CHAIRPERSON: ... Mr du Plessis. I have spoken to certain people, and think that it would probably be desirable that we adjourn at half past three this afternoon. There may be a lot of traffic going to the airport, and I gather quite a lot of people are catching planes this afternoon. Does that suit all of you? Very well.
EUGENE DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: (cont)
Thank you, Mr Chairman. It's Jan Wagener speaking and I will proceed with my cross-examination of Mr de Kock.
Mr de Kock, on this which I omitted, could you give us an indication of until when you were the Commander of Vlakplaas?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was the Commander until my retirement by means of package, until March or the end of March 1993.
MR WAGENER: Did the command of Vlakplaas not transfer on the 1st of February 1991, to Mr Baker?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Vlakplaas still existed as a group. It was divided and there were two other fundamental farms, apart from Vlakplaas and while Baker stayed at Vlakplaas, the others diversified. However, I still occupied the highest rank and I was the de facto Commander of C1.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, my instructions are that from the 1st of February 1991, you were no longer the Commander of Vlakplaas.
MR DE KOCK: That is not correct, Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: And that it was Mr Baker.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he worked from Vlakplaas and he was the Commander of the specific group, however I was still the Head of C1. There was no other appointment for the Head of C1, I was still the Head of C1.
MR WAGENER: Please don't misunderstand me. That you were the Commander of C1 is something that I will accept, but I'm proposing that you were no longer the Commander of Vlakplaas.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it's simply an issue of distance between two premises. I had access to Vlakplaas at all times and if I wanted to work from there, I would have done so without requesting this from Mr Baker. As a result of etiquette one would have requested it, or requested his permission, but furthermore I was fully authorised to launch operations from Vlakplaas or to store weapons at Vlakplaas, or whatever I wanted to do.
MR WAGENER: Then just a few final aspects, one of them being that you gave colourful evidence here yesterday, regarding how General Engelbrecht would have covered up evidence according to you. In your evidence during this hearing, in this relation, you have referred to certain examples. It is not my objective to take you through each and every one of those examples, however I would like to pause at one or two of these examples, for a brief moment.
You gave evidence about the incident, the incident which is referred to as the Nelspruit incident, if I'm correct.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.
MR WAGENER: I accept that we understand each other regarding which incident this is, there is no uncertainty here?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: And it was your evidence that with this incident, General Engelbrecht was the one who covered it up - at least I'm not certain about the exact vocabulary that you used, but it was something to that effect.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: Is it correct that this shooting incident took place in the middle of the night?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I wouldn't say it was the middle of the night, I would have said it was early morning, Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: Approximately 2 o'clock in the night?
MR DE KOCK: Well, that would be early morning, Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: Very well, early morning, 2 o'clock in the night. Is it correct that a local senior police officer from Nelspruit, and I mean that he was then a Colonel Alberts, was on the scene after approximately a half an hour?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not certain of the exact time. I cannot give you a time factor here. However, there was such a Colonel who arrived there.
MR WAGENER: And that there and then on the scene a relation was give to him of what would have happened?
MR DE KOCK: No, that is not correct, Chairperson. I gave him no version of the events, it wasn't possible for me. This Colonel came walking up to me and I referred him to Captain ...
MR WAGENER: Geldenhuys?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, to Captain Geldenhuys, because I didn't have the capacity or the authority to explain the situation because I wasn't completely informed about the situation.
MR WAGENER: Yes. I would just like to state it clearly that it wasn't necessarily you who would have put this version to him, but that within half an hour he arrived at the scene and that he found members of your unit there and that a version was put to him there and then regarding what would have taken place during this incident.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I wasn't present when the version was put to him, and I wouldn't like to speculate about it.
MR WAGENER: I put it to you that this was the case, can you deny it?
MR DE KOCK: I would deny it because I wasn't present when the version was put to him.
MR WAGENER: Thus you deny it?
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: It's not being put as I understand it, that you put the version to him, it's that someone else put the version to him. How can you deny it if you weren't there?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, let me just clarify this. When Colonel Alberts arrived by me, I referred him to Captain Geldenhuys and referred him to this person for an explanation as a senior person who was on the scene. I cannot tell you what Captain Geldenhuys' version was.
MR WAGENER: Yes, I accept that. The only statement that I'm making is that Colonel Alberts was already given a version there and then, about involved members at the scene, regarding what happened. That he would have put this on paper and that later - and this would be during your criminal trial, I'm not certain whether it was your criminal trial or whether it was the trial about this incident, but that he later gave evidence about this in Court.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he did give evidence about this before me.
MR WAGENER: Now the question is this naturally, Mr de Kock, here we already have a version immediately after the time - perhaps I should just put this to you first of all, General Engelbrecht wasn't there that night?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he arrived there later that morning, during the early morning, - if I might put it like that. I would say between 7 o'clock and 8 o'clock or 7 o'clock and 9 o'clock.
MR WAGENER: Yes. My instructions are that he was there approximately at noon on the following day.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not certain. That is my recollection of the time that he was there.
MR WAGENER: Anyway, when he arrived there, there was already a version which had been told by the members who were on the scene and this was the version that they told to Colonel Alberts.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that would be probable.
MR WAGENER: Was Colonel Alberts a security policeman?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: Now Mr de Kock, how must General Engelbrecht amend or manipulate or adjust a version after the time, after your members have already given a version there and then on the scene?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the morning that General Engelbrecht arrived at the scene I went to him and told him that things had happened here which weren't right, things had happened here which would create problems. In other words, problems for the unit, problems for C1 and naturally then problems for the Security Police and the SAP, in particular.
And from my evidence which was given, or at least not my evidence but evidence from one of the others, the other witnesses from the unit, I would Sergeant Holtzhauzen, General Engelbrecht then mentioned to the members that nobody should make any statements on that day, and no statements were made on that day, as what was the due process after such an incident. Such statements were only made later, approximately a week or a month later here in Pretoria at the covert house from where we worked.
And General Engelbrecht arrived there and he synchronised all these statements from Holtzhauzen, Geldenhuys and the others. Thus, no statements were made at the scene of the incident, or taken down by Colonel Alberts at the scene of the incident. As far as I can recall, certain amendments were brought to the shooting report, with regard to the use of ammunition.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, my instructions are, and I put it to you that General Engelbrecht
(1) was not in a position to amend the version which was already given at the scene and;
(2) that subsequently, as a result of his involvement, did not amend any evidence in an illegitimate fashion or manipulate or cover up such evidence.
MR DE KOCK: I will stand by my version here, it is correct.
MR WAGENER: Just another case that I want to refer you to, the case of Japie Maponya. Is it correct that members of your unit, and I include you in this, that members of your unit made statements to Adv McNally, when he and General Conradie were appointed for their investigation at the end of 1989?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I do recall that. It is vague, but I recall making such statement.
MR WAGENER: Yes, those are my instructions, that you made statements which were in fact dictated by Adv McNally.
