR TAYLOR: I don’t want to speculate, but if they did not have a file then honestly I’m convinced they did not do their work. I believe that they should have had a file. MR POTGIETER: You did not try to find out? MR TAYLOR: I just want to explain Mr Chairman in this instance. If I gather information where Mhlawuli’s name appeared and specifically with the activities surrounding Mr Goniwe, I would write a report about Mr Goniwe and Mr Mhlawuli’s name would be mentioned there. The report would be of such value that it had to go to head office and I would have sent a copy - I would send a copy to SWD for their information. MR POTGIETER: It seems like - to this effect from one of the exhibits that we have. MR POTGIETER: Just to come back to the point, are you in the position that you feel that you need to protect the identity of these informers in respect of Mr Mhlawuli? MR TAYLOR: That’s right. I want to state it pertinently, I would not reveal this. I want to assure that you that some of these people, some of them are inactive but some of them still regularly contact me. Firstly this is in regard to the contract and secondly it’s the loyalty between us. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Taylor, when you made this application - or shall I put it in another manner, when you considered this application did you speak about this to your fellow applicants? MR TAYLOR: Yes. Can I just explain what happened? I just need to remember what time this was. I think it was in November 1996 or around there, General van der Merwe sent circulars to other regions where he invited all ex-security members, where a proposal would be put about the whole reconciliation process and specifically the amnesty process and this was done by representatives of the Department of Justice. I just want to add that General van der Merwe was respected because he was previously the commander of the security branch. He requested us that if we were involved in any operations in the past we need to consider seriously involving ourselves in the process, in this reconciliation process. And an integral part of this is the exposure of undercover activities, this was one of the motivations. I cannot name any specific dates but we came in contact with each other and we decided that we need to apply for amnesty and every person, it was individual choice whether he would participate in this process. CHAIRPERSON: Now, the reasons for your application can be as well attributed to the part played by informers, not so? MR TAYLOR: I’ve never thought about this factor, it was never a consideration. CHAIRPERSON: Were they not consulted or that person not consulted and told: "Look I’m going to make this application in respect of these killings"? MR TAYLOR: No, these informers did not know what happened to the information that we received from them. I did not see the need to bother them with this. CHAIRPERSON: Well, on the day of the killings you were informed on two occasions that you can expect a particular combination of these trouble makers in a particular vehicle, not so? MR TAYLOR: That’s correct Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: I don’t think it would take a genius to work out the next day what occurred to those people who were in this car. MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairperson. I want to state clearly that it was a daily activity to give tasks to informers about whatever subjects, it was not out of the norm to liaise with them daily, the fact that it had to look like an AZAPO attack. I did not underestimate their ability or their intelligence. Maybe some of them drew their inferences to this fact. I think unfortunately there might be some of them, in spite of them being informers they shocked, must have been very shocked to know that I was involved in this incident. MR BOOYENS: You’ve mentioned, and I think we need to get clarity on this, there’s mention from Captain van Zyl of an informal file and you have mentioned an index card and then we’ve spoken about an S file, a security file and a regional file too. Did you have much to do with the administration of these papers? MR TAYLOR: Not with the administration thereof. I wish to explain how I collected files and what I did with them. All the files S13/436, and I would later report in my own handwriting, it would go to Major du Plessis. If he needed to know more he would refer back to me and then it was sent for typing. After that I had nothing to do with the report anymore. The person who did they typing the addressing and the sending of it to headquarters. MR BOOYENS: This is with a formal file. Now this index card, how did this work? MR TAYLOR: Index cards were used in general. When another person from another region came to our attention, the first field worker who picked this up would open an index card. There would be short entry on this index card, it would take one or two forms or one person could write on index card a date and then would say COP, whatever number / whatever number. Secondly he would write subject and would say: a certain date: made contact with an activist. There were two types of index cards that we had. MR BOOYENS: And that which Captain van Zyl mentioned, the informal file? What was that exactly? MR TAYLOR: I would describe it as an operational file. I don’t know the briefing between Mr van Rensburg and Mr du Plessis but the impression that I had was that it was an operational file. Amongst others it would be small bits and pieces of whatever was discussed concerning this person. MR BOOYENS: And this operational file, would this receive a number? MR TAYLOR: I don’t think I’ve expressed myself properly, there were no other operational files. I just mentioned, I just named it an operational file because it’s clearly a file that was kept for this specific operation. MR POTGIETER: Mr Taylor, we’re trying to understand what’s the importance of these index cards. This was for persons who did not originate from the district where you had jurisdiction. MR POTGIETER: The first thing that you would do, wouldn’t you contact the region where these persons came from to find out what was available on this person? Firstly there was a file and if there was a file what type of information is available in respect to this person. MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairperson. As I’ve said earlier what we do is, when a person from another division’s name was mentioned in a report ....[intervention] MR POTGIETER: Yes, I understand that but I want to come back to Mr Mhlawuli. A person - it seems that from the end of 1984 you had information about it, you had informers who reported about Mr Mhlawuli. MR TAYLOR: That’s correct. I want to reiterate that initially when he came to my attention he was not as prominent as Mr Goniwe and the others. MR POTGIETER: And eventually you established that he was one of Goniwe’s cohorts? MR TAYLOR: Yes. As I’ve said, in the last three weeks when we looked at the information intensely - and I would just like to add that we had a large volume of suspects, we couldn’t handle it at that stage. MR POTGIETER: I understand. I’m not speaking in general, I’m specifically referring to Mr Mhlawuli. What system are you trying to explain to us in respect of him? You had to monitor the cohorts of Mr Goniwe more intensively. My question would be, would you not contact SWD, Oudtshoorn: "We have a man here from your division, it’s becoming a problem, we want to take action, what do you know of this person"? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, I would not have told Oudtshoorn we would want to take action. MR POTGIETER: Okay, I can understand that. You’ve mentioned previously you did not trust everyone, not to let on to them. MR TAYLOR: If I did this before this three weeks it would have been normal but if I did it within these three weeks it would have been suspect and they would not see that because I contacted them about Mr Mhlawuli so close to this incident, it would have been suspect. MR POTGIETER: Is it because you didn’t trust them? MR TAYLOR: No, no it’s not because I didn’t trust them. In respect of the operation itself I just want to come back to the three weeks. It’s not just us who went around in this manner, the people in the struggle at that time went about in the same manner. I would especially not contract anther region in respect of something that we were planning. MR POTGIETER: Why did you have all these systems, index cards, operational, information files? Why did you just not keep one file, it would have been so simple? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I’ve just referred to an operational file, that was not a usual thing, it was not an official file. I’m just referring to them as operational files, it’s just by way of describing, it was not official. There were no official operational files. Index cards, as I’ve already explained was a kind of an alphabetical system about people who came to the region, that was more official. The index system was an official system. The index system was a little filing card which was filed in a little filing cabinet, filed alphabetically and it was classified "Whites, Blacks and Asians" MR POTGIETER: Yes, I can imagine what this looked like but what it boils down to is that nothing has been presented to us regarding Mr Mhlawuli in the form of one or other official record, something tangible which the security police had one him and this is why I’m asking these questions. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I understand your problem. This also causes a problem for us. I am convinced however, that if Oudtshoorn did not have a file on Mr Mhlawuli there was a omission. At certain instances I specifically used his name in my reports and I would have sent them a copy of this letter. If they did not have a file I would have expected them to come back to me and ask for information about him. MR POTGIETER: Perhaps later more material will become available. MR TAYLOR: I think so Mr Chairman. MR BOOYENS: I want to refer you to a document which has become available. There’s a statement attached to the inquest report. This is a statement coming from Alex Goniwe and it is a statement apparently dated the 18th of June 1987. It’s a statement 18 June 1987. From this document, do you just want to read number three into the record? MR TAYLOR: It says in the third paragraph "The organisation at Cradock, the residents organisation was established, Goniwe was the Chairman. It’s also known as Cradora. Sparrow, Ford and Stwele were all members of Cradora" MR BOOYENS: The context of this statement, about what was that? - It was during this inquiry. MR TAYLOR: The context was, if I draw the correct inference, it had to do with the inquiry into the death of these four people. MR BOOYENS: And who is Sparrow, Ford and Stwele? MR TAYLOR: Ford Calata, Sparrow Mkhonto and it must be Stwele Mhlawuli. MR BOOYENS: I think the word: "operational file" creates certain perceptions regarding one certain matter, you have to explain. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, this is a term I’ve coined here this morning. It was a non-official file, it was only related to the planning of operations and that’s why I’m calling it and operational file, an informal file not available to people outside the group involved in this task. MR BOOYENS: In other words the phrase: "operational file" would not be used in the official police jargon of that time when matters were discussed? MR TAYLOR: This is a term which referred to JOS activities. MR BOOYENS: You’ve already given evidence that the people would be in P.E. according to evidence. Yesterday you referred to the meeting which you held with the families of the deceased and specifically the fact that a minister was involved, a reverend. That meeting, I think it’s stated in the minutes that you did not consult your lawyer in this process, you didn’t talk to him about that. MR TAYLOR: That is correct Mr Chairman. MR BOOYENS: Mr Taylor, when you held discussions with these people, where from the depth of your heart came the idea to talk to them? MR BIZOS: ...[inaudible] he told the witness where it came from Mr Chairman but anyway we will have to see. CHAIRPERSON: Maybe he was talking about the different ventricles. MR BOOYENS: I think my learned friend knows what I’m asking. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, it is one of the most difficult aspects of the whole process, it was a very emotional occasion because I had this desire, an expressed desire which I felt. I wanted to meet these families, it was really a need which I felt. Amongst others, especially from a Christian point of view, I don’t think amnesty at that stage was more important for me than reconciliation. It was a very emotional experience, it is an experience which I will never forget. MR POTGIETER: Were you aware of the inquest? MR TAYLOR: I read about that in the newspaper Mr Chairman. I never had any in-depth knowledge. MR POTGIETER: Why did you not assist the Attorney General or the court with that inquest to tell them that you felt terrible over this whole incident, but as a policeman you only performed your duty because you had received an instruction and that was what happened. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, in the first place I was not approached. I understand what you mean, why did I not go voluntarily. The possibility that I would still be charged there - at that stage I had not experienced this transformation which took place later on when I changed my whole view of the politics and also later on the purpose and functioning of the TRC. I want to tell you that at a certain stag, because of ignorance I was careful of the whole process or hesitant. After I read documents what this was all about, what the functioning was, what the purpose was and I agreed with that. MR POTGIETER: Did you not consult anybody when this inquest was going on, like a minister, a reverend of somebody, that "This is troubling me, I want to do something about that"? MR TAYLOR: No, I did not do that, only a later stage I considered that. MR BOOYENS: At the stage when the inquest was on were you still a member of the police? MR TAYLOR: I don’t know what the date was of the judicial inquiry. MR BOOYENS: It was ‘93. The first on was in ‘87 and the second one was in ‘93. MR TAYLOR: Please repeat your question. MR BOOYENS: During this inquest, I’m referring to the second one because you were still a member of the police force in ‘87. MR TAYLOR: I was still in the police force in ‘93 but I was not a member of the security force anymore and I was in the anti-crime prevention unit and I was in their management support system. MR BOOYENS: And the people who were involved with you, were they still your colleagues? You’ve referred to loyalty, were some of them still stationed here? MR TAYLOR: Only Gerhard Lotz was still stationed here. Captain van Zyl travelled a great deal, I did not have a lot of contact with him and Colonel du Plessis was at that time stationed in Pretoria so it was only me and Lotz in Port Elizabeth - of the Northern Transvaal. MR BOOYENS: Just a moment please Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I don’t want to waste any time, it concerns Exhibit DD. There are a few technical problems regarding that which I want to set right. I’m referring to the minutes of the meeting with the family. Can we just have an adjournment for five minutes during which I can finalise this aspect? MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman with respect, it is most unusual for an attorney to be consulting with a witness who is in the witness box and it is also unusual, with respect, to tell us that there are technical problems with the minutes. We have prepared - the document was produced by them, we have prepared cross-examination on it and I don’t understand what is meant by a technical problem. If the intention is to consult with the witness in order for him to change - to give us a different version in relation to it, it would most unusual. I don’t understand what this is about. ...[no sound] that I’m referring to is that the attorney of the witness was talking to the witness during the pause in the proceedings. I think that we must, with respect, try as much as possible to do it in accordance with the well-established rules of procedures. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, would you have any objection to them requesting an adjournment to consult? MR BIZOS: I think the Committee is entitled to be told what is the technical problem Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: No, I’m dealing with the first complaint first. CHAIRPERSON: Would you have any objection if they were able to consult, still consult with the witness before cross-examination? MR BIZOS: No, I wouldn’t object, they’re probably entitled to that. CHAIRPERSON: But not in this fashion? MR BIZOS: But not in this fashion. CHAIRPERSON: That’s all I ask. Mr Booyens, you heard the complain? MR BOOYENS: Yes Mr Chairman, I heard the complaint and I’ll deal with it. I don’t think it’s necessary to deal with it here, can I request a five minute adjournment please? CHAIRPERSON: Okay. What seems to be the problem with the minutes? MR BOOYENS: For example on page four ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON: Yes, what about page four? MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, the witness said yesterday that certain things were marked on his minutes which are not exactly correct. I just want to clarify that, that’s all it is about. These are small things, for example you would recall the two that he specifically mentioned were "shoot" and "shoot". There was reference - I seem to recall that there are here and there small things like that. I’m not talking about a changing evidence or anything of that nature but it’s the type of thing that can lead to lengthy cross-examination on things which can be rectified now. CHAIRPERSON: Would you want to adjourn to do that first? MR BOOYENS: Yes, that’s why I’m asking for the adjournment. CHAIRPERSON: Well, I must point out I would have expected that exercise to have been completed last night already. MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman with respect, if that is the technical problem, why can’t the witness be asked now to have a look and tell us if he has any further amendments or matters to mark? Why must he adjourn and why must he consult? CHAIRPERSON: Mr Taylor, have you read that document? MR TAYLOR: I glanced through this, I did not read it in detail. Yesterday I told you that in essence this in an accurate representation of that meeting with just here and there a difference in emphasis which is not correct. I’ve mentioned two things to you and I saw a few other small things but it won’t be a problem. CHAIRPERSON: On page four, what is it that you want to correct? MR BIZOS: ...