ON RESUMPTION
ERIC GOOSEN: (sworn states)
MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, if I can just come in here, I just want to mark the document "Gewysigde Bladsy 62", that is Mr Momberg's amendments, can we just mark that Exhibit N for the record. Is it not necessary Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: We don't think it is necessary to accept it as an Exhibit, it is an amendment of an already document.
MS LOCKHAT: Fine Chairperson, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
EXAMINATION BY MR ALBERTS: Chairperson, may I at the outset move for a similar amendment in respect of Mr Goosen. I beg leave to hand up the page concerning his application in this regard.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we will accept that amendment Mr Alberts.
MR ALBERTS: Thank you Chairperson.
MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, may I just apologise that Mr Britz and I weren't here when you came in. We had lots of problems with the people with the food and the availability thereof, and I have had a few fights with the people in there, so - but we apologise.
ADV DE JAGER: Are you apologising for having the fight or being late?
MR DU PLESSIS: No, I was quite justified in the fight we set up, because they do not seem to be in quite a rush to provide us with food, but we apologise that we were late.
CHAIRPERSON: Your apology is accepted Mr Du Plessis. Next time make sure that you have the fight ten minutes before we are to commence.
ADV DE JAGER: What is the paginated page of this - 45?
CHAIRPERSON: It is 45 Mr Alberts, is it not so?
MR ALBERTS: Indeed Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. You may proceed.
MR ALBERTS: Page 45. Chairperson, in this instance, Mr Goosen also prefers to testify in Afrikaans, so I will lead him in that language.
Mr Goosen, you applied for amnesty and your application is in the Bundle on page 1 and on, in fact up to page 62.27, is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct.
MR ALBERTS: Are you aware of the content of this application?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, that is correct.
MR ALBERTS: Do you confirm in general the correctness of the content?
MR GOOSEN: I confirm the correctness, yes.
MR ALBERTS: Once again your application consists of three components, the first is an introductory part, that gives an indication of your personal circumstances at the time within the South African Police, that is in general terms?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: And then for current purposes, the second part contains this specific incident for which you are applying, that is the bomb explosion in Botswana and then at the end you have a few comments in closing?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct.
MR ALBERTS: What was your rank in the Police at the time of the incident?
MR GOOSEN: I was a Sergeant.
MR ALBERTS: And where were you stationed?
MR GOOSEN: I was in the Security Branch, Northern Transvaal, Unit A.
MR ALBERTS: And that is the same Unit where Mr Momberg was, is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: Yes.
MR ALBERTS: Who was the Commander of that Unit?
MR GOOSEN: Brigadier Jack Cronje was the Commander of the Security Branch, Northern Transvaal.
MR ALBERTS: And who was the Commander of Unit A?
MR GOOSEN: If I remember correctly, it was Captain Fred Blauw at that stage.
MR ALBERTS: Was Mr Momberg also a member of Unit A?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, that is correct.
MR ALBERTS: Would you please have a look at page 45 of your application, that has now been amended, please turn to 46. Do you confirm that this incident occurred during March and April 1987?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, that is correct.
MR ALBERTS: Would you please just read to the Committee how it occurred that you became involved in this incident.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, yes. Lieutenant Momberg and myself at all relevant times, handled a certain informer, McKenzie and this informer was recruited in 1983 and initially he was used locally. During 1985, we succeeded in getting contact between him and Freddie Legoka, MK member, Gaberone and that led to the fact that he was recruited as a courier by MK and McKenzie then brought weapons and explosives into the Republic from Botswana. During March 1987 Momberg and myself were approached by Brigadier Cronje and we were informed that a meeting between us, Brigadier Wikus Loots, the Commander of the Security Branch, Western Transvaal and members of the South African Defence Force, Special Forces were organised to discuss a specific operation for the elimination of Victor Mnisi, Ernest Pule a member of MK Special Operations Group, Lusaka who was also the MK Co-ordinator for Botswana and one Lester Dumakode, a member of MK Special Operations Group at Lusaka and the responsible member for MK for smuggling weaponry via Botswana to the Republic.
MR ALBERTS: Could I just interject here, you mention Victor Mnisi, is that his correct name, full name?
