CHAIRPERSON: It is the 30th of September 1997. We are
proceeding with the applications that we have been hearing since
yesterday and the panel of the Committee is constituted as
yesterday.
We have just finished hearing Mr Lotz and there is a request
as to whether he can be excused from further attendance, and I
believe that can be done, unless somebody has problems with it,
subject of course to the condition that he would be available should
he be needed.
ADV BOOYENS: He is available, Mr Chairman, he is a cellphone
call away. He would obviously not be available within five minutes
or so, but we can get hold of him, he his not leaving town or
anything like that. In that regard, may I perhaps also ask, we have
handed to you in chambers an affidavit by Mr Lotz, in which he just
expands on his application, where we ask for an amendment to his
application, to cover certain other offences, not necessarily other
offences, but offences which might flow from the same incident.
Does the Commission require me to read it into the record or is it
adequate that my Attorney handed it over to you in chambers?
CHAIRPERSON: Because it is a loose paper, it maybe just get
displaced, maybe you should just read it into the record.
ADV BOOYENS: Certainly Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, the
affidavit reads:
I the undersigned, Gerhardus Johannes Lotz declare
under oath as follows: On the 29th of September 1997
I have already proposed by amnesty application,
additionally should be added to paragraph 9(a)(1)
offences and as well as any other offence or omission
and more specifically, perjury and an attempt at
defeating the ends of justice as appears clearly from my
evidence before this Commission".
And it is signed by the deponent and confirmed.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, the amendment is granted.
ADV BOOYENS: As the Committee pleases Mr Chairman.
ADV FORD: Mr Chairman, may I take this opportunity, I am sorry
to interrupt, merely to place on record Mr Chairman, that we have
been confronted, I am talking about my Attorney and myself, with
some difficulties. For reasons which aren't clear, we were not
furnished with a full copy of the amnesty applications, we were not
aware of that obviously until certain documentation was referred to
yesterday.
Yesterday for the first time we came into the possession of the
applications of the applicants Ras, Kok and Du Toit and certain
portions of the application of the present applicant today, Mr
Nieuwoudt, Mr Chairman.
We have studied what is now available to us, we believe that
it may well require an application to recall at least Mr Van
Rensburg, to deal with certain issues which are dealt with more
clearly in these applications. I just wanted to place that on record.
There is an outside possibility that that may also involve Lotz, but I
do not anticipate that to be so, Mr Chairman, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, why would you say that Van Rensburg
might be recalled?
ADV FORD: Because of certain further information which has
become apparent from the documentation which we now have
relating both to the fraud aspect and to the Goniwe aspect, if I can
refer to it in those terms Mr Chairman, and certain other information
which has also become available. But I do not wish to deal with it
at this stage Mr Chairman, I merely wish to place it on record.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, you will motivate that application as and
when ... (intervention)
ADV FORD: Certainly, when I bring it, Mr Chairman, I will
motivate it.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Ford, kindly for our own household
purposes, when did you receive the applications and when did you
receive the further documents?
ADV FORD: Mr Chairman, through you Mr Chairman, we were
formally instructed some ten days ago when we got the batch of
documentation which we believed to be full, the full documentation
relating to the applications. During the first part of the hearing
yesterday, it became apparent that certain of the applications had
not been made available to us.
I got from Mr Brink his copies, his bound copies, we don't
have such bound copies, indexed copies of the applications, I got it
from him and over lunch time yesterday we were able to make copies
of all those documents which we had not been furnished with, but
obviously we didn't have time to peruse them. Last night and this
morning we have spent time perusing them and trying to investigate
and consider certain of the other issues which are raised there.
ADV DE JAGER: Thank you. Mr Brink, I take it you would kindly
take it up with the office in Cape Town, why wasn't the victims'
representatives furnished with full copies of the documents?
MR BRINK: I have made a note of that already Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: I sincerely hope this is not going to cause some
delays in our proceedings, because in our view, there is no reason
why we shouldn't dispose of this matter by Thursday evening,
Thursday.
I sincerely hope that every attempt would be made to try and
help Mr Ford where necessary and Mr Ford, you will make use of
such time as would be available to you to clear up such issues so as
to avoid delay in the matter.
ADV FORD: I certainly will Mr Chairman, and it is certainly not
our intention to delay the proceedings, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman. I call Gideon Johannes
Nieuwoudt.
GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS: Mr Nieuwoudt you are
applying for amnesty in the matter and you have your amnesty
application in front of you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.
ADV BOOYENS: I refer to the first page thereof to the point
where you start with your personal summary on the second page of
that, do you confirm the correctness of that? Mr chairman, this is at
page 296, it starts off at page 296 of the record.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.
ADV BOOYENS: Do you further confirm the contents of
paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of the application?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: The personal summary illustrates where your
political convictions were shaped and indicates that you later
became a supporter of the National Party government and the basis
for that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: On page 300, that is page 5 of the application,
you deal with the general background and your experience in the
Security Branch, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Do you confirm what appears in paragraphs 1, 2,
3 and 4. Is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 5 you refer to certain annexures.
Perhaps we could just tell the Committee that annexure 3 appears on
page 377, annexure 4 on page 385, annexure 9 appears on page 421
and 422 and annexure 12 appears on page 435, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you enclose these annexures as
corroboration of the fact that the broad masses in the 1970's and
1980's had become very politicised?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You also in terms of paragraph 6, these
annexures 5 and 6?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: On page 304, that is page 9 of your application,
you refer to the four pillars of the revolutionary war and the
opposition against the National Party government?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And then you further elaborate in this paragraph
on this aspect and how it ultimately developed that there was this
so-called - that the politicisation led to a mobilisation for so-called
people's war, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: You then continue on page 304, paragraph 7, to
sketch the history further as well as in paragraph 8?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 9?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes.
ADV BOOYENS: And up to paragraph 12?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: What you mentioned here, did you obtain that
from literature and your own experience on the ground as a Security
Policeman, in other words was it only theory or was it also
happening in practice?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It was happening in practice and I also got this
from literature.
ADV BOOYENS: On page 12 you deal with the extension of the
structures and the New Year's message of 1986, and the combat
units of MK who launched attacks on strategic targets, is that
correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 13, I think the word police officers
should be added because in that list, the people that were killed
were also warders and people like that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you obtain these details from murder and
robbery documentation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, from their registers.
ADV BOOYENS: Perhaps we can just tell the Committee, I have
forgotten for a moment that the Committee members are not from
Port Elizabeth so we can just go through KwaZakhele, that is Port
Elizabeth district?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Page 309, Swartkops, that is also a police
station here?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: The same goes for New Brighton?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Adelaide is not in Port Elizabeth, is it?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It is in the Eastern Cape, yes.
ADV BOOYENS: And then we have Swartkops again. And then
13.1.13 there is a Grahamstown incident?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is Eastern Cape.
ADV BOOYENS: Cradock is also in the Eastern Cape, although
the case was in the Somerset East, that is the Eastern Cape?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Once again KwaZakhele. Paragraph 14, there
you deal with the damage to police vehicles and an amount is
mentioned there, that is obviously in terms of the money in those
years?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you have any personal knowledge of attacks
on police officers and that the homes were burnt down?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 15 you deal with the political
intimidation and the economical intimidation which deals with the
intimidation of black councillors, consumer boycotts and the rent
boycotts, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: The boycott against the councillors caused a
large number of them to resign as you've set out there?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: And you mention the specific case of Mr Linda
whose business was burnt down?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 17 you deal with the consumer
boycott and in paragraph 18, you deal with the unemployment
situation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: If we can just get the statistics here, these you
obtained from Manpower?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And those were only the unemployment cases
that were actually registered?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 19 you talk about the Amabutu,
what is that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is a terminology which was used, to mean
the army of the people.
ADV BOOYENS: And annexure 14 to which you refer, is on page
389 is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: On page 316, that is page 21 of the record, you
state that you are applying for amnesty for the murder and other
offences relating to those four people there mentioned?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Particulars which may be of importance here are
the following. For how long had you known Mgoduka, Faku,
Mapipa and Jack?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Warrant Officer Glen Mgoduka had worked for
the Security Branch since 1977 and he worked with me. We shared
an office along with Mr Marx. Mr Faku joined the Security Branch
in 1980, and he was also part of my Unit, that is the black affairs
unit.
Mapipa joined later, in 1986 when a special investigation team
was established as result of the state of emergency which had been
declared, that is the state of emergency of 1986.
Charles Jack was a trained person whom we used as an
informer and he later gave evidence in several court cases and at a
later stage during 1983/1984 he then joined us permanently at our
Branch.
ADV BOOYENS: I think the term is commonly known here, he was
an askari?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Right.
ADV BOOYENS: In other words a person who was trained as an
MK and then was turned to work for you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And then at page 316 you deal with issues with
which we will have to deal with more thoroughly, from page 316,
you deal with the circumstances which reigned and which gave rise
to the death of the deceased.
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: I think it would be a good thing if you
commented on the fact that you were the Regional Commander of
the Intelligence Unit. Perhaps you can explain the structure of the
Security Police from 1983 onwards.
MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairman, in 1983 the Security Branch
component consisted of the Commanding Officer. After General
Erasmus left Port Elizabeth in 1983 and he went to Johannesburg a
Colonel Snyman took over as Commanding Officer and there was a
Unit that deal with black affairs of which Colonel Du Plessis was the
Commander.
There were also the Indian, coloured and technical and trade
union components. After 1983 after I had become an officer, I was
in charge of all information or intelligence and the coordination of
that intelligence, viz a vie all the organisations. The four deceased
Mgoduka, Faku, Mapipa and Charles Jack were under my command.
ADV BOOYENS: You said four, you mean three?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, three at that stage. In 1986 I was
transferred to the Special Investigation team who deal with the
investigation into emergency regulations issues. In June Mapipa, the
third deceased joined us.
At that stage Sergeant Faku and Mapipa were part of that
investigation team. During June of 1989 I was the Regional
Coordinator of the Eastern Cape region and it also included East
London at that stage.
And we coordinated the intelligence component which was
actually an extension of the Intelligence component of the Security
Branch and it was under the command of Brigadier Gilbert.
ADV BOOYENS: What was the function of the Intelligence Unit,
what was your job?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Intelligence gathering, the maintaining of
updated intelligence, the perceptions that existed and the data bases
we had relating to this information, which we obtained.
ADV BOOYENS: You say that your tasks were set out in the
Police Act, very broadly speaking, I don't think it is necessary to go
into that. Paragraph 3, 3.1 creation, extension and maintenance of a
covert intelligence capacity in respect of internal as well as foreign
intelligence networks, please explain to us in layman's terms what
are you talking about here?
MR NIEUWOUDT: We didn't have offices at the Security Branch
per se we had our own facilities, such as safe premises, operating
centres. Part of our duty was to gather intelligence relating to
covert actions and we operated under cover in that respect.
ADV BOOYENS: In the process, you made use of agents and those
kinds of persons?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 4, page 318, you say that the
importance of an effective intelligence network, you refer to that
and then you define what you mean by an effective intelligence
network, perhaps you should explain to us, you talk about
associates, what do you mean by that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairman, associates would act as go-
betweens between the agent and the handler. And in my case, as is
well known in Port Elizabeth, I made specific use of associates to
deal with the agents for me in order to protect their identities.
ADV BOOYENS: So an associate would be a civilian person who
is well disposed towards you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: As far as the source is concerned, would the
source necessarily always have known that he was working for the
Security Police or would he sometimes be under the impression that
he was working for MI6 or the CIA or something like that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: The agent wouldn't know that he was working
for the Security Branch.
ADV BOOYENS: Were the sources sometimes deliberately brought
under the impression that they were working for some of the other
intelligence agencies that I have referred to?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: You are talking about agents there as well, those
are underground policemen, policemen who act as underground
spies?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you also make use of them?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: You also relate physical sources, those are
informers?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Non-physical sources, would that be technology
for instance?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Interception, monitoring, interception of post,
etc. That type of situation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: The existence of an intelligence network, did
that depend on the existence of these people, in other words could
you gather intelligence if you did not have these kind of people to
work for you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, we would not be able to.
ADV BOOYENS: You refer to the fact that it often takes quite a
long time to recruit reliable sources and agents and associates, is
that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Yes, most people wouldn't make an immediate
decision to work for you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Then you say that in 1988 a need was identified
and in 1989 the intelligence operation was established. You say that
on page 318, paragraph 5?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You mention that there was a real fear amongst
associates, agents, sources and informers that they were not assured
of sufficient protection as far as their identity and security was
concerned? So there was a problem in that regard?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Your local Security Policemen, such as yourself,
could not do the work of the agents and informers, because you
were well-known?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 7, the exposure of members and
informers, they were intimidated and murdered?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: It was also the declared policy of the liberation
alliance?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: As far as the identity of informers were
concerned, do you think that there would still be some antagonism
to some of these people if they were still alive?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: You were present here last week during an
application when there was reference to a certain informer?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: I saw it on a poster which was displayed here.
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: There was a lady in front of the building here,
saying that the identity of the informer should be revealed?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 8 you deal with the fact that
violence had escalated?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: We now are moving towards the 1988/1989 era?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 9, you deal with the so-called
operating facility. You already mentioned the fact that that is where
you had your administrative centre and that that was not at the
police station as such. You made use of other premises for your
intelligence business?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And safe houses and premises, those would be
places normally used to debrief agents, informers and such?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You mention in paragraph 10, something which
is probably very well known, that intelligence services throughout
the world, make use of cover operations such as these?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 11, page 321, in July 1989, you
came to the conclusion that there was a leak, an intelligence leak
from the Security Branch, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Even before this happened, you had some
suspicion that there could be problems?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: And it related with an operation in Swaziland.
Please try and keep it as brief as possible, but please tell us what the
situation was.
MR NIEUWOUDT: At that stage we had a trained cadre in
detention and we were busy interrogating him and he was supposed
to make contact with the other members of his cell to infiltrate and I
made use of that opportunities, the four deceased were also present
during that interrogation.
The trained person then wrote a letter for me in which he
made contact with the contact person in Swaziland and I used a
source as a courier to hand over this letter and the objective was
that the ANC would give him the weapons with the view to the
establishment of a DLB internally and to be able to exercise control
over that.
ADV BOOYENS: You sent the source in?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, the source was sent in. Later I learnt that
he had been detained in Quatro.
ADV BOOYENS: Now Quatro is an ANC camp in Angola?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Were they detained and interrogated spies and
people like that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: This source came known to the other side on one
or other way and you said it was you yourself and the four deceased
who were involved. Did anybody else from your side know about
this?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Nobody else knew.
ADV BOOYENS: This was the first instance, this was before 1989,
is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Can you remember when this was?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It was 1988.
ADV BOOYENS: This was the first indication, not even the first,
but did you start realising then around July 1989 that there were
problems with the intelligence network at the Security Branch?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Can you mention other examples?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I can. I know of two instances where Mr
Mgoduka was present where he acted as my associate and we
recruited a person under false pretences. And later he was
necklaced. In another instance, it happened in the same way.
It happened in Lesotho. He was murdered there and I had the
suspicion that the information was conveyed to the ANC.
ADV BOOYENS: You mention this agent's name. Was that
because he was shot dead?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: The name is Mtoto Mbali.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: In both cases Mgoduka was with you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Were there any of your colleagues that
complained that the effectiveness of the intelligence was not good
any more?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Did that mean that sources were inactive, agents
did not report any more?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You have already mentioned that Mr Mgoduka
worked with you. Did the others work with you from time to time
as well?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: In the situation on the ground, it could have
been that the black members working with you and would they have
known who were your sources? Would the black members know
how the sources worked, which methods you were using?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is like that.
ADV BOOYENS: If a source had to be arranged, a meeting at a
safe house, you were well-known?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: You were well-known in Port Elizabeth?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Could you for example go and fetch this source
of did you use the black members for that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I used the black members to go and fetch these
sources. Amongst others Mgoduka and Faku and Mapipa.
ADV BOOYENS: And were they with you when these sources were
debriefed?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Did they hear at certain instances which
instructions were given to the sources and the agents, for example if
a specific person or organisation was targeted, would they have
known?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: You also used other sources, people who were
murdered, but according to you do they still have family in Port
Elizabeth and therefore you would not like to disclose who they
were because according to you it would, the families' lives endanger
or they would be ostracised by the community?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, for sure.
ADV BOOYENS: You mentioned earlier, and we are on page 23 of
the false flag method. What does that mean?
MR NIEUWOUDT: This is a method whereby the person who was
recruited, that he as I have already mentioned that I am using an
associate to execute this covert operation.
ADV BOOYENS: This was the person who for example said he
worked for the CIA?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: So you became more and more suspicious that
this leak in the intelligence network could have come from
Mgoduka's side? The initial suspicion was on him?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: But at that initial stage, you only had a suspicion
and nothing more?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: As it became clear, also based on what your
colleagues had said, was counter espionage also part of this
intelligence network?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it was. At that stage I handled the
counter espionage component.
ADV BOOYENS: Counter espionage means to find spies working
for the other side.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: On page 324, on paragraph 14, round about
August 1989, this idea of the leakage and your suspicions were
discussed with Brigadier Gilbert. He told you that you had to
investigate this matter to determine whether this leakage was coming
from the inside. Whether there was a mole situation.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: At that stage, because it had become clear that
certain parts of your covert operations had been disclosed, and that
you had to spend money to find other premises.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 16 I want you to discuss this in detail.
You said security measures were tightened, information was
handled on a need to know basis, that was all to prevent that the
moles could obtain more information?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You tried to determine whether there was
surveillance instruments in your safety premises and also
surveillance was instituted in your own premises?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And you mentioned the WH11 method, that was
monitoring telephone calls? That worked with a sound recorder
which was activated by voice.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You also said that other monitoring apparatus
was also installed at Louis le Grange square and also in the tea room
of that building?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You had a suspicion at that stage regarding Mr
Mgoduka, is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Then you refer to the post which was intercepted
according to the WH10 method.
MR NIEUWOUDT: Our technical division fetched the post early in
the morning, they had a person in the post office who sorted the
post, and they had a list of well-known addresses which we have
provided them with.
Addresses overseas and internally. There were certain
addresses in Lesotho. Amongst others the Roma Church in Lesotho,
in London a Mr John Smith and in Anreith in Canada and in Eastern
Germany.
ADV BOOYENS: Did that work as follows, that all post which was
posted here to all the post posted in the Port Elizabeth environment
and I also think in other big cities, would be taken to the central
post office to sort them.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You had an agent working there and all the post
to a specific address as you have referred to, be intercepted and be
put in a post bag for the Security Police?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And this post you opened, you steamed it open
and read it?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: On the other hand, would the same method be
used with incoming post? That all post in this specific case,
addressed to Mgoduka, that his post would be intercepted?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And it was then brought under your attention
that Mr Mgoduka was receiving post from overseas?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: The letters were innocent, it seemed. ... (tape
ends) In this process you mention the Roma Church and an address
in Canada and in Eastern Germany. These addresses, what was the
meaning of these?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Those were contact addresses for the ANC
overseas, from where they would obtain their post.
ADV BOOYENS: In other words, post would go from here to the
Roma Church?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And all post going to the Roma Church, was
suspicious?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You say Mgoduka worked with you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Some of the post which was intercepted on its
way to these addresses, and you came to the conclusion that he
could have been involved in that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: How did you draw this inference? He did not
sign his own name or used his own address, he did not do that.
