Amnesty Hearings

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: 21st of April and we are today starting with the McKenzie bombing incident which involves the following applicants, E. Goosen, W.J. Momberg, P.R. Crause, W.J. Loots, J.V. van der Merwe and K.C. McKenzie. Ms Lockhat, are we still proceeding with the application of Mr McKenzie?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, we have duly served a Section 19(4) on Mr McKenzie, we have informed him of the hearing. He has informed me that he is not interested in appearing before the Commission, he duly is withdrawing his amnesty application in connection with this incident and that is the position regarding Mr McKenzie, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So the application of Mr K.C. McKenzie is withdrawn?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Could you perhaps ask him to confirm that in writing?

MS LOCKHAT: I will do that Adv De Jager, he has informed me that he has Counsel in the matter, so he's got legal representation in this matter, so we will advise them.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes please.

MS LOCKHAT: He has informed me that he has taken advice from Counsel in relation to this matter, and therefore he has decided to withdraw the application, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you requested by him to make a formal withdrawal on his behalf, is that the situation?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. The application of Mr K.C. McKenzie is therefore withdrawn as a result of instructions given by Mr McKenzie to Ms Lockhat in this regard.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat, are you in a position to give an indication whether any person who is implicated in these applications, has been served with the necessary Section 19(4) notices in particular, are you in a position to give an indication whether Mr Charl Naude has been served with such a notice?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, it is correct that the relevant implicated parties have been notified in connection with this matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you just for the record, give us an indication who has been served and if you do have such notices, if you can give us the returns of service.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, when you say returns of service, the acknowledgements of receipts?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS LOCKHAT: Well, we basically have a general problem that when we serve the notices on the relevant Attorneys or Counsel, we didn't really receive acknowledgements of receipts, but just the mere fact that there is an Attorney that corresponded to us in relation to the Section 19(4), that we regard it as proof that they have all received the relevant notices.

CHAIRPERSON: We shall accept that proof and we would request you to hand that up to the Committee.

MS LOCKHAT: I will do so Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Who is going to start Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I act for Van der Merwe, Crause and Loots. The arrangement is that Mr Momberg and Goosen will start.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Maybe it will be an appropriate time for all legal representatives who are going to be involved in this incident, to kindly state their names for the record, starting with you Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Yes, Louis Visser on record Chairperson, I appear for Gen van der Merwe, Brigadier Loots and Colonel Crause in the McKenzie matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

MR ALBERTS: Good morning Chairperson, my name is George Alberts. I appear for Messrs Momberg and Goosen in this application, instructed by Attorneys Weavind & Weavind.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, Roelof du Plessis of the Pretoria Bar and instructed by Strydom Britz Attorneys. I act on behalf of Brigadier Jack Cronje insofar as he is mentioned and to safeguard his rights, and on behalf of Captain Jacques Hechter in so far as he is mentioned in one of the applications.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: My name is Lynn Lockhat and I appear on behalf of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Alberts, are you ready to commence with one of your applicants?

MR ALBERTS: I am indeed Chairperson. The first applicant that will be heard, will be Willem Johannes Momberg.

WILLEM JOHANNES MOMBERG: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Alberts, you may proceed.

EXAMINATION BY MR ALBERTS: Thank you Chairperson. Before I formally lead evidence, I would move for an amendment of the application of Mr Momberg, I beg leave to hand up to you pages incorporating the amendment. It is an amendment to the document entitled "Bylaag 5", and it deals with the crimes and delicts for which amnesty is sought. In my submission, it is merely a formal amendment and I beg leave to hand up to you the amended page.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you proceed Mr Alberts, I note that Mr Fanie Molapo who is the Investigator charged with the investigation of this matter, is here. You will recall that the matter was made to stand down until today to enable the relevant victims in this incident, to be duly notified in terms of Section 19(4) and Mr Molapo was requested to urgently travel to Botswana with a view of ensuring that the Section 19(4) notices have been served on the victims and if they had not been served, to attend to the service thereof. Maybe we should hear from Ms Lockhat what the position is before we commence with your applicant.

MR ALBERTS: As you please Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you Chairperson, Mr Fanie Molapo was instructed to go to Botswana in order to trace the relevant victims Chairperson. He went to, he corresponded with the senior Assistant Commissioner of Police, Mr Kenneth Mapani and he deposed to an affidavit as well Chairperson, setting out the names, the date of the incident which occurred on the 9th of April 1987 and then he included the names of the deceased, the three victims. I've got an affidavit which I will hand up Chairperson, as well as the names of the injured persons, as well as the relevant plots that were damaged as a result of the bomb blast Chairperson. Mr Fanie Molapo can just briefly inform us as to exactly what he did when going to Botswana Chairperson. If you would allow me just to then ask Mr Fanie Molapo just to brief us basically.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you may proceed to do so.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Fanie Molapo, can you just inform us as to who you had spoken to in Botswana and what steps you took to actually trace and inform the victims?

MR MOLAPO: On Monday I arrived in Botswana. I met with High Commissioner from South Africa, in Botswana. We went to Police offices, that is the Headquarters, where I met the Commissioner of the Police and his assistant together with those who were involved with the investigation of this incident. I informed them who I am and what I want. They told me that they are going to request the government for permission so that they would be able to allow us to get the docket. After that they looked for a docket, then they told us that they cannot photostat the docket and that we will not be able to photostat the album. They told us that what would be possible is that Mr Mapani should give me an affidavit which I am going to hand over today. Those people who were deceased on that day, were Botswana citizens. They were not members of the ANC or where the kombi was, it was not an ANC camp or a place where ANC people used to reside. It was a kombi which was put there. The person who died there together with her children, was a social worker. They wanted to know as to whether who were responsible for this incident, and that we informed them that these people applied for amnesty. They told us they would not allow their people to come to South Africa. What they would do, they would notify the victims about what happened and what is going to happen today. They took me to the scene of the incident, I found that it was a township. They asked me why do these people who committed this incident, did not investigate first the identity of the residents of that place before they do the operation.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, Mr Molapo said to me that the three persons mentioned as the deceased, he met with the next of kin in relation to these three people, and that the other injured persons, that the Police actually also informed them and that we will duly also notify them as well Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So is it correct that Mr Molapo, you met with the relatives of Madibize Pitolo, Gomotso Pitolo, Sehofatso Mabyo and advised them of their right to be present at these hearings in terms of Section 19(4) and that they elected not to be present and you are satisfied that their names be handed up to the Committee?

MR MOLAPO: What I would say is that they were not satisfied because they told me that they did not know this in time, and they did not have passports, and there was nothing they could do. They requested me to inform you that they are opposing amnesty.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, were you given an indication on what basis the opposition would be?

MR MOLAPO: I went to the scene of this incident ...

CHAIRPERSON: No, I am not talking about your personal observation, I am asking if the relatives, did they give you any indication on what basis they would oppose this application for amnesty?

MR MOLAPO: They were talking to the Policeman whom I was with. They were saying they were Botswana citizens and they were not members of the ANC.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. With regard to the persons who were injured, did you have an occasion to have a meeting with them, to advise them of these proceedings?

MR MOLAPO: I was not able to meet those who were injured. The Botswana Police told me that they would go and notify those people who were injured.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Ms Lockhat, I think for purposes of proper compliance with Section 19(4), we are aware that these people were given late notification, Mr Visser, Mr Alberts, Mr Du Plessis, we will proceed with this matter and what we will do is, if we do get an indication, a very firm indication that the relatives of the victims of the three persons identified under 4 on page 1, in this affidavit, they intend to oppose these applications, and the opposition is substantive, we will allow them to do so, they will get a copy of the record of these proceedings and we will take the matter from there. Otherwise we will not delay these proceedings, we will commence with the applicants as arranged last week.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, on the part of the Commission, we will see that the relatives, the next of kin and the injured persons, actually do get a copy of the record in order, if they do still want to pursue opposing the application, that they be granted that opportunity Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Will you try and make contact through Mr Molapo's assistance of course, with the relevant authorities with a view of getting firm instructions or indications from the victims, meaning those who were injured, as a result of this incident, as well as the relatives of those who are deceased, whether they intend to oppose, so that we can make the necessary arrangements to send the record and will you get back to us probably by tomorrow with an indication of whether indeed they want to pursue this matter?

MS LOCKHAT: In order Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Shall we give the number to the affidavit that has just been handed up, will that be Exhibit A?

MS LOCKHAT: That will be Exhibit M Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: M?

MS LOCKHAT: That is, Chairperson, Exhibit M.

CHAIRPERSON: So the affidavit of Mr Kenneth Mapani will be reflected as Exhibit M in our records. Thank you very much, Mr Alberts, you may now commence, presenting of evidence on behalf of Mr Momberg.

MR ALBERTS: Thank you Chairperson. Might I just mention that Mr Momberg prefers to testify in Afrikaans, and I will proceed in that language. Mr Momberg, do you have your application in front of you?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: As it had been bound in the Bundle, it is from 77 and further?

ADV DE JAGER: It is Bundle 10, page 77 and further.

MR ALBERTS: Did you read through the application before you attended these hearings today?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I know what the contents of the Bundle is.

MR ALBERTS: Do you confirm in general the correctness of the contents thereof?

MR MOMBERG: I do.

MR ALBERTS: Can we specifically look at page 77 to page 106, it is the general introductory part of your application?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: In that your general background appears of the role which you played in the South African Police during the relevant period of time?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: In particular, do you confirm the correctness of the contents thereof?

MR MOMBERG: I do.

MR ALBERTS: We now know that this incident took place during April 1987?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: What was your position in the South African Police during that period?

MR MOMBERG: I at that period, I was a Lieutenant in the Security Branch Northern Transvaal of the Security Police.

MR ALBERTS: Which Unit of that Security Branch were you stationed at?

MR MOMBERG: I was a member of Unit A.

MR ALBERTS: What work was that Unit involved in?

MR MOMBERG: Unit A was mainly involved in White, Coloured and Indian matters as well as tertiary educational institutions and religious matters.