MR DE KOCK: Well I don't know whether or not he dictated it. We made the statements. I would just like to clarify however how that situation operated at that stage. Adv McNally was not aware of it, and also not General Conradie, but these statements and interviews took place in the office of the Head of the Investigative Branch, which was a adjacent to the Security Police Head Office and there was a tapping device which was installed in the office where Adv McNally and General Conradie and our members were and the rest of us who still had to make affidavits were sitting on the security side of the building and listening to what was happening there. The entire thing was orchestrated and manipulated.
MR WAGENER: So you made false affidavits to Adv McNally?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is obvious.
MR WAGENER: And a few months later during the Harms Commission, you once again made affidavits to your own legal representatives.
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson. That was before we went to the legal representatives. As I stated yesterday there was a euphemism, we held school. We would look at where the gaps were in our stories and where there could be documentary evidence of something which could indicate something else, and after that we went to the legal representatives.
MR WAGENER: And that was the legal team under the leadership of Adv Sam Maritz of the Pretoria Bar?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: Is that what you're speaking of?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. Sam Maritz and the others were all misled. If we had told them the truth they would have had to withdraw or they would have had to make it public and that was not expected of them.
MR WAGENER: And after the Harms Commission there was a post-mortem inquest?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.
MR WAGENER: And you and your members once again made affidavits regarding the dossier.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know whether or not we made new statements or whether we used the statements that we made for the Harms Commission.
MR WAGENER: Whatever the case may be, is it correct that the same false version which you gave in the first case to Adv McNally, was put through to the Harms Commission and later the same version was put to the post-mortem inquest, before a Magistrate from Pretoria?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, with the assistance of General Engelbrecht and General van Rensburg and the others, we succeeded in this. The interest was of such that when Warrant Officer Nortje and I waited at the Pretoria Court to give evidence, we were visited by General Johan le Roux and we were congratulated and only the best was wished to us, and he told us that we would be able to succeed with this case, which we did.
MR WAGENER: Yes, now you're dragging somebody else into this whole story, General Johan le Roux, that's not necessary. We all know what the condition of his own amnesty application is. The Japie Maponya matter will be the subject of a later amnesty hearing, so I'm not going to dwell upon that right now. What I'm trying to say, Mr de Kock, is that the deception of the Court is exactly the same line that you and your men had taken from the time of the very first affidavits that you made before Adv McNally in 1989.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, within necessary expertise to help us through it, Chairperson, and precisely from the side of the Generals and the police. I did however go at that stage and make statements, or I made these statements when Judge Goldstone proposed this to me. I had done that Mr Wagener's clients would all be in jail right now and they would be sitting without the benefits of medical aid and pension. That's basically my summary of the events.
MR WAGENER: Yes, this is all very interesting. Is it your evidence that General Engelbrecht manipulated the version and the evidence before the post-mortem inquest, that he covered it up and manipulated it?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, by the time we arrived at Court, all those things had been arranged.
MR WAGENER: When did he do this, according to you?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, from when General Engelbrecht came in among others, he was, or after he took over at least, or when he became the successor to this cover-up he continued among others, to investigate the Japie Maponya situation further, to such an extent that - and I'm just going to repeat the evidence of Nortje, that he sent Nortje to Krugersdorp to fetch a register there which was in use during the Maponya incident. Warrant Officer Nortje returned and gave this to him, to Engelbrecht, and consequently it was destroyed because it was quite a deadly piece of evidence.
Furthermore, there was also manipulation of the work register or work charts of Japie Maponya, where he worked at the bank. This was also done by Engelbrecht. ...(intervention)
MR WAGENER: I beg your pardon. I'm sorry, I interrupted you.
MR DE KOCK: No, you haven't, I'm finished.
MR WAGENER: Thus do I understand you correctly, that you yourselves decided to lie to McNally, that this wasn't Engelbrecht's idea, that he inherited it as such and that he continued with it? Would that be your evidence?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we are not speaking here of inheritance in the sense that you don't know where these things come from and that you are purely fortunate or lucky.
From the very first day it was an absolute crisis and from that point on it was a situation of permanent crisis management. Not only myself, but Joe Mamasela and all these persons were told from the very beginning "You don't know anything" - the English word for that is "stonewalling", and we kept to that.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, my instructions are that you and your men decided to lie to McNally, and that General Engelbrecht at that stage had absolutely nothing to do with it.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was a very simple situation for Engelbrecht and for Conradie. There was enough or sufficient other documentary evidence which would indicate that we were involved, but they would have had to arrest other Generals and probably a few Brigadiers as well.
MR WAGENER: Yes, I will deal with your obsession later, with regard to the Generals. It seems to me to be a very important aspect to you.
Just to conclude with Maponya. General Engelbrecht denies that during the later course of events he covered up any evidence as you have put it, or manipulated any evidence and that this is purely the idea of you and your men and that you are trying to involve him maliciously in a matter in which he cannot be culpable.
MR DE KOCK: My evidence during my own trial and even here yesterday has never shown any malice towards Engelbrecht. I have never wished anything malicious for him or spoken maliciously to him. I did not refer to him in any derogatory manner, I have always had the most time and respect for him and it will continue as such. I understand his modus operandi of denial, it's nothing new. This has been going on for years.
MR WAGENER: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: And you have the full respect for this man whose modus operandi of denial has been going for years, is that what you're telling us?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, not because he remained silent, but because he was a really good investigator, he was a good officer. He was a good person who was drawn into things which, according to my belief I don't think he agreed with but for the greater interests of the SAP and the country, he decided to become involved with and then offered further assistance in order to protect the country.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, I will come back to this aspect of your evidence where you put these wild unsubstantiated allegations about people, specifically Generals, based upon no proof whatsoever. I will return to that.
Just to return to the whole financial aspect, I would just like to ask you two or three questions. Last week you gave comprehensive evidence about the financial set-up at Vlakplaas and how false claims were used in order to finance numerous aspects. - if I might express it that way. Can you recall this?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: You even went as far as saying that in this manner, by means of false claims, you purchased furniture for the Minister?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that's correct.
MR WAGENER: Now how on earth did you get that right, were you the furniture supplier for the Minister?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I was the person who provided the funds from the Secret Fund and it went to Colonel Koekemoer who was the Head of the Financial Division and then they would have made these purchases. However, at a certain stage I did provide furniture and I purchased furniture for Colonel Herman du Plessis, who was General Nick van Rensburg's second-in-command. This was furniture that suited his managerial status. It was worth approximately R18-20 000. The money for this furniture was also obtained by means of false claims.
MR WAGENER: Well let us just keep to this matter of the furniture supply business for the Minister. Did you visit the Minister and see that his furniture wasn't up to standard and decided to purchase some new furniture for him, how did this happen?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, Colonel Louis Koekemoer as he did many times in the past, lodged a request and he also gave me the reasons for his request for this money.