MR NIEUWOUDT: He did not do that. From the samples of his
handwriting and some typed letters from specific typewriters, some
were handwritten and the handwritten letters, I could recognise his
handwriting because he used to write my reports.
ADV BOOYENS: You were already suspicious regarding the typed
letters?
MR NIEUWOUDT: He made use of his own typewriter which he
had in his office.
ADV BOOYENS: Was that a mechanical type typewriter?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: So he usually typed on the typewriter and from
the intercepted letters, you came to the conclusion that it was done
on that same typewriter?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: On the basis of what?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairman, I don't have knowledge and I am
not an expert, but on the typewriter I could see that there was a
similarity between certain letters, certain typed letters and so I
could draw the inference that it was coming from the same
typewriter.
ADV BOOYENS: If we can just discuss the contents of these
letters quickly. These letters was written in a kind of a code
language?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Definitely yes.
ADV BOOYENS: A person, an uninformed person could draw no
inference from this letters, it read like a friendly letter?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Did the Security Branch know that certain words
used in certain letters had a certain meaning?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Could you mention a few examples?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Amongst others there is a funeral, it would
appear in the letter. You must attend a wedding on such and such a
day.
ADV BOOYENS: Let us use the wedding example. What did that
mean?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That means that people would be sent into,
people would be sent to Lesotho on a specific date.
CHAIRPERSON: And if they actually wanted to attend a wedding
or a funeral, what would they say?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Then they would come back and say, we would
attend that on such and such a day.
CHAIRPERSON: The person who sends the letter ... (intervention)
MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairman, perhaps you have understood me
wrong. If he said he is going to send somebody with a message, he
says there would be a wedding on such and such a day. It had
nothing to do with a wedding. The date was important. So that
means the people had to be sent on that specific date.
CHAIRPERSON: I understand you, you didn't understand me, but
we will come back to that later.
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV DE JAGER: I think what the Judge wants to ask, if there was
really a wedding and they were really invited to a wedding, say for
instance come to my daughter's wedding, and he accepts the
invitation and says he is willing to come, how would you distinguish
between an innocent invitation and an invitation which was encoded,
could you comment on that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't comment on that, there is the possibility
that that could happen. But I would have determined whether there
was a real wedding. It could have happened that there was a real
wedding. But it could have been an innocent letter.
ADV BOOYENS: But what was important regarding the innocent
letter was not only the letter, but the address to which it was sent?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: There were too many weddings and funerals
mentioned in letters to the Roma Church for example?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And this was well-known ANC addresses?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Were these addresses where you would expect
that a member of the Security Branch would correspond with
people?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.
ADV BOOYENS: A member of the Security Branch rather?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, no.
ADV BOOYENS: These were kind of cover up addresses?
MR NIEUWOUDT: These were cover up addresses, yes.
ADV BOOYENS: And these addresses, those were the addresses
where the weddings and funerals were mentioned in the letters?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Were you satisfied that some of the
correspondence which Mgoduka received, also entailed coded
messages?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You say Mgoduka, Faku, Mapipa and Sehati
were not members of the intelligence unit, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: In other words they were outside this counter
espionage operation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: But three of them, they have already been
associated at the least three years, with the Security Branch?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: If the three of them, or the four of them, pooled
their intelligence regarding the Security Branch, the informers, the
possible informers, the safe premises, it would have been an
enormous source of information?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You refer to a safe premises at Tesco which he
knew about?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You mention in paragraph 17 that the monitoring
apparatus which you installed, that was in the tea room?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Also bore fruit in the end?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: And in paragraph 18 you summarised what you
found there.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Were the only those four people present in the
tea room at that stage?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Mgoduka and Sehati told you, and they told the
other two that they made contact with a family member of Mr
Mgoduka who was involved in the liberation struggle?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV DE JAGER: Please be careful, the paper makes a lot of noise.
ADV BOOYENS: I am sorry Mr Commissioner. The Security
Police had a kind of photo system or a system of photographs which
you used for identification?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You had a photo album of exiles and based on
this, you determined that there was a family member of Mgoduka
who was in exile?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: If we could possibly just explain. The photo
album consists of a separate index, it is especially used for
photograph identification?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: I don't seem to recall we have had documentary
exhibits this far Mr Chairman, I think this will be the first one. I
shall mark it as Exhibit A1 and A2. And you determined that
photograph number 2044, was the photograph of Mr Christopher
Mgoduka and A1 and A2 are photocopies of the photo album of
exiles and also its index?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: If I could hand this in Mr Chairman. We have
made copies for all the legal counsel. We have copies for the family.
Mgoduka and Sehati said that they had already tried to make
contact and the other two said that they were interested to ...
(indistinct)
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you discuss this interpretation with
Brigadier Gilbert?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: At that stage, two of the members also according
to what you have said, had made contact with the ANC and there
were two on their way to make contact?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Gilbert's first reaction was to transfer these
people?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Would that have been successful?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, it would not.
ADV BOOYENS: Why not?
MR NIEUWOUDT: They could escape.
ADV BOOYENS: Let's start from the beginning. Should all four
of them had been transferred?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Then they would have immediately realised that
we know about their activities. The chances were that they would
try to escape.
ADV BOOYENS: At that stage they were still functioning as
moles, if these people had to flee and would be debriefed by trained
intelligence operators, were you satisfied that they had tremendous
lot of intelligence?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I am satisfied with that.
ADV BOOYENS: You yourself at a certain stage, debriefed
various agents who came back?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Just is not a discussion which took 5 or 10
minutes over a cup of tea, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Such a debriefing as you have told me, could
take a few days?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And for these four people, the information which
they had in their possession, according to you what did that include?
MR NIEUWOUDT: They could, not all, but they could identify
most of our informers and sketch their profiles. The profiles on the
members of the Security Branch could have been exposed.
ADV BOOYENS: If you mention a profile that means where he is,
where he works, where he lives, where his children go to school,
what car he drives, it is all that type of information?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Informers, you also include some agents?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Agents, some associates and also sources.
ADV BOOYENS: And also regarding the physical sources, or
rather the physical facilities, the safe premises?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. And also our operating
centres.
ADV BOOYENS: In other words with an experienced team of
interrogators and a tremendous amount of information can be
gathered from these people.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you have any reason to believe that the ANC
outside and the military wing did not have this capability or did you
know they had this capability?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I was satisfied that they have the ability to do
this.
ADV BOOYENS: You mention in paragraph 22 about your
continued discussion with Brigadier Gilbert, that you have
mentioned that these members knew about your operations and
should it be disclosed that these people were double agents or
moles, it would have had a negative influence on the black members
in the Security Branch. They would realise immediately that their
identity and profiles would be made available to the enemy.
Mr Nieuwoudt, an Intelligence network, such as the Security
Police had, there is a problem people are murdered, everybody knew
about that because they were part of the Security Police and then it
would have been difficult to recruit other sources?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You struggle to find policeman who would work
as agents.
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Should such a mole been able to provide the
information and the opposition forces use this information, that
means this whole intelligence network could deteriorate, fall apart?
Could the Security Police function without an intelligence
network?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, we can't. It was our ears and our eyes. It
was theoretically possible to deploy a network, but that would have
taken a long time.
ADV BOOYENS: could you in 1989, as far as you knew at that
stage, could you afford something like this? something negative like
this to happen?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, we couldn't.
ADV BOOYENS: You also mention in paragraph 23 an aspect
which you have already mentioned, namely that the profiles of the
Security Police could put their lives in danger?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You then gave Gilbert this information and he
told you to do further investigations?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: He also told you that you should perhaps try to
talk to them and find out if you could extract any information from
them.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: That is paragraph 24. What happened about
that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I tried, but nothing came of it.
ADV BOOYENS: Did they act?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: This discussion that we are talking about, what it
meant was that you confronted him directly and told them that they
were spies?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, no, it was far more subtle than that.
ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 25, you refer to the fact that you got
information via an informer in Lesotho?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: And that the information was to the effect that
your safe facilities had already been exposed?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And that a specific operation regarding a
Swaziland operation had been exposed and you came to the
conclusion that that was the agent, the agent had been intercepted?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Your information also indicated that this specific
Swaziland source had been detained in Quatro and that Chris Hani
had interrogated him?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You then activated your sources further and
monitored their activities in an ongoing basis?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Eventually you obtained the information which is
spelt out in paragraph 26?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Namely that Mgoduka and Charles Jack had been
recruited by Godji Skenyana?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: He operated in Lesotho?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And it then later became clear that both Faku
and Sehati and later Mapipa as well, had been sub-sources for Godji.
That Mgoduka was the principal agent and the others had given him
information.
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: What was the degree of reliability of this
Lesotho source? You had certain methods to test sources?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: It was usually compared to information from
other sources to see how reliable it was?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: In other words, if the agent says there was to be
a bomb at a certain place, and if the bomb exploded, that would act
as corroboration.
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Now the source in Lesotho who gave this
information, had he been used by you for quite some time?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, when you come to a convenient
point, you should tell us, because we should adjourn quarter to.
ADV BOOYENS: Certainly Mr Chairman, if I can just finish this
aspect of the source then that would be a convenient stage. The
information which he had given you in the past, was that reliable?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: So you get the information from the source and
independently of that, you had already monitored conversations,
intercepted letters etc, and you knew that some of your people had
physically disappeared and these four people were the only ones who
had known about this?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: You also knew that there was a safety and
security leak in the Security Branch?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: So these objective facts, did that corroborate the
information that there were moles in the Security Branch?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: We will continue with paragraph 27 after the
adjournment. Mr Chairman, subject to your, what you say, this may
be a convenient stage.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we will adjourn and resume at eleven
o'clock.
COMMISSION ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
CHAIRPERSON: We are continuing with the evidence of Mr
Nieuwoudt and Adv Booyens was busy leading him. You can
continue Mr Booyens.
GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: (s.u.o.)
EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS: (cont)
Thank you Mr Chairman. We go to paragraph 27 on page
331. The information which you got that Godji had in early
December, contacted him about the identification of a police vehicle
from that well placed informer, the same one which gave you the
previous information?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: And in the same period, there was a
correspondence from Police head quarters which you received that
there was revolutionary planning for the 16th of December which
was also known as Heroes Day and it also fit in with the information
that acts of terror were planned for that day?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: You have attached the coded message as per
Annexure 19.
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: The planing of a bomb underneath a Security
vehicle, it could be argued that you knew that there would be such a
bomb and that you could have prevented it?
Would there be a hundred percent chance to stop the bomb
planter?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV BOOYENS: You then realised that security measures should
be beefed up before that date?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: It will be suggested to you that the information
had already all come out, in other words the horse had already been
bolted, why now close the stable door and for that reason it wasn't
necessary to take the drastic actions which ultimately was taken.
What is your comment on that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I don't think that they were in possession
of all the information. I believe that they would have to be
debriefed for a considerable period and I can give you an example.
When the people apply for asylum in Lesotho, photographs are
taken of these people so there would have to be a photograph
identification and that would take time. They would have to write
an autobiography of themselves, and that would have to be checked
first. So according to me, I don't think they already had all the
information at their disposal.
ADV BOOYENS: One of the methods which you used on this side
and we have already referred to it, was to have a photo
identification for people whom you had arrested or turned to find
out which people they actually knew?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Would it be possible for this to happen on the
other side, on the ANC side if these people had gone over to the
ANC, for them to have an photo identification to identify further
sources which they had perhaps seen as Security head offices?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: According to paragraph 28 you discussed the
matter with Brigadier Gilbert?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: He knew that your intelligence network was
becoming less effective?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: And you were already aware of the fact that
there was a large number or a large amount of sensitive information
in the ANC's intelligence network's hands?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 29, you mention that the ANC
could not make use of this information to such a great extent. It is
not clear, could you perhaps explain what you mean here?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairman, the ANC could not use some of
this information. Apparently they had not received all the
information and they wanted to ensure they could not act
immediately, to also protect their own sources.
ADV BOOYENS: In other words, if the ANC acted too sharply,
then the inference would be that they had sources inside?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is right.
ADV BOOYENS: You refer to the situation of the possible transfer
that could exert pressure on Security people because it cold become
known that there were moles?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
MR NIEUWOUDT: In paragraph 31, you refer to the fact that you
and Mr Gilbert discussed the matter and it was clear that drastic
measures were needed since the intelligence unit could not be
utilised to maximum efficiency in the struggle at that time? The
efficiency was decreasing?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: After all these facts had been placed before him,
Brigadier Gilbert told you that you should eliminate the people?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You mentioned that the second sentence should
read he according proposed that this operation be managed in such a
way that the blame for the elimination could be placed on the ANC's
shoulders?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Because as it reads at the moment, it sounds as
if it was your suggestion, but it was actually his suggestion?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: The decision to eliminate the people ...
(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, which sentence are you referring to?
ADV BOOYENS: Sorry Mr Chairman, paragraph 32 should read he
accordingly suggested to me, not I suggested to him. The roles are
just reversed.
ADV DE JAGER: Could he perhaps explain to us how this fault
happened, how this occurred that this sentence appears in the
documents, it has a completely different interpretation and if you
want to retract it, you must realise it has been done under oath.
ADV BOOYENS: Yes, I am aware of that. I am not sure how the
mistake happened, but it had to have happened during the drafting of
these documents. I noticed the mistake when I went through the
documents during consultation with my client and during
consultation he told me that the suggestion that the operation should
take place in this place, had come from Gilbert and not from his
side.
Unfortunately I cannot answer as to how the mistake crept in.
In a document as weighty as this, I am sure mistakes occur.
CHAIRPERSON: The mistake does not lie in the misprint, but in
the version itself.
ADV BOOYENS: Yes, Mr Chairman. On page 334, paragraph 33
you mention that the fact that the decision was made to eliminate the
people, wasn't taken lightly. Were you convinced that in the
circumstances there were no other way than to eliminate these
double agents or moles?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You were given an order by Brigadier Gilbert
that it should be done?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I received a direct order from Brigadier
Gilbert.
ADV BOOYENS: On page 334, paragraph 34, you refer to the fact
that as a result of this, Brigadier Gilbert told you that you should
commence provisional planning?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You already realised at that stage that you
couldn't use local personnel to actually carry out the elimination and
that you would have to get help from outside?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Approximately two days after the order had been
given, Brigadier Gilbert met you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And he arranged for you to fly to Pretoria?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Did he also give the order that the authorization
should be obtained for the plane ticket?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Could you arrange for the authorization yourself
or did it have to be done through the Commanding Officer?
MR NIEUWOUDT: The latter, it had to be done by the
Commanding Officer himself and he had to get authorization from
head office to give that authorization.
ADV BOOYENS: In so far as it is relevant, the requisition order is
available on which it appears that General Van der Merwe gave
authorization for the plane ticket, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: We've only got one copy available Mr Chairman,
perhaps I could just hand that to the Commission of the requisition.
It is part of a court record. Your secretary could perhaps just make
copies for us and I will hand it in.
Brigadier Gilbert told you to go to Pretoria?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And the Brigadier Van Rensburg, the first
witness that you should come into contact with him?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: That would happen the next day? Brigadier
Gilbert also told you that there were allegations that two of these
people Mgoduka and Sehati were involved in certain fraud
allegations, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: These allegations of fraud, did it have anything
to do with the decision to eliminate them?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV BOOYENS: Do you confirm what is said in paragraph 35?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: The afternoon of the 12th of December you flew
to Pretoria?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Let me put it in this way, Mr Van Rensburg says
that you arrived at his house at six o'clock that morning. Why was
it done at such a strange time?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I received instructions from Brigadier Gilbert
that I had to make contact with him early the morning at his house.
ADV BOOYENS: You did not know what the reason for that
arrangement was?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV BOOYENS: You then arranged through a police contact and
the morning of the 13th of December you went to Brigadier Van
Rensburg's house?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You knew Mr Van Rensburg since his days in
Port Elizabeth?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: And at that time he was the Commanding Officer
of C10?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Under which Vlakplaas resorted?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And in this discussion between you and Gilbert it
was mentioned that you should get assistance from outside and
mentioned Vlakplaas in this regard?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: While you were at Brigadier Van Rensburg's
house, Mr De Kock arrived there?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you arrive there before Mr De Kock or did
he arrive afterwards, or did you come there together?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I arrived before Mr De Kock at General
Van Rensburg's house.
ADV BOOYENS: And did he tell you what Gilbert had told him?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, he did.
ADV BOOYENS: And did you provide him with further
particulars?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I did.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you give him a more complete picture of the
conclusions you have arrived at?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I did.
ADV BOOYENS: And it was suggested that he could possibly
investigate it himself. At that stage he wasn't stationed here any
more, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And the investigation was an investigation which
had to be done locally?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: At a certain stage, did you tell Brigadier Van
Rensburg after he had asked you who were the people who were
involved?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And did you provide the names of the people to
him?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I did.
ADV BOOYENS: The names of all four people?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: And did he know some of them as he has given
evidence?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, he knew some of them.
ADV BOOYENS: After Mr De Kock had arrived there, was he also
told the reason of this operation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, we did that.
ADV BOOYENS: Could it have been that only the fraud was
mentioned or as it concerns you, a whole picture was given?
MR NIEUWOUDT: As I can remember we mentioned the fraud. I
don't know whether it was at an earlier stage before Mr De Kock
arrived or whether I mentioned it to General Van Rensburg or while
Mr De Kock was present. But what I can remember is General Van
Rensburg told us that he was in a hurry because he had to go to a
meeting.
I can't remember exactly in detail what was said. What I have
referred to already is that three of these people were involved in
Goniwe and I mentioned their names regarding that matter.
ADV BOOYENS: And the fact that they were double agents?
MR NIEUWOUDT: And the fact that they were double agents, yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Did Brigadier Van Rensburg as he has testified,
did he give instructions to Mr De Kock to assist you in this regard?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, he did.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you and Mr De Kock then leave Van
Rensburg's house?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I accompanied Mr De Kock to his house.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you walk or did you go by car?
MR NIEUWOUDT: We walked, because the distance from Van
Rensburg's house to De Kock's house was a short distance. It is
about 50 metres.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you have transport?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you go with Mr De Kock in his vehicle?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you go to the technical support system
where you met Waal du Toit?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And then a discussion took place regarding the
detail of this operation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: In other words that was just a technical
discussion of how this should be executed?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Afterwards you and Colonel De Kock left for
Vlakplaas?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And there, like you mentioned in paragraph 39,
he said to Vermeulen, Snyman and Ras, he gave instructions to them
to accompany you to Port Elizabeth?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You left on the same day?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And that evening late you arrived at Port
Elizabeth and you provided accommodation for them for the night?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you know Mr De Kock beforehand?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV BOOYENS: That is, did you know him personally?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, that was the first meeting I had with Mr
De Kock.