MR ALBERTS: Will you please go to page 108 of the application, that is where you deal with the factual events concerning this motor bomb, car bomb, and will you please look at paragraph 4 on that page. Will you please inform the Committee as to what the course of events were which were relevant here?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, during the period relevant to this incident, Sergeant Goosen and I acted as handlers of an informer, a certain Keith Charles McKenzie. This informer was already in our service since 1983 and was initially used on a local basis.

MR ALBERTS: What does local use mean?

MR MOMBERG: We used him locally in order to get information regarding coloured school matters as well as local unrest in the coloured areas, Eersterust in Pretoria.

MR ALBERTS: Where did he live?

MR MOMBERG: McKenzie lived in Eersterust.

MR ALBERTS: Will you continue please?

MR MOMBERG: During 1985 we succeeded in making contact between him and a certain Freddie Legoka, an MK member in Gaberone, which led to the fact that McKenzie was recruited as an MK member, as a courier. As such, McKenzie regularly smuggled weapons and explosives into the RSA.

MR ALBERTS: McKenzie also made an affidavit regarding this matter, you will find it on page 136 and further of this Bundle. Have you seen this yet?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, I have seen this.

MR ALBERTS: According to this affidavit implies that for the first time, during 1986, he made contact with amongst others, you, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: That is wrong, he already made contact with me in 1983.

MR ALBERTS: And at that stage, had he already been recruited as an informer?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: Was any force placed on McKenzie in order to get his co-operation in this regard?

MR MOMBERG: No force was used whatsoever.

MR ALBERTS: Do you not then agree with his affidavit to the extent that this is implied?

MR MOMBERG: I definitely do not agree.

MR ALBERTS: How did it occur that in this specific incident, that you became involved in this?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, during the end of March 1987 I was approached by Brigadier Cronje and he mentioned to Sergeant Goosen and I that there would be a meeting between us, Brigadier Cronje, myself and Goosen and Brigadier Wikus Loots, the Commander of the Security Branch Western Transvaal, as well as members of the South African Defence Force's Special Forces in order to do planning regarding an operation in Botswana. This operation dealt with the elimination of MK Victor Hannes Mnisi, Ernest Pule, a member of MK Special Operations group, who also acted as Co-ordinator for MK in Botswana and a certain Lester Dumakode, a member of MK Special Operations group in Lusaka and responsible for the smuggling in of the weaponry via Botswana to the Republic of South Africa. According to information at our disposal, Mnisi was one of the chief planners of the Church Street bomb during 1983 and was also very closely involved in the planning and execution of many other serious acts of terror and on a continual basis, was involved in the continued planning of terrorist acts in the Republic of South Africa. The meeting as mentioned above, took place on a secure - the South African Defence Force, Special Forces, in the vicinity of Broederstroom. The people who were present and who I can remember were Brigadier Cronje and Loots, Commander Charl Naude of Special Forces, Lieutenant Hechter, myself and Sergeant Goosen.

MR ALBERTS: Was a certain Rudi Crause present there as far as you can remember?

MR MOMBERG: At the time of my application for amnesty I was not aware of these facts, later I was made aware of the fact that Captain Rudi Crause was present.

MR ALBERTS: Continue please.

MR MOMBERG: During this meeting, it was proposed that McKenzie's vehicle which was a Hi-Ace bus would be equipped with a bomb and that thereafter he would depart for Botswana for a meeting with MK members in Gaberone, but specifically in the Wade Adams industrial area. The planning was furthermore that the bomb with which his vehicle would be equipped, would explode in Gaberone, during the meeting as a result of detonation by means of a remote controlled equipment, which would be controlled by an operator of Special Forces. This plan also held that McKenzie would die in this explosion. Lieutenant Hechter, Sergeant Goosen and I did find this unacceptable and we left this meeting.

MR ALBERTS: What happened thereafter?

MR MOMBERG: Further discussions took place between ourselves, that was Hechter, Goosen and myself in which we were informed that we had to look at alternatives and that in all cases, we had to keep the informer, McKenzie ready for a follow up meeting the next day.

MR ALBERTS: Did this take place?

MR MOMBERG: The second meeting did take place the next day at Hennops' Pride, a picnic place in the same vicinity and the same people were once again present.

MR ALBERTS: Is that also the case with Lieutenant Jacques Hechter, was he present at the second meeting?

MR MOMBERG: No, Hechter was not present at this meeting. At this occasion we agreed that the plan should be amended so that McKenzie would not be a victim of the explosion.

MR ALBERTS: Can I just refer you to page 111 of your application, with regards to the newly amended plan which you agreed upon.

MR MOMBERG: The way in which it was going to work, was based on that followed by MK in the past regarding the infiltration of weapons to the RSA. MK's method of working was such that weapons which were smuggled into the country, would be placed in McKenzie's vehicle in the following manner, namely that the vehicle would be taken from McKenzie on his arrival in Gaberone, that the weapons would then be loaded from the secret hiding place, put in his vehicle and then the vehicle would be given back to McKenzie.

ADV DE JAGER: I see that you are reading, is this somewhere on a page, because I cannot follow where you are reading from in your application? Thank you, if you could just indicate to us, then we do not have to write everything down, we can just write down the page numbers.

MR ALBERTS: Will you then continue on the end of 111 where you have just started?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, as I have already mentioned, the way in which MK worked, was that the vehicle would be taken away from McKenzie on his arrival in Gaberone and that the weapons would then be taken from the secret hiding place which was unknown to McKenzie, be loaded and the vehicle would be given back to McKenzie for his trip back to the RSA. Taking into consideration this way of doing things, it was expected that McKenzie's meeting with the MK members would take place, and the weapons would be loaded into this vehicle which he had to smuggle back. If the secret compartment would then be opened, the bomb would be detonated by a light sensitive switch, which would be built into this bomb, and the targeted MK members would be killed in the process, without McKenzie being endangered at all. It is however also so that McKenzie did not necessarily smuggle weapons into the RSA on every visit to Botswana. Sometimes he only conveyed messages or brought messages back to the RSA. In this way for example, during the period in our service, he visited Botswana 23 times, and only on seven occasions, brought weapons back to the RSA. If it therefore happened that there was no opportunity for detonation by way of light sensitive switch, we would fall back on the alternative method of detonation by means of remote control, so if that occasion had arisen, in order to eliminate the above-mentioned targets.

ADV DE JAGER: After you had agreed upon this plan, can you just explain to me, at the top of the page you say, taking into consideration the way in which things were done, it was expected that McKenzie's meeting with targeted MK members would take place, and that the vehicle would then be taken for purposes of loading it with weapons. You have now told us that only on seven occasions were weapons loaded, this is out of 25 or 23 occasions. The remaining 16 occasions, was the bus then never taken by MK, did it remain in McKenzie's possession?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, it differed from incident to incident or visit to visit. Sometimes the bus was taken by MK, then for example if they came back to him, they would have told him that there were too many roadblocks in Botswana, that they did not want to load the weapons, it would be dangerous. On other occasions, the bus was not taken and it remained in McKenzie's possession.

ADV DE JAGER: Now if this would not be detonated by this light sensitive control, by somebody who opened that secret chest, then the person would have pressed the switch or the detonator?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, on the condition that the targeted MK members were in the bus or the immediate vicinity of the bus.

ADV DE JAGER: Now, if this happened on 16 occasions that those people did not take the bus, then it was not very certain on this occasion as to whether they would take the bus and how long the bus would move around and whether that person would be able to follow that bus the whole time?

MR MOMBERG: On this specific occasion I can just mention that we monitored this informer by means of his post and tapping his telephone, because he was sensitively placed and from the mouth of the informer, we were aware of the fact that he had been requested to come to Botswana urgently and this made us believe that MK wanted to get weapons through to South Africa very urgently and that is why we could accept with reasonable safety that weapons would be loaded.

CHAIRPERSON: Without putting words into your mouth, I can't recall whose application does deal with the matter pertinently, that McKenzie had actually divulged the information that he was going to Botswana at the request of one Mnisi on a particular date and that they were going to meet at a particular destination. That was the information that you were fully aware of and your planning was in accordance with that information, so you were not planning in the dark?

MR MOMBERG: I can confirm that Chairperson, that is true.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you haven't however, dealt with that aspect of evidence in your, you haven't dealt with that aspect in your evidence. I don't know whether it is something that you will soon be dealing with or it is something that you have already left out. If I follow the sequence of your evidence, it would appear that you have omitted to state how you knew that there would be this meeting, you have not dealt with that at all. Mr Alberts?

MR ALBERTS: That is so Chairperson, but I think the applicant has just given an explanation based on the Intelligence which was available to him as to constitute a reasonable degree of certainty that in this particular instance, in all probability McKenzie would be involved with the transportation of explosives or weapons. Be that as it may, might I then continue with the applicant?

CHAIRPERSON: You may do so sir, and will he also make mention because I don't think he has also dealt with the aspect involving the detonation of the bomb by remote control. So far only reference to the light sensor.

MR ALBERTS: Chairperson, we will get to that in due course.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

MR ALBERTS: You have testified as to the planning, will you please give the Committee an indication as to how this plan was put into operation?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, after we had agreed on this plan, the following steps were taken, namely that McKenzie would be identified by the operator of Special Forces and therefore where he was hidden in our vehicle, we made him get out at a reasonable distance from where the meeting was to be held, and let him stand up straight under the pretext that we wanted to give him something to drink, and at that stage Special Forces had to identify him physically, so that he could be identified by the operator who would be involved in Botswana.

MR ALBERTS: You find this evidence on page 110 of your application?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: Was McKenzie ever aware of the contents of this plan?

MR MOMBERG: At no stage was McKenzie aware of the fact that his vehicle would be equipped with a bomb. Sergeant Goosen and I told him that the vehicle would have a tracking device and this was responsible for the manufacture and placing of the bomb, there was a false component which already existed in his vehicle. This was used in the past to smuggle weapons into the RSA in the past. The day after that, his vehicle was given back to him with the bomb in it.

MR ALBERTS: You have already mentioned one method of detonation of the bomb, being the light sensitive switch which was built in. What was the alternative?