MR WAGENER: So it all boiled down to the idea that the Ministry of Law and Order, if they wanted new furniture for the Minister, didn't have access to the usual budgeted funds which they could use to purchase furniture for the Minister, and they had to go over into a process during which policemen would literally steal money in order to buy furniture for the Minister, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know what the situation at the Department of Law and Order was, however I did obtain the money for those purposes by means of false claims.
MR WAGENER: With the greatest of respect, Mr de Kock, if you believed that that was how the Minister was supposed to obtain furniture, then you would also believe in Father Xmas and the fairies, really.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, since the age of four I have not believed in Father Xmas.
MR WAGENER: Well I am putting it to you that this is absurd. It is absurd that this was the manner in which a department had to obtain furniture for its Minister.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I will reiterate this. This is the reason why I put in these false claims and I had no reason, or at least I was never informed and I never asked Mr Koekemoer, and he never told me any mis-truth about why he required this money.
MR WAGENER: And without going into too much detail, I'm putting it to you that it is equally absurd that many of the other previous examples that you have given by means of which certain apparatus or equipment had to be purchased, that this was done with stolen money. The police could have done so by means of the usual budget process and using State funds.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know, I just deal with the requests that were put to me, I executed them and that is why I mentioned those situations. There is no other reason for this.
CHAIRPERSON: I just want to clarify something in my own mind. When Colonel Koekemoer came to you, this was furniture for the Minister's office was it?
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: There's no suggestion of any personal benefit for the Minister?
MR DE KOCK: No, there was no personal benefit for the Minister. I just want to confirm further that when Colonel du Plessis left the Force, that furniture remained behind at the Security Office, he didn't take it home or attempt to sell it.
CHAIRPERSON: And I take it that the furniture would appear on the records of the Department ...(intervention)
MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: ... as the normal way in Government offices? It is an inventory of the contents of offices.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, annually those items would have to be accounted for because otherwise what were they doing in the office? However, I don't have any record of that.
MR WAGENER: And I also accept, Mr de Kock, that you are aware of the normal Civil Service practice, that there are committees responsible for - I think they use the word "Procurement Administration", and they're usually responsible for buying equipment and furniture and so forth. Are you aware of such a process?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I only have knowledge of the Department of Public Works. They provided the furniture. I don't know the rest, it wasn't my field.
MR WAGENER: And then just to add to the question of the Chairperson. This component of a department, and in this case your department, would then have to account for all the equipment and furniture, that it is on a register and so forth?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I had no record and I never gave record. I can give you an example where we had bought 4 .22 Ruger pistols with silencers and telescopes and that was bought by means of the Secret Fund, and these pistols were used in covert operations.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, I find that you every time try to talk away from the furniture. Every time when I refer to the Minister's furniture, it's either Colonel du Plessis' furniture or pistols. I'm just trying to indicate the absurdity concerning the furniture for the Minister, and every time your answer tries to take it away from that.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I maintain what I have said, it is correct as I have put it. If Mr Wagener wants to see it as being absurd he is welcome to do that.
MR WAGENER: Another instance of claims. You testified about funds which were given to Joe Mamasela during the Harms Commission, by means of false claims.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: Are you quite certain that it was by means of false claims?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because I wrote out false claims and I only received the receipts, I didn't even receive the money.
MR WAGENER: My instructions are, Mr de Kock - and once again I'm going to give some evidence, as State Attorney I had instructions concerning the claims of Mamasela, whether it could be paid from the special account. Are you aware of that?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, as far as I can recall Mr Baker and myself wrote false claims from the Secret Fund to keep Mamasela within the framework.
MR WAGENER: Are you aware of the fact that there was legal opinion given that these monies could be paid from this fund?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did not have knowledge of that. The claims that I submitted were not for Mr Mamasela and then the reference for the approval with the operation number, these claims were written out by means of a so-called fund for two limpet mines or three weapons and the amount was then given for the purpose thereof - well to keep Mamasela within the framework.
MR WAGENER: I want to put it to you that there was official authority requested and it was given for these claims and that it wasn't necessary to steal the State's money for this. It would have been a normal transaction.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that was most probably how it had to work, but that is not how it happened and I did write out false claims for Joe Mamasela, and it was on more than one occasion.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, then I also just briefly want to address issues concerning your own application for amnesty. I noticed that, I think the last 20/25 incidents in your amnesty application are all incidents where you yourself were not involved, where you did not commit any offence, but where you had heard stories from other people and on the basis thereof you then thought that it would good to apply for amnesty. Can you remember?
MR DE KOCK: If you can perhaps just mention the incidents, then I can answer you.
MR WAGENER: I mode notes of them all. Just as an example let's just discuss one or two. You applied for amnesty for the murder of Anton Lubowski, do you remember that?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did not apply for his death. There was information on the periphery that I provided, and that was on the basis of the testimony of the spoken word of people who had been there.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, on page 754 of your application you apply for the murder of Lubowski.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not for his murder. If I had information and I did not give it to someone, then in that process a finger could be pointed at me. But the amnesty process as far as I can remember, then wants you to make all relevant information available.
MR WAGENER: And I see in this particular incident a colleague phoned you, that was the day after Lubowski's death, and asked you whether you had read the news.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as far as I can recall it was early in the morning, well not early in the morning, I think it was approximately eight in the morning, and Mr Lubowski was shot at night and ...(intervention)
MR WAGENER: I beg your pardon, sorry. And based on this telephonic conversation your very rampant imagination then led to you applying for amnesty without any evidence of any nature.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I had the information. I provide it for further investigation. This process is to get information about the past and based on that you then provide all the information at your disposal.
MR WAGENER: Now because a colleague phoned you and told you to look at the news, you then make this great inference that it must have been him or one of the other colleagues and then you apply for amnesty. You have no evidence whatsoever.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, what happened was a former colleague whom I know quite well - when the phone call was made he was a member of the CCB and he was resident in a hotel where other members of the CCB were present and they are now being involved with the Lubowski issue. That was the information that I had and it's relevant. And because of the nature of the work that we were involved with later on you could perhaps say that a certain operation had a fingerprint. In other words you could perhaps say that this was a military operation or a police operation.
MR WAGENER: I'm going to argue the fact Mr de Kock, that this incident and also the other incidents and examples that you have given in your testimony, that you very vaguely heard the bell ringing, that you then draw your own conclusions without any evidence or proof and that you also then have it here as the absolute truth. And that is without you having any substantial factual basis for it.
MR DE KOCK: I will leave that to Mr Wagener's imagination to continue with that, Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: If the Chairperson will allow me, I'm not going to deal with all these incidents, but perhaps just another example where you refer to the poisoning of Rev Frank Chikane.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Are these matters being heard later?
MR WAGENER: I don't know.
MS PATEL: I'm not certain what the status of those matters are at this stage, but I believe ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: If it's an application for amnesty in respect of a murder, surely it must be a public hearing.