ADV BOOYENS: You confirmed in paragraph 14 that this Jetta
vehicle which was blown up, that you fetched it from Louis le
Grange square and made it possible for the bomb to be planted?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: The bomb was a remote controlled bomb?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And you mention here what happened
afterwards, further events regarding time and place were discussed?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You also had gathered intelligence that a certain
terrorist Mandla Makhubela, that he was in 124 Hinza Street in
Motherwell?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And this information, was this used to instruct
these four people who had to be eliminated, to go and do
surveillance?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You informed Colonel Roelofse regarding this
person in Hinza Street, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Colonel Roelofse was not informed regarding the
exact purpose of this operation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Then you went to New Brighton police station
and you had discussions with these members. A photograph of this
supposed terrorist was shown to them?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Mgoduka was not present. You made
arrangements to go and fetch him from his house?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And from there telephone calls were made with
his Divisional Commander and you told his Divisional Commander
that he must come to work?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You decided that they would not use the usual
vehicle because it was part of observation.
MR NIEUWOUDT: Faku recommended this.
ADV BOOYENS: And you told the applicant Mr Lotz that he had
to bring the Volkswagen Jetta to a certain point.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You say that this vehicle had a SAP registration.
That wasn't on the number plate, it was a false number plate?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Page 339, paragraph 46. Did you arrange that
these four members, I am sorry, we are still busy with Mr Lotz. Did
Mr Lotz have any previous knowledge of this operation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV BOOYENS: After he had left the vehicle there, the bomb had
to be put there?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Was that after he had left?
MR NIEUWOUDT: If I remember correctly, Mr Snyman and I had
a discussion with Mr Lotz and at that stage, Martiens Ras activated
the bomb.
ADV BOOYENS: The four deceased arrived there at the
Motherwell crossing?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: They got into the vehicle, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: They got into the Jetta?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: That is paragraph 48. It was round about
23h50?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: After they had driven for about 100 metres, they
activated the sender and an explosion took place?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You also mention on page 341 that you
investigated the scene and you found a VZD3M detonator there?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Was this from the Eastern Block?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: In other words this was used by infiltrators?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Messrs Snyman and Ras did not have any
knowledge of that? You did that on your own?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Just by the way, you detonated the bomb? You
pushed the button?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you have a problem doing that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I was hesitant to do that?
ADV BOOYENS: Why?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Because those were my colleagues.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you that same evening contact Colonel
Gilbert? At a certain stage Mgoduka was not present and at that
stage did you make contact with Brigadier Gilbert again?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Initially it seemed that only three of these
victims would have been there? What did you discuss with him?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I told him that because Mgoduka was not
there, he was not working, I suggested that we should postpone this
operation and he pertinently instructed me that I have to go and
fetch Mgoduka from his house and that he had to accompany them as
well.
ADV BOOYENS: After this explosion, did you mention it on the
radio that there had been this explosion?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Lotz came back to the scene?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And he realised that the motor vehicle that he
had driven a little while ago, had been blown up?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: What did you tell him?
MR NIEUWOUDT: He was shocked and I told him that this was an
authorised operation for which head quarters had given permission
and he should not worry about this any more and he should keep
quiet.
ADV BOOYENS: The statement that you make that head quarters
gave permission. Was that based on what Gilbert had told you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: So Gilbert, before you went to Pretoria, he told
you that he had cleared this whole matter?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You made false statements in which you blamed
the ANC for this explosion?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And this became part of the inquest?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Justice took its course and then eventually you,
Mr Du Toit and Mr Ras were convicted for these murders?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You have already described your broad political
view points, but let us come back to the purpose, specifically the
political purpose you wished to obtain with this specific case.
As you have understood it, what was the function of the
Security Branch, in other words what was the basis of the Security
Branch?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That was the protection of the government of
the day.
ADV BOOYENS: And to execute this task, the Security Branch
had to gather intelligence for this purpose?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: The fact that this intelligence network was
negatively influenced, would this effect the ability to protect the
government of the day?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It would, yes.
ADV BOOYENS: And would it in the end make impossible the
purpose to protect the government of the day?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: And you regarded it as your task and as your
duty to prevent something like that, in other words the overthrowing
of the government?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I did.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you support the government of the day?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I did.
ADV BOOYENS: And did you believe that it was necessary that
you should act in such a way under these circumstances?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Why kill these people, why not less drastic
measures?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It was for the protection of the intelligence
network. For the protection of the government of the day, that it
should not be overthrown by violence.
ADV BOOYENS: Would detention by virtue of security regulations
Section 29, of the Internal Security Act, why according to you
would it not have worked?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I feel that they would still have been able to
have contact with other police officers wherever they were detained
and after a while, after an indictment had been served they had
access to their legal counsel.
ADV BOOYENS: And to visitors?
MR NIEUWOUDT: And to visitors.
ADV BOOYENS: Section 29 detention could not be done all the
time?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You could not have kept them there for an
unlimited time?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Were there cases known to you where
intelligence was smuggled from Section 29 detainees?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.
ADV BOOYENS: So that could not have worked?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Should there have been sufficient evidence to
accuse them successfully and send them to jail, would that not have
been sufficient because they still would have been able to provide
the intelligence?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: We have already referred to the question of
transfer, that would not have worked either?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You also refer in more detail to the political
purpose you wish to achieve on page 48, paragraph 10 (a).
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Do you confirm that that is correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And paragraph 10 (b), I think you have already
referred to that, do you confirm that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 11 (b), just one sentence. And an
instruction from Security head office which was now known to me,
you don't know on which Gilbert's assumption that it was cleared by
head office was based?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You did not ask?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not ask.
ADV BOOYENS: If the Commission would just bear with me Mr
Chairman. That concludes the evidence Mr Chairman, thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV BOOYENS.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hugo?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: I am Hugo on behalf of
the first applicant. Mr Nieuwoudt, just a few aspects.
CHAIRPERSON: The first applicant by the way we do it for the
purpose of, who is the first applicant, Mr De Kock?
MR HUGO: Mr De Kock, Mr Chairman. That afternoon of the
12th of December, did you arrive there in Pretoria?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I arrived there that evening.
MR HUGO: Where did you stay that night?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I stayed in a safe premises in Midrand between
Johannesburg and Pretoria.
MR HUGO: What arrangements were made for your transport from
the airport to this safe premises?
MR NIEUWOUDT: A person, a certain Sergeant, I can't remember
his surname, he lived on these premises, he was a guard there and he
fetched me from the airport that evening. And from there we went
to the safe premises.
MR HUGO: And I assume that he took you to Nongwe Park the
next morning?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR HUGO: Having arrived there, did you go directly to Van
Rensburg's house?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR HUGO: How long did this discussion between you and Van
Rensburg last before De Kock arrived on the scene?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Oh, it was not long. If I could take a guess
about four to five minutes. If I can take a guess, I can't remember
exactly.
MR HUGO: During this time, did you have enough time to discuss
the main points of the motivation as discussed by Van Rensburg, to
discuss all these things?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR HUGO: During this time before Mr De Kock arrived on the
scene, did you touch on this aspect of fraud?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It could have been possible, as I have already
said, I can't remember in which context whether it was before Mr De
Kock had come there or while he was there, I can't remember
specifically when that was mentioned.
MR HUGO: But you did mention this fraud aspect to Van
Rensburg?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR HUGO: And I believe that Gilbert would have mentioned it to
him as well?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I think so.
MR HUGO: And then according to your version, Mr De Kock came
there four or five minutes later. Did you repeat the motivation
which you have mentioned to Van Rensburg earlier?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR HUGO: And to the best of your recollection Mr De Kock was
also explained this matter of the fraud?
MR NIEUWOUDT: According to what I can remember, I told him
that the fraud had complicated this matter even further.
MR HUGO: The aspect or the fact that the Goniwe matter was also
related to this, was that also explained to De Kock?
MR NIEUWOUDT: The Goniwe matter was mentioned pertinently
and the three people who were involved in that, I mentioned those
people.
MR HUGO: I put it to you that Mr De Kock is going to say that
when this discussion took place at Van Rensburg's home, only the
fraud aspect was mentioned. Do you want to react to that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, it was not like that. Mr De Kock is
perhaps making a mistake.
MR HUGO: Mr De Kock is further going to state that the Goniwe
matter was for the first time brought under his attention when he
returned to Van Rensburg and told him that he had a problem to
receive instructions to kill other colleagues only on the basis of
fraud?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, it could not have been like that. What I
can distinctly remember is that General Van Rensburg was in a great
hurry because he had to attend a meeting, or give a lecture at a
meeting and this is why I draw the inference that Gilbert said I had
to meet Van Rensburg at his house.
That was the only reason I could think of and in any case, I
did not have transport so I can't understand that Mr De Kock could
say that.
ADV DE JAGER: Could it not have been that he could have gone
back to Van Rensburg the next day?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That could have been, yes.
ADV DE JAGER: Or even later that afternoon?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That could be possible.
MR HUGO: Are you sure that during this discussion where Mr De
Kock was present, that four people were mentioned who had to be
eliminated?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I am dead sure of that.
MR HUGO: I am putting it to you that Mr De Kock is going to say
that during this discussion only two people of the Security Branch
was mentioned to him. Two people who had to be eliminated and
then also a third person, and as Mr De Kock says in his submission a
previous ANC member who was working for them.
MR NIEUWOUDT: No. I mentioned four people.
MR HUGO: Did you during this discussion at Van Rensburg's
house, mention the fact that cheques meant for trade union
organisations were intercepted and these cheques were changed and
then the people who had to be eliminated, used it for their own gain?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I have no knowledge of this fraud aspect. All I
know is that when I had left, Brigadier Gilbert told me that some of
the members were also involved in fraud. He did not provide any
detail at all. I did not have any knowledge of that. They were not
working with me and I don't think it was necessary for Gilbert to
mention it to me.
MR HUGO: I am putting it to you that Mr De Kock is going to say
that he obtained this information from you and that was the reason
provided to him, why these people should be eliminated?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I deny that.
MR HUGO: Mr De Kock is also going to say that you said that
pressure was exerted on you to accuse these members and that the
result would be that these people should they be accused of this
fraud, that these offences would be made public to the police?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I deny this. I don't believe that Brigadier
Gilbert would have been able to protect them not to be charged for
fraud.
MR HUGO: I just want to ask you one more question. Can you
remember whether Van Rensburg during this discussion you had with
him, at one or other stage, left the room to go and make some
coffee?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It could have been like that. He might have
left the room, he was in a great hurry, so I can't remember whether
that had happened.
MR HUGO: Mr Nieuwoudt, I am putting it to you that Mr De Kock
will say that he can't remember that Mr Van Rensburg, and he is sure
about it, that Mr Van Rensburg did not leave the room at any
specific time.
MR NIEUWOUDT: I am not dead sure, but it could be that he did
leave the room at a certain stage, because he was in a great hurry.
MR HUGO: How long did this discussion between you, Van
Rensburg and De Kock last?
MR NIEUWOUDT: If I have to make an estimate, I did not watch
my watch, I think about 20 minutes, 20 minutes to half an hour?
MR HUGO: So according to you, this discussion was completed
round about half past six that morning?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR HUGO: And according to you, you accompanied Mr De Kock
directly from there to the technical division. At what stage did the
members, let me rather rephrase, at what time did the members there
start working?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Their working hours started quarter past
seven, half past seven, that was normal practice.
MR HUGO: The offices, were they opened when you arrived there?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, when we arrived there I met Mr Du Toit
for the first time.
MR HUGO: But my question is office hours start at quarter past
seven, half past seven, your discussion lasted half an hour and you
said you left immediately for the technical division. I want to know
where these offices already open and were they open, why so early?
MR NIEUWOUDT: They were there.
ADV DE JAGER: Do you know how far this technical division is
from Van Rensburg's house?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It is far. It is near the police college, it is on
the northern side of Pretoria and General Van Rensburg lived on the
southern side of Pretoria, near the University.
MR HUGO: I want to put it to you that Mr De Kock is going to
say that his recollection is that he used his own transport to go to
police head quarters and there he contacted Van Rensburg again and
there he made arrangements with the technical division?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, just give me one moment please. ADV
DE JAGER: Mr Hugo, could you perhaps give us an indication how
far is the house and the technical department, how far are they
apart?
MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, if you can give me a minute just to get
instructions on this point. Mr Nieuwoudt, I put it to you that Mr De
Kock will say that at that time in the morning, bearing in mind the
traffic at that stage, it would take about ten to twelve minutes to go
from General Van Rensburg's premises to the technical division?
Can you comment on that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't deny that, but all that I know is that Mr
De Kock went round to his house, if I remember correctly, he
collected his moonbag, greeted his wife and it was then that I met
his wife for the first time and from there we departed.
Because how would I have gotten there, I didn't have
transport at my disposal and I didn't personally know Mr Waal du
Toit at that stage.
MR HUGO: I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HUGO.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr
Chairman. I represent Mr Lionel Snyman and I have a few questions
to ask to Mr Nieuwoudt. Mr Nieuwoudt, did you and Colonel De
Kock leave the technical division together on your way to
Vlakplaas?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
MR LAMEY: Is it correct that Mr Vermeulen, Martiens Ras had
been summoned to Colonel De Kock's office?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Please repeat the question, I didn't hear it
properly.
MR LAMEY: Is it correct that after you and Colonel De Kock
arrived at Vlakplaas, that Mr Vermeulen and Ras and Snyman had
been summoned to Colonel De Kock's office?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: Were you there introduced to these three people,
Snyman, Vermeulen and Ras?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
MR LAMEY: Is it possible that during this discussion, mention was
made by yourself of by De Kock that you had come from head
office?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't remember that specifically.
MR LAMEY: What was the communication made to Ras, Snyman
and Vermeulen when they were summoned to the office, what was
said to them? Was an explanation about the nature of the operation
given?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, not there.
MR LAMEY: Was that done at a later stage?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it was done later.
MR LAMEY: Where did that take place?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That could have been during our journey from
Port Elizabeth.
MR LAMEY: Was it discussed in more detail then?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Not in depth, no details were given.
MR LAMEY: Mr Snyman's evidence and his affidavit says that
Colonel De Kock mentioned that Deon, that is yourself, would later
tell everything, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes.
MR LAMEY: Was mention made of trouble caused by a member or
an askari during this discussion at Vlakplaas with Vermeulen and
Ras?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Not as far as I can recall.
MR LAMEY: What can you remember relating to the operation, the
nature of the operation and the motive?
MR NIEUWOUDT: There wasn't much discussion at Vlakplaas. I
was introduced to the members and I stood outside and I waited. I
waited to leave.
MR LAMEY: Are you saying there wasn't very much time for
discussions at Vlakplaas?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, we didn't spend much time there.
MR LAMEY: Mr Snyman's recollection is that there was
recollection of an askari who had been causing trouble and that
something had to be done about it and that mention was made of
money that had been stolen and that he was a threat, a risk to the
other Security Branch members and that he had to go back to the
ANC, can you recall anything like that being discussed at Vlakplaas?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Not at Vlakplaas. As I have said, it could have
taken place whilst we were driving. And perhaps I then told them,
not in detail, the purpose.
MR LAMEY: Are you saying that you later mentioned the
motivation for this operation, later when you left Vlakplaas?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. It could have been mentioned by Mr De
Kock but I didn't hear that.
MR LAMEY: What exactly was told to these people on the way to
Port Elizabeth, relating to the motive for the operation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I think I told them that they were playing a
double role, and as a result thereof they had put out feelers to go
over to the ANC and that on the 16th of December, there was the
plan to place a landmine in one of the vehicles and that they were
also involved in sensitive operations, some of the members.
And that they had also committed fraud, that is all, because I
had no details about the fraud.
MR LAMEY: Snyman's recollection is also that he had already at
Vlakplaas gained the impression that it was to be an organised
operation since members of the technical division were involved. Do
you know whether that was mentioned then?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It could have been mentioned by Mr De Kock,
I didn't mention it, but that is so.
MR LAMEY: Snyman says that he also thought and that his
recollection was that you at some point mentioned that you had
flown to Pretoria to discuss the situation in Port Elizabeth with the
General and he will testify that that was General Van Rensburg?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: In Port Elizabeth, Mr Du Toit and members of the
technical division were mainly involved in the installation of the
explosive device in the vehicle, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: But that Mr Snyman and Vermeulen and Ras, their
task was mainly guard duty or to secure the surrounding area?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
MR LAMEY: Snyman also says that he from time to time helped
with the explosives, can you remember that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
MR LAMEY: And then is it also correct that on the scene where
the explosion eventually happened, that Snyman and Ras' role was to
stand near the crossing and that they had been tasked in case
something went wrong with the explosion, to shoot the persons?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: Were these details discussed beforehand in Port
Elizabeth?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
MR LAMEY: How would Snyman and Ras have known that that
was to be their role?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I think that their Commanding Officer would
have informed them.
MR LAMEY: Weren't they taken to the meeting place beforehand
to see where it was?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I took them there.
MR LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY.
CHAIRPERSON: What was the purpose of taking them there?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Because they didn't know the area and we were
only supposed to meet there that evening and I therefore arranged to
see the deceased at New Brighton and they were to meet at a certain
time there.
CHAIRPERSON: Didn't they ask you what are we going to do
there, to the place where you are taking us to now?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I believe that they knew what their task was to
be, that they had known that in Pretoria already because their
Commanding Officer would have told them that if the bomb did not
explode, they had to take further action by shooting the people.
They didn't ask me, they were only supposed to fulfil an auxiliary
role.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you point out specific points where they
would have to post themselves?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, that they observed for themselves.
ADV POTGIETER: What did you mean when you told them that
the people to be eliminated, had put out feelers to the ANC?
MR NIEUWOUDT: What I meant was that they had already made
contact with the ANC.
ADV POTGIETER: In what way?
MR NIEUWOUDT: In the sense that they had been recruited by a
member of MK.
ADV POTGIETER: Why didn't you tell them? Why didn't you tell
them that the people had been recruited?
MR NIEUWOUDT: As I said, I didn't go into any detail. All I said
was that they had defected, they had put out feelers to the ANC and
that they were planning to plant a bomb on the 16th, which was the
commemoration to show solidarity and that they were playing the
role of double agents.
And I assumed that they knew what I was referring to.
ADV POTGIETER: No, what I am interested in is what you said
the feelers that they put out. You are alleging as a fact in your
evidence that these people had been recruited and you referred to
the Commanding Officer who had recruited them, allegedly,
Mgoduka, who had recruited Mgoduka in any event, but you told
these people that these people had put out feelers towards the ANC.
That is something different, if you put out feelers, it is as if
you are still testing the waters, you are trying to make contact and
to establish whether you can cooperate with them, isn't that so?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV POTGIETER: But if you had been recruited, then you are
already a part of their structure?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV POTGIETER: So what was the situation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That they had been recruited.
ADV POTGIETER: They had been recruited?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes.
ADV POTGIETER: Ras, Snyman and Vermeulen, did you want to
mislead them?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, that wasn't the intention at all.
ADV POTGIETER: Did you just express yourself incorrectly?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is possible, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Is that how you expressed yourself to General
Van Rensburg as well, because - I am asking this because at the end
of General Van Rensburg, it was unclear to me as it had been from
your evidence until my colleague to my left asked you, it had not
been clear to me whether in fact these people had already been
recruited or were in the process of being recruited by the ANC.
How did you express yourself to General Van Rensburg?
MR NIEUWOUDT: If I recall correctly, I told General Van
Rensburg that the people had been recruited for the ANC and that
they were planning a certain action for the 16th and I further told
him that these people, these three, were involved in a sensitive
operation relating to Goniwe. That information I got from General
Gilbert. And I mentioned the names of all four people.