MR GOOSEN: Victor Mnisi as reflected here in my application, is Johannes Mnisi and his MK name was Victor, MK Victor.
MR ALBERTS: You may continue on page 47.
MR GOOSEN: According to our information, the above-mentioned Mnisi was one of the chief planners of the Church Street bomb by the Poyntons Building during 1983, and he was also involved with many other serious acts of terror and on a continual basis, was involved with the continuing planning of acts of terror in the Republic. The aforementioned meeting took place at a site at Broederstroom Road, and Brigadier Cronje, Loots, Commandant Charl Naude of Special Forces, Lieutenants Hechter, Momberg and myself were present during this meeting. It was suggested that McKenzie's kombi had to be equipped with a motor bomb and that he should then have a meeting with these MK members in Gaberone at the Wade Adams industrial area. The planning was also that the bomb with which his vehicle would have been equipped, would explode in Gaberone during the meeting, as a result of detonation by means of a remote control device, which would be controlled by an operative from Special Forces. Part of this plan was the fact that this explosion would also mean the end of McKenzie. This aspect of the proposal was unacceptable for myself, Lieutenant Momberg and Hechter, and as a result thereof, we left the meeting and then also distanced ourselves from this plan in its totality.
MR ALBERTS: May I just interrupt here. According to the information at your disposal, it does seem that McKenzie was called to Botswana for a meeting with specific MK members, is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, that is correct. Telephone tapping was done at McKenzie's home, he received a call if I remember correctly, from Lester Dumakode, who gave him instructions to go to Botswana for serious discussions with him and the inference we made was that that had to do with more weaponry to be taken to the country.
MR ALBERTS: We now know that you had the first meeting where the planning was done, and you left it. What happened after that?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, after we left the meeting, we didn't return to the meeting. Myself, Momberg and Hechter stood on the stoep and had an informal discussion and the meeting then had to adjourn because the other people present, came from the room and with Brigadier Cronje, we then went back to Pretoria.
MR ALBERTS: What happened after that?
MR GOOSEN: The discussion in the vehicle of Brigadier Cronje was that we don't have to worry about McKenzie's well-being, other alternative plans would be put in place to ensure that he would not be hurt in this operation.
MR ALBERTS: We now know that there was a second meeting. Were you present?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, that is correct.
MR ALBERTS: Who else was present?
MR GOOSEN: At the second meeting it was - everyone was present with the exception of Hechter, everyone that I had already mentioned, and afterwards I couldn't remember it, but I heard afterwards that Major Crause was also present at the second meeting.
MR ALBERTS: Could you then continue on page 48.
MR GOOSEN: The meeting took - a second meeting was held at Hennops' Pride, the same people were once again present at this stage. We then agreed on a changed plan and this changed plan then held that McKenzie would not be a victim of the explosion, where the aim was to eliminate the MK members. After this plan had been finalised, McKenzie was introduced to the Special Forces member for identification purposes, to ensure that the plan then proceeds without problems.
MR ALBERTS: Could I interrupt you once again. It is quite clear that certain MK members were targeted, is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: Yes.
MR ALBERTS: How would those people be identified?
MR GOOSEN: They were well known to the operatives of the Special Forces or Security Forces in the Police. There was a terrorist photo album where the photo's of these specific MK members who had to be eliminated, appeared. At the time of the second meeting, if I remember correctly, some of these photo's of these MK members, were then handed to the Special Forces.
MR ALBERTS: So Special Forces would then be responsible for the identification of these people in Botswana?
MR GOOSEN: The MK people, yes.
MR ALBERTS: You may continue.
MR GOOSEN: McKenzie was never made aware of the fact that his vehicle would be equipped with a bomb. Lieutenant Momberg and myself told him that the vehicle would, or had to be equipped with a tapping device and we then under this pretext, got hold of his vehicle. It was handed over to the Special Forces and they then built the bomb into a false compartment which was already in the vehicle for the smuggling of weapons. A day or two later, we gave the vehicle back to McKenzie. The built in bomb could be detonated in one of two ways. The compartment in which it was housed, was equipped with a light sensitive switch and that would immediately detonate the bomb, the moment the compartment was opened, or the detonation could be done by means of the remote controlled device. MK's modus operandi with regard to the loading of weapons which had to be smuggled into the country, consisted of the fact that a vehicle would usually be taken from McKenzie in Gaberone and that the weapons would then be loaded at a secret place, that McKenzie didn't know and that the vehicle would then once again be given to McKenzie for his journey back to the Republic. Because of these arrangements that existed ...