MS PATEL: Ja. I don't know that they've been scheduled yet though, Honourable Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, I don't want discuss the merit of these applications, the only point that I'm trying to make is that also in this incident and then also based on the hint by the Chairperson I will not deal with the facts, but that you are sitting in a bar and you hear stories and based on those stories you then draw conclusions and then you see them as being facts. That's the only point that I'm trying to make, and that will be part of my argument.
CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) that's he's too prudent, that he's too careful and makes application for matters that he may be involved in just in case he is. Is he being blamed for that now?
MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, it's got nothing to do with being careful. The point I'm trying to make is that this applicant before you, giving evidence here, has a notion to hear often, even in a pub situation, vague references to matters of which he doesn't know the true facts and he presents it here before you as being factually correct. That's the point.
CHAIRPERSON: That is when he gives evidence. When he makes his application he is merely doing so in cases where he may be vicariously responsible, isn't he? Does he say more than that in this application? Does he say he had any personal dealings with it?
MR WAGENER: That's exactly the point, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Does he say it, that he had any personal dealings in connection with the death of Lubowski?
MR WAGENER: That's exactly the point. He was not involved at all.
CHAIRPERSON: So what he's frightened of, if it is frightened, is vicarious liability.
MR WAGENER: Although Mr Chairman, with due respect, the point is there is no basis for him even to draw this as a factual deduction. That is the point. The fact that he's very careful, it may even be attributed to trying to be sensational.
ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Wagener, just for my own clarity, this Anton Lubowski incident you've been referring to, has Mr de Kock implicated your client, Mr Engelbrecht?
MR WAGENER: Not at all, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: So you're no longer representing your client, you're having a general attack at the applicant at this stage.
MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, I was under the impression that I would allowed to ask questions beyond the Chand incident, but if you indicate to me that I'm not allowed to ask questions ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: I can't see the relevance of them. If it's a matter that's going to be heard, you can ask those questions when it is heard. If he has made such an application it will have to be heard.
MR WAGENER: Of course, Mr Chairman - I haven't seen on the schedules that these incidents have been scheduled, but course you're correct. If those hearings are scheduled, then these questions could be asked there, of course. The mere point I'm trying to raise is regarding the credibility of this witness, and I was under the impression that I'm entitled to do so, but I'll step off this point.
Mr de Kock, I will make this the last point. In your criminal trial and also during evidence at amnesty hearings on various occasions I have heard how you then said things about the Generals, do you remember that?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I made very strong statements, that's correct.
MR WAGENER: Are you embittered?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. In the house that I grew up and during my service inside and outside the borders of the country, my perception has always been - and that was also the way in which I saw life, that the Generals had walked ahead. A General had moral integrity and he does not turn his back on his men.
Mr Wagener made a big issue of this, to say that I'm a liar, that the Generals say that I'm a liar. They said it in '94, they said it '95, they said it in '96, during the trial. Now once again they're saying that. But if we think back to last year, and this is within my context, and we think of Khotso House, all these Generals who had said that I had lied applied for amnesty. I don't know, perhaps there is a problem with the Generals.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, where Generals have been guilty - this is my instruction, well that's according to the Generals for whom I'm appearing, they are applying for amnesty where they feel that they have been guilty. And you refer correctly to Khotso and Cosatu house. My question is in general, although you say that you are not embittered towards the Generals, I have to say to you that throughout I detect an embittered attitude, enmity, towards the Generals.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in 1994 before Judge Goldstone where the opportunity was given to me and where I could have made statements, then he would have visited his clients in C Max and he would have consulted with them there. And I still maintain that.
MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, thank you for the opportunity granted.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WAGENER
CHAIRPERSON: Before we go on, I would request Ms Patel to make enquiries of the office in Cape Town as to whether the Lubowski matter has been set down for hearing, if so, when or whether it is going to be set down for hearing, and when she has obtained such information, to let Mr Wagener have it.
MR WAGENER: Thank you.
MS PATEL: I'll certainly endeavour to do so, Honourable Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Because there have been matters in the past
where due to computer failure, if one can be kind, applications have been set down which don't cover all the persons who have referred to them, and it may be that this has been set down as a separate incident without having notice of Mr de Kock's application in regard to it.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson. Ramula Patel.
CHAIRPERSON: Are you appearing for the victims?
MS PATEL: For the victims, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: I see.
MS PATEL: Mr de Kock, from your evidence yesterday, do I understand you correctly that the motivation or one of the motivations in attacking the Chand family was as a result of Tony Oosthuizen having lost control over Mr Chand and the infiltration route for the PAC that had been set up with Mr Oosthuizen's assistance?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the inability of Mr Oosthuizen to further manage and control this operation led to the fact that - I don't want to say that there was a whole flood, but that there were many trained PAC people who infiltrated the country with weapons.
MS PATEL: Okay. Can you give us an indication perhaps of how long this had taken place? Over period was Tony Oosthuizen involved with Mr Chand?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I can't give you the specific time-frame I became involved with the Chand situation. The first opportunity was when we caught the four PAC members and Mr Oosthuizen's manager close to Magaliesburg and from there I became involved, but not intensively. I wasn't really drawn into DCC and the whole situation was not explained to me.
MS PATEL: Can you perhaps tell us, before your involvement then with Mr Oosthuizen, would some the PAC members who had been arrested as a result of that operation, would they have been turned into Askaris and landed up at Vlakplaas?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if some of them had been arrested then they didn't get to Vlakplaas, because the one only four Askaris from the whole infiltration process were the four that we had captured.
MS PATEL: Alright. And who would have been in control of those Askaris, those PAC Askaris? Would it have been Mr Ras or would it have been you personally?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as the Commander of C1 and Vlakplaas they would have fell under my command, but with the deployment of members to different areas or regions in the country, they could have been divided as individuals or in groups of two to go out with the different section leaders.
MS PATEL: Would that be the different section leaders of Vlakplaas though?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct. I was in command and then there was a second-in-command and during deployment of the groups we also acted as a control or as visiting officers. And depending on the requests made by the different areas where the people had to work, we could divide them in groups of eight or perhaps in four, but then you had a bigger group. That was depending on the nature of the task.
MS PATEL: Alright. The reason I ask you this is because we had an amnesty application that was heard recently in which it was alleged by the applicant, Mr Dlova, that in 1988, July of 1988, they had infiltrated the country with the assistance of Mr Chand, but were subsequently, some of the members were shot and he managed to get away, but this resulted in a roadblock at Lichtenburg in which many police officers were apparently injured.
If my memory serves me correctly, one of the persons who were in the van with them at the time was shot and killed. And they went further to say that one of the parties had been arrested and according to their information had become an Askari. Do you bear any knowledge of this incident?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not by means of only newspaper, but security reports, I know that there was such an incident. We at C1, at Vlakplaas were not involved in that incident, we weren't even in the area. If the person had become an Askari then he was most probably using one of the branches in the Western Transvaal, but he was definitely not at Vlakplaas as far as I can recall.