ADV POTGIETER: You see, the annexure to which you refer on
page 327 of the record, paragraph 19 of your application, you refer
to the document of the inquest proceedings in the case of M. Goniwe
and three others and that record appears on page 498 of our
documents.
It is apparently one of the Advocates representing the parties,
Mr Mostert, at the bottom of page 399, he refers to Jack. He says
Jack was what was called an askari. And then he explains, in other
words he was a trained ANC activist who at that stage was working
for the police.
And he then says but at that stage he had put out feelers to
return to the ANC fold. Then the court asks him, you say he had
put out feelers and then he then says, Mr Mostert then says, he put
out feelers to return to the ANC fold. My Lord, as far as Mgoduka
is concerned, our information is that in respect of Mgoduka too, his
loyalty was being questioned. So it is in the same context in which
reference is made to this inquest. Reference is there also made to
the approach to the ANC, putting out feelers as such.
Now, this extract, could that be corroboration for your
allegation that these people had contact with the ANC?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV POTGIETER: But once again to put out feelers, reference is
made to putting out of feelers?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV POTGIETER: Was this submission to which you referred us
in the Goniwe inquest, was that also wrong?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so, yes.
ADV POTGIETER: Why do you then refer us to that in your
application?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Because I testified there and it was put to me.
ADV POTGIETER: But why do you refer us to an extract which
says that Mr Jack, the askari, had put out feelers to the ANC and
that Mr Mgoduka's loyalty was being questioned?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I annexed that as corroboration of the facts
already sketched.
ADV POTGIETER: But that cannot be corroboration of what you
allege. You are saying that the people were recruited?
MR NIEUWOUDT: But it could have been beforehand, before they
were actually recruited in the follow up.
ADV POTGIETER: But in your application at page 327, why didn't
you say I refer you to the record, but that record is wrong, it wasn't
a question of putting out feelers, the people were actually recruited?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, but that was only at a later stage.
ADV POTGIETER: That what happened?
MR NIEUWOUDT: When they were recruited. They went through
a whole process. They also had to be screened first before they
were accepted.
ADV POTGIETER: Thank you.
ADV DE JAGER: On the 13th, what time did you leave Pretoria?
MR NIEUWOUDT: If I remember correctly, it was approximately
eleven o'clock, twelve o'clock.
ADV DE JAGER: And what time did you arrive at Port Elizabeth?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I think it was about 10, 12 hours' journey, so it
would have been round about eight o'clock in the evening.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey, can I just for clarity, when you put
questions to the witness, you put it to him that Mr Snyman will say
quite a few things and one of the things that you said he would say
was that an askari was mentioned and that he caused trouble etc,
etc. What is not clear to me is this askari, when you said an askari
was mentioned at Vlakplaas and that he caused trouble, was the
askari who caused trouble in Vlakplaas or is it the askari that we
talked about in PE?
MR LAMEY: No, Mr Chairman, it is referring to an askari in Port
Elizabeth.
CHAIRPERSON: Oh, I see, thank you.
FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr
Chairman, may I just proceed to ask one further question to the
applicant? Mr Nieuwoudt, on the basis of the information and
statements made, and I refer specifically to Mr Snyman, would you
agree that Mr Snyman had every reason to believe that based on
your communications that this operation in which they were going to
assist and play a supportive role, that this operation had to be
carried out in the national interest?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Most definitely.
MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have got no further
questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY.
ADV DE JAGER: Could you just clarify one point for me. You
said you took them out to the place during the afternoon and that
they chose their own positions there?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV DE JAGER: And the would then have to act if there was no
successful explosion?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV DE JAGER: So, they would have known where the explosion
was to take place?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV DE JAGER: Did you give them an indication that it would
take place 100 paces from point A or what was the position?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV DE JAGER: And did they take up position further on or
where?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, where the exchange of vehicles took place.
It was about 100 metres from that point, that was where the
explosion was to take place.
ADV DE JAGER: If you had pressed the button a couple of
seconds too late, it would have been passed?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV DE JAGER: So they had to know exactly when you were to
press the button to place themselves in the correct position from
where they could still shoot?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV DE JAGER: You say that they chose that positions for
themselves. They must have been able to chose it from information
which you had given them?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is why I took them to the scene, correct.
CHAIRPERSON: You see, the one thing that I don't understand is
how can you take people to a place they hadn't seen before, you take
them so that they would know where they would put that evening
and they should also determine the positions where they would have
to be placed without you, the person who is taking them there to the
place that they don't know, discussing with them the purpose of
them being there.
MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have already said, I took into account the
fact that their Commanding Officer had told them what role to play
and they were trained people and I took them to the scene and they
made their own observations there and they knew in which direction
the vehicle was to travel.
CHAIRPERSON: But when you arrived at that place, what do you
say to them? As far as they were concerned, that place could have
been anywhere. You have gone passed a number of places and you
come to a particular point and what do you say to them, you just
keep quiet?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I said that that was where the exchange of
vehicles was to take place. That is where they would switch the
vehicles, in other words where the Jetta and the kombi were to be
switched and the four deceased would then take up their positions in
the Jetta.
CHAIRPERSON: Now, that is what you told them?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: So that it should make sense?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and then?
MR NIEUWOUDT: And in the direction in which the Jetta was to
travel.
CHAIRPERSON: And that's it?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. And they were then able to observe the
area and where they could take up their positions.
ADV DE JAGER: But the most important thing for them to know,
was where exactly the explosion was going to take place, 100 paces
or 500 paces away.
MR NIEUWOUDT: They knew that it was 100 paces, they were
present. It is 100 meter.
ADV DE JAGER: Did you tell them that it was going to be 100
meter?
MR NIEUWOUDT: They were present when we were preparing the
car.
ADV DE JAGER: Yes, but the preparation of the car does not tell
them exactly when the car would explode. They were present during
the preparation, but did you discuss this type of detail, in other
words take up position 200 paces further on and if the thing doesn't
explode after 100 metres, then you must shoot?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I didn't discuss it in such detail with them. But
it could have been.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, if you speak of so many metres from two
points, what are the two points? It must be the point where they
would have to place themselves and the point where the explosion is
supposed to take place?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: That you must have told them, otherwise the
whole thing wouldn't make sense. You must have told them that
people are going to be blown up at this point.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV JANSEN: Thank you Mr
Chairman. Jansen is the name on behalf of applicant Marthinus Ras.
Mr Nieuwoudt you were in charge of this operation, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV JANSEN: You would have been aware of the detail of the
operation right down to the finest details?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: You involved head office in the operation because
you didn't have the necessary technical and other facilities, is that
correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Why did you say that, Mr Nieuwoudt? I am
surprised you agreed to that, unless I misunderstood the evidence?
If you didn't have to make use of technical experts, would you have
done, would you have proceeded with the operation without the
head office? Would you still not have sought the approval of head
office?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, as I understood it, Mr Gilbert made those
arrangements with head office.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, he is asking you, why did you involve head
office? Maybe let me ask you that way?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Pardon me?
CHAIRPERSON: Why did you involve head office?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Because we didn't have the necessary abilities
to plant the bomb, it had to be done in a professional way.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Nieuwoudt, you informed Mr Gilbert
because he was your senior and you expected Mr Gilbert to get an
approval from head office?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: And whether or not you would have used
whatever method or whatever, you would still have tried to make
sure that you got the necessary approval, isn't it?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Mr Jansen?
ADV JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Nieuwoudt, you
knew very well what support you required from head quarters, in
other words what was it that they had which you did not have?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It is like that, we did not have the necessary
capacity, but the arrangements were made with Brigadier Gilbert
with head quarters.
ADV JANSEN: You have just mentioned in answer to a question
from the Chairman, that you did not have the capacity to
manufacture the bomb, to plant the bomb. At that stage you already
knew that a bomb would be involved?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so, yes, because Gilbert had told me
that we should create the impression that the ANC was responsible
for that.
ADV JANSEN: Yes, but that could mean a lot of things. It usually
means that Makarov pistols had to be used?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is like that, yes.
ADV JANSEN: At which do you say the method or the manner of
elimination, at what stage was that discussed with you for the first
time?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It was when Gilbert gave me a direct
instruction and he told me that we had to use a limpet mine to create
the impression that the ANC was responsible.
ADV JANSEN: The planning had already been done, and that was
even before there was contact with head office on the 12th of
December?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't know whether he had already cleared
this matter with head office.
ADV JANSEN: I want to correct myself, I am not referring to
contact with head office, but I am referring to contact with Van
Rensburg. Those discussions had to take place before you left Port
Elizabeth with Gilbert?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV JANSEN: In other words the details of what the operation
would physically entail?
MR NIEUWOUDT: All I can remember what Gilbert told me
regarding the limpet mine, that it should appear as if the ANC was
responsible. That was all, he did not discuss any detail.
ADV JANSEN: At least he wanted a bomb to be used?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: And it could mean only one thing, the bomb had to
be attached to a car?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: In other words a car had to be involved as well?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: And the person who had to be eliminated, you had
to get them into the car in one or other way?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: That detail also had to be finalised before you
came to Pretoria, or perhaps you had good ideas regarding this?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so, yes.
ADV JANSEN: You see, it is clear that shortly after these
discussions on the 13th, definite plans regarding a certain plan B had
been made.
Vlakplaas operatives Ras, Snyman and Vermeulen were given
Makarov pistols or they took their own Makarov pistols, is that
correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: You knew about that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV JANSEN: So at that stage you wee aware what plan B
entailed?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't remember that it was explained to me,
but what I know is that they had to support this operation should
not bomb not explode.
ADV JANSEN: What support would these three people be able to
give at that stage? In other words the morning of the 13th, what
did you think their role had to be?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't remember regarding what they thought
or what Mr De Kock thought by sending them with, but all I know is
we have already cleared it out at the technical division.
ADV JANSEN: All right, I want to tell you what Mr Ras says. Mr
Ras says regarding that aspect in the first place, it was clear to him
that the detail of the plan already had been finalised, because they
were aware that the technical division would become involved. You
won't have a problem with that statement?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, that is correct, that is how I accepted that.
ADV JANSEN: Once again he says he can't remember where he
was told this, but he did know that their support would entail firstly
that they would put these explosive devices on the scene. Because
all three of them completed the explosives course?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: And furthermore, they would be part of this plan B
if the explosives device did not work, they had to eliminate these
people by shooting them?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes.
ADV JANSEN: Would you then at least agree that all this detail
had been finalised to a great extent before these three people were
called in and told that they had to become involved?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: And they were not in a position to change the basic
planning?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: The consideration of which operatives had to be
chosen for a specific operation, depended on the type of planning?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: It was certainly also at a very early stage clear for
these people, that this operation entailed the elimination of police
officers?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: So this was an extraordinary situation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: Mr Ras says in the first place that he can
specifically remember that the morning of the 13th, he was with
Brigadier Van Rensburg in his office together with Eugene de Kock,
that was for a very short time, and he was then told that he had to
go to Port Elizabeth for an operation. Do you wish to comment on
that part of his evidence?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't remember before we left to Port
Elizabeth, that Mr De Kock had left Vlakplaas.
ADV JANSEN: Mr Ras says it was the habit of the Commanding
Officer of Vlakplaas and some of the other members, that had to do
business at head quarters to go there early in the morning, round
about seven o'clock and to go to head quarters at Wagtehuis. I
suppose you don't really have knowledge about that, but I want to
just put it to you because there is this difference in evidence?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I don't have personal knowledge about
that, but that specific morning I accompanied Mr De Kock to the
technical division in Rebecca Street. I don't know that Mr De Kock
and Martiens went to head quarters.
ADV JANSEN: Furthermore Mr Ras states that he then, it appears
from his application, that he then went to Vlakplaas. He made
preparations and he met in De Kock's office? You would agree to
that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes.
ADV JANSEN: Can you remember which detail of the operation
were given to the operatives at that stage?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I can't because Mr De Kock talked to them
all alone. I was standing outside.
ADV JANSEN: Mr De Kock surely knew how long they would
remain in Port Elizabeth?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I assumed he did know.
ADV JANSEN: How did Mr De Kock know how long they would
be in Port Elizabeth?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I have no idea.
ADV JANSEN: You see one of the most important things of this
operation was that as few as possible people should know about
this?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: You see Mr De Kock at that stage, was not the
Commanding Officer of Vlakplaas, Mr Dave Baker was the acting
Commander of Vlakplaas?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't deny that, I don't know.
ADV JANSEN: The point is Mr Nieuwoudt, even some of the
senior colleagues were not told the detail of why these operatives
were absent, in other words it is important to know how long these
people would be absent, so should enquiries be made about where
the people were, that these questions could be answered, is that
correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: In other words you should have told De Kock at
which stage, for when this operation was planned and when the
operatives would be back?
MR NIEUWOUDT: As far as I can remember, we were in Du Toit's
office when we discussed the method and then he could have made
the observation or drew the inference how long this would take.
ADV DE JAGER: In Du Toit's office did you discuss that Du Toit
and them had to go to PE that same afternoon?
MR NIEUWOUDT: that is correct.
ADV DE JAGER: And was it discussed there that it was planned
for the night?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It was planned for the following day.
ADV DE JAGER: Yes.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes.
ADV JANSEN: And you must have been relatively sure that the
targets would be available for elimination the next day?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is like that.
ADV JANSEN: You see, Mr Ras says that although he did not
know all the detail, but his general impression of the whole
operation was that it was very urgent. Was that a fair observation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: Secondly that it was extraordinary circumstances
because there was a security breach in the Eastern Cape?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: Mr Ras also says in the journey to Port Elizabeth,
because the two of you were in the same vehicle, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV JANSEN: Snyman and Vermeulen were in another car, is that
correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV JANSEN: And he says the merit of the operation was
discussed in broad terms, but he can't remember the detail.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: Furthermore Mr Ras states that as far as he can
recall the scene, the so-called plan B would entail that should the
explosive device not be detonated, they would have waited for the
members to do the so-called observation tasks in Motherwell and on
returning, that would possible be early the morning, just before or
during the sun came up, that at that stage they would be shot. Do
you want to comment on that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It could have been like that.
ADV JANSEN: You would agree that when those plans were made,
you did make such a plan or agreed to that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen, what is your difficulty? Earlier on
you put it to the witness that your clients could not have been in a
position to change any aspect of the plan.
ADV JANSEN: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: I just want to know what precisely where are we
leading to and what aspect of the matter are you dealing with?
ADV JANSEN: Yes, Mr Chairman, I think it would be clear that as
far as, I think I specifically put the question on the basis that the
basic plan or what would be used and the mechanisms, that can't be
changed, but obviously at the end of the day, on the actual ground
and at the scene, the operatives do to some extent use their
discretion, as to how the operation is concluded.
There aren't any specific, my instructions isn't that there was
any specific rule as to what they can change and what they can't
change, that will depend on the operation itself to what extent the
operatives have a discretion.
But the planning is done on a more senior level and that
planning determines which individuals are more likely to be asked to
be involved, depending on their qualifications and their experience.
CHAIRPERSON: But plan B never even came into operation?
ADV JANSEN: No, it didn't.
CHAIRPERSON: Why should we be detained about around aspects
relating to plan B which didn't even come into operation?
ADV JANSEN: No, I accept that Mr Chairman, that it probably
doesn't play much role in the present circumstances. I am doing it
purely to explain the role of the three Warrant Officers in the fullest
possible sense.
CHAIRPERSON: Although I don't think there is much argument
about the role that it was thought they would play and also the fact
that they got instructions to pack and go to PE. They just had to
follow instructions as far as I can see things.
ADV JANSEN: No, I accept that Mr Chairman. Mr Nieuwoudt, at
the end of the day Mr Ras and the other two Warrant Officers were
under your command in the Eastern Cape?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: And that what they had done, was a direct
consequence of the commands given to them by you or by Mr De
Kock?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: And there is no doubt that that what was done
would be regarded by them as part of their job or reasonably as part
of their work?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV JANSEN: As it pleases the Chairman, I do not have any
further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV JANSEN.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr
Chairman, Cornelius for the seventh applicant, Mr Vermeulen. Mr
Nieuwoudt it is clear that Vermeulen had nothing to do with
handling and the placing of the explosive device?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: It was done by Waal du Toit and De Kock?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: I just want to clear up something which also
bothered Mr De Jager. The idea is created by you that on the scene
Vermeulen and Snyman made a certain submission should this
operation fail. I just want to put this straight.
The applicant Vermeulen guarded the motor vehicles where
they were parked, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: And if I look at the submissions it was a far way
from the scene where the bomb exploded?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: Such a distance that the applicant will say he
did not even hear the explosion?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: At that stage when this explosive device was
activated, applicant Vermeulen was out of sight and far from the
scene?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: So he was in no position to execute another
plan should this explosion fail and so that he could then eliminate
the people?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: I just want to follow on the following, it was
clear even from Eugene de Kock's part, that this was cleared at a
higher level and that he had to follow your instructions.
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further
questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kemp?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KEMP: Mr Chairman, Mr Kemp
on behalf of Du Toit and Kok, the fifth and sixth applicants. I only
have a few questions to ask.
The morning you left Nick van Rensburg's house, did you go
directly to the technical division?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, this is how I recollect it.
MR KEMP: Now, earlier it was put to you that it could have been
around half past six that morning, can you remember more
specifically what time it was that morning?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I can't remember specifically what time it
was.
MR KEMP: Have you met Mr De Kock previously?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
MR KEMP: Did you know Mr Du Toit?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
MR KEMP: And Mr Kok?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
MR KEMP: When you came to the technical division, who did you
meet there?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr De Kock took us to Mr Du Toit.
MR KEMP: Is it correct that Mr Kok was not there?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR KEMP: Mr Kobus Kok?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR KEMP: It was only Mr Du Toit whom I had discussions with.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR KEMP: I am stating it to you that Mr Du Toit as he remembers
it, was that this visit took place between ten and eleven o'clock that
morning, but he isn't sure. Could it have been at that time?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It is possible, but I can't remember exactly
what time it was.
MR KEMP: Did you do anything else that morning before you went
to Vlakplaas, after you had been to the technical division?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
MR KEMP: One aspect I want to mention to you is that when you
were in the office of Du Toit, you explained to him precisely what
this matter was about, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR KEMP: Did you explain to him the scope of this operation and
the importance of this operation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR KEMP: And also the urgency?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR KEMP: And De Kock was also present?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR KEMP: The question that some of these members were
involved in offences, do you agree that it was never a reason for
eliminating them?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR KEMP: Because if they were only guilty of offences, they
could have been prosecuted in a normal way?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR KEMP: It was because of the results and the threats around
that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR KEMP: At which stage did you for the first time meet Mr
Kobus Kok?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It was early the next day when Mr Du Toit
contacted me that they had arrived in Port Elizabeth. I met them
and I took them to my safe premises and that was where I met Mr
Kobus Kok for the first time.
MR KEMP: Is it correct to say that when you arrived at Mr Du
Toit, you and De Kock also realised that the way in which the
people would be eliminated, was by using a motor vehicle with a
bomb in it? That was conveyed to Du Toit?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR KEMP: Was it mentioned that he should come to Port
Elizabeth or just that somebody from his offices should come?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't remember exactly whether he had said
or who should come to Port Elizabeth, but it was mentioned that
they should assist us because they were the experts.