MR MOMBERG: The alternative would be that if the targets were near the vehicle and the opportunity arose, that the bomb could be detonated by means of remote controlled device. This device would be controlled by the operator from Special Forces and his instructions were to have this detonation take place in a case where the targets Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode were either in the bus or in the vicinity of the bus.

MR ALBERTS: Is it correct that the light sensitive switch would only detonate the bomb if the hidden compartment was to be opened?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct. The light sensitive switch was hidden behind the lid of the false compartment.

MR ALBERTS: So that method could only succeed if the compartment were to be opened physically, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: How was the plan executed further?

MR MOMBERG: I continue on page 113, after the vehicle was handed back to McKenzie, Goosen and I in April of 1987 accompanied McKenzie to the Kopfontein border post where Goosen activated the light sensitive switch without McKenzie's knowledge. He then crossed the border on the way to Gaberone for his meeting with the targeted MK members. At that stage, Special Forces operator was already in Botswana and in Gaberone, and his instructions were to observe this vehicle at all times.

MR ALBERTS: What did you do then after McKenzie had crossed the border?

MR MOMBERG: After McKenzie crossed the border, we, that is Goosen and I, in the vicinity of Zeerust in a safe area, we awaited news as to what had happened in Botswana. We waited on this farm for approximately four or five days and then on a certain day, received a report that a bomb had exploded in Botswana. Thereafter we waited for a further day in the hope that McKenzie would return to the RSA.

MR ALBERTS: McKenzie did not know about the intended explosion. Did you give him any instructions with regard to his return to the RSA?

MR MOMBERG: We could not tell McKenzie that there was a bomb in his vehicle, and neither did we. Before he left, we did mention to him that if on a specific visit or any future visits, he felt threatened in any way or if anything newsworthy were to happen in Botswana, he had to flee immediately and attempt to cross the border back to the RSA, be it by foot or per vehicle, be it at the border post of in an illegal manner.

MR ALBERTS: Did you ever find out afterwards what really happened to McKenzie in Botswana?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, after McKenzie, this is his period of incarceration with the ANC, after he returned to the RSA, we debriefed him. During this debriefing, McKenzie informed us that before he got to Gaberone, he was stopped by unknown MK members. They gave him instructions to go to Francistown where he was kidnapped by Dumakode, Pule and other MK members and after a period in Zambia, he was taken to Quattro Camp in Angola. McKenzie was then also later moved to Uganda where he was detained for a long period. It was therefore clear that MK had already found out before the time, that McKenzie was an informer of the Security Police. This fact was confirmed where we were told about the ANC's Operation Vula, the documentation clearly indicated that information was given from the Security Branch or leaked to the Security Branch to the ANC. This kidnapping of McKenzie was a blow for the whole operation. The operator of Special Forces, could at no stage observe the vehicle and launched an intensive search for that vehicle. After the operator searched for the vehicle for approximately five days, it seems that he saw the vehicle in a residential area in Gaberone and that he immediately detonated the bomb by means of his remote controlled device. Information received thereafter indicated that civilians which were killed in this explosion, or injured, and serious damage was incurred to property. This also led to an official complaint from the Botswana government to the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.

MR ALBERTS: According to the evidence which you have just given, it seems as if the explosion can be ascribed to the detonation of the bomb, by means of the remote controlled device. Are you certain about this?

MR MOMBERG: No, this is a deduction which we made due to the information which we received in bits and pieces and I am not going to stand by this statement, it is quite possible that MK members could have fiddled with this vehicle and the secret compartment.

CHAIRPERSON: May I interpose Mr Alberts? How could you have - there is some disturbance in the hall - if I may proceed, Mr Momberg, you say that you deduced that the detonation was caused by the activation of the bomb by means of the remote control that would have been operated by the operative from Special Forces, did you not discuss this matter with the relevant members of Special Forces with a view of wanting to find out what had happened, once you became aware that the detonation resulted in people other than your targets, being injured and killed?

ADV DE JAGER: It seems as if there is remote control in action.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, are you in a position to respond to my question Mr Momberg, we hope we will not be interrupted any further, it must be some interruption coming from Reception, I suspect.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, I think it is a conference meeting that is taking place.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, I can give you an answer. I can answer by saying no, I never concerning this specific incident, contacted people from Special Forces, and that was for the reason that at the level at which I was acting on that stage as Lieutenant, that I really wasn't in a situation where I did any planning or evaluation with Special Forces, this was done at a higher level as one can see from the fact that Brigadier Cronje, Brigadier Loots were also involved in the project.

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe we will canvass the matter with you later on, you may proceed to give your evidence in chief.

MR ALBERTS: As you please Chairperson. Were there any elements in the planning that would imply that certain innocent people would be affected by means of this bomb?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson, the planning was aimed purely at MK members and the elimination of MK members, either at the weapons cache where the weapons would be loaded, or perhaps at a place where the targets would be at the bus, but where innocent civilians would not be put in danger. That was the planning Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was the planning aimed at specific targets, the interpretation came through as aimed at MK members. You intended, your intended targets were Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that not so? Yes. And at all material times, your intention was to eliminate them and the two methods of detonation of the bomb was intended to ultimately result in the death of the three mentioned MK members?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR ALBERTS: If I may interpose Chair, surely Mr Momberg, the issue of other people besides those three, must have crossed your mind? Other MK members may have actually been tasked with the loading or unloading of that vehicle?

MR LAX: Chairperson, that is correct. In the situation in which we acted, although our primary target was Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode, it would be correct to say that should the bomb have exploded at the cache at Botswana, other MK members could also have died. With that part of the plan, we reconciled ourselves because they would have been members of MK.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I am getting a little confused if your response to Mr Lax's question is in that fashion. The plan was devised on the information that was at your disposal, which information one would like to presume, was furnished to you by Mr McKenzie that he would be having a meeting with certain members of MK on a particular day and particular time. What I would like to clear with you, maybe at this stage and not later, is whether in giving information to you as your informant, did Mr McKenzie advise you of how the weaponry into the false compartment was done? To be precise, did he give any indication as to who would do the loading of such weaponry, whether it would be Mr Mnisi, Mr Dumakode or Mr Pule? I think you understand where I am getting to?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, as I have already said, the method was that the vehicle would have been taken from McKenzie by one of these three people, that would be Mnisi, Pule or Dumakode and that the vehicle would then be given back to him after the weapons had been loaded. On the basis thereof, we assumed that the weapons, because it would mostly happen at night, that it would be loaded by Pule, Dumakode or Mnisi.

ADV DE JAGER: You refer to the course of action, the method, that is what usually happened. The Chairperson asked you did you have specific information that in this specific incident, there would have been a meeting where these three people would have met McKenzie?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, we had such information.

ADV DE JAGER: For this specific incident, did you work with the general way of doing things or did you have a specific pattern or specific method for this specific case?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, perhaps I could just clarify by saying that the meeting that McKenzie had with Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode, was something that occurred with basically every visit, with every visit, he would have seen Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode, with exceptions for example of Mnisi or one of the others, would have been busy with another assignment in Lusaka or somewhere else, and then he would only have seen two of the three. But with each visit of McKenzie to Botswana, he saw Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he know who in the normal course of running of things, would do the loading of the weaponry into the false or secret compartment? Was that information known by Mr McKenzie?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson, he did not know.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may proceed Mr Alberts.

MR LAX: Sorry, before you do, Chair, you have just interrupted my questioning, there was just one aspect I just wanted to follow up on.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed Mr Lax.

MR LAX: I just want to recap before I get to my question, just for the sake of ensuring that we are still on the same page. The reason I put this suggestion to you that I did, was precisely because McKenzie didn't know who actually loaded the vehicle, but that was your backup plan as I understood it, am I correct in that understanding? In other words, the light sensitive detonator was the backup and in the best of all possible worlds, the Special Forces operator would see all three targets together with the vehicle and detonate it, thereby getting the first prize, so to speak? Have I understood you correctly?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, no, it was the other way around. The light sensitive switch was the primary switch. In other words, it meant that when this compartment was opened to load, and you could accept that it would be MK members and probably Pule, Dumakode and Mnisi who would load it, and then the bomb would be detonated. The remote controlled switch or equipment was the backup.

MR ALBERTS: That would be the case should, against everything that would happen, that weaponry was not the main aim for getting McKenzie to Botswana?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, that is correct, if it would seem that weaponry would not be loaded during this visit, but that there would be a meeting between McKenzie and these three people in the bus or in the vicinity of the bus, then this bomb would have been detonated by means of remote control.

ADV DE JAGER: But then McKenzie would have died in any case, not so?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, I would have to concede, but the planning, the primary planning was that McKenzie would not be hurt in this action.

MR ALBERTS: And was that also the instruction that was given to the Special Forces operative in Botswana, that was given to him?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, that is correct.

MR ALBERTS: Then to continue with your application Mr Momberg, from page 116 of the paginated bundle you deal with the aim and the motivation of this act. Are you aware of the content?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I am aware of the content.

MR ALBERTS: Do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I do.

MR ALBERTS: And specifically what concerns your motivation, have you seen the application of Brigadier Cronje who was also involved?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, I have seen his application.

MR ALBERTS: With regard to his application it is in Bundle 1, that is the second cluster of documentation that was provided, did you read the application appearing there?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I have read the application.

MR ALBERTS: And specifically in that Bundle, from page 246 and on, Brigadier Cronje deals with the motivation obviously from his perspective for this particular operation, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct Chairperson.

MR ALBERTS: And do you know the motivation that he gave?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I have knowledge of that.

MR ALBERTS: Do you identify yourself with that, do you agree?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: Might my learned friend perhaps tell us about that, because we don't have it in front of us. We would like to know what that motivation is with which the witness agrees.

CHAIRPERSON: Could you assist Mr Visser, Mr Alberts?

MR ALBERTS: Chairperson, it is a matter which is canvassed in several pages, about eight pages of Brigadier Cronje's application. Might I be permitted ...

ADV DE JAGER: Which Bundle is it or don't we have it in a Bundle before us?