MS PATEL: Would Vlakplaas members have had access to those Askaris then, that were used at the Western Transvaal branch?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no. Section C2 which did identification and interrogation of terrorists would have had access to them. The only opportunity that I am aware of where Vlakplaas co-operated with such a group, well similar to Askaris, was in Boputhatswana and a group who worked under the Boputhatswana National Intelligence Service or the Boputhatswana, it's the Internal Intelligence Service.
MS PATEL: Okay. Can you tell me Sir, the PAC Askaris that you would have had at Vlakplaas at the time of this operation, can you give us an indication of how many they were?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it's going to be very difficult, but I think it would be in the region of perhaps 80, and perhaps even more. It's a very rough estimate. We later divided and some of these Askaris went to East London and Durban, where they also formed units.
MS PATEL: Okay, now I'm basically interested in your figures as at the time of this incident. Do you have any idea which parts of the country these Askaris would have come from? Would some of them have come through the infiltration route that Tony Oosthuizen had set up?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the operation that was launched against the Chands dealt with PAC members who were infiltrated by the Chands. We didn't have any other infiltration routes, for example through Zimbabwe or Lesotho, it was only this one specific line that we had.
MS PATEL: Would it be fair for me then to infer that a large number of those Askaris would then have come through the route and possibly through Mr Chand, into the country and then to Vlakplaas?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the only Askaris that we got were the four PAC members who later became Askaris and then came to Vlakplaas. I have no knowledge of any other who were captured or arrested or who were kept at other places or who were recruited elsewhere, I only have knowledge of the four.
MS PATEL: Is it correct then for me to say that you're not really certain, bar the four that came through this infiltration route, where the rest of your Askaris had come from?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, usually we were told that there was an Askari coming from Soweto, he has already been interrogated, he had already testified or will testify. You would for example get an incident where a person was captured in Kimberley and the same situation would occur there.
Former members of the ANC or PAC came to us within two weeks, in other incidents it took more than a year before they came to Vlakplaas. There wasn't a specific set rule.
MS PATEL: Alright. After Mr Ras had given you the information that you had asked him to collect, I would imagine that a plan was put into place. Can you give us the details of that plan, who was meant to do what?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it is very difficult to say after such a long time, but I will do my best. The information that he would have gathered would have been among others, about the area that we would have to move in first, what the area on our side was like, what the area on the other side was like, the Security Forces on our side, the Security Forces on the other side. In other words, the Botswana border patrol and so forth. We would have to investigate the possibility of the construction of the house, fencing, lighting, alarms. One would have to investigate the general movement of the public in that environment, one would have to investigate whether Mondays are quieter than Sundays or whether Saturdays would be busier that Friday nights for example.
In this case one would have had to examine how busy the border post was over weekends in comparison to midweek or Wednesdays. Wherever it was possibility within our ability, we had to obtain as much knowledge of the spectrum as possible. And upon that basis infiltrate the country for purposes of the operation.
CHAIRPERSON: I understand that on this occasion you sent Mr Ras off in the morning and he came back in the afternoon and you did the operation that night.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, no. There had already been information that had been collected. And when I sent Mr Ras for the last time was after we had undertaken the planning, packed the weapons and arrived at the starting point and that is when I sent him for a final time, just to make certain of everything.
In other words the last time that I sent him was that morning and he returned that afternoon. And that was basically the final confirmation of circumstances, as already determined on the basis of information that was collected. We had to determine whether conditions were still the same or that no observable changes had taken place, such as border patrols on their side or our side.
It was almost like a final reconnaissance and a final assessment of the situation, so to speak.
MS PATEL: Mr de Kock do you have any idea how many times or for how long Mr Ras would have reconnoitred the Chand premises?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I cannot give you any indication. I don't want to attempt that because I can't.
MS PATEL: Okay, and ...(intervention)
ADV SANDI: Sorry, Ms Patel, just on this, if you will dealing with another aspect. Colonel, are you saying you sent Mr Ras to do a final assessment of the situation for the last time and that was at the stage you had already collected information, how did you go about gathering this information before you sent Mr Ras for the last time?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this is information that Mr Ras had already been working on, that he had already obtained by means of interrogation of those four PAC Askaris who had been captured by us, and other information that he could collect wherever possible. The problem that we experienced, apart from the time-frame, was also that we couldn't consult with other Intelligence Units in this regard, not even within the SAP.
ADV SANDI: Thank you, Ms Patel.
MS PATEL: Thank you, Sir. Alright. Given the background information, my question was also twofold. What specific plan was put into operation, can you tell us?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the operation which was put into working was that which took place. No other method was formulated. This method based upon the information, was the most effective method and that is the one that we followed.
MS PATEL: Were members of the team given specific instructions, and if so, what were these instructions?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think two members were tasked with the external defence of the building and by nature of the situation they would have to act if anybody from buildings in the vicinity or surrounding buildings were to interfere. The rest of the team consisted then of the internal penetration group that would go into the house.
MS PATEL: Okay. Just to backtrack for a second. You stated that when the plan was devised all parties would have been appraised of at least the basic reasoning for the operation, not necessarily the relationship between Tony Oosthuizen and DCC, but that the house was being used a transit house. Would the parties have been told that it was used as a transit house for PAC members only?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, according to the information that we had and especially about the PAC members who were in our custody, there was no indication that the ANC was using it or that the Black Consciousness Movement was using it or any other activist organisation.
MS PATEL: The reason I asked you that was because I picked up from Mr Mentz' application or his hearing that he'd indicated that it was ANC who were being infiltrated through the Chand house. Would you like to comment on that?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think he is mistaken because it was definitely a PAC structure. There was never any mention of the ANC.
MS PATEL: Alright, thank you. Did Mr Ras give you the specifics of the interrogation? Did he give you details as to who was living in the house at the time? Did he have that information available according to you recollection?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have no independent recollection thereof, but he would have indicated that to me. What happened with the interrogation of these Askaris and the information that they provided was that it would be collated and concentrated and then be put forward as a final product. It is possible that he mentioned this to me, but I have no independent recollection thereof.
MS PATEL: And just - if you just for a sec refresh my memory on the information regarding the children, well not the children but the progeny of Mr and Mrs Chand. Did he indicate to you that they did have sons in the house?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I have no recollection of that. What would have emerged however, and now I'm merely inferring, is that there may have been an indication of a number of people, but no specific reference to children or boys, not that I can recall. If he did that then it is only me that has no independent recollection thereof.
MS PATEL: You also say that you expected, besides the family I would imagine, PAC persons in the house, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, one could have readily accepted that.