MR KEMP: Thank you Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KEMP.
CHAIRPERSON: When you explained to Mr Du Toit in his office,
as to the reason for elimination, how many of you were in there?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It was just me, Mr Du Toit and De Kock. Mr
Ford.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV FORD: Thank you Mr
Chairman. Mr Chairman, I see it is one o'clock, do you wish me to
start with the cross-examination?
CHAIRPERSON: We lost ten minutes around eleven o'clock, let's
go on for the next ten minutes.
ADV FORD: As it pleases the Chairman. I am sorry, Ford for the
families of the victims Mgoduka and Faku. Mr Nieuwoudt, you have
annexed to your application for amnesty and you have referred to it
in your evidence in chief, a number of documents including
documents from what appeared to be pamphlets or magazines and
other documents, other portions of what appeared to be books. Can
I ask you what was the purpose of annexing this documentation?
What did you wish to convey by it?
MR NIEUWOUDT: This documentation indicates the facts and also
the resistance operations, establishment of revolutionary bases, the
necklacing and that is in support of the anarchy which existed, the
unrest situation which prevailed and the people's war concept.
ADV FORD: I see so what you are saying is it was annexed for
substantiation of the facts which you have referred to in your
application. You are not suggesting that you read all this
documentation before the Motherwell bombing incident and it led
you to certain convictions which influenced your actions?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No. Because it was already in existence at that
stage.
ADV FORD: Had you read any of this documentation prior to that
incident, the Motherwell incident?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. I did read some of it.
ADV FORD: Were you continuously involved in obtaining
whatever information there was relating to the ANC, to perusing
that and utilising it where possible?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Now, just to get some certainty on the hierarchy in
the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth at the time, do I understand
that Brigadier Gilbert was your senior officer at the time?
MR NIEUWOUDT: At which stage?
ADV FORD: We are talking about the time immediately before, and
at the time of the bombing incident, Mr Nieuwoudt?
MR NIEUWOUDT: He was the Divisional Commander of the whole
Eastern Cape region.
ADV FORD: And you reported directly to him?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And Colonel Roelofse, what was his position?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Colonel Roelofse at that stage was the
Commanding Officer of the Investigative Unit.
ADV FORD: And Mr Van Wyk, I think it was Captain Van Wyk,
was he also known to you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. He was also part of the
Investigative Unit resorting under Roelofse.
ADV FORD: We know from Mr Van Rensburg's evidence that for
some time, he was stationed in Port Elizabeth and a member of the
Security Branch. You were also in Port Elizabeth at that time?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And were you in any way under his command at that
stage?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, he was second in charge at that stage.
And at that stage I was under the command of Roelofse and I was
assisting the Investigative Unit.
ADV FORD: Did you ever find it necessary or did you ever on any
occasion bypass you seniors to go to head office in Pretoria for
authority for any operation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: You would always go through your senior locally?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Getting some perspective in so far as the time
sequence is concerned, Mr Nieuwoudt, as I understand it, I think
you refer to it as an Intelligence Unit, or words to that effect, was
created in June 1989, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It is the Intelligence Unit.
ADV FORD: And you were in charge of that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And in respect of the activities of that Unit, you
reported directly to Brigadier Gilbert?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: When was it for the first time, that you identified the
possibility of a leak in that Unit? Or was it in that Unit?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It was round about August. But the leak did
not exist only in our division, but also in the whole Security Branch.
ADV FORD: I see. What brought the possibility of a leak to your
attention?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Because of the elimination of some well-placed
informers and also covert operations which I launched.
ADV FORD: And where did these take place, the elimination of
these informants? Locally or out of the country?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Some of them took place locally and others
overseas.
ADV FORD: Now, when did it first come to your attention or
when did you first form the suspicion that Warrant Officer Mgoduka
might be involved in the leak?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That was in August 1989 that that suspicion
was caused.
ADV FORD: And what precisely was it that brought your attention
to the possibility of the involvement of Warrant Officer Mgoduka?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It was precisely the elimination of my agents.
And also of other members' agents.
ADV FORD: And if I understood your evidence earlier and the
application, you then kept these certainly Mr Mgoduka under
observation as a result of that, after discussing it with Brigadier
Gilbert?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And how long did it take before you reached some
certainty that in your mind, that Mr Mgoduka was in fact putting out
feelers or in fact had been recruited by the ANC?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That was about two weeks, in December, that
was a whole process which led to the final stage.
ADV FORD: And precisely when was the incident when you allege
that you heard the discussion between the four deceased in the tea
room?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That was during that same time.
ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, but precisely when, can you recall?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't remember the exact date, but the
reports were presented to Gilbert and also the sound recordings
were given to Gilbert, we listened to those.
ADV FORD: Do you have copies of that documentation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I do not.
ADV FORD: Did you make a transcript of the tape which you
allege you listened to?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I did.
ADV FORD: Do you know where that is?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I have provided everything to Brigadier
Gilbert.
ADV FORD: And of course Brigadier Gilbert is now deceased, so
he is not here to answer any of this?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Now when did you decide, because you returned at
some stage to Brigadier Gilbert, you had decided that the, if I
understand your evidence, that the situation was getting more
critical and that further steps needed to be taken?
MR NIEUWOUDT: This was about two days before my departure
to Pretoria.
ADV FORD: Are you aware whether or not Brigadier Gilbert had
discussed this with anybody at head office in Pretoria at that stage?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't know, but he assured me that he had
received instructions from head quarters.
ADV FORD: Did you make any investigations as to what precisely
the order or the instruction, what it covered?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not question his instruction.
ADV FORD: Are you suggesting that when you went back to
Brigadier Gilbert he had already made the decision that these
persons should be eliminated?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I would say so yes.
ADV FORD: The allegation has been made and you have agreed
with it, that this matter was extremely serious at that stage. It was
of great and critical urgency and importance at that stage?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: You have also suggested that there was a period
during which the post of Mr Mgoduka was being monitored?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Presumably that had taken some time?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Over what period of time would that have taken
place?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I think it lasted from August, September up till
November. It was done continuously.
ADV FORD: Getting to your first suspicion of Mr Mgoduka, was it
a certainty in your mind that he was now leaking information to the
ANC or was it merely a suspicion?
MR NIEUWOUDT: At that stage it was just a suspicion I had, but
when I identified it, I realised that he was involved.
ADV FORD: All right, can I ask you this. What precisely was it
that finally convinced you that Mr Mgoduka had turned, that he was
conveying information to the ANC?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It was the information I obtained from the
informer that he was recruited by Godji Skenyana. He was the MK
Commander in the Eastern Cape and that was my confirmation.
ADV FORD: Now, you have suggested that you have intercepted
letters, if I understood your evidence, from Mr Mgoduka, addressed
to these various addresses, the Roma Church, John Smith in London
and two other addresses you mentioned as well?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: How long had Mr Mgoduka been a member of the
Security Branch?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Since 1977.
ADV FORD: Was he actively involved in the activities of the
Security Branch?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, he was.
ADV FORD: He was aware of all the different avenues open to the
Security Branch to keep people under observation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: He was aware that phones were tapped?
MR NIEUWOUDT: He should have known about that.
ADV FORD: He was aware that post was intercepted and was
read?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV FORD: He was aware that a big bag was opened at the post
office, if your evidence is correct, where anything addressed to these
specific addresses were thrown into and referred to the Security
Branch?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Presumably Mr Mgoduka having been a member of the
Security Branch for that long, was not an absolute fool?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, that is correct.
ADV FORD: Are you suggesting that in those circumstances with
that knowledge, he wrote letters to the Roma Church, he wrote
letters to John Smith in London?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Where reference was made to funerals and to
weddings?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, that is what I can remember.
ADV FORD: You don't have any copies of those letters I take it.
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, all my reports from the first day on
regarding this matter, I provided that to Gilbert. And my post was
also directed in the same manner, to him. What he did with that, I
don't know.
ADV FORD: Would you agree with me Mr Nieuwoudt, that there
can be no doubt from what you have told this Commission now, that
Mr Mgoduka would have been aware that letters, these letters he
addressed, were going to be intercepted by the Security Branch?
MR NIEUWOUDT: All letters are not intercepted. Some of those
letters would have gone to those addresses, just some were
intercepted.
And by using code names and not his own name, all those are
factors must be taken into consideration.
ADV DE JAGER: Did he use a code name or a foreign name?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, the address to which it was sent made use
of a code name.
ADV DE JAGER: Yes, but who signed the letter?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It was signed by a code name, he didn't write
Glen Mgoduka, he used a code name. I identified it on sight, his
handwriting.
ADV POTGIETER: And you drew an inference that he was using
the office typewriter?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I think he used his own typewriter which
he had in his office.
ADV POTGIETER: Yes?
MR NIEUWOUDT: But I also identified some of the letters on
sight.
ADV POTGIETER: So these are all inferences which you drew?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so.
ADV POTGIETER: You are not a handwriting expert?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so.
ADV POTGIETER: So you wouldn't be able to say whether it was
Mr Mgoduka's typewriter which had been used to type the letters?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, but I could see that there was a similarity.
ADV POTGIETER: Yes, but you couldn't say as a fact that it had
been typed on that typewriter?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV POTGIETER: But you relied on a hearsay allegation by an
informer to the effect that Mr Mgoduka had been recruited by the
ANC?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV POTGIETER: That is all you had?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV POTGIETER: And on the strength of that, you came to the
conclusion that had been recruited and he was working for the ANC
and that he should therefore be killed?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Mr Chairman, do you wish for me to continue, I see it
is now quarter past one?
CHAIRPERSON: I think we will adjourn until two o'clock.
COMMISSION ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ford?
GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: (s.u.o.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV FORD: (cont)
Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Nieuwoudt, there is an aspect of
your application which is not clear to me and I would like you to
have a look at page 321 of your application, or 321 of the record,
page 26 of your application. Do you have it before you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I have.
ADV FORD: And starting at the bottom paragraph 11, "during July
of 1989 it came to my attention by the personnel and operators, that
there was a serious security leak in the information network at the
Security Branch and this leak led to sensitive information being
exposed. The exposure of this operation led to the death of a very
sensitively placed informer and the intelligence capacity of the Unit,
was detrimentally effected by the loss of this source."
And then you refer to annexure 15 as well as annexures 8, 9
and 25. Now, if we can start with annexure 8. Annexure 8 is an
issue of Sishaba, dated May, 1986, is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Just a moment please.
ADV FORD: Page 412.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ford, excuse me, where are we now?
ADV FORD: I am sorry Mr Chairman, it is page 412, annexure 8 of
the application. Maybe I could put the question to you Mr
Nieuwoudt, this annexure was presumably referred to for a purpose.
Where in that annexure does it refer to the sensitive operation
which had been exposed?
CHAIRPERSON: I am going to interrupt you a little bit. I would
like to appeal to those people who arrive late in the hearings, not to
make a noise for those who are already listening, please.
MR NIEUWOUDT: Could you please repeat the question.
ADV FORD: The issue of Sishaba you say it is, which is annexure
8 at page 412, where if at all, does it refer to the sensitive operation
which was uncovered?
MR NIEUWOUDT: What I would like to indicate, if you look at
page 5 of Sishaba, page 415 of the record, just underneath where it
says forward freedom, we have seen them attacking the community
councillors and the informers.
ADV FORD: I see, so there is no reference at all to this specific
incident that you are referring to?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And similarly annexure 9 at page 419 ...
(intervention)
ADV BOOYENS: If I may assist my learned friend, Mr Chairman,
nowhere in the annexures does it refer to the specific one. I have
checked that as well.
ADV FORD: Well, then perhaps, Mr Nieuwoudt you can explain
what the reason for annexing them, was? They appear to have been
annexed with specific reference to this incident?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, what it deals with is the death of the
informers and as I have already explained, the unrest and riots which
had been and the establishment of underground structures, the
mobilisation and the politicisation of the masses and the people's
war which eventually took place.
ADV FORD: I see, so none of these annexures are of any
assistance in identifying the leak which occurred in the Security
Branch neither are they of any assistance in dealing with the issue of
whether Mgoduka was involved at all?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Then I will ask you to turn to page 323, Mr
Nieuwoudt, and to the second portion of paragraph 13. "It was
clear that it was Warrant Officer Mgoduka or it had to have been
Warrant Officer Mgoduka", and I emphasise had to have been. You
are not referring to a suspicion, you are referring to a certainty. It
was clear that it must have been him, am I right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Why was it so clear?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Because it was only the two of us who had
knowledge of that operation.
ADV FORD: Was there not a possibility that this source could
have made a slip up of his own in his undercover position and could
have been identified for other reasons?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is possible, but I had applied the
necessary security measures.
ADV FORD: No, no, no, that is a general term which is not going
to assist you, what does that mean Mr Nieuwoudt?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I applied the necessary security measures and I
was certain that it didn't come from my side. I believed that it came
from Mgoduka's side, that is what I believed.
ADV FORD: Why?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Because that source had been eliminated.
ADV FORD: But then I return to my question, why couldn't it have
been possible that he made his own slip up?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is possible, one can't exclude that
possibility.
ADV FORD: Why then did you say that it was clear that it must
have been Warrant Officer Mgoduka.
MR NIEUWOUDT: I repeat, I believed that I had applied all the
necessary security measures in dealing with an informer and I was of
the view and believed, that that was the position.
ADV FORD: And this was the starting point which led to the
execution of Mr Mgoduka at a later stage?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes, that was the prior events.
ADV FORD: On the following page Mr Nieuwoudt, you say in the
light of this, I was uncertain whether he could have been the source
of this leak. It was however, noticeable that during the riot period,
his home was never attacked, even though he lived amongst his
colleagues who did indeed suffer during these attacks. The vehicle
which he drove, was also not attacked. Where did he live Mr
Nieuwoudt?
MR NIEUWOUDT: In Mabiza Street, New Brighton.
ADV FORD: Are you certain of that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: My instructions are that he lived in KwaMagxaki?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That was only at a later stage.
ADV FORD: When was that Mr Nieuwoudt?
MR NIEUWOUDT: After KwaMagxaki had been developed, he
then bought the house.
ADV FORD: Well, that seems to follow, I am asking you when that
was Mr Nieuwoudt?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't give you an exact date, but it was only
at a later stage.
ADV FORD: Well, what you are saying is that - let me ask you
this, how long had he been living in KwaMagxaki? Can you tell us
that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That was probably from 1987 onwards, but I
am not entirely certain.
ADV FORD: So for a period of at least one and a half years, he
had been living in KwaMagxaki?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: KwaMagxaki was a reasonably upper class area? Is
that a fair statement to make?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And a number of policemen lived there?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: None of them had any problems in so far as attacks of
their houses were concerned, is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Not there.
ADV FORD: And the real suspicion about Mr Mgoduka, the first
indication occurred in July 1989?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And you had no indication that before that he was in
any way putting out feelers or in any way involved with conveying
information to the ANC?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV FORD: Well then why would the absence of attacks on his
house in that period, when there were no attacks on other policemen
in the area, have played any role whatsoever?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, because before the development of
KwaMagxaki the other Security Police homes had been attacked, his
home was never attacked. And that was strange and I can remember
that before that he had lived next door to an ANC activist who had
been involved in the recruitment of people and distribution of
pamphlets, it was quite some time earlier, and he didn't give us that
information when he was in Mabiza Street.
ADV FORD: And when did you find that out Mr Nieuwoudt?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That was early in the 1980's.
ADV FORD: I am sorry, when you found it out?
MR NIEUWOUDT: When it came to our notice, yes.
ADV FORD: So are you saying that long before 1989, you
suspected Mr Mgoduka's loyalty or you questioned it?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, it didn't arise with me. We must take into
account that some of my sources had been eliminated much earlier,
which he had been involved, so it all gave rise and contributed to the
final phase in which there was recruitment and so forth.
ADV FORD: I see. Mr Nieuwoudt, you then carry on in paragraph
14 about your discussion which you then immediately went to
discuss the matter with Brigadier Gilbert and you say the fear
existed that other undercover operations as well as safe houses and
premises would be exposed. Is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Now, the Intelligence Unit of which you were the
Commander, had only been on the go for a month at that stage, is
that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Presumably you hadn't developed any real number of
safe houses and what do you refer to them as facilities with respect
to your specific Unit?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but the Unit had already
existed in 1988. I further developed it and got it off the ground.
Captain Van Vuuren had told me that there were safe premises
available at the time.
ADV FORD: Now, when we refer to a safe premises, I presume
you refer to no more than a house which is presumably rented with
no reference to the police, there is no involvement of the Security
Branch in so far as the public are aware in relation to that house?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: So to replace a safe house, is really no more than
terminating that rental and finding another one, is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And presumably your Unit would have been interested
in setting up and maintaining your own safe houses, unrelated to the
other Security Branch safe houses?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, they formed part of my Unit. So I used
their facilities.
ADV FORD: I am sorry, what formed part of your Unit?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Captain Van Vuuren who already at that stage
had a safe house, formed part of my Unit.
ADV FORD: But was there any reason why your Unit could not
establish its own safe houses?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but there were cost
implications and contracts to be drafted and there were many other
factors to be taken into consideration, needed authorization from
head office, and all those things had to be considered, it wasn't such
a simple matter of just going out and finding a house.
ADV FORD: You are not suggesting that these four men were
killed just because it was a matter of spending a bit more money and
a bit more red tape?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: And the operating premises that you refer to later,
what precisely did that entail?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Those were also premises where all the
operatives and the handlers performed their administrative duties.
ADV FORD: Once again, a bit of money, a bit of arrangement, you
could have organised a new operating premises without too much
problem?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but there was a lot more to it
than that. It wasn't such a simple matter and you had to motivate it
properly and head office would have to consider the matter.
ADV FORD: We are talking about a calculated decision to kill four
people Mr Nieuwoudt, as opposed to the proportionality, as opposed
to a little bit of inconvenience and a little bit of cost of changing
your houses?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I didn't make the decision to eliminate them.
It was Brigadier Gilbert. Whether he considered those factors, I
don't know.
ADV FORD: But we know, because you have told us, what
Brigadier Gilbert's immediate reaction was, transfer them. He didn't
want to kill them. You pushed him into that, didn't you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not.
ADV FORD: By repeated returns to Brigadier Gilbert and which is
apparent from your application, you pushed him into that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No. I couldn't give him orders. It is
unacceptable, I don't agree.
ADV FORD: Well ... (intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, it is not suggested that you gave him
orders. I think what is being put to you is that you impressed on
him the fact that these people should be eliminated, in other words,
you were not quite happy with the transfer? You impressed on him
that the best thing would be to eliminate them?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I only made a suggestion to him. I didn't place
any pressure on him.
ADV FORD: So the suggestion that they should be killed, came
from you Mr Nieuwoudt?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No. No.
ADV FORD: Well, what suggestion did you make then Mr
Nieuwoudt?
MR NIEUWOUDT: What I said, I told him what the implications
were as I saw it and it wouldn't help to transfer them.
ADV FORD: Well, Mr Nieuwoudt, I want to take you to page 327
of your application, paragraph 21, where you say Brigadier Gilbert's
spontaneous reaction was that these people should immediately be
transferred from the Security Branch and that he was prepared to
immediately make the necessary arrangements with head quarters.