MR ALBERTS: Unfortunately it is in a cluster 2 Bundle, and that is the only document that gave us access to what Brigadier had said. That cluster is unfortunately not in front of you, but that is the only source for that, and that is why we specifically referred to that. May I perhaps have the opportunity to hand this extract to my learned friend.

ADV DE JAGER: Can't you perhaps just read that part of the motivation, is it very long?

MR ALBERTS: I will read it.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you do so Mr Alberts, I think Ms Lockhat might be in a position to give us some kind of assistance. Which Bundle, is it Bundle 2(A) or (B)?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, the relevant pages that Adv Alberts are referring to, is not contained in our Bundles, but it is information that he received in another hearing that is to come. He used that information, I have informed him this morning that he has to make it available to us if he is going to present it, but it is not in our Bundles Chairperson, and Cronje - his application, is also not contained in this Bundle Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Alberts, I thought you were making reference to the evidence that has been given before this Amnesty Committee during the Cronje hearings.

MR ALBERTS: What I was referring to here Chairperson, was merely the application itself of Brigadier Cronje. Of course we know now that he has testified concerning this incident, and we also have a record of that evidence but the reference I am making to you now, is to his application itself and not to any evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: In relation to this incident?

MR ALBERTS: In respect of this particular incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, that would be the application that we have already heard as a Committee, is that not so, that is contained in one of the Bundles?

MR ALBERTS: Indeed.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, what Adv Visser is saying is the amnesty application form of Cronje is not contained in the Bundle, but the transcripts relating to that hearing is. He refers to the amnesty application of Cronje which we don't have, and then he also refers to the transcripts which we do have in 2(H), that is Bundle 2(H). But at this stage, we don't have Cronje's original amnesty application, not original, but a copy thereof contained in the Bundle, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, his motivation was dealt with when he gave evidence, and it is contained in one of the Bundles. I am saying this because I was a member of the panel that heard that application, so if you could assist Mr Visser by providing the necessary details with regard to the motivation as contained in the transcript that is forming part of this hearing, we have quite a number of Bundles, 2(A) up to 2(I). One of those Bundles should be able to assist both this panel as well as all the representatives appearing in relation to this incident.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, Visser on record, what I am really only interested in is ascertaining whether there is any conflict between the evidence which he gave before the original Amnesty Committee, that is Jack Cronje, and what is stated in his written application. If my learned friend assures me that there is no conflict, then we can let the matter rest and deal with the evidence as it was being presented and as it is contained in Bundle 2(H).

CHAIRPERSON: So now that we understand Mr Visser's bone of contention, Mr Alberts, are you in a position to assure him that the motivation as contained in his written application and supplemented by his affidavit, attached to that written application form, is the same as that one contained in our record, which is Bundle 2(A) up to (H)?

MR ALBERTS: It is the same motivation, it was just given possibly in greater detail in the application itself than in his actual evidence, which is contained in the Bundle.

ADV DE JAGER: But the application he confirmed under oath, so that is part of his testimony. If he incorporated it, he didn't read each and every word, but he said that I confirm what is contained.

MR ALBERTS: Yes, that is indeed the case.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, it would appear that according to Mr Alberts who has read both the application of Brigadier Cronje as well as the motivation as appearing in our records which would be Bundle 2(A) up to (H), in as far as he is concerned, there appears to be no contradictions. That should satisfy you.

MR VISSER: Yes, indeed it does. I would just like to explain Chairperson, that I don't want to be criticised later that I should have been aware of something what I am not aware of, which appears ex facie the written application, because that is not part of the papers, and I am only ready to deal with that which is before us, which is the evidence, that is the only point.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we understand your point and it is only fair for you to make it.

MR ALBERTS: Chairperson, might I finally put my learned friend's fears to bed. I will read directly from the record of his evidence, the transcript, it reads as follows, he was asked from page 162 onwards.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, which Bundle? We have to have it on record, we have to go and read it, and if we have to search for it, it makes it difficult, so please refer to the Bundles and the pages?

MR ALBERTS: It is Bundle 2(H) and the evidence is from page 1 to 11 of the Bundle and I am going to read from page 8.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.

MR ALBERTS: What stands there is the following

" ... from page 162 onwards to page 167 you set out the general political motive, do you confirm that as correct?"

Brigadier Cronje answered yes, so he has under oath confirmed the contents of what Mr Momberg has associated himself with and adopted in his evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Thank you Mr Alberts, that should assist Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: With respect, that doesn't assist me at all. I know that he confirmed his application form, but I don't know what it stated.

ADV DE JAGER: Then it reads, if you continue, and page 167, the last paragraph, please read the last paragraph on that page

"... their objectives were to in respect of Dumakode, Pule and Mnisi, to eliminate these because they inter alia ..."

and then he continues to read on page 168 and then he is returning to page 156, so he is actually reading from the application, so it is incorporated in the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe to come to Mr Visser's plight, we have Mr Du Plessis here, who is representing the interests of Brigadier Cronje. I am sure with the precision that I know Mr Du Plessis to be capable of applying when it comes to his applications, he would be in a position to give us Brigadier Cronje's application, in relation to his general motivation, which is referred to in this paragraph as read out by my colleague, Adv De Jager. That should come to the immediate assistance of Mr Visser. He would be in a position to see whether indeed what is said by him, and what was confirmed by him, does accord with what was in writing in his application.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I have just been handed certain documents which appear, I take it to be an extract from the written application form, Form 1, of Brigadier Cronje, and if that is so, then I will just need a few moments at an appropriate time, just to read through it and I will know what my learned friend is talking about. I won't waste any more of your time.

CHAIRPERSON: I am sure Mr Du Plessis will also not charge your client a fee, if you were to ask him to confirm if what you have been handed up, is indeed what was Brigadier Cronje's written application.

MR VISSER: I might be disappointed Chairperson, he wants his money.

MR DU PLESSIS: I am not so sure about that Chairperson. Chairperson, may I just mention that in so far as there might be doubt about what Brigadier Cronje testified in respect of the political background and so on, he never testified anything pertaining to this incident. His only evidence about this incident is contained in Bundle 2(H).

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but you also refer to his general motivation?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, in his application.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but then if you could assist Mr Visser by giving him, show him, you must have one of his applications, written applications with you.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I don't have Brigadier Cronje's applications with me, I just have the evidence unfortunately, but during lunch time I can obtain it and bring it with.

CHAIRPERSON: I see your Instructing Attorney is sitting next to you, I do trust that he still operates the same as he did when we were hearing the Cronje applications, so with that kind of operation, we should be able to at least allow this matter to proceed knowing that during lunch time, you will organise the necessary papers and assist Mr Visser with his problem.

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I have the application in my office, I will go and get it.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I have just read through the pages, I have scanned through it and the problem solved itself. What I didn't understand is this does not refer, what my learned friend is referring to now, does not refer to this particular incident. It is part of the general background.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, general motivation.

MR VISSER: That I have no problem with.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, it is a general motivation that became applicable in relation to all the incidents that Brigadier Cronje applied for amnesty.

MR VISSER: If that is so, I have absolutely no problem.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: I was brought under the impression, quite incorrectly so apparently, that he was talking about the motivation for this particular incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, will Counsel try to go on the same page next time, so that we can fast track these proceedings? Mr Alberts, you may proceed now that we have sorted this problem out.

MR ALBERTS: As you please Chairperson. With specific reference to page 116 of this application, can you just repeat the motivation which you mentioned there?

MR MOMBERG: My motive with the committing of the above-mentioned deed or deeds, was to protect the safety of the country and offer relief for the political opposition against the government. The context in which this deed or deeds took place, seems more complete out of the facts which were explained here. This took place in the continuation of the continuing political unrest and was a counter reaction to that.

MR ALBERTS: With reference to sub-paragraph 4, what was the objective of this deed?

MR MOMBERG: The objective of this deed seems out of the above-mentioned, it seems to be aimed at the political opponents of the government and or the property of such opponents.

MR ALBERTS: And further it seems as if it was committed in the execution of an order which you received?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct. It was done in the execution of an order which I received as a member of the Security Forces.

ADV DE JAGER: Who gave you this instruction or order?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, it came from Brigadier Cronje.

MR ALBERTS: Finally, can I refer you to the concluding remarks which appear in your application, it is from page 118 point 1 and further and with regard to paragraph 7 which appears on 118.1, do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I do.

MR ALBERTS: As we are sitting here now Mr Momberg, we know what the result was of this bomb explosion, innocent civilians apparently were killed and injured and property was damaged. If you now sit back, what is your feeling presently as regards the consequences of this event?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, at that stage of my career, I was involved in a struggle against MK and in no way did I have any gripe with any citizen or inhabitant of Botswana as such, and therefore it is disappointing and saddening for me that innocent people and especially children were killed in this explosion. They were not the targets at all, not at any stage, and at no stage were we apathetic towards the interests of the people of Botswana or their lives.

MR ALBERTS: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ALBERTS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Alberts. Mr Visser, are we going to start with you sir, do you have any questions to put to Mr Momberg?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Yes please Chairperson. Mr Momberg, just what regards the meeting, in your statement and in evidence, you refer to two meetings where people were present and you also referred to other discussions, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, if I understood the question correctly, there were two meetings. The one at the secure place of the Security Forces at Broederstroom and the next day at Hennops' Pride picnic terrain.

MR VISSER: Is it possible that there could have been a further meeting which you could have forgotten about, I know it is 12 years ago. Let me just say why I am asking you this, Brigadier Loots for whom I am appearing, in the first place only remembered one meeting when he completed his amnesty application. Later he was reminded of the fact that there were two meetings, and I agree with you that there were two meetings, but the incident where he was present at a meeting where discussions were held about killing McKenzie together with the bomb explosion, now is this something which you, Hechter and Goosen perhaps discussed on another occasion?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson, this incident or the meeting where the first plan was discussed, which dealt with the fact that McKenzie stood a very good chance of being blown up together with the vehicle which he was to take to Botswana, it was the meeting which took place at Broederstroom.

MR VISSER: At that first meeting, Colonel Crause tells me that he was not present there. You testified today that you heard later that he was present there, but he says that he was not there, would you agree with that?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, as I have said quite rightly and as Mr Visser says quite rightly, I only found out later that Captain Crause was present.