[inaudible] Mr Chairman, I object to the witness having whispers with his counsel whilst the court is in session. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, I’ve asked the witness a question and I would appreciate it if he answered it. INTERPRETER: The speaker’s mike is not on. MR BOOYENS: Perhaps I should repeat first of all what the witness said to me. He said: "I’m ready, I think I can continue". CHAIRPERSON: Then he should have said that to me. MR BIZOS: I accept that Mr Chairman. MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I feel that my learned friend is very quick to suggest that both me and my attorney are behaving unethically. I certainly do not think that’s justified ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, I think - I don’t know what Mr Bizos has in mind, but it doesn’t look right. CHAIRPERSON: At least in public. MR BOOYENS: Yes. No, but the witness was speaking to me Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: I accept that. I’ve asked him a question and I would expect him to answer the question. Mr Taylor I’ve asked, is there anything else you want to change or correct in these minutes in Exhibit DD? CHAIRPERSON: Let us go through the whole document. Page 1, are you finished with page 1? CHAIRPERSON: Is there anything you want to correct? MR TAYLOR: No thank you Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: Page 4, you’ve already said there’s nothing? MR TAYLOR: Nothing Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: Page 6 you’ve already corrected yesterday. MR TAYLOR: That’s correct Mr Chairman. MR TAYLOR: Nothing Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: So there are no problems with Exhibit DD. Yes Mr Booyens? MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, that concludes my evidence as far as this witness is concerned. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS CHAIRPERSON: Mr Taylor, please page to page 8 of your application. MR TAYLOR: I have it in front of me. CHAIRPERSON: Question 11(a) and (b). MR TAYLOR: Are you referring to page 8? CHAIRPERSON: Yes, page 8 of the record. MR TAYLOR: I’ve only got my application in front of me, I will get it now. Mr Chairman, paragraph 11(a) and (b)? CHAIRPERSON: 11(a), the question is "Is the deed or deeds, omissions, offence or offences executed in the execution of an instruction of or on behalf half or with the approval of the relevant organisation, institution, body, liberation movement, government department or security force"? "Yes". MR TAYLOR: That is correct Mr Chairman. "If yes, give particulars with reference to such an instruction or approval and the date of that and if known the name and address of the person or persons who gave such an instruction or approval". CHAIRPERSON: And your original answer is "Will be provided at a later stage" When you answered question 11(a) you certainly knew what the answer to (b) was, why did you complete it like this? MR TAYLOR: I can’t remember but it’s definitely like that. In my latest application the answer is correct. CHAIRPERSON: When you signed this application, did you read through all of this? MR TAYLOR: Yes, I read through this very quickly, everything went very quickly at that stage. CHAIRPERSON: Can you give a reason why this happened? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman, I can’t provide a reason. CHAIRPERSON: Did you not complete this? Whose handwriting is this? MR TAYLOR: It’s not my handwriting Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: Who’s handwriting is it? MR TAYLOR: It could be my attorney’s handwriting. MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, if I can assist you, I’m not suggesting that my lawyer is giving evidence but he said it is his handwriting. CHAIRPERSON: Before you completed this form did you tell your attorney who gave this instruction or on behalf of which organisation you did this? MR TAYLOR: Yes, that is correct. While we discussed the chronological order I definitely told him the line of command. CHAIRPERSON: So your attorney knew what the answer was. CHAIRPERSON: He understood what you said? MR TAYLOR: I don’t have the old application but from the start I said that the instruction came from Captain van Zyl, I refer - as from page 4, 5 and onwards. When I came to page 8 the answer had already been given. CHAIRPERSON: So you can’t provide a reason why your attorney wrote something else here? CHAIRPERSON: Six months before this incident you found out more about Mr Mhlawuli. CHAIRPERSON: You got photographs, bits of information, little bits of paper and the so-called informal file. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I’m sorry to interrupt. The operational file did not come about at the beginning of that period, that was established during the discussions with Captain van Zyl when the ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON: When the plan came into force? [No English translation - transcriber’s own translation] CHAIRPERSON: So can we say a month or so before the incident? MR TAYLOR: I would say about three weeks before the incident I became aware because at certain instances I made notes and I wrote short memos and provided it to Captain van Zyl. CHAIRPERSON: It seems to me that here in Port Elizabeth you did not have enough information about Mr Mhlawuli and that is why there was not an official file for him. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman as I’ve already explained, we would not open a file on a suspect from another region. I’m convinced that in those reports where Mr Mhlawuli was mentioned would have been filed in Port Elizabeth, perhaps in the file of Goniwe or under a UDF file or a file of activists or under all three files. CHAIRPERSON: As you’ve heard from the witnesses before you a decision was made according to your version, that Mhlawuli had to be killed based on the information you had access to. CHAIRPERSON: And it seems to me that in comparison to the others it was not much. MR TAYLOR: Not as detailed as the information on the other three. But to go back to the pattern which we followed with expanding this information Mr Mhlawuli fitted into this pattern. CHAIRPERSON: I don’t know if it was you or somebody else who said that the whole operation against Mr Mhlawuli was to prevent that he did similar things in Oudtshoorn. MR TAYLOR: Amongst others, yes Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: You did not know whether he would succeed with that in Oudtshoorn. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, if we look at all the people who co-operated with Mr Goniwe I have not doubt that he would succeed under Mr Goniwe’s guidance. CHAIRPERSON: I’m talking now about the possibility that Mr Mhlawuli would succeed in Oudtshoorn to do what you said Mr Goniwe was doing in Cradock and other places. MR TAYLOR: I thought he would succeed, yes. CHAIRPERSON: How did you know that? MR TAYLOR: In the first place he had access to the same power base, namely scholars. CHAIRPERSON: But that was all ...[intervention] MR TAYLOR: He was influential in the community as a teacher. CHAIRPERSON: That was guess shots, not so? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman. As I’ve told you, the interpretation of this information we established a certain pattern and he fitted into that pattern. CHAIRPERSON: It could have been that it was to come into contact, you could have contacted the security police in Oudtshoorn to find out whether Mr Mhlawuli was a leader in the Oudtshoorn area and that he would be able to establish all these structures there. MR TAYLOR: It could have been easy, yes. CHAIRPERSON: And then you would have been in a better position to decide if he posed a threat for the state. MR TAYLOR: Yes, I agree but during that time I am convinced, it’s a subjective opinion, I worked with the information, I worked with a certain established pattern and I was convinced that he had to be included. CHAIRPERSON: Shortly after this incident murder and robbery branch of Port Elizabeth investigated this, did they question you? Were you aware that people were being questioned? MR TAYLOR: No Mr Chairman, the only thing I heard about was what Captain van Zyl referred to the other day, that Engelbrecht confronted him in Pretoria regarding this. I know at a certain stage the investigative officer visited the security branch and that was related to obtaining transcriptions of 11(a) conversations. CHAIRPERSON: At that stage why did you not come to the fore, why did you not tell them what had happened? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, if I can say it in my own words, I know it does not sound good but we undertook this operation precisely because we wanted to get away with it, our intention was to get away with it. At that stage I would never have presented any information. From the beginning it was my conviction that it had to be undertaken, that we would not be charged. That we in other words were going to get away with it. CHAIRPERSON: But you know that you could have approached the Attorney General or the investigative officer and said: "Look I’m willing to tell you everything on the condition that you should look after me", there are ways and means of doing that. MR TAYLOR: Captain van Zyl, Lotz and myself decided jointly what to do and it would have been unethical and disloyal to go behind their backs and address the Attorney General. Mr Chairman, you must remember that in 1985, how I felt then differs completely from how I feel today. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: Could we have a date on which you say your transformation took place Mr Taylor? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, can Mr Bizos just say to which transformation he’s referring to? MR BIZOS: That you decided that your - what you did in 1985 was legally and morally wrong and you were sorry about it, that’s what I’m mean by transformation. When did that happen? MR TAYLOR: I would say it started in 1990 Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: In the beginning of 1990. And was it a - is that what you said? MR BOOYENS: No, he said it started in 1990, not at the beginning of 1990. MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon. During 1990? MR TAYLOR: That is correct, yes. MR BIZOS: We can even take it that by the end of 1990 you were a completely transformed man. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman no, that was only the beginning of the process and this was a process which continued up to 1994/’85. Initially, if I can mention incidents about a new way of thinking was when the negotiations took place. If we knew in 1985 we knew that five years later those negotiations would start, it would have been a different matter. Mandela was released, negotiations were started and I just started to change my point of view. MR BIZOS: So by 1992, how far along the road of transformation had you reached? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I just want to think when President Mandela was inaugurated, it was in 1992 I think. Yes, it was in a advanced stage, I followed the CODESSA process and also the bilateral discussions before the CODESSA negotiations started. At that stage I was not against these negotiations. MR BIZOS: Yes, no I’m not talking about - the negotiations helped you to recognise that you had done wrong in 1985, am I putting it correctly? MR TAYLOR: To a certain degree that is correct yes, but that was the starting point of a long process. I think that was a political conversion, it was not something which happened overnight. Gradually I started accepting things I would never have considered in 1985. MR BIZOS: And by 1993 when the election date had been fixed, by the end of 1993 and an interim constitution was voted on in the beginning of August 1993, were you still in the police force? MR TAYLOR: That is correct Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: And did you agree, and if you were asked to take an oath on the interim constitution, you no doubt would have taken it because of this process of transformation that was going through you. MR BIZOS: You must have been watching the proceedings before Mr Justice Zietsman with great interest, beginning the beginning of ‘93 and finishing in the beginning of ‘94 with interruptions in-between. Do you recall all that? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I never followed the inquest, the only time I had knowledge of this is when mention of the documentation was mentioned in the consultation with the witness that was given here. You must remember, if I’m correct, this inquest was started because of the "Motherwell" bombing in which I had no interest. MR BIZOS: I think you’ve got your facts wrong but let’s just clarify them, where were you during 1993? MR TAYLOR: I was already gone from the security branch and I was crime prevention. MR BIZOS: At which town or city? UNKNOWN: May I just come in here if you don’t mind Mr Bizos? Were you at your own request from the security branch or were you transferred? MR TAYLOR: The security branch had what we called transferral, this was because their security branch was united underneath the NBO. The NBO and the detectives did not have the ability to operate and because of this I was transferred to the CPU. MR BIZOS: Were you doing your police work here in Port Elizabeth during 1993? MR BIZOS: Now the newspapers in 1993 had almost invariably an article on their front page in relation to this inquest before Mr Justice Zietsman and you never read any of those newspapers? MR TAYLOR: Not that I can recall, I had no interest in this matter. MR BIZOS: You know ...[intervention] MR TAYLOR: I beg your pardon Mr Chair. What I can remember was it was a conflict of interest between the Defence Force and the Police Force, that’s all I can recall of this procedure. MR BIZOS: I would have thought that you, having been one of the killers, would have been watching this with a very keen interest just in case things turned - took a turn and you might even have been identified in some way. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chair, at that stage I was convinced that nobody had any information, that there were any witnesses or any evidence that we were involved in that elimination process. I want to assure you that if something was known murder and robbery would have picked it up. I think it’s public knowledge that murder and robbery would have been operational then. At that stage I had no concern whatsoever that we would be involved. MR BIZOS: Didn’t it come to your notice that Mr Justice Zietsman on more than one occasion made a public appeal or an appeal in court to the public at large that anyone who has any information about these killings would they please approach either counsel or the Attorney General and furnish the information that this blot on our history may be expunged. Don’t you recall the Judge making this appeal and it appearing on the front pages of the newspapers? It did not come to your notice? MR TAYLOR: No, this did not come to my attention, I did not follow this procedure. At that stage I was just not interested. MR BIZOS: Are you asking the Committee to believe that the matter that occupied the attention of the news media of the country, the vast people - the vast number of people that were concerned about it and one of the killers didn’t care two hoots of what was being said in court by the Judge or the witnesses even though that killer was busy transforming himself into the new society and was loyal to the constitution which had already been adopted. MR TAYLOR: Yes, I’d like to ask the Committee to believe that because I wouldn’t say this if I wasn’t sure of my facts, I did not follow this matter in the press. It came to my attention in consultation, I knew the matter was ongoing and I knew that the inquest was ongoing but I did not follow this. At that stage I felt safe because it was eight years earlier or whatever the period was and I knew if they could not resolve this matter at that - then they wouldn’t resolve it. I knew that the only witness that was there was the three of us. MR BIZOS: Well, that’s now quite right unless of course there is some truth in the suggestion that the three black members or four black people that were there were not there at all and that they were put there for the benefit of getting amnesty in the "Motherwell" matter. Why do you say only the three of you, did you think that black people couldn’t give evidence or give information? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chair, I cannot recall when these person died, these black members in the Motherwell matter. I think at that stage they were already deceased. If I remember correctly the Motherwell case was in 1989, the black members were already dead at that stage. MR BIZOS: So what you should have said was that of the seven witnesses, four had been killed by the security police and therefore we were not afraid that any names would come out. MR BIZOS: That’s how you should have said it. MR BIZOS: I think you’re probably correct on that basis. I’m going...