MS PATEL: What was that expectation based on, was it just generally that the house was used as a transit house or was there specific information in that regard at this specific time?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, at that stage we had already captured or arrested four persons who had infiltrated from there. Furthermore, the information which I collected from Martin Naude at Section C2, indicated that there was a group of 76 terrorists who had already infiltrated or who were already in the country with their weapons, and given those numbers we could reasonably expect that there weren't only person who wanted to infiltrate, but wanted to ex-filtrate for the purposes of reorientation or rest and that they could find themselves at that transit house.
ADV SANDI: Sorry, de Kock, when you say you expected PAC people in the house, do you mean people who have received military training or just ordinary members of the PAC?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, in terms of those persons that we had arrested who were fully armed, as well as the others who had already infiltrated and who were also armed, I expected armed members.
ADV SANDI: Thank you.
MS PATEL: Sir, you mentioned that you also accessed information from Martin Naude. Do you have any idea what he based his information on?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, what I do know is that Martin Naude liaised with the Intelligence Division of the branches in the Western Transvaal and that they were involved in the analysis of information. Head Office was a centralisation point for all information and from there it was processed. And if my memory serves me correctly, he also attended meetings of a group which was called "Trevits". However, I'm not saying that this was the group that made a stipulation, but in that regard Mr Naude had a very broad understanding of the situation in the Western Transvaal, with regard to PAC infiltration.
MS PATEL: Okay. So at least prior to the operation, Mr Naude, if you had requested it from him, would have been able to access information that the other branches, not of Vlakplaas, but the other Security Branch branches would have had on the Chand family, if there was any. Is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I wouldn't know. What he did inform me about - and that is why I recall that number so specifically, what he did inform me about was that there was a number of 76 PAC terrorists had already infiltrated the country by means of that facility, and in guerrilla terms that was a very large number. He didn't tell me whether it was going to happen at one time or whether there would be various group or whether this would take place over an extended period of time. (transcriber's own interpretation)
MS PATEL: I sorry, I may have misunderstood you. Did you say that there were a group of 76 who still wanted to infiltrate or who had already infiltrated the country by the time this operation had been organised?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that group of 76 had already infiltrated the country, they had already come into the country with their weapons. And in retrospect I wondered after that whether that number of persons who had infiltrated and over whom control had been lost, were not in all probability the activation facility or the activators at least, of this order which was given.
MS PATEL: Okay. My question to you earlier Sir was, would you have been in a position to request from Martin Naude, to ascertain whether there was any other information available on the Chand family at the time?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I didn't request that from him, my order was already very clear. This was a question of which terrorists there were and what he knew about it, about the infiltration and that specific group, and if he had known more about weapons or special equipment he would have informed us about it, but I didn't ask him anything about the structures or the persons as such.
MS PATEL: Can you explain why you didn't attempt to ascertain whether there was other information available? Is it that you merely left it to Mr Ras?
MR DE KOCK: I left it to Mr Ras. As I've already said yesterday, I assume responsibility if there was a lack of information and if it was consequently my fault.
MS PATEL: Can you say whether Mr Ras would have been in a position to request information from Mr Naude?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, I believe that he could have gone directly, however he would probably have done this through me. And that which I had already collected was sufficient for my purposes.
MS PATEL: Okay. Sorry, Honourable Chairperson, if you will bear with me for a moment.
Now - okay, perhaps I should put it to Mr Ras, but in all fairness I think I should say it to you as well, that according to my instructions the guard that you say you didn't expect, apparently that guard was placed at the gate on a 24-hour basis.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it may be so. However, I don't know whether he was appointed as a guard who stood there all day and whether he remained there all the time. I don't wish to speculate about that. I would accept that he was a 24-hour guard.
MS PATEL: My instructions are also that Mr Samsodien Chand had three sons who lived with him all the time, that their names were Imran, who was 17 years old, Armien, who was 23 years old and Riedwaan, who was 26 years old. The latter two were both deaf and dumb and had, inasfar as it was possible for them given their limitations, had assisted the family in the business but were not gainfully employed anywhere else given their limitations, and this is has always been the case. The younger son Imran was still schooling at the time and was schooling in an area nearby. And that they were all three killed in this attack on the house.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the first section of the question I will take not of here. With regard to the second section of the question, regarding the fact that were killed, I am aware of it and by nature of the situation, as in my other applications, I would like to tell the family that that loss can never be recovered and that I deeply regret that loss as unnecessary as it was, that we in this country would sooner fight each than talk it out.
MS PATEL: You've stated ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on. You mentioned they assisted the family in the business, what business?
MS PATEL: May I take instructions on what the nature of the business was, Honourable Chairperson?
CHAIRPERSON: And where was it carried on.
MS PATEL: Alright. Do you want me to do that now, Honourable Chairperson?
CHAIRPERSON: You can do it at the adjournment.
MS PATEL: At the adjournment, okay.
If I may proceed, Sir. Mr de Kock, on page 6 of your application you state that:
"Our instructions were clear, all the inhabitants were to be eliminated."
It is the last line on page 6.
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.
MS PATEL: Given that it was - I would imagine, common knowledge that Mr Chand lived there with his wife and so he had a family. Why was there never any proper investigation down as to exactly who else would be in the house? - give that the instructions were that everybody was to be killed.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in this case the man and the woman were targeted by General van Rensburg - we refer you to a plurality of persons, and that was my idea when it came to everybody in the house. Apart from the fact that I said that we could expect that if other persons were there, they could be members of the PAC. I believe that if we had been granted a longer period of time, if it hadn't been so urgent, if we had more time to undertake observation over a period of a month or two or three we would probably have had that portion of the picture as well. However we did not purposefully destroy these people.
MS PATEL: Given the timing that you had, I'm instructed by the daughter of Mr Chand, that she was told by her mother the week before the attack had taken place, that she was very concerned because there were helicopters flying around in the area. Can you ...(intervention)
MEMBER OF FAMILY DISTRESSED
MS PATEL: ... can you tell us whether Mr Ras had access to helicopters as part of his reconnaissance?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we didn't use helicopters, we also didn't use microlight aeroplanes and we didn't have any helicopters that were flying in that area.
MS PATEL: Okay. Sorry, I'm sure I've asked you this already, but if you can just bear with me. Mr Ras at no stage said that bar the husband and wife, there was any other family in the house? - or you couldn't recollect whether he had said that or not.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I have no independent recollection thereof, but he may have mentioned to me that there were more people than the man and the wife in the house. If he had said that to me we would probably have regarded this as more members of the PAC.
MS PATEL: Well I want to put it to you Sir, that if Mr Ras had done his job properly he would have, he must have known that there were sons in the house and that this information would have been relayed to you.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Mr Ras' work had always been thorough in my opinion, however there was no mention of which I have an independent recollection, during which he mentioned sons or family that were living with the Chands. Yesterday I also explained that I would have incorporated this in the planning of an operation. However I have no independent recollection thereof.