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Goosen, you are reading your affidavit just too quickly for even the Translators to translate without seriously gasping for air. If you could just slower your pace with which you are reading your affidavit.
MR GOOSEN: I have taken note, Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: And also enable other people to hear in other languages, because they are also translating into various languages. You are also too quick even for my eyes, I can't keep pace with your reading.
MR GOOSEN: MK's modus operandi with regard to the loading of weapons, which had to be smuggled into the country, consisted thereof that the vehicle usually would be taken from McKenzie in Gaberone and that the weapons would then be loaded at a secret place, which was not known to McKenzie and that the vehicle would then be given back to McKenzie for his trip back to the Republic. Based on the arrangement that existed with regard to McKenzie's meeting of the mentioned targeted MK members, it was expected that those members would take McKenzie's vehicle for the purpose of loading the weapons that he had to smuggle back. Consequently the explosion would occur in the presence of these members when they would have tried to load the weapons. It was a fact that McKenzie did not necessarily bring weapons after every visit to Botswana, sometimes he only had to take messages. Should it then happen, there would not have been the opportunity for detonation of the bomb by means of the light sensitive switch and in that instance, it would have fallen back onto the alternative method of detonation that would then be by means of the remote control device, as soon as the opportunity arose.
MR ALBERTS: What would have been the opportune moment?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, we are aware of the fact that the Botswana Police quite often had roadblocks and should they then have taken McKenzie's vehicle for taking the weapons, and that they would have then come across a roadblock and that they would then have returned to the hotel where McKenzie was, there then would have been a situation where the targets then could have been involved in this explosion.
MR ALBERTS: Would an opportune moment then imply that the targets be present?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, that is correct.
MR ALBERTS: Could you then continue?
MR GOOSEN: Momberg and myself followed McKenzie at the beginning of April 1987, up to the Kopfontein border post. We accompanied him, and I activated the light sensitive switch and the transmitter unit without McKenzie knowing. He then crossed the border on the road to Gaberone for his meeting with the three targeted MK members. At that stage, Special Forces operative was already in Gaberone and his instruction was to always observe this vehicle.
CHAIRPERSON: May I interpose Mr Alberts, when you say at that stage the operative of Special Forces were already in Botswana, was that information given to you by Mr Charl Naude?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I can't say - Charl Naude didn't say this to me in person, but in the execution of the operation and McKenzie going to Gaberone, we were informed by Brigadier Cronje that Special Forces operative was in Gaberone.
CHAIRPERSON: You may continue.
MR GOOSEN: Before McKenzie could meet with the targeted MK members, he was stopped on the outskirts of Gaberone by MK members whom I did not know. They re-routed McKenzie to Francistown where he was abducted by the Dumakode, Pule and others.
CHAIRPERSON: May we interpose again. Are you talking about something that you personally witnessed?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I didn't see it personally. These facts given here in my application, came to the fore when McKenzie in 1992 was repatriated from the Quattro Camp and we then debriefed him.
ADV DE JAGER: So that is four, five years after the incident?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, it was only then that these facts came to light, and that was that he was re-routed. That was what he said.
MR ALBERTS: Were you personally involved with the debriefing of McKenzie when he returned approximately 1992?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, yes, that is correct. I was responsible to meet him at Jan Smuts airport with the repatriation and thereafter I met him at the Springbok hotel and from there, we made arrangements to debrief him in Pretoria for approximately a week.
ADV DE JAGER: So if one looks at the chronological order, you would have said that McKenzie disappeared, you don't know where he was?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct.
ADV DE JAGER: And when did you find out that McKenzie was somewhere, and that he was alive?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, there was a lot of speculation, it could perhaps be that he did not return, that he turned around, that he started working with the ANC, in other words that he became a double agent, it could have been that - there are a variety of factors which led to the fact that we didn't precisely know where McKenzie was.
ADV DE JAGER: When did you for the first time, not you personally, when did you get to know that he was abducted?