MR VISSER: You yourself cannot remember that?

MR MOMBERG: No.

MR VISSER: He was present at the second meeting?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: I think you also testified to that.

MR MOMBERG: Yes.

MR VISSER: The run up to this thing, McKenzie was your and Goosen's informer, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: Yes.

MR VISSER: Would it be correct to say that it would not be general knowledge in the Security community as to the identity of McKenzie, only the two of you would have known his name and his identity?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, that is the ideal with any informer, that his identity be protected as far as possible.

MR VISSER: Yes, but you also gave informers numbers, not so?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: So that if you reported regarding information which you received from an informer, that you should report it to Head Office under that number?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: For example MT395 reports that, or whatever the case may be?

MR MOMBERG: I confirm that.

MR VISSER: And by the way, the informer number of McKenzie, was it 3195?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, it was.

MR VISSER: Now can we accept that reporting would have been done on a regular basis to Head Office as regards information received from McKenzie?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, to Head Office as well as to other Security Branches which had an interest in the matter.

MR VISSER: Yes of course, such as the Western Transvaal?

MR MOMBERG: Most certainly, yes.

MR VISSER: Where Brigadier Loots was the Sectional Commander?

MR MOMBERG: Yes.

MR VISSER: I wonder if you can remember perhaps I must just ask you this, Loots tells me that he can recall that at one stage you contacted him and asked him to attend the meeting, whatever meeting that might have been, but he remembers that you contacted him telephonically, can you remember such a discussion?

MR MOMBERG: No.

MR VISSER: I do not want to blame you for that, it is a long time ago, but can I try to refresh your memory with this question. He says that you also told him that this source 395, MT395, would go to Botswana during the Easter weekend to receive weapons from Dumakode, is it possible that you could have said this?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, in that context it could have been possible. We liaised with Brigadier Loots and his personnel from the Western Transvaal on a regular basis because McKenzie was placed in Botswana and because Botswana apart from the national threat which MK was regarded as a part of, MK in Botswana was the primary responsibility of the Western Transvaal, so yes, we did liaise regularly and we would have informed him that the informer was on his way.

MR VISSER: Yes, but it now deals more specifically with what he was to have done there, and that is as a result of the question which Commissioner Lax asked you and I think the Chairperson. Brigadier Loots remembers that you told him that during the Easter weekend your source was to go to Botswana to get weapons from Dumakode and he says that there was a tape recording made of a telephone discussion between Dumakode and McKenzie, which was available. Can you recall something like that?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I confirm the existence of the tape recording with that discussion between Dumakode and McKenzie.

MR VISSER: Yes, that Dumakode in that discussion which was taped, asked McKenzie to come specifically to fetch weapons?

MR MOMBERG: Can I reply in this way, he did not say it openly on the telephone that the man had to come and load weapons.

MR VISSER: Was it a deduction which you all made?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, in the sense that Dumakode told McKenzie that they needed him urgently in Botswana.

MR VISSER: I see that Brigadier Loots is agreeing, he is nodding his head, so maybe I put it wrongly, I apologise. But the deduction which you all made, quite reasonably from the telephone discussion between Dumakode and McKenzie was that this was a case of weapons being loaded?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: This information would naturally have first come to you as you are the handlers, you and Goosen, of McKenzie, not so?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you go to Brigadier Cronje with that information?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Was the idea at that stage already, was there a plan or would it only have come later, that this occasion was to be used to see whether you could not deal a blow? Was it your plan or did it only come later?

MR MOMBERG: No, it only came later.

MR VISSER: You reported this to Brigadier Cronje. Do you know from your personal knowledge what he did?

MR MOMBERG: I have no personal knowledge as to what Brigadier Cronje did with the information at that stage.

MR VISSER: We do however know that Commander Charl Naude, from Special Forces, was supporting the Security Branch, Northern Transvaal, are you aware of that?

MR MOMBERG: No, at the time of this incident, I was not aware of the fact that Charl Naude was assisting the Northern Transvaal.

MR VISSER: We heard evidence from a master plan which Joubert had, and this was the sending of members of Special Forces to Northern Transvaal and Gauteng, but if you don't have any knowledge of that, we will leave it at that. When you gathered at the first meeting, Brigadier Loots was present, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: Yes.

MR VISSER: Please assist me to see whether he has this correct, he says during that meeting, he was informed by Cronje about a plan, he was informed that the information which he already had because you had discussed the tape recording with him, that he was informed that McKenzie would go out, he would probably bring weapons in and that it was envisaged that there would be a chance to build a bomb into the kombi, with which especially Dumakode, Pule and Johannes Mnisi could possibly be blown up. Would that be correct that at that meeting, at Broederstroom, that it was said as being the facts or can you not recall that?

MR MOMBERG: If you would allow me to just answer, this meeting took place, this Goosen and I, we were informed by Brigadier Cronje that that evening we had to attend a meeting where he and Brigadier Loots and people from Special Forces would be present. At the time of this meeting, this plan was discussed and in all honesty, today I cannot tell you who said what at that specific meeting, and who made which proposals.

MR VISSER: That is good enough. The spirit of the thing is that a plan was discussed during this meeting - would it be correct to say that without Special Forces, this plan would have had no chance of succeeding?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, in a certain sense it is true as Special Forces had the abilities to place an operator in Botswana which the Security Branch did not have at that stage.

MR VISSER: And to build and design this specific bomb?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, I do not want to say anything about the design of the bomb or the form it took, I never saw it. After we received the vehicle, if we opened it the light sensitive switch would have gone.

MR VISSER: While you are referring to the light sensitive switch, and to join in the question from Commissioner Lax, Brigadier Loots as we know, on the day after the meeting at Broederstroom, spoke to Gen Van der Merwe as Security Head Office and asked him permission to continue with the plan. If you did not know that, I am telling you so that you know, Van der Merwe and Loots will testify to this. The question which it is about now, is that Brigadier Loots says that he cannot recall at that first meeting, that there was, that anything was said about a light sensitive switch as a detonator, the only thing that he can remember is that they spoke about an operator of Special Forces who was in Botswana and was placed in such a way that with a remote controlled device, he could detonate the bomb. My question to you is simply, is it possible that it was decided later on a further detonator, namely the light sensitive switch or are you convinced that this was already discussed at the first meeting?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, no, it is one of the reasons why the plan was not acceptable to myself, Goosen and Hechter, namely the fact that there was only one method of detonation and that was by remote control. It is so that the light sensitive switch was raised at the second meeting.

MR VISSER: Thank you, because this is in agreement with what Loots will tell the Committee. I am nearly finished, Mr Momberg. If you will just give me a little while longer. You said that it was not part of the planning at all that innocent civilians or people would become victims, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You also added something and I want to question you about that, with an operation which involves a bomb which explodes, which cannot be aimed, does the possibility not always exist that the bomb could hit a target which it was not intended for?

MR MOMBERG: With a bomb it is possible, I agree, but in this specific case, it would have worked in such a way that if the bomb exploded by means of the light sensitive switch, it would have been at an arms cache of MK, and secondly, according to my knowledge, the operator of Special Forces, had specific instructions regarding the detonation of this bomb, by remote control if this was deemed necessary.

MR VISSER: Not that it matters greatly, but is Commissioner Lax not then correct? The sure way of having the bomb explode that the targeted people would be involved, was with the pressing of a button, was when somebody saw them and somebody then pressed the button? I don't think you understood the question correctly, that is why I am asking you again.

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, no. I say no in the sense that if the vehicle was taken away by Dumakode, Pule and Mnisi to an arms cache where the weapons were to be loaded, then this would mean that our targets would have - seen in the fact that McKenzie was never taken with and the time that lapsed between the time that the bus was taken and returned, that this arms cache was outside of Gaberone, outside the built up area, therefore our planning and our whole manner was intended at eliminating these three at the arms cache with the light sensitive detonator.

MR VISSER: But I think what Commissioner Lax was on about, if one wants to speculate is the fact that the kombi could have been stopped at a roadblock and Police from Botswana could have discovered that place, surely that is a possibility?

MR MOMBERG: It would have been pure by chance that it would have been discovered.

MR VISSER: Mr Crause will testify that one of this tasks which he forgot about and which he only remembered a short while ago, was that - it was to ensure that the Kopfontein border post, where the kombi entered Botswana, that there were no members of the staff of the border post who could open that compartment, it was part of what he would do to ensure that there would be no mistake.

MR MOMBERG: This could be so. If you will allow me, I can explain exactly how this compartment was equipped. In the inside of the Hi-Ace bus, behind the driver's seat was a flap which opened where the battery of the vehicle was. The compartment is an extension of that compartment which usually housed the battery. In other words, in order to get to the false compartment, a person first had to lift the carpet, remove the flap, take out the battery, take out another flap and only then would the secret compartment be open.

MR VISSER: So you say that there was no probability that this would be opened?

MR MOMBERG: The probability that this would be opened, this person went through the border post 23 times, and this compartment was never detected.

ADV DE JAGER: I think that the planning was not to hit civilians, but if you think about this very calmly and you use a bomb which explodes, then it injures whoever is close to it, is that not true?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: You cannot aim it like a gun at a specific target?

MR MOMBERG: Correct.

ADV DE JAGER: And had somebody been walking by, he could have been hit?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, that is true and that is precisely why we attempted by means of the way of doing things, the way in which the bomb would detonate, the light sensitive detonator and the deduction that the arms cache was outside the built up area.

ADV DE JAGER: You would have expected that the loading of the weapons would take place in secret, but even there, you could not say that nobody would walk past at that specific moment? You would have taken precautions that a civilian would not be injured, but you cannot say that this would definitely not happen?

MR MOMBERG: No, we couldn't.

MR VISSER: And the next question is did you make peace with that fact?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, to the extent that one took all the precautions possible in such an operation, but once again seen in the light of a war situation, one made peace with the fact that innocent people could be hurt. Not had to but could.

MR VISSER: And that is why you apply for amnesty?

MR MOMBERG: Yes.