MS PATEL: Okay. What was the purpose in bombing up, in using the explosives?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that was to ruin that building as a facility and to deprive the PAC of that building as a facility. Due to it's proximity to the border post we would also not be able to search the house in order to determine whether or not there were weapons there. These weapons would probably have been concealed along with any other explosives. However, that was of secondary importance. The primary objective was to deprive the PAC of this structure as a facility.
MS PATEL: Sorry Sir, what did you say about the weapons? I didn't get that.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
"Couldn't search the house to see if there were concealed weapons there"
MS PATEL: Okay, alright.
CHAIRPERSON: Are you going onto something else now?
MS PATEL: I'm just checking my notes, I might be almost through.
CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps this would be a convenient stage and you can take instructions on that other point.
MS PATEL: Okay, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: We'll take the short adjournment now.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: (Cont)
Thank you, Honourable Chairperson. In response to your query, the nature of the business, it was just a normal general dealer store that they had and the buildings were separate. The house ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Was it adjoining the house?
MS PATEL: No, it wasn't, it was about 15 metres away from the house.
CHAIRPERSON: Well that's ...(indistinct)
MS PATEL: Ja, ja. Okay.
Mr de Kock, are you ready, can we proceed?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MS PATEL: Sir, you stated that during the operation you were injured because you fell down the embankment. Can you tell us where this embankment is, is it close to where the guard was standing at the gate?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, when you moved along to the fence in the direction of the house, there was a kind of embankment and after the third shot, if I recall correctly, I moved backwards to get a better silhouette. There is a hospital close-by to this settlement and it was these kinds of lights, a similar sort that you would get a sports stadium, but I had to get a better silhouette.
It was difficult to shoot this person, and in moving backwards, and not to lose sight of your target, I then had almost a free fall and landed on my left knee. And then my knee was injured to such an extent that I thought that I had shot myself or perhaps that someone had accidentally shot me but at that stage the people moved away. It's a kind of embankment which goes down like this.
MS PATEL: Sir, there are two things that arise from your response. Firstly, my instructions are that there is no hospital nearby and secondly, that there is no embankment near the fence where the guard was.
CHAIRPERSON: Let's deal with them one by one. Firstly, it's been put to you there's no hospital there. What do you say to that?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I could perhaps confuse this with another incident, but as far as I can recall it was a hospital set up there where the floodlights were used.
CHAIRPERSON: And the next question - it was put to you there is no embankment.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, there was most definitely. It wasn't a question of me losing my balance and slipping and for that distance that I fell there was no ground and then this sudden bang on my knee. And as I can recall there was a type of embankment.
MS PATEL: A moment please. Honourable Chairperson, thank you for that.
My instructions are Sir, that the lights that you refer to don't come from a hospital, that it's possible that it comes from the border gate lights. So that sorts that out. And then secondly, that the embankment is not near the fence, that it's at least 20 meters away from the fence where the guard is.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I would not disagree concerning the slope or this embankment, but I did not move backwards for 20 metres, I would say that it was for approximately a metre to two metres that I moved backwards, whilst my weapon was still aimed at the guard so that I could not lose him as a target because the silhouette wasn't very good. And I will accept with regard to the lights, that that was the situation. I would concede that.
MS PATEL: Sir, can I ask you - just to move onto a different aspect, that at the end of the day Mr Chand, Tony Oosthuizen was Mr Chand's handler, he set him up, he gave him the money to run the operation and he gave a 4x4 vehicle, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have no knowledge of the 4x4, the only 4x4 that I saw was driven by a black man who was an employee of Tony Oosthuizen, or an agent and then the four PAC members that we captured.
Regarding the money for the Chands or whatever their remuneration was, I can't give you any information on that, but they were most definitely sources for DCC, and also members of the PAC, as I understood it.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you give any money to Oosthuizen?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, this was a DCC project and the project of DCC is purely and alone. And I also said yesterday that it had been approved or had to be approved on a much higher level because it also had foreign implications that would include vehicles, liaison with other departments, also funds. So as project, it should also have been established and approved on a much higher level than Mr Oosthuizen.
MS PATEL: You wouldn't be in a position to deny however, that Mr Chand was given money and that he was given a 4x4 vehicle with a specific intention of assisting in infiltrating the PAC members into the country.
MR DE KOCK: I would not deny it, and with the advantage of hindsight I will confirm it.
MS PATEL: Alright. Now my question to you Sir, is that if it was Tony Oosthuizen who had set up the Chands, if he was assisting DCC, if Mr Chand was assisting DCC, and it was Tony Oosthuizen who in all likelihood had gone against the grain, why was it necessary to deal with the problem in the manner that you did? I mean why didn't you rather go to Tony Oosthuizen and say: "Look, we're experiencing this problem" and discipline him rather than take an innocent person out, who was assisting you and who was in fact set up by you? I don't understand the reasoning behind that, could you perhaps help?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, C1, or my unit never had any terrorists infiltrated, we also did not put the Chands to assist with the infiltration of terrorists or acts of terror. Personally the idea surfaced with me that we should perhaps go and talk to Tony Oosthuizen. In that regard I didn't know how approachable he would have been, he had his own style of management. My instruction was not to ...(end of tape)
MR DE KOCK: ... with Tony Oosthuizen, the instruction was to destroy the facility, the man and the woman as well, and if Brigadier or General van Rensburg would have wanted us to frighten them or scare them, there would have been many ways in which we could have done it. We could have fetched them during the night, taken them to the RSA, where van Rensburg could have talked to them, where he could have told them to stop it. I don't know whether there were any decisions on a higher level. The fact that the Chands assisted the PAC to infiltrate the country, never assisted anyone, Chairperson.
MS PATEL: Did you not question your instructions, given your knowledge that Tony Oosthuizen was in fact the person who had set up this operation with the Chands?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, my questioning would have been - after I'd received the instruction from van Rensburg I went to Martin Naude and it was a question of confirmation, I wanted confirmation of what van Rensburg had told me, whether that was in fact the case. And it was confirmed and I went from van Rensburg's office to Naude.
MS PATEL: But you had known by that stage already what Tony Oosthuizen was doing, not so, because you had assisted him in previous cases where he needed help, and also you realised that what he was doing in a sense wasn't kosher, to put it - if you understand.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, here we have a situation, we could perhaps have thrown a shock grenade to the house and they could decide that evening to leave the house, but that would not mean that the infiltrations of terrorists would have been stopped. It would also not stop the infiltration of weapons into the country, and would also not have prevented the public from being, having difficulties. I don't want to make a statement here that I only carried out orders, I won't do that,
I will take responsibility for my people. The idea that I have is that this operation went too far and I am not aware of it if perhaps they hadn't talked to Tony Oosthuizen and that he ignored it. That is an inference that one could make if you analyse the information. And the death of the Chands, not the physical aspect thereof, but if one looks at the reasons and the way in which they had been drawn into it, I would blame him for that.