MR GOOSEN: That was during the debriefing in 1992 after he had been repatriated from Quattro.
CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed Mr Alberts.
MR ALBERTS: Thank you Mr Goosen, will you proceed.
MR GOOSEN: It became clear that MK had already found out before the time that McKenzie was an informer of the Security Police. This state of affairs threw the whole operation into chaos. The Special Forces operative never saw the vehicle when it arrived at Gaberone and as a result, he launched an intensive search for it.
MR ALBERTS: May I just interrupt you here. How did these facts which you have just testified to, come to your knowledge?
MR GOOSEN: As Momberg has also said in his evidence, on the safe terrain of the Western Transvaal, there was a mobile radio vehicle of Special Forces. There was also an operative on a hill with a sender, which as I understood it, received the messages from the operative's line to that person. That person would re-route it to the vehicle, the mobile vehicle and after McKenzie had gone across the border and the explosion did not take place within a day or two, this message reached the mobile unit that the vehicle had never been seen by the ...
ADV DE JAGER: You know what hearsay evidence is. Did you hear this with your own ears or did you hear it from one of the operatives?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, these were things that were told to me by the Special Forces operatives.
ADV DE JAGER: To you?
MR GOOSEN: No, I did not hear the message personally.
MR ALBERTS: So what you are saying, rests on hearsay is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: Yes.
MR ALBERTS: Will you just continue with your evidence?
MR GOOSEN: Approximately five days later, he saw McKenzie's vehicle by chance in a residential area of Gaberone and he immediately detonated the bomb by means of the remote controlled device.
ADV DE JAGER: Why do you say in his silliness, stupidity?
MR GOOSEN: At that moment the message was re-launched or resent to Special Forces. It was sent to the operative that that vehicle had to be searched for and found under all circumstances in Botswana and on plus minus the fourth or fifth day, once again, based on hearsay did not hear the radio message, but we were still on the safe terrain of the Western Transvaal. It was mentioned that the vehicle had been found by the operative.
ADV DE JAGER: But you haven't answered my question, why do you say that in his thoughtlessness, that he pressed this button?
MR GOOSEN: It was my deduction at the time of the compilation of this amnesty application as far as I knew, and the deduction that I had made at that time, that the car bomb was exploded as a result of detonation by this operative.
ADV DE JAGER: But why do you say that he did it thoughtlessly, why didn't he do it on purpose, who says he didn't see the people there?
MR GOOSEN: I cannot give an answer to this, but we knew that the arms cache was on the outskirts of Gaberone and this explosion apparently took place in a residential area.
MR LAX: Sorry, with the greatest of respect, you didn't know where the place was, McKenzie didn't know where the place was. You were guessing that it might be in the outskirts, some area beyond Gaberone, but it could just as easily have been right in the middle of a township, right in Gaberone, it could have been in a built up area, that they may have waited a suitable period, this is all total speculation? You don't know where or when or how or anything that this might have happened? All you know is what he told you?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, and the deduction that we made about the time that they took as regards when they took the bus until when they handed it back, gave us the indication that it was not in the immediate vicinity of Gaberone, but we could have been wrong in that regard.
MR ALBERTS: And the deductions, if I understand you correctly, can we accept that this was also based on hearsay evidence?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct.
MR ALBERTS: Did you also hear what the consequences of the explosion was?
MR GOOSEN: The initial was that an explosion had taken place in Gaberone, at that stage we were not one hundred percent sure as to whether it was the car bomb, and later from the media reports, in the newspaper and on the news, we heard that it was the car bomb which had exploded.
MR ALBERTS: Was this at the stage when the explosion took place when the operative of the Special Forces found the vehicle?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct.
MR ALBERTS: And afterwards, did you find out, we all know today, that there were lives involved, personal injuries were done and property was damaged and that it could be that all these people who suffered, were innocent?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct.
MR ALBERTS: Was it part of your planning that they were to be involved?
MR GOOSEN: No, the initial planning was aimed at the three identified MK members, Pule, Dumakode and Mnisi. But I could have envisaged that something could have gone wrong if one sent in a car bomb, and that innocent people could also have been injured or killed in such an explosion. But this was not part of the planning or the reaching of our objective.