MR VISSER: Now finally, you referred to discussions after the first meeting with Brigadier Cronje, and that he said that they would look at alternatives, just to bring things together, the light sensitive detonator, was this the alternative?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, that would be correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I didn't understand your evidence in chief to have meant that the light sensor switch was the alternative. I think that was - your evidence in chief when you were being led by your Counsel, Mr Alberts, led you on that aspect, and your evidence in chief was that the light sensor detonation was the first choice of detonating the bomb, and that the remote control, was the alternative. Further, when Mr Lax posed a question to you, you again corrected him, because that is how he put it, he said the light sensor detonation was an alternative method and not the first method, you corrected him and you said no, it was the reverse, again confirming your evidence in chief, that the light sensor was the first choice of detonation of the bomb, and the remote control was the alternative method. So you cannot agree to what has been put to you by Mr Visser, because it would be contrary to what you have already stated in your evidence in chief?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, would you allow me, because I caused confusion, and I believe I should put it straight. I am not talking about that part of the evidence. What I am now referring to was the evidence of this witness where he said that they were dissatisfied with the plan which was planned at the first meeting which would have involved also the killing of Mr McKenzie. They then walked out and they discussed that with their Commander, Brigadier Cronje, and he said don't worry, we will look for an alternative. Alternative in the sense of how can we preserve Mr McKenzie from now being killed, and the question now that I put is what were those alternatives, and the alternative was it was then agreed on a light sensitive switch, which is not in conflict with what he has said before.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson. The last aspect, we know that mention was made about Johannes Mnisi, you already testified that he was involved in the Church Street bomb in one way or the other, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, he was one of the main planners.

MR VISSER: Evidence was given by Johannes Mnisi before a hearing of the Amnesty Committee in this same hall, that he was a member of Special Operations. Do you have any knowledge of that?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: He was MK Chief of Staff, Special Operations in Lusaka and his actions were channelled through Botswana as well as through Mozambique and Swaziland, would you agree with that?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: The Church Street bomb for example came from Swaziland?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Are you also aware of the fact that he was involved in the attack on Voortrekkerhoogte?

MR MOMBERG: Correct.

MR VISSER: And the Magistrate's court bomb in Krugersdorp and many more?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, that would be correct to say that he was involved in numerous acts of terrorism.

MR VISSER: So he was a very important MK Commander?

MR MOMBERG: Extremely important.

MR VISSER: Yes, and if I may say his Lieutenants were Lekgote Pule and Lester Dumakode?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Since the Church Street bomb exploded in May 1993, what was the priority or how high would you have described the priority of the members of the Security Force to try to get hold of these three people?

MR MOMBERG: This would have been an extremely high priority to get these three people out of the system. Firstly, arrest and to bring them before Court for the acts of terrorism, amongst others the Church Street bomb, which we all know had a tremendous impact and secondly, if this was not possible, we would try and get them out of the MK channels to ...

MR VISSER: By eliminating them?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: By killing them? Was it in the four years after the Church Street bomb up to and including the McKenzie incident, was it possible to arrest any of them that you were aware of?

MR MOMBERG: No.

MR VISSER: And that left you with the only other alternative, namely to eliminate them?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: One last aspect in this regard, and this is that Brigadier Loots tells me, and I think that you mentioned this somewhere, I am not sure where, that the planning was that the big fish were Johannes Mnisi, Dumakode and Pule, but he also said or other MK members and or ANC supporters, this was the target of this bomb, would you agree with that?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, our primary target I will agree, was Pule, Dumakode and Mnisi, but other MK members could also have been killed in the process. And it would mean that if this was the case, it would also have been a win-win situation for us in the sense that it would have given MK the message that we can act against them in their own area.

MR VISSER: Yes. Thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Before I proceed to Mr Du Plessis, you have answered positive to what was put to you by Mr Visser, that prior to this incident, prior to the McKenzie bombing incident it had not been possible for the Police to arrest these people who were in the list of your Unit to get them arrested, and if failing to arrest them, to then eliminate them. Are you personally aware of how many attempts were made to arrest them?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, no I am not personally aware of any attempts made to arrest these people, all that I can say is that Pule, Dumakode and Mnisi as far as my knowledge went, never entered the RSA themselves, apart from Mnisi a while before this.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, now would it therefore have been feasible at all to attempt to arrest them?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson, at that stage from the information which we had at our disposal, it would not have been possible to arrest them.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, so that never, that idea of attempting to arrest them, never entered your mind, did it? It wasn't a possibility?

MR MOMBERG: Yes Chairperson, to say that it never came up in my mind, would not be correct. Had those people put their feet in South Africa, not only I, but many other members of the Security Branch, would have descended upon them in order to arrest them, but seen in the light of the fact that they did not come into the RSA, there was no possible way of arresting them, and therefore we decided on elimination.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, from the information that was at your disposal, they had not made any attempt to enter the RSA?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And therefore it was not possible for you to have even considered an arrest under those circumstances, with the information at your disposal?

MR MOMBERG: Under the specific circumstances it is correct to say that we did not consider an arrest at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Du Plessis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Chairperson, I will be very short. Mr Momberg, the first meeting you testified that Captain Hechter was present?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: He was Lieutenant then, but let's call him Captain, that is how he is known these days. And thereafter he wasn't in any way involved in this operation?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, no, at no later stage he was involved in any aspect of the operation, and he was also not informed about this.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Tell me Mr Momberg, who did you report to, who was your senior?

MR MOMBERG: My direct superior Chairperson, was Brigadier Cronje.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, did you report to Cronje regarding McKenzie and the three targets?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, regarding McKenzie I reported on a daily basis as the information became available, to Cronje.

MS LOCKHAT: So tell me, how did Loots actually get involved in the situation?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, I will have to make the inference that Brigadier Cronje talked to Brigadier Loots. Besides conversations among individual members at the Security Branches, the Commanders also on a regular basis, contacted one another and then co-ordinated.

CHAIRPERSON: But you have no personal knowledge thereof?

MR MOMBERG: No, I have no personal knowledge of that.

MS LOCKHAT: Why I am asking you this is just because on page 2 of Bundle 2(H), Cronje says that

"... Wikus Loots, the Commander of the Security Police in the Western Transvaal, approached me about this matter."

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat, he has no personal knowledge, I think the right person to ask is Mr Loots and not Mr Momberg.

MS LOCKHAT: Point taken Chairperson. You said there were two meetings, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: I note in your amnesty application form, you said that the same people that were at the first meeting, also attended the second meeting, and you included Hechter in the second meeting. Can you comment on that?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, I can perhaps just ascribe that to an error, Hechter was definitely not at the second meeting.

MS LOCKHAT: I just want to point out Chairperson, that that would be at page 108 of Bundle 10 where he mentions the names of the persons present at the meeting, and then page 110 where he says the same people, the second paragraph

"... a second meeting was held the next day at Hennops' Pride."

And then he goes on further and he mentions that the same people were present.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that all Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: No Chairperson, I've got more questions. Tell me, you said Charl Naude was also present at these meetings of Special Forces, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, that is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: So was he instructed to approach Special Forces to organise the bomb?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson yes, he was a full part of the meeting, so he had the opportunity to make input. Whether he then offered to build the bomb or to let the bomb be built by Special Forces, I can't comment on that. That was an open meeting, everybody had the ability or the opportunity to make input.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, the plan to detonate this bomb, was there ever a plan as to abort, was it possible to actually abort this bomb?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, there was an alternative plan or a Plan B if I can call it that. As you can remember in my evidence in chief, I mentioned that Sergeant Goosen activated the light sensitive switch, without McKenzie's knowing of it. This activation included what we call an armed switch, this is a pin so that if for example, if you have headphones, something that you had to remove and the bomb was then removed, then the plan to abort, would then comprise that should, there would be no opportunity for the Special Forces operative to get the targets at the bus and then to detonate the bomb, and before that, if the bus was not taken to be loaded with weapons and the light switch sensitive would not then detonate the bomb, and it would then perhaps happen that McKenzie returned to the country, then the same procedure would have followed as with arming the bomb. In other words, at the border post, McKenzie would once again, whilst he was busy with his documentation to enter, the bomb would have been de-activated, by placing this instrument back and the bomb would then be useless.

CHAIRPERSON: If that would require some instrument to be placed back, that would have been placed back by whom?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, it would have been done by Goosen or myself.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR MOMBERG: That is one of the reasons why we waited at the border post.

CHAIRPERSON: You would then have gone into the other side of the border, that is the Botswana side, to do that?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson, we would have done that on the RSA side.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Yes Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: I just want to refer you back to your amnesty application form. You state - page 114 Chairperson, Bundle 10

"... after the operative searched for the vehicle for approximately five days, he then noticed it in a residential area in Gaberone and he immediately, without taking into consideration the consequences of his deed, he then detonated the bomb by means of his remote control device."

Can you please comment on that?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, as I said in my evidence in chief, that is an inference that we made at that stage, and I also said in my evidence that it was quite possible that it could not have been the case, that someone could have tampered with the compartment in the vehicle, so that was purely an inference that was made with the information at our disposal.

MS LOCKHAT: Do you think that the person at Special Forces, was he instructed to just be there at all times until the bomb detonated in whichever way?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, if I understand the question correctly, I am going to answer in such a way - the operative had a specific instruction to always observe the vehicle in Gaberone. If I refer to the bus, I refer to the Hi-Ace. And then to determine in such a way, what was happening in the first instance, and then secondly, should it be necessary, that the detonation then be done.

MS LOCKHAT: So basically it took five days for this bomb to go off?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: Could it be possible that this person that was following or looking for the vehicle, contact you and tell you that the bomb did not detonate and that you should come, or Goosen should come to Botswana and then use the instrument, was this a possibility?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson, the operative was not known to us. We did not know him, the operative was a member of the South African Defence Force, Special Forces and not the South African Police.

CHAIRPERSON: You in fact had no control of this operation whilst the car was in Botswana?