MS PATEL: Then finally, just the question of the urgency. From the information we have - I mean I look at the Lichtenburg incident, it occurred at least two years prior to the attack taking place, it seems obvious that Tony Oosthuizen had to an extent lost control over the infiltration route for a long time. Can you then explain, given that, why it was so urgent that you couldn't plan this operation properly, that alternatives weren't discussed?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I did not know during the incident at Lichtenburg, that Tony Oosthuizen had been involved with something like that. If I can recall correctly, I didn't even know that there was someone like Tony Oosthuizen.
My liaison with DCC was with Colonel At Nel, who was second-in-command of DCC, and two of the other members who were involved with ANC issues. I did not really become involved with the PAC issues. The PAC wasn't a problem for us in the same nature as the ANC was, to the same extent. They were just as dangerous, but it was not to the same extent and scope that the ANC was.
CHAIRPERSON: Then was this Lichtenburg matter ANC?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, my information was that it was PAC.
MS PATEL: Alright. Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL
CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr de Kock, the instruction was that the facility had to be destroyed, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Could you just repeat.
MR HATTINGH: The instruction that you had received was that this facility had to be destroyed and that the people had to be killed and the house had to be destroyed.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Now if you had known - this is hypothetical, if you had known that there were adult sons living in the house, would that have led to the fact that you would not have executed the instruction?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we would still have executed it. I perhaps would just have amended it or adapted it, based on the information at our disposal.
MR HATTINGH: You have already said that you foresaw the possibility that there could also have been armed terrorists in the house.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it was expected that there would be people.
MR HATTINGH: And was the attack launched on that premise?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the attack was aimed as the approach of a hard target, in other words we're going to fight to get in and fight to get out.
MR HATTINGH: Was that the type of situation where you would enter the house and first wake the people and ask them who they are and what they were doing, or was it a different kind of situation?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that kind of operation and as it had been planned and also the same with other incidents in the past, in the first instance it was a surprise element, you attack with everything at your disposal and you also destroy everything in your way. On to the operatives, it was expressly stated that they had to use their own discretion, we were not here involved with a zombie force.
MR HATTINGH: Was the operation planned in such a way that the house had to be entered and that people would be shot at randomly?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And according to what you obtained later on, was it also executed in that way?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
CHAIRPERSON: If you had known that there were grown-up sons in the house which was used as a terrorist venue, would you have thought that they would be part of this?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I would because obviously it is impossible for adults to live in such an environment every day and not be members of the PAC, or to see terrorists, one could assume that if people are infiltrated to the RSA, although the weapons might not have been conspicuous, that they would in fact be armed.
MR HATTINGH: Colonel de Kock, the reconnaissance which was done by Mr Ras, did it reveal that apart from Mr and Mrs Chand, there were also members of the family staying with them?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I can't recall that independently, but that information would have been gathered by the interrogation of the Askaris that we had at Vlakplaas. We could not at that distance have seen that that was a member of the family or that would only be a visitor. That was one of the problems that you have and that would limit your observational ability.
MR SIBANYONI: When the four PAC members were interrogated, they mentioned that they were infiltrated through the Chand family. Was this problem raised with Mr Tony Oosthuizen?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, at that stage it was only Mr Ras, myself and a small group of people who had knowledge of that. The instruction was clear that this information, this operation, would not go any further than the gates of Vlakplaas because of the sensitivity thereof.
CHAIRPERSON: But these four men, as I understood it, Oosthuizen had asked you to take action against them and to kill them. You said you arrested them
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: And he had told you they were coming through, they were infiltrators coming into the country.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson. I realised later on after the arrest of these people, that Oosthuizen saw that as a danger for his sources, in other words the Chands who assisted with this infiltration. In other words that the reference that these four PAC members, that they could make to identify the Chands, could perhaps have been leaked and that would have jeopardised the whole operation. That is one of the reasons why these people were never charged, all four were sent to Vlakplaas.
MR SIBANYONI: Did I hear you correctly when you were answering questions from Ms Patel, that according to your information the Chand family were PAC members?
MR DE KOCK: I won't say that they were members of the PAC, but they worked for the PAC as well as for the DCC. They were double-agents.
MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, no further questions, Mr Chairperson.
ADV SANDI: Just one, thank you.
When you say the Chand family were working for the PAC and the DCC, do you mean each and every member of that family? Who are you talking about in that family?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in this instance the information and instruction was that it was the Chand man and woman who were responsible for the infiltration. In other words, they were the determining factor in this whole project, the project of Oosthuizen.
Let me put it to you in this way, I had no doubt that the PAC did not know that the Chands were also working for Military Intelligence, otherwise they would never have sent their members to them. In other words, the PAC had the wrong impression, that the Chands were working for DCC.
ADV SANDI: And you had no such information about the three other members of the family that have been referred to, the children of the Chands? You didn't have such information?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I have no independent recollection that it had been said, or where there was reference made of three children or sons, but by determining the figures it's very important to know the number of people, that perhaps that could have been mentioned, that we could expect more people. And in that regard, I would have made the inference and the observation that we could accept that it would be members of the PAC, or busy with an infiltration or ex-filtration.
ADV SANDI: When you testified last week, I personally gained the impression that you were not just an ordinary commander, you had some measure of discretion. Would that be a fair understanding of your testimony last week?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, each commander had discretion that he has to apply. Just to give you an indication, your Special Force, like your reconnaissance people are usually selected from the ordinary members because they are people who can think independently, they don't have cattle mentality. The person from day one has to act as an individual person, so yes, you can use your discretion. Your discretion is then confined and limited, based on the danger of the situation in which you find yourself.
The attack on the Chand house is not a normal police function, and you have a different kind of approach in handling such cases.
ADV SANDI: Is there any reason why in your discussions with Mr van Rensburg you did not suggest to him that: "We should not be killing the Chands, but rather we should deal with Oosthuizen or even organise a clandestine killing of Oosthuizen, if need be"?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think by the time the instruction came to us or myself to attack the Chands, nothing could be done concerning Oosthuizen. In other words, this situation could perhaps have been approached with him or his superiors, and that he ignored it, and that the infiltration of PAC terrorist was continuing and that was the only way to put an end to it. I don't know what the interpersonal liaison was higher up of General van Rensburg to other units.
CHAIRPERSON: The problem with an approach to Oosthuizen was that the contact between the Chands and the PAC would have remained. He wasn't merely Oosthuizen's operative, he was working for the PAC, the Chands were working for the PAC.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, they worked for the PAC and they worked for Oosthuizen and this process would have continued. In some other manner, let us use the word "neutralise", which doesn't necessarily indicate that we would have to kill them "let's persecute them, let's blow up his shop and phone him and say you're next", but that was never told to us. At the time that I received the instruction it was, level the facility.
ADV SANDI: Thank you, Colonel. Thank you, Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: I take it Mr Ras will be giving evidence. Do you know if that is the position?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: So he can tell us about what he did. I won't bother you then. Thank you.
MR DE KOCK: Thank you, Chairperson.
WITNESS EXCUSED