[indistinct] Do you want to take the adjournment now? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (cont) Mr Taylor, the non-security policeman that was investigating these deaths was a Mr Fanie Els. MR BIZOS: I’m given to understand that he and you are very good friends. MR TAYLOR: That’s is correct Chairperson. MR BIZOS: And you know that murder dockets never close and you know that he is still the investigating officer. MR TAYLOR: I don’t know if he still has the documents, dockets. MR TAYLOR: I realise that ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON: Even if he didn’t have it he could acquire it, isn’t it? MR BIZOS: Now, the question of the Motherwell incident became an issue in the Goniwe inquest before his Lordship Mr Justice Zietsman. MR BIZOS: You were there shortly after the vehicle in which the four deceased were blown up, and Mr Niewoudt gave you the undamaged detonator of the supposed mini - what’s "kleefmyn", limpet mine that was supposed to have blown up that vehicle. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, that’s correct except for the detonator was damaged in an explosion. MR BIZOS: Well I have a very distinct recollection of it being produced as an exhibit and there being cross-examination as to how could they explain that it hadn’t been damaged, but let’s leave that detail out for a moment. Now you, as one of your specialities mentioned that was related to bombs. MR BIZOS: Let’s take the benevolent interpretation of that statement to mean that the investigation of bombs from the point of view of the prevention rather the letting off of bombs. MR TAYLOR: That’s correct. In other words we speak here of packages that look suspect, that may contain explosives. MR BIZOS: And what do you say to the evidence that was led in that case, that anyone that knew anything about bombs going off wouldn’t it have been taken in that that vehicle was blown into the air with a mini limpet bomb put by the ANC, supposedly put by the ANC. What do you say to that? MR TAYLOR: Can I just give clarity? Do I have to comment whether it could be a limpet mine or something else? MR BIZOS: Well, what is the problem with your answering the question? Did you or did you not realise that this detonator of a mini limpet mine could not have done the damage that had been done and that it required a minimum of four to five kilograms of explosive for the vehicle to be blown up in the manner in which it was? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, I understand the question better. The detonator could not have done the damage but I wish to say this was a time detonator, would have been in any explosive, it could have been used in any explosive. Secondly at the scene I judged it a little bit higher, I judged it for a least between 6 and 8 kilograms of explosive was used. I do not know the source of the detonator with the short period of time I was at the scene. MR BIZOS: Well that’s good enough for me. You were of the view that a high quantity of explosive was used but you must have become aware that the "dek storie" then put out was that it was a mini limpet mine put there by the ANC. You must have become aware of that, you were called to the scene immediately afterwards. MR TAYLOR: I remember that there was rumour of the ANC being responsible for the explosion, I just know where the word: "mini limpet mine" or where it was suggested that a mini limpet mine was used because I had no doubt that the damage that was done there could not have been done by a limpet mine. MR BIZOS: You had another interest because three of the people that helped you to kill Goniwe and his friends died in that explosion. MR TAYLOR: Yes, I had interest in the incident, two ...[intervention] MR BIZOS: And you knew that his Lordship Mr Justice Zietsman was investigating that matter. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, may I please just answer the first question? I had interest in this explosion. I was at mini scenes, I think this was one of the most shocking scenes that I was at and I want to point out two things. I was relatively close to two of these persons who died in this explosion. MR BIZOS: Yes. Therefore that must have heightened your interest in the proceedings before his Lordship Mr Justice Zietsman? MR TAYLOR: I just had interest and followed it in detail when the matter was in the Supreme Court where Mr Niewoudt and others were charged in Pretoria. and at times I attended some of these hearings. I would just like to say that except for the question that I was at the scene of the explosion, I was never present at any of the other investigations in this matter. MR BIZOS: I think the question that I had hoped you would deal with, when you had this particular interest why you didn’t express that interest by following the inquest before Mr Justice Zietsman with greater care. MR TAYLOR: I cannot explain this. At that stage I did not follow it, just later on I started following the inquest. I cannot give you another explanation for this, I cannot tell you something that I could not substantiate. MR BIZOS: Shortly after you attended the meeting with members of the families of the deceased, were you approached by one of your fiends on behalf of the investigating officers to go the investigating officers to help with the investigation? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairperson, this did not happen. I just have to think, they only time that I was approached with regard to this matter was just after - in the beginning of 1986 I was approached by a Colonel Jonker for the Special Investigation Team and there was another person, I don’t know what his rank was. This was early in 1996. MR BIZOS: Didn’t you instruct your attorney to instruct the investigating officers that you were not interested in assisting them or talking to them? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman, I wish to explain. At that stage, I do not remember the persons, this investigating officer just contacted people or came to their houses to interview them and I went to my attorney, not the attorney next to me but Mr Alwyn Griebenhout and he liaised with this investigation team because there were other allegations against me at that stage and I told him to tell them that if they want to see me they need to make an appointment. I did not like the manner in which they were handling the people. MR BIZOS: Will you please turn to page 8 of the record with your application for amnesty dated the 13th of December 1996. MR TAYLOR: I have it in front of me. MR BIZOS: That was two days before the cut-off date of the 15th of December, before it was extended. MR TAYLOR: That’s correct if I remember correctly. MR BIZOS: And the fact that the information as to who gave you the order to kill the people was going to be provided later, you say was, is in your attorney’s handwriting and not in yours? MR BIZOS: Did your attorney know from you who had given you the order? MR TAYLOR: Definitely Mr Chairperson, the ...[intervention] MR BIZOS: Did you ever ask him for a reason why that name was not given, was not put in your application? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson I want to honestly say that this was a formality to me, my great concern was about the contents of my statement. This was a preliminary statement, it was relatively busy at that stage. MR BIZOS: Well, ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON: Who told you that it was a preliminary statement? MR TAYLOR: Initially when I started Mr Chairperson, it was told to me that we would have the opportunity to give full details and at a later stage Mr Mac Adams of the TRC and his Investigation Team and I gave them a statement and he asked me in-depth to clear up some information. MR BIZOS: If I were to suggest to you that the reason why you did not mention Mr van Zyl’s name when you filled in the form was because you were not prepared to mention Mr van Zyl’s name without his consent, would you say that that suggestion is wrong? MR TAYLOR: That is wrong Mr Chairperson. Before we went - we had any of these forms or when we got to any of these sections of these forms we collectively decided that we were going to apply for amnesty. This process started after the meeting in Pretoria with General van der Merwe. And in this statement, if we look at the contents, I had said that it came from Captain van Zyl, in the same statement. And somewhere in the statement it would say as I’ve set out my chronological order, Captain van Zyl’s name is mentioned as the one who gave the instruction. MR BIZOS: Did you know when ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON: Would it interest you to know that by the time you signed your statement on the 13th of December, van Zyl had not yet made an application? MR TAYLOR: I don’t know how all this fits in. If I can just ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON: His statement was signed in May 1997. MR TAYLOR: If can remember Mr van Zyl did not use the same legal team and I can remember that he was abroad and he was consulted much later. MR BIZOS: You see there’s a difference between Mr van Zyl being involved and Mr van Zyl giving the order, isn’t there? MR TAYLOR: That’s correct. If I can remember correctly I did not go through this previous statement but initially I said that the instruction came from him. UNKNOWN LADY: Mr Chairman, Mr Bizos this may be helpful in response and in fairness to the witness, on page 13 of the record, of the bundle, paragraph 4 he states "I was instructed by Captain van Zyl" UNKNOWN LADY: Oh, I’m so sorry, I’m so sorry, I’ve got Lotz here. MR BOOYENS: Well if I may assist my learned friend, if you look at the very first line on page four, the same appears. MR BIZOS: That’s Mr Lotz’s, that’s Mr Lotz’s. UNKNOWN LADY: I beg your pardon, my apologies. MR BOOYENS: Maybe Mr Chairman through you I can assist my learned friend if he looks at the very top of page four. MR BIZOS: Yes, no that is correct. Yes, that is correct, it is mentioned there but let us deal with this as to where the order actually originated and with it being supplied later. Can you explain this co-incidence: van Zyl applies on the 6th of May ‘97, the extended date, would you accept that? MR TAYLOR: Yes, I would accept that. MR BIZOS: And the following day, the 7th of May ‘97 your amended application is filed, do you say that that was a coincidence? MR TAYLOR: It may be co-incidence but my second statement was taken by Mr Mac Adams from the TRC Investigation Team. I don’t know when he finalised it, I do not have that detail. MR TAYLOR: I just wish to point out, if I can remember correctly the difference between the two statements is minimal. At that stage Mr Mac Adams just wanted more particulars about certain issues. MR BIZOS: You told us that you were concerned in reading about how to counter the revolutionary warfare that the country was involved in.. MR TAYLOR: I can just say I had model for anti-revolutionary action, I had a model of the revolutionary onslaught and what I remember at that stage came about from what I studied. I never studied a course in counter-strategies. MR BIZOS: Well in studying what the revolutionary strategy was, wasn’t it part and parcel as to how to counter it as a security policeman? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I was not interested in those aspects. As I’ve said, my initial idea of the pattern and dimension of such an onslaught I gathered during certain courses and I processed that for myself. During those courses mention was never made of methods to combat the revolutionary onslaught, they emphasised the necessity of gathering intelligence. MR BIZOS: And not what to do with it? MR TAYLOR: No Mr Chairman, I did not make a study of that. MR BIZOS: Did you ever come across "The Lessons from Past Revolutionary Wars" by a Brigadier Fraser? MR BIZOS: And did you never attend any lectures in which the name was mentioned? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman, not as far as I can remember. It might be possible and perhaps the people who prepared the lectures, I don’t know whether they consulted that person’s books. MR BIZOS: Will you please turn to: "The Signal" on page 101 reproduced in the Judgement of Judge Zietsman? You’ve seen this before have you? MR BIZOS: Didn’t you read the Judgement that was annexed to your application? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, the only documents I had was my own statement, I did not have one of these bounded volumes. MR BIZOS: Please look at page 101 and you will see that there was a telephone discussion between General van Rensburg and Brigadier van der Westhuizen, at the bottom of the page, do you see that? MR BIZOS: And then the three names are set out: Matthew Goniwe, Mbolelo Goniwe and Ford Calata. MR TAYLOR: That is correct Mr Chairman. "It is proposed that abovenamed persons be permanently removed from society as a matter of urgency". MR BIZOS: Now here we have a situation that a Brigadier in the JMC procedure, process has to report to a General in the Secretariat of the Security Council, has to request for a death warrant for the people. You agree with that interpretation? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I agree with Mr Bizos but if I look at this sentence there is no request just a proposal. MR TAYLOR: Although this is not a problem for me. MR BIZOS: It’s not a problem for you, right. It’s a good basis to ask you the next question. Do you agree that even a Brigadier in the South African Defence Force could only propose that people should be killed, to a General of the Secretarial of the Security Council? MR TAYLOR: That is what I can draw the inference from what stands here. MR BIZOS: And the next inference that we can draw is that not even a Brigadier in the army could order the killing of three people. MR TAYLOR: It appears like that yes. MR BIZOS: And you as you’ve told us were involved in some ways in the JMC and subordinate bodies, must have known that if a Brigadier required permission from the Secretarial of the Security Council a Major or a Captain like van Zyl couldn’t himself give orders without the authority from higher up. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I was never involved on the level you are referring to. Communication between the regional body between these two bodies, I was not part of that. All I can remember is that Brigadier van Rensburg was the Chairman of that JMC(?). MR BIZOS: Did you think that a Captain in the security police had the authority to tell you to kill four people without any reference to his superiors? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman, I did not accept that a Captain would give such an instruction but I accepted that he received this instruction from somebody else. MR TAYLOR: No, I did not ask him Mr Chairman. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I want to explain to you. I want to tell you that we had a kind of a sub-culture, we did not question one another. I accepted, I knew van Zyl very well, I know what his competence’s were. He was a very intelligent man, he was a very practical person and I knew he would not attempt such an operation all by himself. We worked on a need to know basis and we were not the only people who operated like this, this was being done world-wide. It worked like that on grassroots level regarding the revolutionary onslaught, the fewer people who knew the better. MR BIZOS: You say that it happens like that throughout the word. I suppose you mean in orders given: keep the filing system in order, go and take a statement here or do some other lawful activity, do you say that killing, orders to kill were accepted without any question, without any enquiry as to why and from the orders came above? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, what I mean by that is that organisations like the CIA and others, they functioned on a need to know basis. If you received a command from your seniors in any of the organisations you accept that it would have been approved in that organisation. I believed that Captain van Zyl would not give that instruction and ask me to participate in an operation if he did not get the authorisation. MR BIZOS: Let’s leave the CIA out of this, we have enough problems or our own. Would it be possible in this culture that you say you existed, that if a Captain had a private grudge against half a dozen people he could get a number of his subordinates without asking any question of him, to eliminate those people? MR BIZOS: Well, what do you mean, what was the difference? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman as I’ve already said, such an operation would not have been performed against innocent people. I had no reason to at any stage doubt his integrity. MR BIZOS: You use this matter of innocent people, who were you to judge who is innocent and who is guilty? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I think we’ve already talked about this. We all realise that what we did was wrong and it was actually murder, I don’t want to deny that fact. MR BIZOS: Yes. Well, when did you for the first hear that this order came from someone even above Colonel Snyman, when did you first hear that? MR TAYLOR: When consideration was given to apply for amnesty, then it was brought under my attention. MR BIZOS: Who brought it to your attention that it came from above Mr Snyman? MR TAYLOR: I can’t say exactly which person but I accept it was Captain van Zyl because we were together during the initiation phase of this application in Pretoria. At that stage we did not discuss the details. Later we got together and then this name was mentioned. Initially I accepted that Major du Plessis amongst others, was aware of this, this is what I thought but I was not sure what the hierarchy or the line of command was from there. I would not have been part of such an operation of Colonel - did not have Colonel du Plessis approval because I worked under his direct command in another section from van Zyl. MR BIZOS: Did Mr van Zyl tell you that he had been to Colonel Snyman and Snyman had said: "Do what is best for South Africa"? MR TAYLOR: He did not use those words when he spoke to me. He told me afterwards, during this first phase of the amnesty application, that Colonel Snyman gave the instruction but the detail of the discussions and the exact wording like: "Do what is in the best interest of South Africa", those words were not discussed with me. MR BIZOS: Didn’t you see it in your fellow applicant’s application? MR TAYLOR: Only afterwards when we started consulting with our attorney. MR BIZOS: Yes. When you learnt that Mr Snyman had given the order and when you learnt that it must have come from someone above Mr Snyman, did you go to Mr Snyman and ask him: "Tell me, who gave this order that got all of us into this mess"? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman, I did not do that. After Mr Snyman and I had left the police force we had little contact with one another. I saw him for the first time again during that meeting in Pretoria. MR BIZOS: You were already well on your road to transformation at that stage? MR TAYLOR: That is correct Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: This was complete transformation by the time you learnt that Mr Snyman and someone above him were responsible. MR TAYLOR: I’m sorry Mr Bizos, please repeat the question. MR BIZOS: Your transformation was complete by the time you learnt that it was Mr Snyman and someone above him that gave the orders down to Mr van Rensburg, Mr du Plessis came - van Zyl and it came to you. MR BIZOS: Your transformation was complete. MR BIZOS: And you were already seeking the forgiveness of the family? MR TAYLOR: No, not at that stage Mr Chairman, that came only at a later stage. MR BIZOS: Came at a later stage. MR TAYLOR: I made contact with the family after I had applied for amnesty. MR BIZOS: Yes. Well, when you came to apply - to ask the family - round about that time when you really wanted to purge your soul by asking for their forgiveness, weren’t you anxious to find out who had given the order form high up above? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman, I did not know, I did not ask who gave this instruction. I want to add to this that between me and Snyman and other colleagues, for example van Rensburg, I regard them as my seniors, they’re senior in rank and I would not have gone to Colonel Snyman and asked him who gave the command. I had my own ideas regarding that but that is only speculation. MR BIZOS: Well what was your speculation? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I considered this matter seriously and one thing was very prominent, something which I could not find an answer to. If you look at a body like the - where Ministers are involved and on a daily basis you receive information regarding activists and when you listen to what was being discussed between Ministers and suddenly these people - what I found out from the amnesty application, these prominent activists started disappearing, they’re murdered. Every day they had insight into those documents and I asked myself the question, it’s my personal feeling, I have nothing on which to base that: "Did those people think it was just a co-incidence"? It is just a personal observation I’ve asked myself that question. I don’t know whether it will ever be answered. I can’t believe that those people did not think about those things. MR BIZOS: Do you believe that knowing the full truth yourself and telling the full truth would have helped you in your personal condition? MR TAYLOR: Definitely yes, this is what this whole process is about. MR BIZOS: Yes, but outside this process you had an opportunity, did you not, to ask Mr Snyman: "Here I am having to apply for amnesty, suffering from post-traumatic shock" ...[intervention] MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I can’t explain that ...[intervention] MR BIZOS: I’m sorry,: "won’t you please tell me who gave you the order that you passed on"? MR TAYLOR: I can’t explain that, I did just did not do that. MR BIZOS: You see ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON: When you went to the family in the hope that you would be forgiven, according to these minutes you were asked certain questions not so? CHAIRPERSON: Including details of the deaths of these four unfortunate people, did you not think it wise to ask around after that meeting as to where did this permission or authority come from? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I did not do that. I had no contact with the people and at the same time, I don’t want to expand on that, in that same period I also suffered various personal problems and that disturbed me emotionally just as much as the meeting with the members of the family. MR POTGIETER: Did you take cognisance of the fact that the political leaders of that time denied that they ever gave authorisation that offences should be committed? MR TAYLOR: Yes, I knew about that. MR POTGIETER: Did that not motivate you furthermore to try and find out if they did not give the permission, who did and then approach Snyman and du Plessis and van Rensburg and van Zyl in this regard? MR TAYLOR: I did not ask them Mr Chairman. MR POTGIETER: [No English translation] MR TAYLOR: Yes, I noticed that the politicians were denying all this. I can assure you - I don’t want to talk on behalf of other people, that it is our general impression that at the end of the day we kept them in control of the country but afterwards we stood all by ourselves, we as the security forces. That’s my analysis of the situation. CHAIRPERSON: What has that comment got to do with the question, that you protected and kept certain people in power? The question was that when these people whom you kept in power announced for the world to hear, that they had not participated in any suchlike crimes, did it not give rise to you, not give rise to any thoughts that you should now find out where this authority came from? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, at that stage I would have liked to know who was responsible for approving this whole operation but I did not make any enquiries. I want to add however, even up till today I still want to know where this line of command has stopped. MR BIZOS: You posed a question, a rhetorical question a short while ago, would the politicians not have asked: "Is it a coincidence that all these high level activists are being killed"? Is that a question that you put to yourself at the time that you started preparing to kill Mr Goniwe and his colleagues? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman, those were my own thoughts when this process of transformation started and I realised that somewhere up there there was an authority. MR BIZOS: In your application, in the minutes you say that the structures decided to have them killed, do you remember that? Just have a look at page 4 ...[intervention] MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, to which document are you referring? MR BIZOS: Exhibit DD, the minutes of the meeting. "He pointed out in response to a question that it was the top structures who decided this operation should be carried out and that the people who gave the command will be coming forward at the Amnesty Hearing" MR TAYLOR: That is correct Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Which were the top structures? MR TAYLOR: My line of command from Captain van Zyl, to the top. MR BIZOS: A structures means a body does it not? MR TAYLOR: Yes, it means a body. MR BIZOS: Now Mr Snyman was not a body, he was not a structure, which structures were you referring to? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I want to indicate something to you. In the first place this whole meeting took place in English and my English is relatively good but it is not 100%, I could have made wrong word choices. I also want to tell you and I want to explain it to you that the emotional circumstances of - at that meeting, I want to tell you it’s something you have to experience to understand. This is why I said I have no problem with the question that the person who compiled this document made a few mistakes but she also suffered severely emotionally. MR BIZOS: Would the GBS be a structure? MR TAYLOR: Yes, I would regard the GBS as a structure. MR BIZOS: And would that be a top structure? MR TAYLOR: Yes, it would be a top structure. MR BIZOS: Would the Secretariat of the Security Council be a structure? MR BIZOS: And would that be a top structure? MR BIZOS: And would the police be a structure? MR BIZOS: And would that be a top structure at the head office level? MR TAYLOR: Well, either on regional or headquarters level. MR BIZOS: Yes. And would Cradock be a structure of the security police? MR BIZOS: And ...[intervention] MR TAYLOR: Although, I’m sorry, I would not regard them as a top structure. MR BIZOS: Yes, it would a structure but not a top structure. MR BIZOS: And would the army be a structure? MR BIZOS: And would people holding the position of General and Brigadier be part of the top structure of the army? MR TAYLOR: That is correct Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: You had no quarrel with the words that you used in this paragraph when you were asked whether the minutes are correct? MR TAYLOR: That is correct Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: And would you agree that to the ordinary reader this statement that it was the top structures represented your view at the time? MR TAYLOR: If I look at the meaning here, I accept it. The question was about who authorised this operation. What was I was trying to tell you is that the instructions came from the top, that is what I tried to convey to them. There is a technical problem with the word in the minutes but what I tried to say is that the command or the instruction came from the top, it was a very important aspect for them. MR BIZOS: And did you say, towards the bottom of that page "It was possible the SADF were planning the same operation at this level" if I can put a T there, that’s a sort of ... "at this level he was a Lieutenant, they operated independently" MR BOOYENS: No Mr Chairman, I think my learned friend must read what is written there " At his level in brackets he was a Lieutenant" MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon, you’re quite right I’m sorry "It was possible the SADF were planning the same operation. At his level he was a Lieutenant, they operated independently" MR BIZOS: Did you say, as appears on page 5 "When questioned regarding the disappearance of all documentation between the 16th and 26th of June 1995 at Cradock, he said: "If it was destroyed at Cradock, there should still have been copies at the regional office in Port Elizabeth" MR BIZOS: Do you agree that that is in conflict with your evidence that the files were destroyed? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, if you look at the dates referred to here, between the 16th and the 26th of June no documentation was destroyed at that time. MR BIZOS: Do you agree that you said that "He strongly denied that any" "When questioned regarding the disappearance of all the documentation between the 16th and the 16th of June at Cradock, he said: "If it was destroyed at Cradock there still have been copies at the regional office in Port Elizabeth" MR BIZOS: Well why did you say the files were destroyed and you described the manner in which they were destroyed if this is correct? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I have a problem with the interpretation of this paragraph. As I read it here, the people asked me if all documentation or whether documents were destroyed between the 16th and the 26th of June at Cradock, that is what this entails. MR BIZOS: Well, it speaks for itself, I don’t know that we can ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON: Mr Taylor, I’ve been reading minutes, Document DD on page 5 and I want to refer you to paragraph 4 of that page, the 1st paragraph I will regard as the one that continues from page 4. I want to read it to you "He strongly denied that any informers had been involved in the operation, he said they had taken a chance on the four returning to Cradock that day as they had done in the past. He said the four were definitely not followed on that day". Now earlier today I asked you, or you were asked about how you’d know or how the security police knew that Goniwe and his three colleagues would be in a position to be kidnapped and killed that night. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, we were not sure whether we’d return to Cradock. CHAIRPERSON: And you answered early today that on two occasions your own informers indicated to you that day that in all likelihood these - the combination of these four would be in the motor vehicle. CHAIRPERSON: When you spoke to the families you indicated to them that informers had not played a part in the stopping ...[intervention] MR TAYLOR: That is correct, no informers participated in this operation. That was the question asked of me during this meeting, they asked whether informers were involved in this operation namely the elimination itself and I unequivocally stated that no informers were involved. CHAIRPERSON: So your interpretation of the word: "operation" was the actual commission of the crime? CHAIRPERSON: You disregarded the information that you required to get them into custody as part of the operation? MR TAYLOR: I’m sorry, repeat the question. CHAIRPERSON: The ability to get them into your hands was not regarded as part of the operation. MR TAYLOR: Yes, Mr Chairman. In other words to abduct them or to intercept them. CHAIRPERSON: And you needed the assistance of informers to do so, not so? CHAIRPERSON: And that’s part of the operation? MR TAYLOR: That’s correct Mr Chairman. The question posed during this meeting was whether informers were involved in the elimination, there were no informers there. MR POTGIETER: I still don’t understand you, you said in the second sentence of paragraph 4 "He said they had taken a chance on the four returning to Cradock that day" MR TAYLOR: That’s correct Mr Chairman. What I’m trying to say there is, we were not 100% sure whether we would return to Cradock that evening or sleep over in Port Elizabeth. MR POTGIETER: ...[inaudible] wrongly because I understood that you knew that those four people would be in the vehicle. MR POTGIETER: And then you executed this operation? MR TAYLOR: That is correct, we were not sure whether - we knew that they were in Port Elizabeth but we were not certain whether they would sleep over in Port Elizabeth with Mr Derrick Swarts or return to Cradock. There was a possibility that they would sleep over and that we would miss them. MR POTGIETER: Let me take it one step further, that certainty you had came from the information you received from the informers. MR POTGIETER: That’s how I understood it. MR TAYLOR: That is correct Mr Chairman. MR POTGIETER: So you knew that those four people would be in the vehicle, you knew they were on their way to Cradock. MR POTGIETER: That was the information conveyed to you. MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman, the information I had is they confirmed that the people were, those four people were in Port Elizabeth. There was the possibility that they could sleep over. MR POTGIETER: Good, we will look at the record, that will be the final word. I don’t want to ping pong on what you had exactly said but that was the impression I gathered from your testimony. MR POTGIETER: I can’t understand, why would people want to know whether the informers were involved in the elimination and not in the provision of information. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, that was not abnormal to me, informers were a very prominent subject during those years and discussed during meetings for example, in that area and in Port Elizabeth. During each meeting we had discussion with the faceless people sitting there, the people who were the informers and it was very important to know these things because those people saw those informers as traitors and as part of the oppressors. MR BIZOS: Just to go for a tangent, you said earlier that your informers would have been shocked if they had learned that you had eliminated the people that they gave information about. MR TAYLOR: That’s correct Mr Chairman, I did not say all of them but some of them I know very well and some of them would have been very shocked. They never realised or they would never have accepted that the information I obtained from them would be used to murder people. MR BIZOS: Well, I can understand that because according to the documents that we have the information was mainly of a political activity which may have been considered radical by the security police but which is tolerated in most parts of the world, that’s what they reported on. That there was a meeting here and a speech was made, this is what most of the informers gave you. MR TAYLOR: That is correct Mr Chairman, they gave us a lot of information and because of that we could establish the pattern and the whole core of the security branch was based on gathering of intelligence through the informers. MR BIZOS: Where were you when the PEBCO 3 disappeared? MR TAYLOR: I cannot say where I was exactly, I was in Port Elizabeth. MR BIZOS: Did you become aware of their disappearance? MR TAYLOR: That’s correct Mr Chairman, I had to pick it up. MR BIZOS: Who did you pick it up from? MR TAYLOR: I worked with those people’s files and it was one of my responsibilities. MR BIZOS: And when did you learn that they hadn’t disappeared but that they were murdered? MR TAYLOR: Only with the amnesty process. MR BIZOS: And where did you think they were from 1985 to 1996 when the amnesty process that you were involved in came into being, where were they for 11 years? MR TAYLOR: I’m sorry I’m not following the question, if Mr Bizos could just repeat himself. MR BIZOS: Where did you think the PEBCO 3 were for the 11 years that you didn’t know that they had died? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, I know at that stage the rumours were that they had left the country, I could not confirm this. MR BIZOS: Who started those rumours? MR TAYLOR: I cannot remember. I can remember the questions that were asked about this. I cannot remember whether this was done by legal teams but I know that there were rumours that they were detained at the police station etc., etc. CHAIRPERSON: Those people’s files were kept open for all those years in spite of the fact that the people in your office knew that they were dead. [No English translation - transcriber’s own translation] MR TAYLOR: I don’t know if those files were open or closed, officially they were not declared dead. CHAIRPERSON: Well, officially they were not declared dead, isn’t that so? CHAIRPERSON: After they were reported missing, what happened to their files? MR TAYLOR: I would accept that it would be the same as in the process which I appended before, that the difference would be here that there was no confirmation over there where ...[indistinct], their files would not be destroyed. CHAIRPERSON: The files were kept for so many years? MR TAYLOR: Yes. After a while, as I’ve explained earlier inactive would be transferred to the safe to save up space but their files had to exist until - the files were all destroyed in bulk. CHAIRPERSON: And not one of your colleagues came to tell you that: "Listen, these people are dead, destroy these files"? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairperson, nobody came to tell me during that time that they had died. MR BIZOS: Did you know the PEBCO 3? MR TAYLOR: Yes, Mr Chairperson. As I’ve said, I worked with PEBCO. MR BIZOS: And did you know them as well as you knew Mr Mhlawuli? MR TAYLOR: Yes, at that stage I knew them relatively well. MR BIZOS: As well as you knew Mr Goniwe? MR BIZOS: And if one of the PEBCO 3 had been in the car instead of Mr Mhlawuli, would you have killed him as well? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairperson. The requirement of the operation - we discussed different scenarios, that is someone who was not identified for this operation was in the motor vehicle, we would abandon the operation. As well as the fact that we foresee the possibility that an unknown person could be in the motor vehicle and then we would not continue with the operation. MR BIZOS: Did the PEBCO 3 have fairly thick files also with photographs in? MR BIZOS: Have a look at the bottom of page 6 of what you are recorded as having said at a meeting with the relatives. Page 6, the last sentence Mr Chairman. Read it out aloud for yourself, just read it out please. Why don’t you read it out for everybody to hear. "In fact he had not even" MR BIZOS: Well, let me read it out then. MR TAYLOR: I will read it Mr Chairman. MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, the witness has started. My learned friend is badgering. "In fact" MR BIZOS: Haven’t you got the last sentence on page 6? "In fact he had not even known of their existence although he had heard rumours about the PEBCO 3 and was not so stupid as not to recognise a pattern but it was not discussed" "He did not even know of their existence" MR TAYLOR: Excuse me, can I just hear that question again? CHAIRPERSON: The question is that it states in here that you did not know of the existence of the PEBCO 3, is that true or not? MR TAYLOR: No, I knew of their existence, there was much referral to them. CHAIRPERSON: The question is, as it is here in this document, as when you had discussions with the family, did you tell them the truth? MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I’m sorry, I think one must read the whole paragraph and then see what he didn’t know about. CHAIRPERSON: What is the point you want to make Mr Booyens? MR BOOYENS: The paragraph reads "He ...[indistinct](?) to whether if it was automatic if you were a member of Section B, you were automatically part of a hit squad" "Security branch" "you were automatically part of hit squad" "No, in fact he did not even know of their existence" "Hit squads" He had not known about their existence, and then to talk about the PEBCO 3 doesn’t make sense. MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, let for the purposes of my question accept that interpretation which is a possible interpretation of it. But you said, and that is really the aspect that I want to canvass with you: "He had heard rumours about the PEBCO 3 and was not so stupid as not to recognise a pattern" MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, I wish to come to the rumours first. Many times it was rumoured that the police were involved with the disappearance of the PEBCO 3, right from the start. That’s why we had these inquests. This pattern, to be honest I cannot express myself what I meant there. I see there that I also mentioned that it was not discussed but I had no facts about the PEBCO 3. MR BIZOS: You were being questioned about Goniwe and his associates, correct? MR BIZOS: And in saying that you would have been stupid if you did not recognise a pattern can only mean that your killing of Goniwe and others was part of the pattern of the PEBCO 3 having been killed. MR TAYLOR: I had no personal knowledge of the PEBCO 3’s disappearance and of that operation. I just found that our when the amnesty ... CHAIRPERSON: But from what I can gather here, unless you can point out a different interpretation, it appears that you had grave suspicion. MR TAYLOR: I would agree with that. MR BIZOS: And what were your suspicions? MR TAYLOR: There was much talk when this amnesty process started, it was in November ‘96. Many operations came to my attention, not the detail of it, it was focused on the many amnesty applications that happened at that time. MR BIZOS: Now surely this speaks about the time that it happened, not during the years of the middle ‘90’s but the years of the middle ‘80’s. MR TAYLOR: At that stage I had no knowledge of the circumstances of the disappearance of the PEBCO 3. MR BIZOS: Now let’s just take, on your interpretation "In fact he had not even known of their" "existence" "No, in fact he hadn’t even known of their existence although he had heard rumour about the PEBCO 3 and was not so stupid as to not recognise any pattern" MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, that’s a statement that I made after some facts came to my attention in the initial stages of this whole process. MR BIZOS: I want to deal with the question of Mr Mhlawuli and try and get facts and circumstances from you as to whether he was merely a victim as a result of being in that car or whether he was in fact targeted. Now we know that he comes from Oudtshoorn. MR TAYLOR: That’s correct Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: And that is the South Western District. MR BIZOS: And the UDF was divided into regions. MR BIZOS: Under which region was Oudtshoorn? MR TAYLOR: I don’t know under which UDF region he, it could have been Western Cape, if I could guess. MR BIZOS: Well, I think that you are correct in our speculation that it was in the Western Cape. Who were the regional leaders of the Western Cape in 1985, that Mr Mhlawuli would have to answer to for anything that he did? MR BIZOS: Well, let me just tell you, you might recognise a few of the names. Trevor Manual? MR TAYLOR: I know that name Mr Chairperson. MR BIZOS: Now, did you have any information as to what was the position of Mr Mhlawuli in Oudtshoorn to make decisions as to what plans would be put into operation in that particular region? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairperson. MR BIZOS: Did you have any information as to whether or not he was formally a member of any organisation which was affiliated to the UDF in the Western Cape Region? MR TAYLOR: I accepted that, that he was involved in some organisation because of the fact he was involved here. MR BIZOS: I’m asking whether you knew whether or not he was a member of any UDF affiliated organisation in Oudtshoorn? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairperson. MR BIZOS: Did you try to find out whether he was one? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairperson. MR BIZOS: Did you at any stage communicate with the head of the security police in Oudtshoorn to find out? MR BIZOS: Do you agree that a reasonable investigator could, by the making of a simple telephone call, establish that fact? MR TAYLOR: It could have done, I didn’t do it. MR BIZOS: That’s right, because ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON: Do you agree that it should have been done and especially because this man’s life was in issue. MR TAYLOR: If I should give you now my honest opinion I have to admit that it should have been done. CHAIRPERSON: The basis that was used to sentence to death was weak at that time? MR TAYLOR: I have less knowledge of Mr Mhlawuli than the others. As I’ve explained, the visits to Cradock and the involvement at Cradora and the mini visits to Port Elizabeth and the fact that my information pointed to the fact that the alternative structures would be continued in the South Western districts. MR BIZOS: But without knowing what organisational position he held, whether even he was a member of any UDF affiliated organisation, why should you believe that he was in a position to do anything in Oudtshoorn, whatever the wishes or advice of Mr Goniwe may have been? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, I’ve already stated that the information that I had, it was told to me that Mr Mhlawuli would be used to establish and continue with the structures that were in Oudtshoorn and in the South Western districts. CHAIRPERSON: Weren’t the security at Oudtshoorn the best people to inform you whether he would be successful in this? MR TAYLOR: Yes, this would have been better. I would have had more information if I liaised with them. CHAIRPERSON: Why were they not asked of this position especially if Mr Mhlawuli’s life was concerned here. MR TAYLOR: I cannot explain this. I can remember one thing, that I sent reports through where his name was mentioned. MR POTGIETER: At the best to you, that inference you make was based on information from informers that were not confirmed in terms of objective facts. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, to an extent but it was confirmed though other sources of information. MR POTGIETER: You never consulted anyone, you had these rumours that informers mentioned that Mr Mhlawuli was responsible for these structures then established in the South Western district. That was the rumours or the stories from the informers. Except for that opinion from informers, you had no other confirmation of those rumours? MR TAYLOR: That is so. As I’ve said, when their names were discussed Captain van Zyl had bits of information on him. I cannot remember what Sergeant Lotz said at that stage but during the discussion he was prioritised. MR BIZOS: Did any of them tell you whether or not they had communicated with any security police officer in Oudtshoorn? MR BIZOS: They didn’t make any input that Oudtshoorn security police say, nobody said anything like that at your meetings? MR TAYLOR: Not as far as my knowledge goes. MR BIZOS: Now did you liaise with Mr Eric Winter in Cradock about Mr Mhlawuli? MR BIZOS: Did anyone else at your meetings report that he liaised with Mr Winter about Mr Mhlawuli’s activities in Cradock? MR TAYLOR: Not as far as I can recall Mr Chairperson. What I could, on a daily basis or just about everyday I liaised with the Cradock Security Branch. MR BIZOS: All the more reason why you should have asked what they knew about Mr Mhlawuli. MR TAYLOR: At that stage I asked them, and especially the three weeks before the operation, that I wanted all information concerning, on a daily basis, their movements and activities of Mr Goniwe, it should be sent to the regional office. MR BIZOS: We have an affidavit from Mr Winter, that he knew nothing about Mr Mhlawuli, would you accept that? MR TAYLOR: I’ve heard of this affidavit, it’s Mr Winter’s own perception. I would accept it if you say so. MR BIZOS: Well, what better source of information was there about Mr Mhlawuli’s activities in Cradock than Mr Winter himself, the head of the security police in Cradock, especially on matter on which life and death depended? MR TAYLOR: I don’t know how effective their information network was accept for the information that I had through my informants about Mr Mhlawuli. And I had information that they couldn’t get in their own area. MR BIZOS: But isn’t it generally accepted in the sort of work that you were doing, that informers were to be treated with suspicion and confirmation of - particularly if they are paid informers as yours must have been, and that corroboration must be found on the information that they supplied before it is acted upon? Is that not a general rule that should be applied? MR TAYLOR: That’s correct Mr Chairperson. The information was evaluated on the grounds of the credibility of the informer and on the basis of the accuracy of the information itself. In other words the information substantiated by other sources. MR BIZOS: Corroboration in this matter in relation to Mr Mhlawuli could possibly have been obtained by making two telephone calls, one to Oudtshoorn and one to Cradock and neither were made. MR TAYLOR: There were not telephone calls made. MR BIZOS: Did you know Edgar Ngoi? MR TAYLOR: That’s correct Mr Chairman, that is correct yes. MR TAYLOR: He was a high profile UDF person from Port Elizabeth. MR BIZOS: What precise position did he hold? MR TAYLOR: He was amongst others, a member of PEBCO, he attended UDF regional meetings. MR TAYLOR: Yes, I remember him. MR BIZOS: What position did he hold? MR TAYLOR: I can’t remember Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: And Ronald White? Roland White? MR TAYLOR: I recognise the name, he was under the white section at that time. MR TAYLOR: Correct, he was involved in labour relations activities, trade union activities. MR BIZOS: Any other position that you know? MR TAYLOR: They were all affiliated with the UDF. MR BIZOS: I know that, but how important was he - the UDF structures, do you know at all? MR TAYLOR: On the trade union sphere he was a very important figure. I did not work with him separately because we had a separate union desk. MR BIZOS: Did you know Prince Msotho? MR TAYLOR: I recognise the name but I can’t place him precisely regarding his activities and position, I know his name. MR TAYLOR: I can remember the name Mr Chairman, but once again not full particulars. MR TAYLOR: That’s correct yes. MR BIZOS: What position did he hold? MR TAYLOR: He was on the PEBCO management and he also attended UDF regional meetings. MR BIZOS: Yes. And Stone Sizani? MR TAYLOR: I recognise the name, yes. MR BIZOS: Do you know anything else about him? MR TAYLOR: I talking under correction Mr Chairman, but I think he was involved in the Port Elizabeth Youth Congress. MR BIZOS: Do you know of any other position that he held? MR TAYLOR: No, not that I can remember. MR BIZOS: Now, you know I have just read you out the names of the UDF Regional Council in 1985, you didn’t know - you hardly knew anything about five of them. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, with some of the names I indicated that they attended UDF regional meetings. MR BIZOS: I excluded those, there were in all 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and in relation to 5 you knew nothing about them other than you had heard the name. MR TAYLOR: That is correct, yes. MR BIZOS: Now, would you agree that persons holding office together with Mr Matthew Goniwe who was the 11th person or one of 10 anyway, one of the 10, were much closer "trawante" than Mr Mhlawuli? MR TAYLOR: Definitely yes Mr Chairman, on regional level, yes. MR BIZOS: So that if the original instruction to seek out the "trawante" of Mr Goniwe, why did you not choose from the regional executive and decided - if you evidence is correct, on a person that you knew so little about and check so little about like Mr Mhlawuli? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, right from the start of this planning process and the execution of the operation we were told that it was concerning with the rural areas and the influence Cradock had on the rest of the areas. At that stage we were extremely worried that the mobilisation and the political awareness caused problems and also the implementation of the G Plan. MR BIZOS: Did you think that if you left the whole UDF region members intact and you only executed Mr Goniwe and his other companions, that the UDF that represented the whole region, both rural and urban, the problems would be solved? MR TAYLOR: That’s what I believed Mr Chairman. At that stage, as I’ve said, the rural areas had a high priority. MR BIZOS: Alright well. Who was Mr Ficks Kobesi? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I know the name, if I remember correctly he was also involved in trade union activities. MR TAYLOR: In the Port Elizabeth/Utenhage environment. MR BIZOS: And who was Mr Emson Banda? MR TAYLOR: I don’t know him Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Or Mr Aubrey Marley? MR TAYLOR: I don’t know him Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Who was Mr Chris Mbikela? MR BIZOS: And who was Dan Sandi? MR TAYLOR: I recognise the name Mr Chairman but I can’t place him. MR BIZOS: Where did he come from? MR TAYLOR: Who was Gogile Inkuinti? MR TAYLOR: He was active in the Port Alfred district, amongst other involved at that time during the establishment of alternative structure in Port Alfred and environment. MR BIZOS: Who was Kokele Mkwenti? No, I asked you about ...