CHAIRPERSON: May I interpose Mr Alberts? This really is what concerns me Mr Goosen, when a question is put to you by your Counsel to find out if the injury to other people, other than the three targeted MK operatives, was ever foreseen by you and you respond by saying no, you intended that the targets should be contained in that only Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode should be the victims of the explosion and no one else, when in fact from the evidence you have given before this Committee, you did not know who would load the weapons in the vehicle, you did not know whether it would be Mnisi, Dumakode or Pule who would do the loading of the weapons, how could you say that you never foresaw that people other than Mnisi would end up being the object of your attack?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, if I can react to this in this way and reply to your statement, to some extent we did envisage that at the arms cache, that other MK members could also have been killed or injured in the explosion, others than the three targeted MK members, and with the building of a car bomb and the extent to which McKenzie's kombi was changed, one can also in all reasonableness envisage that there is no safeguard with any such switch and such an explosive device, that it would affect any other targets, other than the three targeted persons.
CHAIRPERSON: Proceed Mr Alberts.
MR ALBERTS: As it pleases you. But if I understand you correctly, despite the fact that you envisaged that others could also have been injured, this was not part of your planning and your planning only aimed at the three targets?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, the primary objective was to eliminate the three identified MK members in the explosion.
MR ALBERTS: But nevertheless one could have envisaged that others could have been hurt as well, and that is the type of risk of such a bomb, is that not so?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, with the extent of such an explosive device, one has no guarantee which exempts you from the fact that anybody else could also be hurt or killed in the process.
MR ALBERTS: No guarantee that it would not happen?
MR GOOSEN: One cannot foresee or envisage that it will not happen.
MR ALBERTS: ... it's the rest of your application. On page 52 and further you mention the fact that according to your information Botswana citizens were injured and that damage was incurred to property. These people were unknown to you I accept?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, that's correct.
MR ALBERTS: Did you at any stage after the conclusion of this operation, speak to anyone of Special Forces who was involved with this or who could have had any knowledge of this? Did you have anything to do with them?
MR GOOSEN: No, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: In your unit or in Security Branch Northern Transvaal, according to your knowledge, was any attempt made to determine exactly why the operation failed or went wrong and what the final consequences or results were?
MR GOOSEN: I have no personal knowledge that any steps were taken after the operation and what the nature of the discussions would have been, so I can only speculate on that.
MR ALBERTS: Would those kinds of attempts - in any case they have been handled with on the level that you were at that stage, namely that of Sergeant?
MR GOOSEN: No.
MR ALBERTS: Would it have been dealt with on the level of Lieutenant Momberg?
MR GOOSEN: No.
MR ALBERTS: Since then and specifically at the time of the compilation of your application which now serves before the Committee, to the present time have you had any discussions or anything to do with members of the Special Forces?
MR GOOSEN: No, Chairperson, simply because I did not have any knowledge of who the members of the Special Forces were at that stage. I had no way of making contact with them. I have no knowledge of particulars, telephone numbers, addresses or any way in which I can correspond with them.
MR ALBERTS: Why I'm specifically asking you this is as a result of the problems which Lieutenant Momberg had with regard to deductions that he made as to what happened then, that there could possibly be the perception that you and he, or at least he can co-operate here to possibly try to protect somebody who has not been incriminated by name here?
MR GOOSEN: No Chairperson, there is no possibility of that option.
MR ALBERTS: Because we know that Commander Charl Naude, who is the one member who you mention here expressly and who has also been mentioned by Mr Momberg, that he was involved. Are you aware of the identity of anyone else of the Special Forces?
MR GOOSEN: No.
MR ALBERTS: ... who was involved here?
MR GOOSEN: No.
MR ALBERTS: In any way whatsoever?
MR GOOSEN: Not at all.
ADV DE JAGER: Was Charl Naude introduced to you by name?
MR GOOSEN: That's correct. During the meeting he was introduced to me as Commander Charl Naude.
ADV DE JAGER: So there was no secrecy about who he was?
MR GOOSEN: No, because everyone's true identities were revealed there, mine, Goosen's and Charl Naude.
MR ALBERTS: Just to step down from this subject, would you please page to page 53 of your application. There you mention in paragraph 10(a), the political objective which was the purpose of this operation, do you confirm that?