MR MOMBERG: The moment that the vehicle moved across the border into Botswana, yes, the vehicle was under the control of the South African Defence Force operative.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS LOCKHAT: One last question, you said that McKenzie and Mnisi had to be identified and that Special Forces had to identify them. Do you know who the person was that was supposed to identify them, do you know the name of the person?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson no, I did not say McKenzie and Mnisi, only McKenzie had to be identified in order for identification in Botswana by Special Forces. I do not know who identified him of Special Forces, it could have been anyone of the people, it could have been Charl Naude himself or it could have been some of his people who were hiding in the bushes.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: But they must have known who had to be killed, Mnisi and Pule they must have been able to identify them, otherwise this man could pushed the button if John or Paul or anyone could have been there?

MR MOMBERG: Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode were well known in Botswana, especially with regard to people in the Intelligence, their faces were well known. So the operative of Special Forces, I don't want to comment on his competence, but if he was in Botswana for some time, then he would have exactly known who Dumakode, Mnisi and Pule were.

CHAIRPERSON: But that would be pure speculation on your part, is it not? This is not the information that resides within you? You don't even know whether they used an operator who was in Botswana for a day, precisely to be able to attend to this matter, or he had been in Botswana for some few months or years, you don't know? That information does not reside within you?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, no, I don't have first hand knowledge, but the fact of the matter is that the operatives were focused on MK. If he was a Botswana operative, he would have been aware of who were members of MK or MK group in Botswana and he would have known what they looked like.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Alberts, before the Committee gets an opportunity to put questions of clarity on Mr Momberg, do you have any re-examination to do?

MR ALBERTS: Thank you Chairperson, I have no re-examination at this stage.

NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR ALBERTS

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I am sorry to interrupt, may I just mention that I have Brigadier Cronje's amnesty application here, if anybody is interested.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Lax, do you have any questions to put to Mr Momberg?

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Momberg, you had quite specific information that you have referred us to with regard to your planning, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR LAX: And that information was that McKenzie met either or all of Dumakode, Pule or Mnisi, every time he went to Botswana?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR LAX: Your information was further that if he was going to load firearms, or ammunition or other weapons to be brought into the country, the vehicle could be taken away from him for some period of time, and then returned to him at a later stage, and he had no knowledge how or where that vehicle disappeared to?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR LAX: Now, I would like to suggest to you that you had no foresight whatsoever that innocent people might be hurt in this operation, because your planning in your own mind, was so careful that only your targets were the people who you might get and that is what you answered earlier in your evidence in chief, as opposed to when you were being questioned by Mr Visser.

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson yes, Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode, they were the targets and the whole operation was aimed at them.

CHAIRPERSON: What Mr Lax is putting to you is that you had no foresight, you couldn't have foreseen that innocent people would be hurt in this operation, it is not something that you would have foreseen. Are you saying that that is correct?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAX: You see, that is how I understood your evidence in chief, you actually did not foresee that at all. In your subsequent answers, that is mere speculation after the fact, but at the time you were planning this thing and at the time you were involved in this operation, you did not contemplate in any way whatsoever that innocent people might get hurt?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson.

MR LAX: Now, the only other aspect that I am slightly puzzled about is this, again in terms of your planning, this was an operation to pick up firearms, to pick up ammunition that would be loaded in that compartment, that is what you foresaw would happen, correct?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR LAX: What possible purpose then did the Special Forces operator serve?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, in any such operation, you make provision for the unforeseen and the unforeseen in this regard was that should weapons not be loaded, should it happen that Pule, Dumakode and Mnisi came back and say they could not load the weapons, and at any stage there was an opportunity to still eliminate them, then the Special Forces operative would have come into the picture and he would then have detonated them by means of the remote controlled device.

MR LAX: You see, if any three of them or all three of them came back, not having loaded the vehicle, in other words, the Special Forces operator would have seen them come back to McKenzie, the vehicle would not have been exploded and therefore there would have been an assumption that nothing had been loaded into it, alternatively that the light sensitive switch didn't work for one reason or another, wasn't there an enormous risk that McKenzie would then be blown up in that next anticipated possible move?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, there was a risk for McKenzie, but within our capacity, our limited capacity to operate in Botswana, we did what was possible to protect McKenzie.

CHAIRPERSON: But wasn't your evidence in chief that special instructions would have been given to the Special Forces operator, not to harm Mr McKenzie, which would then entail that he was not to detonate the bomb by means of a remote control if McKenzie was next to the intended targets?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct. At any stage where it appeared to the operative that he could eliminate the target and there was a chance that McKenzie would not be injured or killed, then he would have detonated the bomb, otherwise he would not have done it.

CHAIRPERSON: So indeed, you did at least apply your mind with regard to the possible risk of McKenzie being hurt in the event of the bomb being detonated by means of the remote control, something that you applied your minds to?

MR MOMBERG: Yes Chairperson, we definitely tried to protect McKenzie.

MR LAX: Now my last question deals with this section that you have been referred to by Ms Lockhat, on page 114 of the papers. Frankly I am having some difficulty with your answer in this regard. Why didn't you tell the truth which is that you don't know how the bomb got detonated in your application? Why didn't you write that here because that is the truth, or that is what you would like us to believe is the truth in any event?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, what I wrote in my application was what I thought at that stage and how I could remember what had happened at that stage, inferences that I made reasonably at that stage, it was 1987. That was that the operative detonated the bomb. That was based on information that I got in bits and pieces and the part where McKenzie said that he was re-routed and that the bomb or the vehicle with the bomb then went back to Gaberone. And the reason why I made the inference was the fact that the operative detonated the bomb, is that it became clear that McKenzie was re-routed to Francistown and afterwards the vehicle was taken back to Gaberone and the operative's instruction was observe the bus in Gaberone. That is why I made the inference that he couldn't keep this bus under surveillance the whole time, so when he saw it, he could have panicked and pressed the button. I just want to emphasise it, it was an inference at that stage and that was at the stage when I made the application for amnesty. At no stage did I try to cover anything.

MR LAX: My question remains, why didn't you tell us in your amnesty application that this is speculation on your part, but this is what you think happened. You see the way it is worded here, is as if you had personal knowledge of these facts, it is as if you know exactly what happened. You say the man saw the vehicle in a residential area, you don't say I assume he saw the vehicle, or I am speculating or I am inferring, you are telling it like a fact. It gives absolutely the wrong impression. Why did you not state it as if this was something that you were speculating about or you were assuming about or inferring about?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, the point is taken to heart and it is my mistake, I surely should have said that those were inferences.

CHAIRPERSON: What really is troubling, Mr Momberg, with how this information is contained in your affidavit, to which you have deposed, is that you are saying things as though they reside within you. You state that the car was spotted in a residential area in Botswana and you say that as a matter of fact, not speculation. You state that it was so spotted, approximately five days after it had somehow disappeared and then you proceed to give a factual information that the operator then decided to detonate the bomb without due regard to the consequences of his action. All these are facts which are stated positively and there is no indication that these are facts stated or deduced from inferences, there is no indication to me that you drawn any inference.

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, once again, my apology. I should surely have put it more clearly, I should have stated that those were inferences that we have made. With regard to the residential area, the bomb exploded in a residential area.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. My other difficulty with regard to that is the secret compartment was installed in such a way that it was to be known to only those who would load the weapons in the vehicle, it was not something that would be easily detected by any person who did not have information about its location or existence.

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now in your deduction you said you deduced that somebody could have tampered with the false compartment, if it was not so easily detectable to any person, is it feasible, is it probable that a person other than those who knew of its existence, who would be MK activists, would have been tampered with it?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson. One has to accept that the vehicle was taken from Francistown to Gaberone by MK members and as you then say, it is so that only myself, Goosen and very few this people this side of the border, knew where the compartment was, and MK members on the other side knew where it was. If it had been tampered with, it would have been MK members in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, making it highly improbable for any person other than the people who would have known of its existence, to have been able to tamper with it?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: You may continue Mr Lax.

MR LAX: I am finished Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: The fact is however, based on the information that you now have, that McKenzie was kidnapped by probably Mnisi and the people that he had to meet there, MK members?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Then he was taken to Quattro Camp?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: So his vehicle would have been under their control?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: They would have brought it back or drove it to wherever it was afterwards, and then they would have given it over to someone under their control, if they did not keep it under their control or command?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Now if the vehicle had been under their control, then they had known where the hidden compartment was?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: And it could be that they wanted to put something in there, or look at it or whatever, at any stage?

MR MOMBERG: It is possible Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: But something that I can't explain is that you did not think of that possibility, but you speculate if it is indeed speculation, is based on the fact, only the fact that it exploded because it was detonated with remote controlled device?

MR MOMBERG: The reason why I made that specific inference at that specific stage, was our information was of such a nature as already mentioned, that the vehicle was taken from McKenzie, that the vehicle was away and then it was taken back to him, then it was loaded with weapons. From that we could have inferred that this loading process did not take place in Gaberone, but in the outskirts of Gaberone. At that stage, I then made the deduction that it was the operative, purely because it would have been illogical for me to expect that anyone in a residential area in Gaberone, would want to load weapons. Therefore, I did not think of the light sensitive switch and that is why I said it was the operative.

ADV DE JAGER: I just want to put it to you that as it is put and stated here, you made a factual statement and not an inference. You could have the opportunity to answer that, but after the operative had looked for the vehicle for approximately five days, that is not speculation, you say to us that you knew that he looked for the vehicle for five days, so someone or he should have told it to you.

MR MOMBERG: There was a five day period between the time when McKenzie went over the border, crossed the border and the bomb exploded, so it is still part of an inference that he was still looking for the vehicle, because he had to execute his instruction.

CHAIRPERSON: That is not stated as an inference Mr Momberg, that is our problem, it is a fact. You know the period it took for him to locate the vehicle as a fact, it is not something that you are inferring, there is no deduction there. It is a fact and it is also a fact that the car is then located in Gaberone, in a residential area in Gaberone.

MR LAX: Can I just add something, you know that whole paragraph - you go further than just mere speculation. You say here that

"... the operative of Special Forces could in no way keep the vehicle under observation in Gaberone and consequently he started with an intensive search for it."