[intervention] MR TAYLOR: Can you repeat the name please? MR TAYLOR: Yes, he’s this person from Port Alfred. MR BIZOS: And who was Koleka Mkwenti? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman no, I’m not going to give an opinion on this, I can’t remember. MR BIZOS: And who was Thembile Beck? MR TAYLOR: No Mr Chairman, I can’t remember. MR BIZOS: And who was Chris Nissan? MR TAYLOR: It’s a well-known name that. MR BIZOS: I know it may be a well known name but where was he from and what did he do? MR TAYLOR: I can’t remember Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: The names that I have read to you after indicating to you who were on the National Executive, are all in the rural areas and you only knew for certain about one of them and you were correct, that he came from Port Alfred, Mr Kopile Mkwenti. MR TAYLOR: That’s correct Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: For the rest you didn’t know anyone else from the rural areas. MR TAYLOR: The names you mentioned I can’t remember Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Yes. Surely in order to put an end to what you call the G Plan and the terrible consequence or - ja, the G Plan, knowledge of the people in the rural areas within your own jurisdiction was more important than a comparative stranger from Oudtshoorn. MR TAYLOR: Please repeat the question Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: The people who I put to you were leading people in UDF affiliated organisations whom you did not know. MR TAYLOR: That is correct Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: They came from Utenhage, Grahamstown, Port Alfred, Alexander, Graaff Reinet. You knew about one person from Port Alfred and one person, that he came from Utenhage but you didn’t know precisely what he was doing. Now if that is correct, how come that you knew so little about the people putting the G Plan into operation in your own area of jurisdiction and so much about a person who came from outside? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I would say that during that time when this operation was planned I paid attention especially to the people from Cradock. MR BIZOS: Yes. Let us just look at what you’ve just said in a short while but in the meantime, could you please tell me the name of the PEBCO 3? MR TAYLOR: I remember two, Mr Hashe, Mr Godolosi. MR BIZOS: Please give me the names that you know. MR TAYLOR: Mr Hashe and Mr Godolosi. MR BIZOS: What was Mr Hashe’s first name? MR TAYLOR: I can’t remember Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: What position did he hold? MR TAYLOR: He was on the Executive Committee of PEBCO. MR BIZOS: What precise position did he hold? MR BIZOS: And what was Mr Godolosi’s first name? MR BIZOS: And what position did he hold? MR TAYLOR: He was also on the Executive Council, I can’t remember what position. MR BIZOS: What position did he hold? MR TAYLOR: I don’t remember Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: And did you know Mr Galele? MR TAYLOR: I’m talking under correction, I think there was somebody, I think his name was Champion Galele, is that him? MR BIZOS: Yes, you got the first name correct. Who was he? MR BIZOS: What position did he hold? MR BIZOS: Did you know Mr Fazi? MR TAYLOR: That’s correct Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: What was his first name? MR BIZOS: Do you now remember that he was one of the PEBCO 3? MR TAYLOR: No, he was not one of the PEBCO 3 Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Was Mr Champion Galele a member of the PEBCO 3, or one of the PEBCO 3? MR TAYLOR: If I remember correctly, yes Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: You see I am going to put to you that Mr Godolosi was the President, Mr Fazi was his Deputy, Mr Hashe was the General Secretary and Mr Champion Galele was the organiser. Now here was an organisation in Port Elizabeth itself, you know mighty little about the top structures of the former organisation in Port Elizabeth, how come you know so little about them and so much about Mr Mhlawuli? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, during that time, I think it was about 13 years ago, I knew all those people, I knew the organisation, I knew all their positions, 13 years is a long time. During this time and during this amnesty application I had to work very hard to gather all the facts regarding the Cradock 4, I did not do the same with these people. If I go and sit down and think deeply, I would perhaps remember. MR BIZOS: Yes, I can understand that and we must make allowances for it but then equally it may well be that what you tell us about Mr Mhlawuli may be self-serving reconstruction. MR TAYLOR: No, it’s not the case. MR BIZOS: Well, why wouldn’t you reconstruct in order to help yourself? How can we be sure that what you tell us isn’t self-helping reconstruction in view of your lack of knowledge and/or memory of much leading people? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I came here with one purpose and that is the purpose to, as far as it is possible, to expose the truth. I’ve forgotten a lot of facts I agree, 13 years is a long time. I handled a large volume of people and organisations. There are many people I can still add to Mr Bizos’ list. MR BIZOS: Do you know Mr Edgar Ngoi? MR TAYLOR: As I’ve said he attended UDF management meetings and also PEBCO meetings. CHAIRPERSON: Who was the chairman of the UDF at that time? MR TAYLOR: No Mr Chairman, I can’t remember. CHAIRPERSON: Was it not Mr Ngoi? MR TAYLOR: It could possibly be yes. MR BIZOS: You say that you concentrated on Cradock, who was the chairman of Cradora? MR TAYLOR: Mr Goniwe at a certain stage and at certain time Mr Calata acted as Chairman. MR BIZOS: When do you say Mr Goniwe was the chairman of Cradora? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, any time from the beginning of 1984 to the middle of 1985 approximately. MR BIZOS: So at the time of his death, you say that he was president of Cradora? MR TAYLOR: Either he or Mr Calata. I want to explain that you can’t distinguish the two. Before they chose an executive committee there was a committee of five who managed Cradora. MR BIZOS: During the period of your investigations at the end of May, beginning of June 1985, who was the chairman of Cradora? MR TAYLOR: Mr Goniwe Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: You’re sure of that? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, as far as I can remember yes. MR BIZOS: And is that on the basis of reliable information that you received? MR TAYLOR: That is correct Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Was there a president of Cradora? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I can’t say whether Cradora had a president, some organisations had a president, others had a chairman. According to me it was the same position. MR BIZOS: And who - was there a vice-chairman? MR TAYLOR: There would be yes. MR BIZOS: Who was the vice-chairman? MR TAYLOR: I can’t remember Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Was there a secretary? MR BIZOS: Who was the secretary? MR TAYLOR: I don’t know Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Was there a deputy secretary? MR TAYLOR: I can’t remember Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Who was the treasurer? MR BIZOS: Was there an organiser? MR BIZOS: Have you ever heard of the name of - well, let’s deal with it, with Cradoya, do you know who the officers of Cradoya were? MR TAYLOR: The officials of Cradoya? MR BIZOS: Cradoya, that’s Y-A. MR TAYLOR: Yes, at a stage I could remember that Mr Calata was the chairman. MR BIZOS: Was there a chairman or vice-chairman or a president? MR TAYLOR: It would have been either a chairman or a president and he would have a secretary and a treasurer and other portfolios. MR BIZOS: And who was secretary of Cradoya? MR BIZOS: And who was the organiser? MR BIZOS: And who was the treasurer? MR BIZOS: And who was deputy president? MR TAYLOR: I can’t remember Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Was there a COSAS in Cradock? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I’m not certain about that. I know the students were organised and I can remember that these people regularly visited the COSAS people in Port Elizabeth and that they liaised with the COSAS people in Port Elizabeth. MR BIZOS: Did you know the names of anybody that was involved in COSAS? MR TAYLOR: Well amongst others, two people who regularly visited COSAS, Mr Mkhonto and then a person I previously mentioned, Mr Madora Jacobs. MR BIZOS: And you don’t know any of the office bearers of COSAS? MR BIZOS: Do you know Mr Mopameni? MR BIZOS: Nombuso Chachana, did that name mean anything to you? MR BIZOS: Lumkile Georgiasi, does that name mean anything to you? MR TAYLOR: I can remember the name but I can’t place him exactly. MR BIZOS: Let us deal with first of all, your suggestion that Sparrow Mkhonto was connected with COSAS, why do you say that? MR TAYLOR: Because he visited Port Elizabeth and contacted COSAS people in Port Elizabeth. Amongst others at a certain instance, if I remember correctly, he made contact with Mr Lulu Johnson. MR BIZOS: What was his age and what would his interest have been in having anything to do with the affairs of COSAS? MR TAYLOR: As I’ve already mentioned, some of these people came to Port Elizabeth at that stage to visit schools or to approach - or to establish SRC’s at schools via COSAS because there were SRC’s at Cradock already at that stage. MR BIZOS: Does the name Victor Powani mean anything to you? MR BIZOS: Does the name Gladwell Makahula mean anything to you? MR TAYLOR: That’s correct Mr Chairman. MR TAYLOR: He was attached to Cradora, he’s a member of Cradora ...[intervention] MR TAYLOR: He was a member of Cradora. If I remember correctly he was on the executive. MR TAYLOR: Cradora, Cradock Residents Association. MR BIZOS: Now, I am going to put to you that you have shown singular lack of knowledge and/or memory in relation to the structures governing the Cradock organisations. Are you able to deny that in fact the president of Cradora was Mr Gladwell Makahula? MR TAYLOR: I can’t deny that Mr Chairman. I’ve just told you that I know he was on the executive. MR BIZOS: Yes, just confine yourself to the direct answer so that we can make some progress. Can you admit or deny that Mr Sparrow Mkhonto was the Chairman? MR BIZOS: That the secretary was Mr Matthew Goniwe. MR TAYLOR: I cannot deny this. MR BIZOS: That the treasurer was Mr Fil Calata. MR TAYLOR: I can also not deny that Mr Chairperson. MR BIZOS: And the organiser was Mr Mbulelo Goniwe. MR BIZOS: That in relation to Cradoya executive in 1985 the president was Ford Calata, the chairperson was Mzimkhulu Zenzile, can you deny that? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairperson. MR BIZOS: Neither of those two positions. That the secretary was Sopomopo Mene. MR BIZOS: The secretary was Lulamele Josi Jasi. MR BIZOS: That the organiser was Mbulelo Goniwe. MR BIZOS: Did the name Veken Soga mean anything to you? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, I cannot place the first name but I can place the surname or I cannot place it but I’ve heard the surname. MR BIZOS: And you don’t know what position he was in? MR BIZOS: Well, he was the treasurer for the Cradoya executive committee. And Nomsa France, that name doesn’t mean anything to you? MR BIZOS: You don’t even know whether it refers to a man or a woman? MR BIZOS: Yes, well you see, even I could, I think, understand that Nomsa is a woman and she was the deputy president of Cradoya. Do you agree that you know and remember very little about most of the people in the structures of the UDF affiliated organisations in Cradock? MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I’m not so sure whether that’s not a double-barrelled question. Wouldn’t it be fair to ask: "no" and "remember" as alternatives? MR BIZOS: Well I’m not sure that I understand the objection but it may be my fault because I was not concentrating Mr Chairman, I was thinking of the next question rather than listening, I’m sorry. MR BOOYENS: No, my learned - "knew" or "remember", I may know something and I may remember something, that’s my problem. MR BIZOS: Yes. Very well, we will split it and then perhaps ask you which applies to each name which is going to burden the record even further. Tell us, which of these people have you never heard the name of? How many of them have you never heard the name of? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, I did not count. MR BIZOS: Well, we will ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON: Mr Taylor, tell me ...[intervention] MR BIZOS: when the record becomes available. CHAIRPERSON: if you knew these people well or to any significant extent, you would have known what and remembered what positions they held and in which organisations, is that not so? MR TAYLOR: Chairperson really, I want to reiterate that in that time, in 1985, I could have told you exactly what these names meant to me, 13 years is a long time. I want to say again that I knew so many names and so many organisations and that’s why I recognised some of the names. I can recognise some of the names but I cannot say with each one where that person was placed. There are names there, I can think of more names, people like Sele Jack and Michael Cheko who was at PEBCO. Some I remember better and some not. CHAIRPERSON: You’ve come here to this Committee to apply for amnesty in respect of Messrs Goniwe, Calata, Mkhonto - let me just get it in order, Mhlawuli - let us leave out Mr Mhlawuli for the purposes of the question, how is it that you are not able to tell us what positions in which organisations they held? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, I’ve explained to you that this was a long time ago and I wish to give you the surety that to the best of my ability I wish to help this Committee. CHAIRPERSON: I do not ask these questions to test your memory, I ask these questions in order to establish whether you were in the proper position to assess the threat that you perceived they presented to the security of this country. MR TAYLOR: I understand it, yes I understand it. CHAIRPERSON: One would have expect in respect of those three you would have remembered because this is what you’re coming to ask amnesty for. MR TAYLOR: That’s why I came to this Committee, that’s correct, to say what I have done, why I did it, why I thought it was justified, what I thought at that stage, how I reasoned. I also told that we - I wish we had the documentation at that time to remember such a long time ago and to rely on my memory is difficult. MR BIZOS: In order to excuse your lack of knowledge of the number of names that I read to you before starting with Cradock, you said: "I was concentrating on Cradock at the time", would you agree that your knowledge of Cradock is as - almost as poor if not as poor as the other areas that I asked you about?MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, I have forgotten some of these things since 1985 and the details thereof, I do, I concede that. I wish to reiterate that I do - I’m doing everything in my ability to put everything on the table. MR BIZOS: Yes, but you see, what you knew about Mr Mhlawuli also was more than - it was the same time, how many years? MR BIZOS: 13 years. You see, what I’m going to suggest to you is - let me ask you before making the suggestion, assume that Victor Puwani was in the car that night and you killed him, you would have come well prepared here today, even though you never heard the name according to your evidence, and say: "Oh yes, I knew him well, he was the deputy secretary of Cradora" and we wouldn’t have any way of checking it would we? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, I would not have done it. MR BIZOS: Well, ...[intervention] MR TAYLOR: Initially I told you which names were discussed and no other persons outside, besides those persons that were mentioned, were considered. If any other person was in the car besides those who were discussed this operation would not have taken place. MR BIZOS: Let us just take Mr Mhlawuli, did you know where he was born, before I put the version to Mr van Zyl? MR TAYLOR: No Mr Chair, I heard it here. MR BIZOS: You didn’t know where he was born? MR BIZOS: You didn’t know that he was born in Cradock? MR BIZOS: You didn’t know that his wife was born in Cradock? MR BIZOS: And you didn’t know that both of them had families in Cradock? MR TAYLOR: I just knew that Mhlawuli at time visited Cradock, I did not know he had family there. MR BIZOS: The first factor that influenced you in deciding that he was a candidate for execution was his regular visits to Cradock, you told us in your evidence, correct? MR BIZOS: We’ll take one by one, don’t worry about the "oor andere" or "met andere", just let’s take one by one because you know simple arithmetic says 4 x 0 in 0, so we want to get to that position. MR BIZOS: So that his regular presence at Cradock may be innocently explained that like most school teachers and other people in the world, comes holiday time they want to go to the place where they are born and where their families are. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chair, that is so ...[intervention] MR BIZOS: And if you knew, if you ...[intervention] MR BOOYENS: The witness was still busy answering Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: I’m sorry, please continue. MR TAYLOR: Sorry Mr Chairperson, what I wanted to say was, it is so that he visited there but he went to Cradora meetings there. MR BIZOS: We’ll come to that one at a time please, one at a time. If you knew or had bothered to find out that he was born there, his wife was born there, the grandparents of his children were there, the fact that he visited Cradora - at least, Cradock regularly would have been a completely neutral fact. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, if that was what he did at Cradock, we would known that, yes. MR BIZOS: And, so that we would take out of account his regular visits to Cradock, that doesn’t prove anything if the facts that I have given you are correct. MR TAYLOR: The fact that he just visited family and was there socially? MR BIZOS: Yes, if those facts are correct, his visits to Cradock were completely contra-indicating that he was involved in subversive activities and that was the reason for his visits to Cradock. MR TAYLOR: If I understand Advocate Bizos correctly, if this is the scenario as he pictured it it was correct, then I agree but as I’ve said there were political activities in Cradock. MR BIZOS: Yes. No, you said regular visits to Cradock in your evidence but we’ll come to political activities. Now the Cradock meetings, the Cradora meetings that he attended, were they public meetings? MR TAYLOR: Yes, at some instances it was a public meeting. He moved regularly with the executive members, members of the management. MR BIZOS: Now he moved with members of the - now let’s deal with the public meetings. Cradora was a lawful organisation? MR BIZOS: It’s meetings were advertised? MR BIZOS: And if I remember correctly from the evidence that we had in the Delmas trial, it was - there were at least many hundreds if not thousands of people that attended Cradora public meetings. MR TAYLOR: I know very little of the Delmas matter. MR BIZOS: Well now, I merely indicated to you where I am getting my source of information from, you don’t have to know anything about it. Can you deny that there were public meetings of a lawful organisation which hundreds of people, at least hundreds of people attended? MR TAYLOR: No, I cannot deny it. MR BIZOS: Also that those meetings held in a hall were being recorded by the security police and transcripts were available of what was being said at that meeting, is that correct? MR BIZOS: Well, didn’t you bother to find out what’s happening at these meetings? Why must we deal with possibilities, you were in charge of information. You hold it against Mr - why do you deal with possibilities, didn’t you know that the meetings, the public meetings that were held at Cradock by Cradora were monitored and what the speaker said and what questions were asked were recorded? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, in that time we definitely did it. I cannot remember the detail of every meeting. MR BIZOS: Well please then don’t say it’s possible, you know that they were recorded. And were transcripts of the meetings made available to you? MR TAYLOR: That’s the normal procedure. MR BIZOS: Please answer the question. Were transcripts of the proceedings of Cradora made available to you? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, ...[intervention] MR BOOYENS: M’Lord, if my learned friend would just curb his enthusiasm a bit, the witness was in the process of answering. If the witness does not answer the question satisfactorily he can repeat the question but really this is not fair. MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, my I just say self defence, I ask a simple question whether he saw the transcript. I am not interested and I’m sure the Committee is not concerned with general procedure. We must get specific answer to specific questions so that we can make some progress, but please answer it your way. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, I cannot remember if I saw those transcriptions but I wan to add it is normal procedure to make transcriptions of such meetings, it was done throughout the region. MR BIZOS: So that we can assume can we not, that the transcript of these meetings were conveyed to the security police and if you personally did not see them, other persons who were watching out for the commission of any offences at public meetings of Cradora would have studied them? MR TAYLOR: That’s correct. I just want to mention that the transcription itself wouldn’t be sent to us, it was sent through but it would be restructured into a report structure. MR BIZOS: Do you know of a single prosecution that followed against anybody for having said anything at any of those meetings during 1984/’85? MR BIZOS: We can therefore assume that even though, with the transcripts available and the tapes available, no witnesses would have been necessary in order to prove whether any offence was committed by any speaker, nobody was charged? MR TAYLOR: That is correct. At this stage I just want to make a remark if I may, I don’t know if I could. MR BIZOS: Please do so if it’s relevant. MR TAYLOR: I just want to say that public meetings that were held the speakers always made sure they did not say something that we could use against them. We experienced the same at WH11. MR BIZOS: Are you serious about that? MR TAYLOR: That’s correct Mr Chairperson. MR BIZOS: Well, I want to tell you that it must be made, if your serious, it must have been a statement made in complete ignorance because there were many prosecutions and evidence led where privilege was claimed as to the manner in which the recording was made and which was upheld and people were charged because there was evidence of their voices on tapes. Where do you get this idea that that couldn’t be used? MR BOOYENS: No, that’s not what he said Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Well, what did he say? MR BOOYENS: He said that the experience was with both WH11 system and where they tape-recorded meetings, the speaker were cautious as to what they say so that they couldn’t be prosecuted. I’m not suggesting it’s an exact repetition of what he said but that is what he said. I don’t what my learned friend ...[intervention] MR BIZOS: Well, that’s not how I understood it from the interpreter but let’s take it on the basis that our learned friend puts it. If speakers were careful, what was wrong with Mr Mhlawuli listening to careful speakers at public meetings at Cradora and why should that be held against him? MR TAYLOR: I never said it was illegal to be there, the fact that Mr Mhlawuli was there. MR BIZOS: Sir, the second ground which you gave for you deciding that Mr Mhlawuli was one of the "trawante" to be executed together with Mr Goniwe was because he attended meetings of Cradora. What I am asking you is, how does he make himself a candidate for execution if he attended meetings at which speakers were careful not to say things which were unlawful? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, I did not say the presence of Mr Mhlawuli at Cradora meetings was a motivation for his elimination. I just responded on questions put to me, what I knew of Mr Mhlawuli and one of the things that I know about Mr Mhlawuli is that he attended Cradora meetings. CHAIRPERSON: No Mr Taylor, earlier in your evidence you were asked what was - what made Mr Mhlawuli so dangerous that one could gain the impression or even guess that he was likely to install these institutions of destruction in Oudtshoorn and one of the reasons you gave was that he was being influenced by Mr Goniwe and he was in the company of Mr Goniwe and he attended meetings of Cradora and Cradoya. MR TAYLOR: That’s correct, I did say. that. MR BIZOS: Now as I understood Mr Bizos questions, that’s what he’s referring to. MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon Sir. CHAIRPERSON: As I understood your question you’re referring to the meetings of Cradora? MR BIZOS: Yes, he referred to the meetings of Cradora in his evidence in chief already and not only in answer to me Mr Chairman. MR POTGIETER: Mr Taylor, the point is, that the attendance of these meetings places Mr Mhlawuli in the same category as hundreds of other people. MR TAYLOR: I agree with this, yes. MR BIZOS: Yes. Now you say that he was in the company of Mr Goniwe and Mr Ford Calata, that’s what you said in your evidence in chief in giving us the picture as to why he made himself a candidate for execution. MR BIZOS: Did you the relationship between Ford Calata and Matthew Goniwe and Mr Mhlawuli, firstly in relation to the church that their parents belonged to? MR BIZOS: And that the father of the one was the choir master of the others? MR BIZOS: That they were fellow teachers? MR TAYLOR: I was aware of that. MR BIZOS: And although there were a couple of years difference in ages and Mr Goniwe was a senior by a couple of years, they were at the same school. MR BIZOS: And whether Mr Mhlawuli and Mkhonto’s brother were at school. MR BIZOS: And by the way, speaking about Mr Mkhonto, do you know what Mr Mkhonto’s standard of education was? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chair, I just know at some instance, if I remember correctly, he worked with the railway. I don’t know what work he did. MR TAYLOR: I don’t know what was his job exactly. MR BIZOS: He had standard 8 education. MR TAYLOR: I did not know that. MR BIZOS: And he’s unlikely to have been, having regard to his age his occupation and the standard of education, to have had anything to do with COSAS. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chair, as far as I know in some instances he did liaise with COSAS. CHAIRPERSON: Of what significance would that be? MR TAYLOR: He was actively involved with the youth, the scholars because of his age - in Cradock. Mr Chairperson, I do not want to be out of order, I just want to make a remark what is important for me at this stage that I wish to point out especially with the Cradock situation. The organisations were closely knitted together. This did not mean that when there was a Cradoya meeting that only Cradoya members were there and the opposite with Cradora as well. Maybe more of that - they would have discussed the objectives of that organisation but there were other organisations in that town as well at that time. MR BIZOS: Now, ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON: Can we take that short break? MR BIZOS: Did you know that Mr Mhlawuli, Mrs Mhlawuli and Ford Calata were teaching at the Dimbasa School in the Ciskei in the late ‘70’s? MR BIZOS: Did you know that the one pair of grandparents, the paternal grandparents were in - no the paternal were in grandparents and the maternal grandparents were in Port Elizabeth? MR BIZOS: And did you know whether Mrs Mhlawuli was, at or about the time you were planning her husband’s death, with her parents here in Port Elizabeth? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman I’ve heard it, Mr Bizos has stated it previously. MR BIZOS: Right. Now, did you know as to why they left the Ciskei and they came to Oudtshoorn and whether that had anything to do with the school unrest? MR BIZOS: And if the evidence is going to be that the reasons why they left the Ciskei was because there was trouble at the school where they were at and they did not have - they did not believe that that was an environment for them to be in, for their children to be educated and they moved away, would you say that - well, you can’t admit or deny that? MR BIZOS: And you didn’t try and find anything out about their background? MR BIZOS: And you don’t know whether Mrs Mhlawuli’s brother was a matric student who was detained and they wanted to get away from that environment altogether? MR BIZOS: You won’t be able to dispute that. But now, what I want to ask you is this, the training, the personal background, the family background must be important in assessing if a person, even though he may be meddling in activities which the security police do not lie, this whole background is important in order to decide what action is to be taken? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, the activities were the first priority. I can just add that part of a personal file of every person had a sub-file in which the - they called the history file. There notes were made about the background of the people as sketched by Mr Bizos and that would have been put on record, yes. MR BIZOS: But you didn’t have it in the case of Mr Mhlawuli? MR BIZOS: And do you agree that what approach one makes to a person to cease those activities depends on the person’s background and previous conduct. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman it could be, although it was more based on his present activities, we placed the emphasis on those. MR BIZOS: No, listen to the question. As to whether you’re going to warn a person or whether you’re going to banish a person or whether you’re going to restrict him or whether you would give him over to the wolves so to speak, to be killed, must depend on his background, his family background, stable background and whether a warning perhaps or a temporary restriction might have served the purpose. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, all opinions and decisions were made on the basis of only the activities of suspects, the activities in the struggle of the day. MR BIZOS: Do you or do you not agree that the personal background is necessary in order to assess what administrative action may be taken before the death sentence is decided upon and executed? MR TAYLOR: I don’t agree Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Why don’t you agree? Why don’t you agree that if you can not assess as to whether a person will take a warning seriously and stop his activities if you knew his background? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, because we only formed out opinions and decisions based on the activities of these suspects. MR BIZOS: Well, we’ve already neutralised the activities at Cradock and we are only left with the unconfirmed information given to you by informers, let’s try and deal with that. Where were these informers that gave you information, in Oudtshoorn, in Cradock or in Port Elizabeth? MR TAYLOR: In Port Elizabeth and in the Cradock area, in two various towns in the Cradock area. MR BIZOS: Now, let’s deal with Cradock. Did you have any informers in Cradock? MR BIZOS: All the more reason why you should have asked Mr Eric Winter and his informers and his security police to give you information. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, during those three weeks before the time I did not want to ask questions outside the normal questions to Winter. MR TAYLOR: It would not have been normal procedures Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: In the context of your decision to kill these four people, did you consider asking Winter and decided against it? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman, I contacted the branch on a daily basis but I went along the normal procedures. During that time I did ask that this daily information regarding Mr Goniwe would be regarded as a priority and despatched to us as quickly as possible. MR BIZOS: Is this from Mr Winter? MR TAYLOR: I can say specifically Mr Winter, I spoke to various people at Cradock including Mr Winter. MR BIZOS: Yes. Now you didn’t have any informers in Cradock and you didn’t get any information from Mr Winter and his underlings in Cradock. MR BIZOS: In which towns did you have informers? MR TAYLOR: I know in which town I had informers, I’m just contemplating whether I should tell you. In Somerset East and Adelaide there were informers. MR BIZOS: When did Mr Mhlawuli go to Somerset East? MR TAYLOR: I can’t say that he himself went to Somerset East but Mr Goniwe contacted people there regularly and exchanged information with them. MR BIZOS: No, we’re talking about Mr Mhlawuli. And when did Mr Mhlawuli go to Adelaide? MR TAYLOR: He himself never went there personally but Mr Goniwe and some of the other persons we’ve already mentioned, they went there. MR BIZOS: So you’re informers from Adelaide and Somerset East could not have given you any information at all about Mr Mhlawuli? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman, although it was not discussed pertinently it emerged from conversations between the informer and Mr Goniwe that Mr Mhlawuli’s name was mentioned. MR BIZOS: So you say that your informer had no personal contact with Mr Mhlawuli at all? MR BIZOS: Yes, and did you have any other informers anywhere that my have spoken to you about Mr Mhlawuli? MR TAYLOR: In Port Elizabeth, yes. MR BIZOS: When was Mr Mhlawuli in Port Elizabeth to speak to - for your informers in Port Elizabeth to get information? MR TAYLOR: Mr Mhlawuli visited Port Elizabeth more than once. MR TAYLOR: During 1984 and ‘85. MR TAYLOR: I can’t remember exactly whom he visited. I know he visited some people in houses where they held meetings in the houses. MR BIZOS: We only have your word but please let us - tell us what these informers form Port Elizabeth said? MR TAYLOR: From the bits of in formation I gathered, it became clear that Mr Mhlawuli at that stage knew what the G Plan was about. MR BIZOS: Well maybe, that he knew what the G Plan was about, so what? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, as I’ve already said, the conclusion I came to and in the end that was the decisive factor, the conclusion I came to in the end was that Mr Mhlawuli, all the indications were that he had to establish the G Plan and the alternative structures in the SWD. MR BIZOS: But that is a huge chunk that he knew about the G Plan, your informers tell you, and the rest you thought out, is that so? MR TAYLOR: On the evaluation and the interpretation of the information I came to the conclusion. MR BIZOS: Well the only information, according to the evidence, that was to be evaluated is that he knew the G Plan because he knew Mr Goniwe, that’s the only information you had. MR BIZOS: But now the G Plan, the G Plan, if it was for the purposes that you have suggested, must have been known to hundreds at least hundreds of people if Mr Goniwe was busy putting it into operation all over the place. Putting it in operation in Cradock for instance where Mr Mhlawuli’s parents lived and where he actually visited regularly. Why did you jump to the conclusion that he was going to put it into operation elsewhere? MR TAYLOR: The information I had at that stage, and this is how I interpreted it and evaluated it, was that he was going to implement the G Plan ...