MR GOOSEN: I do.
MR ALBERTS: It was the general objective, namely this one which is mentioned in 10 as I have it, which was the same with all the operations in which you were involved in the Security Branch Northern Transvaal.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct.
MR ALBERTS: In paragraph 10(b) you give your motivation for the political objective, which deals with this application and this incident, in particular do you confirm the correctness thereof?
MR GOOSEN: I do.
MR ALBERTS: You also have knowledge of Brigadier Cronje's application for amnesty which has served before this Committee?
MR GOOSEN: That's correct.
MR ALBERTS: And do you know what his motivation in general was?
MR GOOSEN: I did read through his pieces and I agree with the contents thereof.
MR ALBERTS: This motivation of yours continues to page 54 of your application, will you just for purposes of the record confirm this?
MR GOOSEN: I confirm this.
MR ALBERTS: And lastly, from the contents of page 55 it seems that you were in the direct instruction of a senior officer.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct.
MR ALBERTS: And who was that?
MR GOOSEN: I was acting in direct instruction of Brigadier Jack Cronje.
MR ALBERTS: And lastly, for purposes of the record I just want to refer you to the remaining parts of your application which have been included here. Not everything has direct relation to this incident, but specifically the contents of pages 197, 198, that would paginated pages 55 and further, is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: That's correct.
MR ALBERTS: Lastly, we now know that innocent people were involved and injured as a result of this operation, what are your sentiments in this regard?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I regard the incident as a pitiful event, it was not part of the operation that innocent civilians of Botswana were to be injured or killed in this operation. I want to express my sympathy to those families and to justify my part in this, that is was not part of the planning.
MR ALBERTS: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions at this stage.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ALBERTS
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Alberts. Mr Visser, do you have any questions to put to Mr Goosen.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you, yes Chairperson.
As we now understand the informer, McKenzie, gave you information and you made a recording of a telephone call between him and Dumakude, is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: Yes.
MR VISSER: Just for the record it's D-U-M-A-K-U-D-E, Chairperson.
You say that thereafter a meeting took place.
MR GOOSEN: That's correct.
MR VISSER: At the end of the testimony you also said that you acted on instruction of Brigadier Cronje.
MR GOOSEN: That's correct.
MR VISSER: What was this instruction that you are referring to specifically, what did he tell you to do?
MR GOOSEN: The instruction or the order was to keep ourselves prepared and to attend a meeting later that evening.
MR VISSER: Yes, and at the meeting were any further instructions given?
MR GOOSEN: No definite instructions were given to me, Momberg or Hechter. The meeting was mainly led by Brigadiers Cronje, Loots and Commander Charl Naude.
MR VISSER: And at the next meeting the next evening when they decided that McKenzie was not to be killed or injured in the explosion, was your duty merely to make the information and the source itself as a vehicle in which to execute this operation?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct that McKenzie was the means to the whole objective. - and the second meeting took place during the day, just for record purposes.
MR VISSER: Am I correct if I say the Security Branch's involvement here was very slight, it actually went about the fact that you had a source who went to Botswana.
MR GOOSEN: The latter is correct. As regards the real context of the stated question, I cannot react to that because at that stage my rank would not have justified me having any such information.
MR VISSER: Yes, but what we are talking about is that Special Forces would have made the bomb, built it in the car and detonated it and monitor the situation in Botswana. You had no control over this?
MR GOOSEN: That's correct.
MR VISSER: The other aspect is, when during the planning there was spoken about who the targets were to be, Brigadier Loots told me that a first prize would have been Johannes Mnisi, Dumakude or Pule, but it was also aimed at any MK members.
MR GOOSEN: That's correct.
MR VISSER: Crause, as you have already said, was not present at the first meeting but at the second meeting. Would you agree if I put it to you that his duty was to ensure that things go smoothly at the border post and to ensure that the kombi goes through.
MR GOOSEN: Those facts, I could not recall that, but I wouldn't argue with them.
MR VISSER: The people who were to load the weapons, if we now speak about the light sensitive switch of yours, would you accept, as the Chairperson has also put it, that it would not necessarily be Mnisi, Dumakude or Pule, but also any other MK operatives?
MR GOOSEN: That's correct.