I mean that is going beyond just mere speculation, that is saying the guy had an intensive search to find the vehicle, he must have looked high and low. You don't know that that happened at all?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, if I had been the operative, that was what I would have done. I would have started with an intensive search for the vehicle, I would have done everything to execute my instruction properly and that is why I make these kinds of statements here. I am just inferring that this operative was in a situation where he had the instruction to keep the vehicle under observation and then he looses it on the first day.

MR LAX: You see, the other thing that really concerns me is that in the next sentence, after you have then spoken about the explosion of the bomb and so on, then you differentiate between information that is in your personal knowledge and information that you have received. You then say

"... information that was received thereafter, indicated that ..."

etc, etc. You go so far in the way this thing is drafted and in the way you are expressing yourself here, to differentiate between information which is obviously in your personal knowledge from the face of the document, and information which you have received from some other source. Do you see our problem?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, I take note of the problem with this specific paragraph and please believe me, I regret that I put it in this way. That was not the intention, the intention is that I should have said that these are the inferences that we had made at that stage and perhaps I should have divided it into different paragraphs, such as the last few sentences that this incident also led to an official complaint. Perhaps this should not even be added to this paragraph, so this is an error on my side in the way in which I have written it. Please I want to make an apology for this once again.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Momberg, after this incident had occurred, did you have an occasion to speak to your superior, Brigadier Cronje, to find out how everything was scuttled through this kind of detonation, did you make such a follow up with Brigadier Cronje?

MR MOMBERG: I am sorry Chairperson, I lost a few words there now with the rain. Can I just put these things up, if you would allow me.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have them on now, are you switched to the right channel?

MR MOMBERG: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Subsequent to this incident, did you have an occasion to speak to Brigadier Cronje about it, to find out how everything went awry, what happened to make the operation not to be successful? Did you make such follow ups with Brigadier Cronje?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, we spoke to Brigadier Cronje and the whole set up regarding the things that went wrong about the operation, were discussed. But at that stage, Brigadier Cronje knew just as much as we did. The knowledge that we got afterwards, we only received after McKenzie's return. Brigadier Cronje would have been just as speculative as I would have been, had he wanted to give me any answers as to why the operation had gone wrong.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, because he also I think, had something to say about the operative having been responsible for the detonation of the bomb, I am just trying to go through Bundle 2(H) to get the right reference to the evidence that was deposed to, that was tendered to this Committee by Brigadier Cronje, in relation to the explosion that occurred in Botswana. That is something that we will pursue after ...

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, he does say on page 6 something contrary to that

".... I don't know, but I have a suspicion which I can express here, that the bomb exploded when the secret compartment was opened and the light sensor was activated."

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Thank you Ms Lockhat. Mr Alberts, flowing from the questions put to Mr Momberg, by the Committee, do you have anything to re-examine him on?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR ALBERTS: Thank you Chairperson, I have a few questions, yes. Mr Momberg, if you page to page 114, that is the page in which the paragraph appears with which they have a few problems, let's start with that. If I understood your evidence correctly, you were on a nearby terrain ... (tape ends) ...

MR MOMBERG: Correct.

MR ALBERTS: Was there any communication from the side of the RSA with the operative in Botswana after McKenzie had crossed the border?

MR MOMBERG: I do not have any first hand knowledge, but there were communication channels between operative and handler in such operations.

MR ALBERTS: This specific place where you were, were there any means of communication available there?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, on the farm where we waited, there was a mobile communication centre which was established by the South African Defence Force, which monitored all the airwaves of Botswana, that is the public broadcaster, the Police channel as well as the Defence Force channel of Botswana. In other words discussions by the Botswana Defence Force, Botswana Police as well as the Botswana radio station and the public broadcaster, was monitored in order to remain abreast of what was going on in Botswana and to know exactly when the bomb would explode.

MR ALBERTS: And before the expiry of these five days, did it in any way come the knowledge of any Security Forces within the RSA that the plan had gone array?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, at one stage we did receive a report that the operative in Gaberone could not observe the vehicle.

MR ALBERTS: Do you know whether any instructions were then given to the operative as to what had to happen as a result of this fact?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, he gave a very definite instruction to search for the minibus.

MR ALBERTS: And do you know this to be a fact?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes. This is a fact.

MR ALBERTS: And now we know that after five days, the bomb was detonated. Do you know that to be a fact, and did you know it then to be a fact?

MR MOMBERG: Yes Chairperson, we received a report that a bomb had exploded in Botswana.

MR ALBERTS: Did you at that stage know that it was this specific car bomb?

MR MOMBERG: We did not know that it was this specific car bomb, but once again it was an inference which we made that it should be, or a deduction that we made that it should be this specific bomb.

MR ALBERTS: Did you at any stage thereafter, were there any specific facts which came to your knowledge which without any doubt could have made the manner of detonation, known?

MR MOMBERG: No.

MR ALBERTS: Your reference here to information which you received afterwards, is this only to do in the paragraph as it stands here, is it only about the consequences thereof or not?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct. The information which I refer you to here, is which was available to the media as well, newspapers, etc.

MR ALBERTS: And this was about death, injury and damage?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: And it was also as a result of this that the official complaint followed by the Botswana government?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct. If I understand your question correctly, the complaint followed on the bomb explosion and Botswana complained officially that it was due to the RSA.

MR ALBERTS: Can you indicate as to how much time it took of your time and that of your legal advisor, to compile this application of yours and when this was done?

MR MOMBERG: I do not have any specific times, but this application ...

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Alberts, that would be his own fault, there were two years in which he had time to do his application. I cannot see the relevance of that. Long periods of time were given to people. If somebody decided to do it at the last minute, it is his own fault.

MR ALBERTS: That may be so, but nevertheless it is still a factual question as to how much time was spent on compiling this application.

CHAIRPERSON: Where is this leading us to Mr Alberts?

MR ALBERTS: It is simply leading us to this point Chairperson, that - and it might purely be a question of argument in any event, nevertheless, if there is to be argument about this, then with respect, I am entitled to canvass facts which might be relevant to such an argument.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, so you want him to testify how an error was made in relation to that paragraph?

MR ALBERTS: Indeed.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed sir, but if you could just get to the point as fast as you can.

MR ALBERTS: Thank you Chairperson. Do you still remember the question?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I do. Although this amnesty application was handed in just before the cut off date, a tremendous amount of hours were spent on this application, long hours and we worked under great pressure, Mr Goosen, myself and our legal representatives, in order to get these applications completed in time. Therefore we often worked until well after midnight on these applications and that is the only reason that I can think of that it seems to you as if I am placing facts in front of you, which are actually deductions or inferences.

MR ALBERTS: Can you just indicate to the Committee as to the period of time, how many days it took for you to compile this application, your specific application?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, it was a matter of a week and a half if I remember correctly.

MR ALBERTS: Thank you. Lastly, was it a possibility or was it not, even on a reasonably theoretically basis, that this bomb could have exploded in another manner, other than detonation or one of the two manners that you sketched for us, in other words, if the vehicle had caught fire or had been involved in an accident? Was it a possibility?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, it was a vague possibility, but it was a possibility nevertheless.

MR ALBERTS: And did you envisage this?

MR MOMBERG: Yes we did.

MR ALBERTS: Did you think it was probable that something like this would happen?

MR MOMBERG: No, we did not. As a matter of fact, we hoped that something like that would not happen. One would like to exercise as much control as possible over any explosion.

MR ALBERTS: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ALBERTS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Lax, would like to put a question flowing from your re-examination.

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Momberg, you will recall that I asked you some questions about this very paragraph on page 114. I specifically asked you how did you know for example that this person searched for five days and so on, and all that stuff, and your answer was very specific. Your answer wasn't in line with the evidence that you have just given. Your answer was if I had been in that position, I would have done that, that is what I would have expected him to do and therefore I drew the deduction that that is what would have been, that was your answer. Why didn't you tell us what you have just told us now after questioning by your Counsel, which is a re-examination by your Counsel that you had specific knowledge that he got instructions to do that. You didn't tell us that at that stage.

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, it is very difficult to sit here and to tell everything exactly as it happened. I am sitting here and trying to explain my part in this operation to the Committee, and it may be that at one stage I leave things out and other times, I add things, but it is not being done with any malicious intent.

CHAIRPERSON: Fortunately we are able to correct this situation before we broke, and you were able to restate the facts as you remembered them better when you were questioned by Mr Alberts. I didn't get the name of the person who was instructed or who gave instruction to the operative to search for the vehicle, do you know?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson, I have no personal knowledge of that. I do know that the message came from the South African Defence Force that he had to look for the vehicle, but I do not know who gave the instruction.

CHAIRPERSON: When did that knowledge, when did you become aware of the fact that the operative was told to search for the vehicle in the event of it being lost? Did you become aware of this fact after the explosion or were you aware before the explosion, that this was part of the plan that in the event of the car disappearing, he were to search for it?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, no, it was not part of the plan, but during the period of time that we waited on the farm for something to happen, information came back to us that the vehicle was missing in Gaberone and that the man had been instructed or the operative, had been instructed to look for the vehicle. At that stage we were isolated on a farm, there was no free access to the farm. On that farm it was myself, Goosen and then that mobile communication centre of the Defence Force. We did not have access to our Security Branch, Zeerust, on a regular basis to know what was going on.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, to your knowledge Charl Naude was the guy who had taken up the planning of the operation in Botswana, is it not so?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And you would then infer that he is the one who might have communicated with the operator in Botswana with regard to searching for the vehicle and such other related matters?

MR MOMBERG: That is possible.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. And the Security Police as a whole, were not involved with anything that impinged on the execution of this operation in Botswana?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Momberg, you are excused.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: I know that Mr Visser is quickly looking at his time, to give an indication to us that it is almost time to take a lunch adjournment. We will take a 30 minute lunch adjournment.

MS LOCKHAT: All rise.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

MS LOCKHAT: (Microphone not on)

CHAIRPERSON: Is he late?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct Chairperson. We will proceed in Mr Du Plessis' absence. Mr Alberts, we are in your hands, who do we call next?

MR ALBERTS: The following applicant Chairperson, is Eric Goosen.