[intervention] MR BIZOS: You told us that the only information that you had was that he knew about the G Plan, the rest was evaluation on your part. Now if that is so, why wasn’t the reasonable and the probable inference drawn that he knows about the G Plan because he’s seen it in operation when he visits his parents in Cradock where everybody must have known about the G Plan if the G Plan was put into operation in Cradock. MR TAYLOR: That’s correct Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: So how do you come to the conclusion that he was going to put the G Plan into operation elsewhere? MR TAYLOR: That was the information informers provided me with, they received this information via their channels. MR BIZOS: No, you are now changing your evidence Sir. You told us that the only information that you had was that he knew the G Plan, for the rest you evaluated it and drew inferences, that has been your evidence up to now. You are now adding further information as having come to you when you said the only information was that he knew about the G Plan. MR TAYLOR: That is what I’ve said but I’ve said earlier that one of the reasons why he was involved was that all the information we gathered pointed to the fact that he was going to implement the G Plan in Oudtshoorn. This came to the fore in discussions where van Zyl and I and Lotz held meetings. MR BIZOS: Yes, that’s the evaluation of the information. Please, I will not allow you to get away with loose answers to my specific questions Sir. You said that the only information you had about Mr Mhlawuli and G Plan was that he knew about the G Plan, do you agree that you said that? MR TAYLOR: I did not say that was the only information, I said I had information that he knew about the G Plan. MR BIZOS: No, at least two or three times Sir, you said it was the only information and I challenge you to listen to the record, I appeal to the members of the Committee that were listening, your counsel is there to protect you, I have the backing of my colleagues and the member of the Commission who heard you at least two or three times saying that the only information that you had was that Mhlawuli knew about the G Plan. Try another explanation. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I did not say it was the only information that we had. Right from the start I said I had information about him visiting Port Elizabeth, attending various meetings and things - one of these things we are emphasising now is he had knowledge about the G Plan. We gathered information and all this information indicated that the idea was that Mr Mhlawuli had to establish alternative structures in Oudtshoorn. MR BIZOS: Well, the record will speak for itself and I am putting to you that not only are you lying about the information that you have but you are now lying and contradicting yourself in relation as to what that information was. Have you got any answer to that suggestion? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I am trying to tell the truth to the best of my ability as far as I can remember. ADV BOSMAN: On my notes Mr Bizos, I’ve written down some bits verbatim and I think it’s fair to the witness that I mention it. I’ve written down "The information I obtained was that Mhlawuli would implement the plans from Cradock in Oudtshoorn. Other information was gathered from other informers" That is my note. I don’t have an independent recollection, it’s just a note that I have written. MR BIZOS: No but he may have said that more recently but the only information was that he had knowledge of the plan, it was said two or three times. Yes, no, he may be - that more recently when I put to him that was a tremendous jump, that he may have said that but he clearly said that it was the only information. ADV BOSMAN: I just mention for the record that it’s three pages prior to where I’m writing now. It’s ...[intervention] MR BIZOS: Oh yes, this was before he was tied down to the question: "Was this the only information that you had"? No, thank you yes, I agree. You told us earlier on that there was also some unconfirmed suggestion that he was recruiting people. MR BIZOS: Where does that come from? MR TAYLOR: I heard that from an informer but right from the start I drew your attention to the fact that this information could not be confirmed. During discussion between Lotz, van Zyl and myself we mentioned this fact and the terrorist desk was not my strong point regarding exiles or remembering the activities of exiles. MR BIZOS: Let us just get this on record, your informers were paid? MR BIZOS: And in order to get paid they had to supply some sort of information? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, to a certain degree I admit that but I don’t think the only consideration was that initially, did money play a big role but a position of trust develops, you evaluate the kind of information you give them, you later re-evaluate how reliable they are and I did not accept the information without evaluating it. MR BIZOS: Now, did you know on the morning of the 27th that Mr Mhlawuli was leaving Cradock for Port Elizabeth? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman, it was only established later on after they had arrived in Port Elizabeth. MR BIZOS: How was it established? MR TAYLOR: It was only later, round about 12 o’clock the afternoon of the 27th. I received the information from the WH11 that he would visit Port Elizabeth. At that stage we did not know who the four persons in the vehicle would be. MR BIZOS: Now, you were under pressure to kill the people that you thought would pacify the situation. MR TAYLOR: That is correct Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: At least three weeks had lapsed since that plan was hatched to kill them. MR BIZOS: You did not know precisely who was in the car until you stopped it. MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman. I’ve already said just now that we’ve determined through my informers, two of them respectively, that Mr Mhlawuli and the other two people were in the car. We established it that day, after the had left Cradock. MR BIZOS: Yes, but how did you know that he would be coming back in the car? MR TAYLOR: We were not sure about that either. MR BIZOS: You were not sure about that? MR BIZOS: So that when I put the question to you: "When you stopped them on the way back, you did not know who would be in the car"? MR TAYLOR: We had a good indication but we couldn’t say with certainty who would be in that car, whether some people would remain behind perhaps. MR BIZOS: Or some, even by your definition, innocent person may have been in the car. MR TAYLOR: That was not excluded, that was a possibility, it could have happened. MR BIZOS: It could have happened. Now we will only have your word for it that you would have said: well, that you would have merely have questioned them for a bit and let them go. I think that is the story that we have heard here, is that correct. MR TAYLOR: That is correct, yes. MR BIZOS: But now, here was an opportunity to get rid of the three people from Cradock in a war that you thought that you were involved in, what difference would an innocent make if he happened to be in the car. MR TAYLOR: It would have made a big difference Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Now let’s see what the results would have been if you didn’t take this opportunity of killing Mr Goniwe in particular. You would have apprised him that you were following him, by stopping him and letting him go, you would have apprised him that you were following him, you would have made known to him that you were following him. MR BIZOS: You would have to wait for another opportunity to arise for these three persons to be together. MR TAYLOR: That is correct, except that I want to add that as I’ve said previously it wouldn’t have been necessarily these three people, if there was the right combination we would have executed this operation. MR BIZOS: Well, I have read you lots of names, please tell me who else would have been a candidate for murder if you had found Mr Goniwe, Mr Calata - let’s leave Mr Mkhonto out for the moment, you found Mr Goniwe and Mr Calata, just the two of them, would you have killed them? MR TAYLOR: That is correct Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: If you found Mr Goniwe and Mr Calata and Mr Mbulelo Goniwe, would you have killed the three? MR TAYLOR: Initially I indicated that I was not sure whether Mbulelo Goniwe was under the initial group of names that we discussed but it was possible. I don’t want to comment on that. The other names were also mentioned. MR BIZOS: If you had found Mr Goniwe, Mr Calata, Mr Gladwell Makahula, would you have killed all three of them? MR TAYLOR: That is correct Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: And if you found Mr Goniwe, Mr Calata and Mr Victor Piwani, would you have killed them? MR BIZOS: Even if you asked: "Who are you"? and he said: "Victor Piwani and I am the Deputy Secretary of Cradora"? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman. We had a specific framework of names we were working according to. MR BIZOS: But if Mr Goniwe was putting into the effect the G Plan and that was a death sentence offence and the deputy secretary, he, Mr Goniwe’s secretary was found in the car with him, why wouldn’t you get rid of the secretary and the deputy secretary? MR TAYLOR: That was outside the framework of our authorisation. Specific names were mentioned and there was no authorisation or no discussion or during the initial discussion with van Zyl and no other names were mentioned apart from these. According to me there was no mandate to kill any other person. MR BIZOS: Well, just give us the names again that you say you had a mandate to kill. MR TAYLOR: I’ve already told you, apart from the four deceased I can remember two specifically, Madola Jacobs, Mr Gladwell Makahula and I’ve also mentioned - I did not want to commit myself, that it was possible that Mr Mbulelo Goniwe was also mentioned. CHAIRPERSON: Would you have been able to make an application if there was a person killed whose death was not approved? ...[Transcriber’s own translation] MR TAYLOR: I can’t say. Are you saying if somebody was in the vehicle whom we did not - whose death was not approved? MR BIZOS: Whose death was not approved. ...[Transcriber’s own translation] CHAIRPERSON: Then you would have not applied. MR TAYLOR: I would have not applied for amnesty because that person would not have been included in the planning of this operation, I wouldn’t have been able to motivate it. MR BIZOS: Well, let’s take it on another basis or on a bit a tangent. So that your agreement with Mr van Zyl and Mr du Plessis and Mr Lotz was to kill these four and Mr Gladwell Makahula and Mr Madodo Jacobs and possibly Mr Mbulelo Goniwe. MR TAYLOR: That’s correct, except that Colonel du Plessis was not part of that discussion, van Zyl and myself had that discussion and at ...[intervention] MR BIZOS: Only van Zyl and you? MR TAYLOR: Mr van Zyl and I and at certain instances Lotz was present. MR BIZOS: Yes. So that we have it on your own evidence that you are - you also conspired to kill Mr Gladwell Makahula and Madodo Jacobs? MR TAYLOR: Yes, that was the names that were in the group. MR BIZOS: Why didn’t you apply for amnesty for them for having conspired to kill them if you are telling us the truth? MR TAYLOR: No, I applied for the murders Mr Chairman, I did not think of the effects that the other persons would hold in for me. MR BIZOS: Well, you see if Mr Mhlawuli was in the original four as you say, when did Mr Snyman give authority for him to be killed, according to you? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, he was not in the original group of four, he was in the original group of six or seven. MR BIZOS: Who - when did Mr Snyman give authority for him to be killed? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, at no stage at a discussion between Colonel Snyman, General van Rensburg, I do not at which times they discussed what. MR POTGIETER: Mr Taylor, after the discussions you and the other officer testified that you had to kill these six persons to resolve this problem. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, as I’ve said I don’t know what happened higher up or before I was approached. When I was approached these names were already in the group because there was not physical list. MR POTGIETER: The decision was then that they should be killed, these people? MR TAYLOR: During the discussion between myself and Captain van Zyl, yes. MR TAYLOR: Yes, or combinations of them. MR POTGIETER: Combinations is easier, but the fact is all of them had to be killed? MR TAYLOR: All of them were identified as targets for elimination, that’s correct. MR POTGIETER: Oh yes, please. You’ve now killed the four, am I right? MR POTGIETER: And there’s two left, what happened to these two? MR TAYLOR: There was no further operations. MR TAYLOR: Because people who took the initial decisions never gave further instructions. MR POTGIETER: But it was not necessary because you already had the instruction, it was already decided that they should be killed. MR TAYLOR: I was never approached again to participate in an operation. MR POTGIETER: But what was the initial instruction, to kill all six, not so? MR POTGIETER: Why did you not continue? MR TAYLOR: I cannot answer that question Mr Chairperson. If further instruction was given we would have done so. MR BIZOS: Please have a look at page 4 of the record of your application for amnesty. MR TAYLOR: Yes Mr Chairperson? "Captain van Zyl later informed me and gave instruction to form part of a planned operation to eliminate these four persons" MR TAYLOR: That’s correct Mr Chairperson. MR BIZOS: Does that not contradict the evidence that you have given a short while ago that the instruction was to kill six? MR TAYLOR: No, at that stage we already knew which four persons were here. That was the final instruction. Let me just make sure that was the final instruction. Yes, that’s correct, at that stage we knew these four people were in Port Elizabeth. MR BIZOS: You see, here you say on page 3 that this happened two or three weeks before the 27th of June and that’s the only date that you give. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, ...[intervention] MR BIZOS: Would you like to try another explanation? MR TAYLOR: Can Mr Bizos just refer me to which page he is referring to? MR BIZOS: Yes, if you go back one page when you start your narrative, you say "Approximately two or three weeks before June, the 27th" "He gave me instructions to monitor these four persons" and then you say that he gave you instructions to have an operation. Why does the four become six? MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chair, at this stage we knew which four persons it was, the six persons was before that word: "targets for elimination" on the 27th. As I mentioned before we established, we had confirmed that these were the four persons who were in Port Elizabeth. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Taylor, that doesn’t make sense. On page 3 you say "Approximately two to three weeks before the 27th of June 1985, I received instructions from Captain van Zyl about the activities of these four persons and to monitor them because they were involved in activities" MR TAYLOR: That’s correct, when I gave this statement it was only referred to the four persons who were the deceased. When this statement was made no reference was made to other persons. MR BIZOS: Just to finish off the day. You see, the fact that neither you nor Mr van Zyl are coming clean on this issue is that one page 48, paragraph 10 we read the following MR BOOYENS: Slow down, slow down, they’re trying to find the page please. MR BOOYENS: Yes, just slow down. "Who both worked at the black activities of that branch and gave instruction to help me to monitor the movements and activities of the three and to implement the operation" MR TAYLOR: I see the paragraph Mr Chairman, is this Mr van Zyl’s statement? MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairperson, what is the question of this paragraph? MR BIZOS: How do you reconcile your evidence that it was four or seven when van Zyl says it was three? MR TAYLOR: I cannot testify to the fact of what Mr van Zyl mentioned here. CHAIRPERSON: Help me please if I’m wrong. Paragraph 10 on page 48 says clearly that the instruction to you was to monitor three activists from Cradock, their movements and their activities. Furthermore it is said that during this process whereby Goniwe, Calata and Mkhonto were very active the close liaison and co-operation between Goniwe and Mhlawuli came to the for pertinently. MR TAYLOR: I see what you mean Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand this wrong? As I understand it, when you received this instruction mentioned was made only of three persons. MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, it is not my ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON: Listen to the question. CHAIRPERSON: And during the execution of this instruction the name of Mr Mhlawuli came up. Do I understand this incorrectly? MR TAYLOR: He came more to the fore pertinently as I understand it, but as I have said, earlier he did come to my attention. CHAIRPERSON: I understand that’s your testimony but do we agree to the interpretation of this paragraph? MR BIZOS: ...[inaudible] stage Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn till half past nine tomorrow morning. |