This was after listened to their talk in the tea room as you
have alleged, this was after you had been monitoring them, this was
after you had intercepted Mr Mgoduka's post. Brigadier Gilbert still
thinks that an appropriate procedure is to transfer them. The idea
was that these people would be transferred to a centre outside of the
Eastern Cape to prevent any further damage being done to the
information network. And then you go on Mr Nieuwoudt, however,
I focused Gilbert's attention on the fact that this matter was a lot
more complicated and sensitive since these particular members had
been attached to the Security Branch for quite some time. What are
you trying to tell us there, Mr Nieuwoudt?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Gilbert didn't know the members, and he
didn't know the circumstances. And I simply explained the issues to
him. That is what I mean. I drew his attention to that fact.
ADV FORD: Are you suggesting Brigadier Gilbert didn't know the
persons under his command?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is not what I am saying here.
ADV FORD: Or how long they had been with the command?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I believed that he knew.
ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, was this anything other than an
attempt to convince Brigadier Gilbert that the only way here was to
kill these persons?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: Maybe you didn't understand my question.
MR NIEUWOUDT: What did you have in mind? What I brought to
Gilbert's attention was that transferring would not be a solution,
because they could escape and then all the information which they
possessed, they would be free to convey it to the ANC.
ADV POTGIETER: You did not agree with them being transferred,
so what did you have in mind?
MR NIEUWOUDT: At that stage I didn't have anything in mind.
ADV POTGIETER: Would you have been satisfied with a transfer?
MR NIEUWOUDT: If that is what he decided, I would have, yes.
ADV POTGIETER: And you would have accepted it?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV POTGIETER: And you wouldn't have had further problems
with that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: The only problem which I would have foreseen
would be that they could defect to the ANC and endanger our
security network by exposing information and that they could
identify informers and policemen, etc.
That is what I had in mind.
ADV POTGIETER: So those are all the possibilities that existed?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV POTGIETER: But if the idea was that they should be
transferred, you would accepted that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: If that was his order, that is how I would have
accepted it.
ADV POTGIETER: So one could have solved the problem by
means of transfer?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't know. I couldn't make that decision.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Nieuwoudt, if I am transferred and I have the
names of four informers, and I go to the ANC and I give them those
four names, what would happen them?
MR NIEUWOUDT: In my view, they would have been eliminated
and our intelligence network would be prejudiced.
ADV DE JAGER: So the only solution was you had to either put
them in a prison where they weren't able to convey the information
and weren't able to defect to the ANC?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV DE JAGER: Now, why was that not a solution?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Because according to knowledge that I had,
some people had already leaked information by means of visitors
which they had received in prison, so there are many ways in which
the information could be passed on.
ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, while we are on that, you referred in
your evidence to Section 29 of the Internal Security Act, is that
right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Your powers went a little bit further than that at that
stage, didn't they? There were certain Security Emergency
Regulations in place, is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And we all know about Section 3 of those Emergency
Regulations, arrest and detention of persons?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: We all know of the prohibition on visits?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Not under the Emergency Regulations.
ADV FORD: You are not aware of that? Are you suggesting that
people detained under the Emergency Regulations, could have
visitors at will?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And they could have access to their legal
representatives at will?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: I see. We will come back to that Mr Nieuwoudt. If I
could then deal with the next sentence in this paragraph I was
dealing with at 328. "The matter was further complicated by the
fact that these members possibly had knowledge of covert offensive
and defensive operations and could exert a certain influence on the
other black members at the Security Branch? That sound to me Mr
Nieuwoudt, like you didn't really know whether they had, you simply
speak of possibly had knowledge, you weren't really certain of
whether these people had information in this regard?
MR NIEUWOUDT: All I knew at that stage about the covert
operations in which he had been involved, was the Swaziland one
and the Lesotho one, where he had been involved. Where all four of
them had been involved.
ADV FORD: What did you mean by to exert a specific influence on
the black members, what did you mean by that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is what I said at the outset, that if he
defected or exposed information and structures, then they would be
able to compile a proper profile of the members in the Security
Branch. And that could be severely prejudicial, that was my view.
ADV FORD: You are not talking about them trying to exercise
some influence amongst their colleagues by trying to turn their
colleagues as well within the Security Branch, you are not
suggesting that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I was more concerned about the damage to
the Intelligence network and threat to informers.
ADV FORD: Now at what stage did this take place, your second
visit to Brigadier Gilbert, how much longer? A month later, two
months later?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't have an independent recollection, but it
could have been a month before that, before December.
ADV FORD: So from July 1989 through to shall we say November
or early November or end of October 1989, Mgoduka and the others
were allowed to continue as normal?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV FORD: There was no attempt to limit their involvement with
Security Force activities?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: No attempt to keep them away from safe houses and
other such premises?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: Presumably the development of your Information
Network and the recruiting of informers, is an ongoing thing.
People are being recruited all the time?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: There was no attempt made to prevent them from
acquiring knowledge relating to the identity of any new informers?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: Why not?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I didn't.
ADV FORD: Well, didn't you think it important to try and limit the
damage?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, they weren't under my command at that
stage.
ADV FORD: Well, under who were they?
MR NIEUWOUDT: They were under the, or some of them were
under the Investigation team and some of them under the command
of the Black Affairs Unit.
ADV FORD: Mgoduka was under Roelofse, is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: Who was under Colonel Roelofse?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Mapipa and Faku.
ADV FORD: And who was Mgoduka's senior?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Colonel Scheepers.
ADV FORD: Did you go and speak to these senior officers?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: To tell them of your suspicions?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: Why not?
MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have already said, my Unit reported
directly to Brigadier Gilbert. If he thought it was necessary, he
could have done it, I didn't know about that.
ADV FORD: Now, your next attempt if we understand your
application and your evidence, was that you were going to - I am
reading page 329, paragraph 24, the purpose was that I would on
gradual basis by means of discussions with these four people, would
communicate and try and illicit information from them about these
activities in order to determine the graveness of the risk. Now
precisely what chance, as subtle as you may have been Mr
Nieuwoudt, did you think there was of you getting these people to
reveal their involvement with the ANC to you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That was an attempt which I made to have
discussions with them.
ADV FORD: I understand that, you have told us that. I am asking
you what possible prospect did you foresee of getting them to talk
to you about that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I thought they possibly trusted me enough
because at that stage we had never had any arguments or
altercations.
ADV FORD: You thought at this stage where there already had
been letters written to the ANC, there had been these talks about
feelers being put out, there had been talks about going over to the
ANC, you thought they were going to say to you Mr Nieuwoudt, we
actually think of going over to the ANC, what do you think about
that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I don't think they would have said that.
ADV FORD: Well, what did you expect from them Mr Nieuwoudt?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is what I thought at that stage. I thought
they would perhaps let slip some bit of information which would
give me some clue, make sense.
ADV FORD: Now, you then go on to deal with the Lesotho, where
one of your informants, it appears, advised that the ANC was fully
aware of the location of our specific facilities and that the issue of
infiltration had been exposed. Now, if I understand your evidence,
you escribed that to Mgoduka and or the others?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: So it was quite clear to you then that a significant
amount of information had already been conveyed?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: You had no way of knowing how much information
had been conveyed?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, but as I have already said I did not believe
that they had passed on all the information that was at their
disposal, to the ANC, but the knowledge they had of this specific
operation, they did pass on.
ADV FORD: Well, what led you to that belief? What possible
reason did you have for believing that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I thought that all four of them were involved,
and the next day a person was arrested in Swaziland and I didn't
hear anything from them. I later found out after they came back,
that they had been in Quatro.
ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, you are not answering my question. I
am asking you what led you to believe that they hadn't disclosed all
the information available to them, to the ANC?
MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have explained there is a lot of other
information, it would have taken quite some time to debrief them
and to extract the information from them, so they would have had to
be physically present at the ANC to give them all the information
and that is why I believed that they didn't pass on all the
information.
ADV FORD: So you are saying that they had probably given over
everything which they knew on an off the cuff basis, but a trained
interrogated could have gotten more out of them, is that what you
are saying?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Were the Security Police in the habit of allowing
trained ANC interrogators into places of detention to interrogate
detainees?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: So what possible chance was there then of any
interrogation taking place if they had been detained in terms of the
Security Regulations?
MR NIEUWOUDT: As I said the could still send messages
through.
ADV FORD: No Mr Nieuwoudt, your reasoning behind why they
should not have been transferred and why they should not have been
detained, as I understood it, was that - or why they shouldn't have
been transferred is that if they then walked over or went over to the
ANC, they could end up in the hands of a trained interrogator and
further information could be gathered from them?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Other than for that, you had no reason to suspect that
they hadn't given the ANC all the information that they had?
MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have understood it, they had to have been
on the ANC's side and somebody would then have had to debrief
them over a couple of days to extract the information from them.
ADV FORD: But you could have stopped that immediately. At the
drop of a hat by detaining them in terms of Section 3 of the
Emergency Regulations.
MR NIEUWOUDT: I couldn't, because then they would still pass
on some of the information.
ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, you are evading the question. You
had no reason to suspect that they had not conveyed all the
information available to them, save for that which would be obtained
by a trained interrogator, that is what we are talking about?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is what I believed at that stage. That is
how I saw it and that is what I believed.
ADV FORD: Well, then what possible further harm could they have
done to anybody if they had been detained in terms of the Emergency
Regulations?
MR NIEUWOUDT: They could give further information because
what we are dealing with is the total concept with the Intelligence
Network. So there were other informers and Security members and
policemen whose lives could have been in danger. And their
profiles.
ADV FORD: But Mr Nieuwoudt, you already know that they have
disclosed at least one safe house, you already know that they have
disclosed at least one informer, why do you think they hadn't
disclosed all the rest?
MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have said I believed that they could have
given more information because they could have damaged the
network pertaining to the other members of the Security Branch, and
perhaps they could have identified more members of the Branch and
other informers.
ADV DE JAGER: I think the question is they had given
information. On what basis did you assume or accept that they
hadn't already given all the information which they possessed? Why
do you think they were holding something back which they would
have given at a later stage and perhaps would have been able to
smuggle from jail where they were not being debriefed? If they had
already passed on anything which they could without being debriefed
by an expert, and in prison there would be no expert to debrief them,
so there could be no further passing on of information. If you
perhaps understand it like that, I think that is what the Advocate is
trying to put to you.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so, but as I understood it at that stage,
there was no guarantee to ensure that the information could not be
leaked and ... (intervention)
ADV DE JAGER: I understand that there was no guarantee that the
information could not be leaked, but you are saying that you
believed that they had already conveyed all the information which
they had, so then the horse was already bolted and there was nothing
more that they could do to cause damage?
MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have said, I did not believe that all the
information had been conveyed, that is what I am saying. I didn't
think they had already passed on all the information.
ADV FORD: I am sorry we are going in circles here Mr
Nieuwoudt, because we get to your statement I believe. You are
talking about a decision to kill four people. What I asked you
before and which I will now ask you again is what led you to believe
that they hadn't given all the information?
MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have said, that is what I believed at that
stage. Because the ANC did not immediately extract all the
information from them, they would do it on a gradual basis.
They do it in stages, not all at once. Because they also had to
test his credibility, they don't just accept that the person was telling
the truth. He might have been a double agent.
CHAIRPERSON: What we are talking about here is the giving of
information, not the extracting of the information. Is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. Yes, but at that stage I
believed that they hadn't yet furnished all the information.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but the question is why on what basis did
you have that belief that they hadn't yet given all the information.
MR NIEUWOUDT: Because they would have had to be debriefed
properly.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, I think he is saying his sole reason for so
believing is that they had not been debriefed. I don't think we can
take it further than that.
ADV FORD: Thank you Mr Chairman. Just getting back to an
aspect which I referred to earlier Mr Nieuwoudt, I am going to read
to you from subsection 7 of subsection 3, or shall we say regulation
3, sub-regulation 7 of the Security Emergency Regulations of the
time. No person other than the Minister or a person acting by virtue
of his office in the service of the State or of the government of a
self governing territory, shall have access to a person detained in
terms of this regulation except with the consent of and subject to
such conditions that may be determined by the Minister or a person
authorised thereto by him. Do you understand that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Was that how you understood the Emergency
Regulations at the time?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Which one are you referring to, is it 85 or 86?
ADV FORD: I am referring to Security Emergency Regulations,
number R86 of 1989. Which given under my hand signed P.W.
Botha, 8th day of June 1989.
MR NIEUWOUDT: As far as I know, if he has consent from the
Minister for somebody to visit him, and his legal counsel, they were
there daily involved with them.
ADV FORD: But we are talking about circumstances where you
specifically don't want him to get permission to consult with his
family or with his legal representatives and then you advise the
Minister accordingly and he doesn't give the permission.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but as I have said that access
to legal representation, you cannot prevent that.
ADV FORD: But isn't that precisely what that section says. No
person without the consent of the Minister shall have access to him?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but he approaches the Minister
directly.
ADV FORD: Are you suggesting the Minister would not have
conferred with those who had ensured the detainee's detention
before granting such consent?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, what I am saying is that he will get the
recommendation from the Commanding Officer.
ADV FORD: And how simple would it have been for you then to
say no, sir, do not give the people consent, he is in possession of
sensitive information which can lead to injury and death of other
people. He mustn't have contact with other people. You could have
done that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It could have been like that.
ADV FORD: Then there was no need to kill these persons, was
there?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I did not make that decision, I did not want to
kill them.
ADV FORD: You then refer also at page 329 of your affidavit Mr
Nieuwoudt, I am reading the last sentence, and the direct
consequence of the leaking of this sensitive information was that a
source was detained in the Quatro camp in Angola to be interrogated
and then we refer to annexure 15 and 20.
Now, annexure 15 deals with the party triumphant from 1969
to 1975 through to mutiny in 1984. Could you explain how this had
any relevance to this incident in 1989?
MR NIEUWOUDT: All I wanted to indicate there was that the
people were detained in the Quatro camp. Some of them were
detained in Quatro camp after the unrest.
ADV FORD: And then we have also, or the Commission with
respect, is referred to the unsigned statement of one Maqonga,
annexure 20 at page 490.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: That deals with, if we are to place any reliance on
this whatsoever, with what happened to him in 1985 and I think that
is the latest date I can find in that affidavit or what purports to be
some sort of statement.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: What earthly relevance has that got to an incident in
1989?
MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have already said this was just in support
of the fact there was a Quatro camp where people were detained and
interrogated and this was precisely what happened to Maqonga.
ADV FORD: And then over the page, Mr Nieuwoudt, you deal with
this interrogation was done by the late Chris Hani and the purpose
was to create a profile of myself and the role of the Intelligence and
the role of the SACP/ANC alliance. Well, now it became personal
didn't it, there was a profile being set up of you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: A profile which could have been used to attack you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It was possible yes.
ADV FORD: Well, in so far as the Intelligence Unit, that is the
Unit which you say came into being in June 1989, is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Well, not too much could surely have passed in the
time in the few months from its creation to when this information
was being made available to you, Mr Nieuwoudt, or is that an
incorrect statement?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.
ADV FORD: Why was this other then for the personal profile of
yourself, why was this of any great relevance?
MR NIEUWOUDT: All I am saying here is after that informer who
was exposed, when he came back, he told me that, that is why I
included that. This was why I mentioned this.
ADV FORD: Where did you get the information that the
interrogation was conducted by the late Chris Hani?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I heard it from my source.
ADV FORD: Did you speak to this man personally?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I did.
ADV FORD: Where did that take place?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Here in Port Elizabeth.
ADV FORD: So this man was able to move from Lesotho to Port
Elizabeth and back again?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: Well, how did he know what was happening in
Lesotho then?
MR NIEUWOUDT: In this case I am referring to Quatro, that is in
Angola. That is not in Lesotho.
ADV FORD: I am sorry, I am referring to the beginning of that
paragraph where you say information was received via an informer in
Lesotho. Could you explain the mechanics there?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is like that. We had a whole intelligence
network where he conveyed the information to me via courier.
ADV FORD: I am sorry Mr Nieuwoudt, your informer was in
Lesotho, is that what this paragraph is saying?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Is that the previous paragraph?
ADV FORD: It is 25, no it is the same paragraph.
MR NIEUWOUDT: It was like that yes.
ADV FORD: What is so? Was your informant in Lesotho?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And you spoke to him in Port Elizabeth?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: So then he moved from Lesotho to Port Elizabeth to
speak to you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, he used the intelligence network and that
was how he conveyed the information to me.
ADV FORD: But you spoke to him personally, Mr Nieuwoudt, you
just told us that.
MR NIEUWOUDT: I was under the impression you were referring
to this case of Chris Hani. I am on page 35 already. I am sorry if I
have misinterpreted you.
ADV FORD: We are talking about the same thing Mr Nieuwoudt, it
is the same paragraph.
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV DE JAGER: I think you are at cross purposes. He received
information from a informer in Lesotho, but he is annexing an
affidavit which was made much later which confirms what the
informer said to him that there was a camp like Quatro and there
were people detained in Quatro. I think that is the only reason why
he is annexing this, as I understood his evidence why he is annexing
those annexures.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is like that.
ADV FORD: Is that so?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV FORD: Well, then we get back to what my real question was
and that is the informant from Lesotho, did you speak to him
personally?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: You got it conveyed to you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: How many people were involved in the conveyance of
this information to you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I worked this according to a courier system,
where his report to me was in writing, it was encoded and he was
doing target analysis in Lesotho and that information was conveyed.
ADV FORD: So you had a written report from your informer in
Lesotho?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Do we have that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: Brigadier Gilbert got that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: Who got that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It went to the Security Branch and in 1991,
these files were sent to head quarters.
ADV FORD: So if you were so able to intercept mail and
documents going out, did you have any reason to suspect that the
ANC weren't able to intercept documents coming this way?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It was possible, yes.
ADV FORD: So the ANC might well have intercepted written
reports from this man?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I don't think so. Not in that instance. The
only documents they could get hold of were those documents
provided by the four deceased, but it could not have come from my
own source.
ADV DE JAGER: Could they not intercept in one or other way the
letter from the courier?
MR NIEUWOUDT: If that information was known to everybody in
the network, it could have happened.
ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, you are an experienced Security
Policeman, you have referred to a lot of the literature, you have
referred to John McEwan, is it?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Do you know of work by Brigadier Fraser, are you
aware of that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't think of that now.
ADV FORD: Okay, you read extensively in so far as literature is
concerned, relating to security, insurgency, counter-insurgency,
intelligence, counter-intelligence?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: What is the value of a Security Police operation of a
double agent? When you have somebody who is feeding information
both ways, as it were? Is that an important thing to have, is such a
person important to the operation of a network?
MR NIEUWOUDT: If he is a double agent, no.
ADV FORD: What about somebody who believes, who has turned,
as you say Mgoduka and the others have done, who has turned and
he is feeding information to the other side, you know that he is
feeding information. He doesn't know that you know, you can feed
him disinformation and he will in turn feed it to the people whom he
is working for, would you agree with that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And it is vitally important to have such a person,
would you agree with that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but I can explain that it can
cause an additional problem.
ADV FORD: What is that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is that the ANC will realise that we have
knowledge or that we know that he is a double agent and they will
use him any more.
ADV FORD: But you can make good use of him before that
happens, surely Mr Nieuwoudt?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it could be, I am just posing an example.