MR VISSER: Who did you report back to after you returned?
MR GOOSEN: To Brigadier Jack Cronje. We reported that an explosion had taken place. Further aspects which were taken by Brigadier Cronje on that, I cannot comment on.
MR VISSER: I did not ask you about that either. I have no further questions, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Chairperson.
Captain Hechter was only present in the first meeting.
MR GOOSEN: That's correct.
MR DU PLESSIS: And thereafter, did he have anything to do with the operation?
MR GOOSEN: Nothing whatsoever.
MR DU PLESSIS: And he knew nothing about the operation?
MR GOOSEN: No.
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS
ADV DE JAGER: And at the first meeting the operation was not agreed to?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, no finality was reached during the first meeting, regarding the continued planning and execution of a plan of action.
ADV DE JAGER: But as I understood it, you and Hechter left, you disassociated yourself with the plan.
MR GOOSEN: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Mr Goosen, did you activate the bomb the first time in the vehicle, McKenzie's car?
MR GOOSEN: That is true. At the border post on the RSA's side when McKenzie handed in his travel documents for purposes of leaving the country I walked to his minibus and activated the bomb.
MS LOCKHAT: You also knew how to deactivate the bomb, is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct.
MS LOCKHAT: You also had an instrument to deactivate the bomb, is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: That's correct, it is known as a sock, which goes in and out of a hole just like those used in earphones.
MS LOCKHAT: So how did you know how to activate the bomb, to deactivate the bomb, who showed you this, wasn't this bomb made by Special Forces? How did you know to do all of this? Please comment on that.
MR GOOSEN: Special Forces did build the bomb. Lieutenant Momberg and I personally took receipt of the kombi at Special Forces from Charl Naude, who then showed us where the arming device had been placed on the steering column.
MS LOCKHAT: You say there was radio contact between yourselves and then the operative in Botswana, is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: No, that's not correct. Ourselves will mean that this includes me or the police, that would not be correct, the communication which is being referred to here is communication between the Special Force operative in Botswana and Special Force member who were placed in the control area of the RSA.
MS LOCKHAT: But you could get information to wherever you were, is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: If one requested information I accept that one would be able to obtain that information from members of the Special Forces.
ADV DE JAGER: But you could also send information out, you could make contact with people outside?
MR GOOSEN: Not in our personal capacities, Chairperson.
MS LOCKHAT: It did come to your knowledge that the operative in Botswana, that there was a problem, McKenzie wasn't there, they couldn't track down the vehicle, they informed that they were, you were informed that they instructed the operative to them go and look for this vehicle, is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: That's correct, based on hearsay and things that were told to us on the farm just outside Kopfontein.
MS LOCKHAT: Was it possible, seen in that five days, that it was five days since the kombi went into Botswana, was it possible to actually deactivate this bomb? Was it possible for them to contact you or you to contact them to instruct them not to proceed if these operatives were not found, the MK operatives, was that possible?
MR GOOSEN: I can just react by saying that in this instance no, because I had the specific sock with which I activated the vehicle. The one reason for us staying there was that if the bomb for one or other reason were not to detonate and the minibus were to come back, that Lieutenant Momberg and I would be in a position to render it harmless.
MS LOCKHAT: So you could actually only deactivate once that bus comes in, back into the RSA?
MR GOOSEN: That's correct, and at that stage we did not have passports to enter Botswana in any case.
CHAIRPERSON: Is that a plausible reason to give, Mr Goosen? I'm sure if you would have wanted to obtain a passport as a member of the Security Branch, you would have been able to do so in a jiffy. Isn't the crux of the matter the fact that you had no control over the operation whilst the car was in Botswana?
MR GOOSEN: That's correct, Chair.
MS LOCKHAT: I have no further questions, Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Alberts, do you have any re-exam to do?
MR ALBERTS: I have no further questions at this stage, Chairperson. In other words, questions following upon the questions by my colleagues or Ms Lockhat. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: So Alberts has no re-examination. Mr Lax do you have any questions to put to Mr Goosen? Mr Lax has no questions to put to you, Mr Goosen. Advocate de Jager?
Mr Goosen, you are excused.
MR GOOSEN: Thank you, Chairperson.
WITNESS EXCUSED