ADV FORD: Well, then you don't kill such a person, you use him,
don't you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so, but I did not decide to have him killed.
ADV POTGIETER: And Mr Nieuwoudt, if the other side finds out
that this person, that the opposite side knows that he is a double
agent, it is not your problem, it is a problem for them, isn't it?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It is a problem for them and they had to make
a plan with him.
ADV POTGIETER: In other words, it is not necessary for you to
provide him with disinformation because he has no purpose?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And if he has become worthless Mr Nieuwoudt, then
there is no point in killing him, is there?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I am repeating, I did not make that decision to
kill them.
ADV FORD: You then say in paragraph 26 of your affidavit, at
330, Mr Nieuwoudt, I started to intensively monitor these four
members and it indicated that Mgoduka and Charles Jack was
recruited by Godji Skenyana. What do you mean you intensively
monitored them?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I used sources on them, I monitored their post,
I infiltrated their friends. All those things, all those intelligence
operations I used.
ADV FORD: Well you are already tapping their phones, you are
already intercepting their post, what else did you do?
ADV BOOYENS: No, with respect, I think this far the evidence
was only Mgoduka's post was monitored and his phone.
ADV FORD: Is that so Mr Nieuwoudt?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Did you then start monitoring the post of all four of
them?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. All of them and their friends
as well.
ADV FORD: This information which you say confirmed beyond all
doubt that they had been recruited, where did that come from.
MR NIEUWOUDT: From an informer who lived in Lesotho very
near to Skenyana. He was a trained person, he was an agent.
ADV FORD: Did you speak to that man or that person personally?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, he was handled on the same basis on my
network. And other people, my associates, went in where they
debriefed him.
ADV FORD: Did you have any reason, or was there any way of
being certain that this wasn't disinformation that you were being fed
to cause problems in the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not have any reason to believe that.
ADV FORD: What I am suggesting to you Mr Nieuwoudt, is that it
might well have been the ANC or whoever was on the other side,
feeding you disinformation to cause problems in your Security
Branch? Did you investigate that possibility?
MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have already mentioned, I believed that
they were involved, that they were recruited, that is what I believed.
That is how I saw that.
ADV FORD: You have told the Commission that already. I am
asking you what your basis was for having such a firm belief.
Whether you thought of investigating the possibility of
disinformation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have already told you, I don't think it
could have been disinformation. The evidence was that my
informers were eliminated. Some of them were detained in Quatro.
That was why I believed.
ADV FORD: But you made no attempt to confirm that in any other
way?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I was sure that the information I obtained
from that informer was positive. His information was evaluated and
therefore I had no reason to doubt his information.
ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, then at page 331, you state that two
weeks prior to 16 December 1989, they are talking about Godji
contacted Warrant Officer Mgoduka to identify a South African
Police vehicle for the purpose to attach a limpet mine underneath
this vehicle. Do I understand that Mgoduka was to do no more than
identify the police motor vehicle?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That was the information we obtained. That
these four people had to identify the vehicle. Mgoduka was the
principle person in this regard. What instructions he gave, I did not
know.
ADV FORD: But there was no question of them personally putting
a limpet mine under the motor vehicle, they were only going to
identify it.?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That was so.
ADV FORD: Did you every tell anybody that your information was
that they were going to blow a motor vehicle up by use of a limpet
mine?
MR NIEUWOUDT: As I remember, I conveyed the report to
Brigadier Gilbert, the report about what they were involved in.
ADV FORD: My question is have you ever told anybody that they
personally were going to blow up a police motor vehicle?
MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have already said I told Gilbert that.
ADV FORD: But that wasn't your information, your information
was that they were going to identify the motor vehicle?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but I believe what the informer
said that they would provide a limpet mine to them on the 16th of
December to show their solidarity and also to test them.
ADV FORD: Are you making this up as you go along Mr
Nieuwoudt, because this isn't contained in your application?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, no.
ADV FORD: All you are talking about here is Mgoduka to identify
a South African Police vehicle with the purposes of putting a limpet
mine under this vehicle.
MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so, here I have stated that who would
place the limpet mine, I don't know, but the purpose was to put a
limpet mine under this vehicle.
ADV FORD: But that was precisely why, because it was unclear
here why I asked you moments ago, if the only information was that
they would identify a police motor vehicle, not place the bomb
themselves and you agreed with that? Are you changing that now?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, for those purposes.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, sorry, I don't understand this argument.
You divide that sentence into two parts Mr Ford?
ADV FORD: That is so Mr Chairman, and I am leading with the
question that I asked him.
CHAIRPERSON: Why did you divide that sentence into two
independent portions?
ADV FORD: No, Mr Chairman, I asked him to do that. I asked
him if his information was only that they would identify the motor
vehicle and not personally be involved in the bombing and he
confirmed, because it was unclear, that is why I asked him. He
confirmed that and now he is saying Mr Chairman ... (intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: It doesn't matter to me what his answer is. If the
question was not on a proper footing, it doesn't matter to me what
his answer is. I am worried about the only, you say to us that you
asked him whether that was the only thing that had to be done.
ADV FORD: Yes, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: But you knew that the sentence didn't end up
there, you knew that it went further to say that, to state the
purpose.
ADV FORD: That a limpet mine was going to be placed under the
car?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes?
ADV FORD: Yes, Mr Chairman. But without identifying the
person who was going to do that, which is specifically why I asked
him the question.
Mr Chairman, may I just clear up the question then if there is
uncertainty. I don't want to mislead the witness.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, maybe you should do that.
ADV FORD: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman. What is your evidence
Mr Nieuwoudt, was the information from your informant that they
would only identify the motor vehicle or were they also going to be
involved in the placing of the bomb?
MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have said, they had to identify a vehicle
for the purposes of putting a limpet mine there.
ADV FORD: They would do the bombing themselves?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: I see.
ADV POTGIETER: Did you consider the possibility that that could
have been disinformation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, not at that stage as far as I can remember.
I did not consider that possibility.
ADV POTGIETER: Especially in the light of the fact that they
were busy to obtain on a fraudulent way, funds which belonged to
the liberation movements?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't have any knowledge of that.
ADV POTGIETER: It could have been that the liberation
movement decided if that was what they were doing, we would place
that disinformation in your system?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, it could have been like that, but that
informer was an evaluated informer and I could trust him.
ADV POTGIETER: But you say you did not consider that option,
that possibility?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: Thank you. Mr Nieuwoudt, if I could then go to page
332, this is paragraph 29 of your application. Do I understand the
contents of that paragraph correctly to mean what you stated earlier,
that the ANC would only use small amounts of information given to
them, they wouldn't use all the information, because that would
reveal their source?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Well, that must have immediately made it clear to you
that the ANC must have already have substantial other information,
or have certain other information if they are only using a portion of
it.
ADV BOOYENS: With respect Mr Chairman, that doesn't
necessarily follow. It doesn't quantify what information, it is just an
opinion that he expressed. I will concede the paragraph is not very
clear.
ADV FORD: Who drafted this Mr Nieuwoudt.
MR NIEUWOUDT: My Attorney.
ADV FORD: Presumably you read it?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV FORD: And you were satisfied with the contents thereof?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Your Honour, it is so, but it is ambiguous.
This was my opinion.
ADV FORD: Well, let's go to something which isn't ambiguous, at
333, 31. I immediately told Brigadier Gilbert that this state of
affairs necessitated drastic measures because the Intelligence
Network was of no use for the Security Branch. You made it quite
clear to Brigadier Gilbert that you thought that drastic measures
were necessary?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Could that mean anything else to him but that you
were suggesting that these men should be killed?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not tell him that they should be
eliminated.
ADV FORD: Yes, I know, you have already said that. I am saying
can this sentence mean anything other than that you suggested that,
that it was implicit in what you were saying to them, that they
should be killed?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so, yes.
ADV FORD: So you for yourself decided that the only way out,
was to kill them, at that stage?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: Then we go on to 32, Mr Nieuwoudt. Brigadier
Gilbert instructed me to launch an operation to eliminate these
people. Then I suggested to him that this should be managed on
such a way that the blame could be placed on the ANC.
ADV BOOYENS: Before my learned friend carries on, that
specifically was, that is the one sentence that was specifically
amended, he said that there was some error in it. I think in fact
even Mr De Jager queried it as to how it happened.
ADV FORD: That is precisely so Mr Chairman, that is why I want
to deal with it with the man who says he has read through the
application and he was happy with it, how such an unambiguous
sentence could have been contained in it. Could you answer that Mr
Nieuwoudt?
MR NIEUWOUDT: During consultation I realised that this was not
the case. These words were switched.
ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, you were sentenced to 20 years
imprisonment for this incident, is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: This is your only chance other than the possibility of
an appeal which may or may not succeed, of not serving that 20
years, is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but I did not give the
instruction to eliminate them. And this was why I brought this
under his attention when we consulted.
ADV FORD: Are you suggesting that you did not consult in detail
with your Attorneys before this was prepared?
MR NIEUWOUDT: We did, yes. Everything was tape recorded
and typed.
ADV FORD: And you read through it before you signed it?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And you were happy with it as it then stood?
MR NIEUWOUDT: After that, when we discussed this in depth, I
did read through that and I signed it. There were many other
applications I handed in.
ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, it is a matter which has been touched
on from time to time and there seems to be differing views in this
regard, but you are a explosive expert yourself, is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And you have undergone certain courses with regard
to explosives and dealing with explosives?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: You are capable of setting a bomb? Preparing a
bomb, fusing it? Setting it off?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: The intention at all times was that this was going to
be the manner of elimination of these four men?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes.
ADV FORD: Why couldn't you do it yourself?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Because I was not so professional. We needed
more professional operatives. I am not a technical expert.
ADV FORD: Well, there was little professionalism about plan B,
was there, shooting the men in the car as they drove past as an
alternative?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That was only plan B, if A did not succeed.
ADV FORD: Your trip to Pretoria was authorised from head office
if I understand your evidence?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Head office in Pretoria?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. Could I just explain here. If I
receive authorization, it is authorised for the requisition of a vehicle
- for that I have to have authority from head office. It was done in
writing or by telephone.
ADV FORD: If the Commission will bear with me. The reason I
am asking Mr Nieuwoudt, is that this requisition which is being
handed in as an exhibit, is signed by - I don't know if it is signed by,
but the authority appears to have been given by General Van der
Merwe, is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And what was his position at the time?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I think he was the Commissioner of Police.
ADV FORD: Do you have any reason to believe that he would have
granted such authority without being fully aware of the nature of the
operation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't know. I can't comment on that.
ADV FORD: Were you ever in other circumstances required to put
in requests for air tickets and the like?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I was.
ADV FORD: And did you have to disclose fully the nature of the
operation and what was involved in order to do so?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I just received approval from the Commanding
Officer and he obtained the authorization.
ADV FORD: Now you say in paragraph 34 of your affidavit, at 334,
on the afternoon of 12 December 1989, I was called to Brigadier
Gilbert's office and he told me that approval was given for this
covert operation. Presumably your evidence is that you have no idea
who that authority came from?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: At the same time he gave me a air ticket and said I
had to fly to Pretoria where I had to contact Van Rensburg early the
next morning for the logistical support to be discussed.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Now, you knew Mr Van Rensburg well?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: You were actively involved with him in the Security
Branch in Port Elizabeth?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: He was present in Port Elizabeth at the time of the
Goniwe murders, is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes.
ADV FORD: Mr Lotz, who testified yesterday, do you know him
well?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I know him, he worked with him.
ADV FORD: Do you know of any relationship between Mr Lotz
and Mr Van Rensburg?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I know.
ADV FORD: What is that relationship?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is his father-in-law.
ADV FORD: Then you say at this stage Gilbert told me that Eric
Strydom contacted him regarding allegations of a fraud regarding
Mgoduka and Sehati. We did not discuss this any further because
the operation had been launched already.
I understand that you mean that as far as you were concerned,
it played no role whatsoever in the decision to kill these men?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Now, you have heard in so far as the questions which
were put to you by my learned friend, Mr Hugo, that Mr De Kock's
evidence is going to be that in fact in the first instance that was the
only thing that was mentioned?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is incorrect.
ADV FORD: Can you think of any reason why Mr De Kock would
be lying about this?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't think that he is lying, perhaps he has
just forgotten about that if I have to speculate.
ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, I want to read to you briefly a section
from the application for amnesty for Mr Ras and Mr Ras hasn't
testified yet, but we must assume that he is going to testify in
accordance with what is contained in these documents.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: I am reading from page 262 in the middle. While we
were having a braai here in Port Elizabeth with Carl Edwards and
others, he also discussed this matter. Carl Edwards mentioned that
the operation was done with money by the ANC. They intercepted
the money and channelled that to the State. That was the instruction
by P.W. Botha and if they defected to the ANC, this would lead to
embarrassment for the Security Police and the government because
of the large amount of monies entering the country in support of the
ANC and other organisations, that was the only counter-measure to
prevent these donors. And it resulted in only new cheques being
written and when these cheques - an d it could be assumed that they
used the money for their own gain. And that would cause that no
further donations would be made to the organisations. I did not
have any knowledge of any monies of this kind which was meant for
the treasurer. Were you aware of such procedure, such an
undertaking or that this was happening?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I don't have any knowledge of that. I
heard of that the first time during my hearing.
ADV FORD: Well, when Brigadier Gilbert told you about the
suggestions of fraud against Mgoduka and Sehati, did you ask any
further questions about that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not.
ADV FORD: Why not?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It was not necessary.
ADV FORD: But surely you were going up to brief Mr Van
Rensburg and Mr De Kock if need be, as it turned out, you needed
to be fully aware of all the relevant considerations in this matter?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Brigadier Gilbert did not discuss this matter of
fraud, this was not why they were eliminated.
ADV FORD: Would you say the primary reason then Mr
Nieuwoudt, for the decision to eliminate the four men was the
possibility of them revealing information to the ANC?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, and also the planting of the bomb on the
16th of December.
ADV FORD: Well, that you could have stopped merely be
detaining them, they didn't have to kill them for that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: And what about the members of the Security
Branch, the Information Network, how could we combat then the
ANC/SACP alliance and prevent the overthrow of the government of
the day. That was the total spectrum we had to take into
consideration.
ADV FORD: You were aware of the operation in which, what are
frequently referred to as the Goniwe 4, were killed, is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, all that Gilbert told me was that some of
these people were involved in the murder of Ford Galatha, Goniwe,
Sparrow Mkhonto and the other one.
ADV FORD: Well, then there could have been no doubt in your
mind that that operation was also a Security Police operation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. It was a sensitive operation.
ADV FORD: And when you went to speak to Mr Van Rensburg, it
was one of the factors which you mentioned to him?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And he knew immediately what you were talking
about?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I assume so.
ADV FORD: You did not have to explain to him what you were
talking about?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't know whether he knew about everybody
who was involved in the Goniwe murder. And I just mentioned to
him what Gilbert had conveyed to me.
ADV FORD: Well, we know that you two were involved besides
this incident Mr Nieuwoudt, you two were involved in instances
where for instance, last week I understood you testified that two
young activists were killed by yourself and Mr Van Rensburg, is that
right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And presumably I didn't hear the evidence, but I
presume that you got authority for that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And you would have been aware that the decision to
kill the Goniwe four, authority would have been required?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I believe so, yes.
ADV FORD: And the authority, if we were to understand your
evidence here, would have been gotten firstly from the senior man or
one of the senior men in Port Elizabeth and subsequently from head
office in Pretoria?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Were you aware that Mr Van Rensburg was involved
in that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: Did you have any reason to suspect that he was
involved in that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: In which case?
ADV FORD: The case of Matthews Goniwe and his three
colleagues.
MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't know. I don't have any knowledge of
that case.
ADV FORD: But what we know without question is that Mr Van
Rensburg didn't have to ask you any questions about what you were
talking about when you mentioned the Goniwe 4?
MR NIEUWOUDT: All that I conveyed to Van Rensburg was what
Gilbert had told me, namely that three of these people were involved
in the Goniwe incident, and I mentioned their names. All four of
those people involved in this incident.
ADV FORD: Yes, but the question I am asking you Mr Nieuwoudt,
is simply this, if Mr Van Rensburg wasn't already either involved
himself or already aware that the Security Forces or the Security
Police had been directly involved in that killing, he would have
asked you but what about the Goniwe, we had nothing to do with
that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't know, he did not ask me that. I don't
know whether he was involved. I don't know which role he played, I
was not involved in that. So I cannot draw that inference.
ADV FORD: Do you know if his son-in-law, Mr Lotz, was directly
involved in that murder?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: You still don't know?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Now I know.
ADV FORD: Well, what do you know now?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That they applied.
ADV FORD: Who is they?
MR NIEUWOUDT: General Van Rensburg and Lotz.
ADV FORD: And if as you say Brigadier Gilbert conveyed to you
that three of the persons involved had also been involved in the
Goniwe murders, if they did go over to the ANC, if they did convey
the information to the ANC, they would have blown the whole story
in so far as the Goniwe murders were concerned?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And that, it appears, would have implicated Mr Van
Rensburg and his son-in-law?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is what I know now, yes.
ADV FORD: When you spoke firstly to Mr Van Rensburg, were
you under the impression that he was fully aware of the whole
operation, what was intended or did you have to brief him
specifically as to what was required, what the problems were and
what the intention was in so far as the elimination of these persons
were concerned?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't think that I gave him the operational
details. What I did tell him was what the members' involvement
would be and what they would be responsible for and the
information at our disposal at that stage.
ADV FORD: Did you tell him about the fraud?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Maybe I mentioned it to him, and maybe
Gilbert also mentioned it to him. I don't know, but I did mention
that two of them were involved in fraud. I may have mentioned that.
ADV FORD: Just getting for a moment to the involvement of all
four these persons. Up to now, if I read your amnesty application
and the evidence you have given Mr Nieuwoudt, you have been very
specific about your information regarding Mr Mgoduka and Mr
Sehati. That is also known as Mr Jack, is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Up to now, the only information you have given in so
far as the other two, Mr Faku and Mr Mapipa is concerned, is the
initial conversation in the tea room, or am I wrong?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, they were also present during the
operation where my source was eliminated and the other one was
detained in Quatro. The four of us.
ADV FORD: Well, you didn't need for of them to tell the ANC
about that, one of them could have done it just as well?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct, but you asked me what the
activities were and they also took some of my informers to the safe
houses. And they were also recruited for the ANC and Mgoduka
was the principle.
ADV FORD: Did you have specific information that they too had
been recruited?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is the information which I got from the
source.
ADV FORD: Mr Mapipa had only been involved since 1986?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: But if I understand your evidence in so far as the safe
houses are concerned, and the like, his knowledge would have been
as good as the others?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Now, when Colonel De Kock arrived, Mr Van
Rensburg was still present?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes.
ADV FORD: Did you go through the whole explanation from start
to finish again or did you just deal with certain aspects?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I only explained to De Kock in what these
people were involved and their roles in the operation and that they
were involved in the Goniwe matter. As I said I can't remember
exactly whether I at that stage when De Kock was there, whether I
mentioned the fraud matter, that they were involved in the fraud or
whether I mentioned that before De Kock arrived. I can't remember
that.
ADV FORD: You see, as it was put to you by the Commissioner
Potgieter earlier, the suggestion certainly seems to be that there was
a potential for Mgoduka, Faku and the others, to be prosecuted on
charges of fraud and the reaction to that was to threaten to convey
information to the ANC. Did you understand that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Not all four of them, only two of them.
ADV FORD: Just two, Mgoduka and Sehati?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: But if they had conveyed the information in regard to
the Goniwe killings and in regard to the fraud itself, the taking of
money intended for the ANC, nothing else was required. Both
operations would have been blown?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And it was then vitally important that they be silenced
for those aspects, would you agree?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It wasn't a primary factor to eliminate them
regarding the fraud.
ADV FORD: Well, that is what you say Mr Nieuwoudt. I am
suggesting to you that your evidence regarding the giving of
information concerning safe houses, the identifying of informants
and the like, is something which came afterwards. The primary
consideration was that the information relating to the Goniwe
killings, should not be made public and the information regarding the
taking of money from the ANC should not be made public?
MR NIEUWOUDT: The fraud was not a factor with me.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Nieuwoudt, we accept that the fraud was not
a factor, but if they were charged, they could have exposed the
whole network?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV DE JAGER: And what the Advocate is putting to you is that
they were threatening to do just that. If I understand it correctly,
they virtually blackmailed you and said to you just you dare to
prosecute me and I will expose everything, they were using that to
stop you from prosecuting them for fraud. If I may use an example,
it is exactly what Nofamela did later on?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV DE JAGER: When he wasn't saved from the gallows, he
revealed everything?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV DE JAGER: Is that not what you feared?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I did not see it like that at that stage, but it is
so that Gilbert could have considered that when he made his
decision, I don't know.
ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, after the bombing you if one has
regard to your evidence in the so-called Goniwe inquest, and other
statements which you have made, and what you have told the
Commission today, were present. You were present on the scene
together with Ras and Snyman. And you planted the detonator as it
were. The detonator which you had previously prepared.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: What was the purpose of that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: To throw the other operatives off the scent.
ADV FORD: I don't know if you will agree with this Mr
Nieuwoudt, but on a perusal of your cross-examination in the
Goniwe inquest, would you agree that that detonator which you
planted, could never have set off the explosives which were in fact
set off?
MR NIEUWOUDT: It may.
ADV FORD: So you believe it could still have been used?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Now, being an explosives expert, you would expect I
am sure that where a terrorist bomb had gone off, especially where
members of the Security Forces are concerned, that at the very least,
the matter would be fully investigated, a report obtained from an
explosives expert, full attempt made to identify the explosives used,
and the like?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes.
ADV FORD: Now, you weren't personally involved in the
investigation of the bombing, were you?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: The Investigating Officer as has already been said was
one Captain Van Wyk?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV FORD: Under the authority or control of Colonel Roelofse?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Did the investigation of bombings fall well within
their powers or within their experience in this regard, do you think?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. Could I just explain that the bomb
operatives would put in his statement his explanation and the
investigation could then proceed.
ADV FORD: The investigation of this matter, do you know was a
video taken of the scene?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Do you know when the video first came to light in the
course of the Goniwe inquest?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it was whilst I was testifying.
ADV FORD: Was there any mention of the video in the
investigating diary?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I think so.
ADV FORD: You think so?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I think so because he was on the scene. Van
Wyk was himself on the scene.
ADV FORD: A sketch plan came to light during the course of the
inquest, is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: Was there mention of that in the diary?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I think so because I think photographs were
taken and on the video you can see where the fingerprint expert had
taken certain measurements on the scene, so there must have been a
plan and I think the Investigation Officer requested it as such.
But I think the person who dealt with that was Constable
Retief, and he was then transferred. I think that is where the matter
ended.
ADV FORD: Was there a report from an explosives expert?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV FORD: Who was that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I handed in a report.
ADV FORD: Well, that couldn't have been of much use, could it,
seeing that you were involved in the placing of the bomb?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct.
ADV FORD: In that report, did you make any attempt to identify
the explosives used?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: Did you make, was there any suggestion that you
conducted any investigations in so far as the identity of the
explosives were concerned?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not.
ADV FORD: Were any specimens taken in an attempt to analyze
these from the scene?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: In those circumstances, how was it ever going to be
possible to analyze the origins of the bomb?
MR NIEUWOUDT: We were all on the scene, all the operatives.
We couldn't take any samples, because it was contaminated and in
any event, you can't determine the origins of the explosive device.
The samples would only tell you what it was made of normally, so
there isn't any concrete ... (intervention)
ADV FORD: The point is I am making, Mr Nieuwoudt, there was
no real attempt made to do any of that, was there?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: Mr Bizos in his cross-examination of Colonel
Roelofse in the Goniwe inquest, referred to it as a parody of an
investigation. Do you think he was wrong?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I don't think so.
ADV FORD: Have you read through the investigation diary of that
incident, Mr Nieuwoudt?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I did.
ADV FORD: Do you know how many times the notation is made
investigation proceeding?
MR NIEUWOUDT: There were many of those, many of those
notes.
ADV FORD: In your experience as an officer, what is the purpose
of an investigating diary? To explain precisely what investigation is
being conducted?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, what kind of diary is this now?
ADV FORD: The investigating diary which related specifically to
the bombing, Mr Chairman.
ADV DE JAGER: In other words you did everything in your
power, to actually cover this up?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: I think we can accept that Mr Ford.
ADV FORD: I certainly accept that this witness would have done
that, I am trying to identify because if other persons were also
involved in the cover up Mr Chairman, then it is appropriate and
proper that they should also be brought to justice.
CHAIRPERSON: Proper that what?
ADV FORD: That they also be brought to justice. That is why I
am asking these questions, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: But you must remain within the parameters of
this particular application.
ADV FORD: Mr Chairman, as I understand it, one of the
requirements of an applicant in one of these applications, is that
there should be a full disclosure of facts. If there are facts which
are available to any of the applicants, which indicate that any other
person committed a criminal act in relation to this incident, then
those facts too should be brought to light. If I am wrong, then I
will desist.
CHAIRPERSON: No, you are wrong. The Act does not say a full
disclosure of all the facts, it says a full disclosure of all the relevant
facts. The word relevant is there, it is used there with a very good
purpose.
ADV FORD: Yes, Mr Chairman. Am I to understand then that the
facts relevant to the cover up which took place afterwards, are not
relevant? Because if that is so, then I will stop, then I am wasting
... (intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Well, the cover up must be relevant first. What
do you want to bring first? We shouldn't argue about what came
first, the chicken or the egg or what should come first. The cover
up in the sense that you want to canvass it, must be relevant before
the non-disclosure thereof can be said to be material and that it
should have been disclosed.
ADV FORD: Mr Chairman, I am trying to ascertain whether there
were any other members of the Security Police in Port Elizabeth,
especially those in higher office, who were well aware of what had
happened, the operation which took place, and were involved in the
cover up which took place afterwards. I am trying to do no more
than that.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, yes, but don't go beyond the limits.
ADV FORD: I will certainly desist if you tell me I am so doing Mr
Chairman, I will stop it immediately.
CHAIRPERSON: I am just about to think that you are just about at
the limit.
ADV FORD: Well, may I ask one or two more questions Mr
Chairman? Mr Nieuwoudt, having regard to the positions in which
both Colonel Roelofse and Captain Van Wyk held in the Security
Branch, your evidence as I understand it is that they had no
knowledge of the operation either before or after?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And as far as you are concerned, nothing relating to
the investigation thereafter in any way changes your view in that
regard?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. I may mention that I misled
the people at the scene by placing that detonator there and even my
experts were misled. They made the assumption that it was an ANC
operation. So I misled them, but nobody else knew about it.
ADV FORD: Let me only put this to you then Mr Nieuwoudt, the
documentation available, documentation which was referred to in
your trial, the reports referred to a limpet mine, is that right?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Not in my statement. That is the statement
which the Magistrate made. Somebody used that terminology and
also explained it like that to the Doctor. That is why Advocate
Mostert told me that I had misled them.
Well, I did mislead them initially on the scene and because I
had left a limpet mine detonator there, they made the assumption.
The Magistrate and the Doctor and the person who had issued the
press statement. The policeman who released the press statement,
all made mention of a limpet mine.
ADV FORD: The report which was forwarded under your signature
to Pretoria, if my recollection is right, also made mention of a limpet
mine, is that correct?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That was an administrative report relating to a
damaged vehicle and I simply signed the post. I didn't even read the
contents. It was simply to comply with the requirements of the
quartermaster regarding a damaged vehicle and somebody else
drafted the report, I was the Unit Commander and I simply signed it
without reading it.
ADV FORD: Would you agree with me Mr Nieuwoudt, that by the
end of the evidence in this regard, it was quite clear that the bomb in
question could not have been a limpet mine?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.
ADV FORD: And had a proper investigation been conducted, that
could have been ascertained by an explosives expert?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV FORD: Well, let me take it, you weren't a professional, you
have already told us that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but you could not from the
scene there, you wouldn't be able to determine what kind of
explosive device had been used. Nobody would be able to determine
that.
ADV FORD: The proper people to conduct the investigation and to
furnish such a report, would have been those who were
professionals, would you agree?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Even the forensic laboratory will not be able to
tell you how big the charge had been, what type of charge had been
used. They would only be able to tell you what kind of elements had
been used in the manufacture of the explosives. That would be all
that they could tell you. They wouldn't be able to tell you how big
it had been, what kind it had been etc. Only the type of explosive
used.
ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, out of the literature which you have
read and which you've told this Commission you have read, would
you agree with me that it is everybody agrees, in as far as the
literature is concerned, that in so far as counter-insurgency,
counter-intelligence is concerned, the elimination of people is an
absolute final resort?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: And that if there are any other ways of - was there
any way of avoiding killing people, it should be done?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV FORD: What I am putting to you Mr Nieuwoudt, that even if
all your other evidence with regard to the involvement of Mgoduka,
Sehati, Mapipa and Faku is correct, that there were other ways.
MR NIEUWOUDT: I repeat what I said, I left it in Brigadier
Gilbert's hands, he gave me the order. He made the decision. It
wasn't necessary for me as far as I was concerned, it wasn't
necessary to eliminate them, but that was my order.
ADV FORD: Mr Chairman, if I may just have a moment.
CHAIRPERSON: Before you resume. I think we should admit this
as Exhibit B. I don't think we did, did we, the requisition for the
tickets?
MR BRINK: The voucher for the plane ticket, yes it is before you.
Exhibit B.
CHAIRPERSON: The voucher for the ticket is then Exhibit B.
ADV FORD: Thank you Mr Chairman. Finally Mr Nieuwoudt,
would it be fair to put to you that had you not conveyed the
information which you did, to Brigadier Gilbert, if you hadn't urged
upon him the urgency and the importance of the situation, and how
complicated it was, and urged upon him that drastic steps were
required, the men would not have been killed?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I had my information which I believed was
correct, that I conveyed to him. I gave him a full report, he listened
to the tapes himself and he made that decision that those persons
should be eliminated.
ADV FORD: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV FORD.
ADV POTGIETER: That order was to commit an offence. Do you
agree with Mr Van Rensburg's evidence that a member had a choice
in the sense that if you didn't want to obey a so-called order to
commit an offence, then you could refuse?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, not in the culture which I found myself,
one did not question one's superiors. I was indoctrinated and told
that we had to fight the ANC as the enemy, so the order which I was
given, I trusted implicitly and obeyed implicitly.
ADV POTGIETER: Was Mr Van Rensburg wrong when he said
that a member in those circumstances had a choice. That was his
very clear evidence yesterday?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I can only speculate. I don't know what
General Van Rensburg meant, but the way I interpreted it was that I
never questioned an order given by a superior. I followed it blindly
and that is why I am in these circumstances, because I was loyal to
my Security Branch and towards my Commanding Officer and to my
country. That is why I did this.
ADV POTGIETER: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Brink?
MR BRINK: Just one question Mr Chairman. Mr Nieuwoudt I am
referring to the so-called funeral and wedding letters, you know
what I am talking about?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR BRINK: In what language or languages were they written, can
you remember?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That was written in English and also in Xhosa.
MR BRINK: Did you have apart from the four people who were
killed, did you have other Xhosa speaking people on your staff?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
MR BRINK: Thank you.
ADV POTGIETER: Mr Nieuwoudt, you might be able to help me
with one aspect, Snyman and Vermeulen and Ras, were they
Warrant Officers?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV POTGIETER: All three of them?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. If I remember correctly at that stage.
ADV POTGIETER: Did you not trust them completely or what?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I trusted them completely.
ADV POTGIETER: You didn't tell them about the Eastern Block
detonator?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No. I deposited it there without being noticed.
ADV POTGIETER: Did you tell anybody else about it?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV POTGIETER: You didn't tell Gilbert or anyone else?
Perhaps the two experts, Du Toit and Kok?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV POTGIETER: Why not?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Because Gilbert had told me that it should
look, made to look like an ANC operation and I knew that on
several such scenes we had picked up some of these detonators and I
knew that if it had been done by the technical division, then there
would be no proof.
And that is why I left that detonator there to point a finger at
the ANC.
ADV POTGIETER: But didn't you think of asking Du Toit and
Kok, why didn't you ask them look if I plant this thing on the scene,
would it lead to any problems? Another expert perhaps, could be
able to work out that this was a planted detonator.
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV POTGIETER: That that detonator couldn't or wasn't able to
detonate this charge?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, but it could.
ADV POTGIETER: Yes, that is your opinion. But you didn't think
of asking anybody about this?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No.
ADV POTGIETER: And the other aspect, you took a detour with
Snyman, Ras and Vermeulen. You drove to the scene?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is when we loaded the vehicle with
explosives.
ADV POTGIETER: Yes, on page 336 of the record and you say on
the last line of paragraph 40 you say I took these people with a
detour to the scene so that they couldn't later be able to identify the
premises?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so.
ADV POTGIETER: Why did you do that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I acted pro-actively to ensure that there would
be the necessary compartmentalisation and that we operated on a
need to know basis in case of future cases testimony. In case any
one of those people had to testify in future cases, they wouldn't be
able to identify the place.
ADV POTGIETER: But they knew what was happening?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV POTGIETER: They would then carry out plan B, or at least
two of them would?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV POTGIETER: Is that also a decision which you took on your
own?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that was one of my security measures
which I put in place.
ADV DE JAGER: So in fact you put plan C into operation as well?
ADV POTGIETER: Just in case the people who was supposed to
carry out plan B, decided to change their minds?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV POTGIETER: And decided that they would rather tell the
truth, then at least they wouldn't be able to identify this place? Is
that how you tried to guarantee the success of the venture?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Those are precautions which I took.
ADV POTGIETER: Was that because they were subordinates?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.
ADV POTGIETER: You couldn't always be hundred percent
certain that there would be no problems in future once the questions
start to be asked.
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
ADV POTGIETER: Thank you.
MR NIEUWOUDT: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: When Gilbert suggested that these people should
be transferred, you didn't think that would solve the problem?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I didn't think that it would solve the problem.
I immediately thought that they would abscond.
CHAIRPERSON: What did you think would solve the problem?
MR NIEUWOUDT: If I think back now I don't know what I would
say, but then I left it in his hands, I didn't think about it. I didn't
think what could solve the problem.
CHAIRPERSON: You see, you and Gilbert were it seems to me, in
good terms and I get the impression that he was actually open to
suggestions from you. He was quite prepared to discuss this issue
with you and I would like to know why you wouldn't have, if you
were not happy with the transfer, in the course of this discussions
with him, why you didn't put your mind to use and come up with
some other suggestions.
MR NIEUWOUDT: If I think back to the events, he didn't ask me
for suggestions or comment or anything like that. I simply told him
what I feared.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but he didn't have to ask you for an
alternative suggestions, I mean he is putting across his suggestion.
His own suggestion and if you are not happy with it, surely he didn't
have to ask you for your own input. The whole purpose of your
being there with him, was precisely to discuss the problem and to
come up with a solution?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I merely gave him the information which I
had and I sketched the consequences which could arise. And then I
left the decision to him, with all respect.
CHAIRPERSON: Is the impression not correct as conveyed by the
uncorrected version of your affidavit, that you came up with the
suggestion that they should be eliminated?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I had never at any stage considered that
they should be eliminated. I had no action against them as far as
that was concerned.
CHAIRPERSON: So while Gilbert suggested one solution namely
that they be transferred, as far as you are concerned, you just didn't
have any other solution, any alternative solution. Your mind just
didn't come up with anything?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. The only thing I was
concerned about was that should they be transferred, it could just
exaggerate the problem and that they could abscond and that they
would still be in a position to expose our whole Security Network.
My security lines would have been cut off because they were my
eyes and ears.
And that is why they were of crucial importance for me.
CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps I should also ask you this. Why didn't
you take these people, detained them, assaulted them and tortured
them as you used to do in the past, extracting information and
admissions from them? I mean you used to do that, the Security
Police used to do that in the past? We know now, you used to deny
it, but now you don't?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Why didn't you get them in, detain them, assault
them and torture them, put big tubes in their faces, suffocate them
like it used to happen until they brought all this information as
opposed to killing them. Why didn't you do that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so. But I repeat we were there to
prevent that the information be leaked. And I left the decision in
Gilbert's hands.
CHAIRPERSON: But I can assure you if you had tortured them the
way that we know people used to be tortured, I am not so sure that
they would ever have dared to leak, take out any other information.
They would have been in serious trouble? That could have solved
the problem maybe.
MR NIEUWOUDT: Maybe, it is possible.
CHAIRPERSON: Why didn't you think of that?
MR NIEUWOUDT: I did not at that stage, with all respect.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I hear you, thank you.
ADV POTGIETER: Just a follow up question. You never at any
stage formed the opinion that the only solution in the circumstances
was to eliminate the people?
MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I didn't. I never formed that opinion.
ADV POTGIETER: You didn't see that as the only way out, the
only way to deal with the situation?
MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so.
ADV POTGIETER: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, re-examination?
ADV BOOYENS: I have got no re-examination Mr Chairman.
NO RE-EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hugo, I notice that it is already four o'clock
and - just a minute.
ADV FORD: I thought you were addressing me Mr Chairman,
sorry.
CHAIRPERSON: No, no. Actually I was trying to address myself
to Mr Hugo.
MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, nine o'clock tomorrow morning will suit
us if you want to start at nine o'clock.
CHAIRPERSON: So we will adjourn and then start at nine o'clock
tomorrow morning with your client, Mr De Kock.
MR HUGO: Mr De Kock will start at nine o'clock.
CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn until nine o'clock in the morning.
COMMISSION ADJOURNS
145 GJ NIEUWOUDT
PORT ELIZABETH HEARING EASTERN CAPE/AMNESTY
ADV BOOYENS 201 GJ NIEUWOUDT
MR HUGO 209 GJ NIEUWOUDT
MR LAMEY 213 GJ NIEUWOUDT
COMMITTEE 218 GJ NIEUWOUDT
MR LAMEY 222 GJ NIEUWOUDT
ADV JANSEN 234 GJ NIEUWOUDT
MR CORNELIUS 235 GJ NIEUWOUDT
MR KEMP 238 GJ NIEUWOUDT
MR FORD 312 GJ NIEUWOUDT
COMMITTEE 320 GJ NIEUWOUDT
