CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Berger, what is the next matter?
MR BERGER: Chairperson, we're now with your leave, going to deal with all the other matters together. And the next witness would be Mr Frans Ting-Ting Masango.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Masango, can I just ask you to remain standing. Are your full names Frans Ting-Ting Masango?
FRANS TING-TING MASANGO: (sworn states)
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, please sit down. Mr Berger?
MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson. Mr Masango will be giving evidence in English. Chairperson, before I start with the evidence of Mr Masango, do I understand it correctly that you have a bundle of additional statements, sworn statements containing statements of Mr Masango, Makhura, Potsane and Masina?
CHAIRPERSON: That is quite correct. It is a document that is paginated up to page 14.
MR BERGER: Yes, perhaps if that could be marked Exhibit A.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, there's another document that has found its way to the desk here, which seems to be extracts from Setchaba.
MR BERGER: Yes, Chairperson, I handed copies to my learned friends and I made copies available for the Committee. I'm going to be introducing that document during the evidence of Mr Masango.
CHAIRPERSON: We'll mark that one when the appropriate time arrives then, but in the meantime Exhibit A contains the statements by the four applicants.
EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Mr Masango, is it correct that you were born on the 14th of August 1958, in Pretoria?
MR MASANGO: That is correct.
MR BERGER: Could you give the Committee a very brief background about your family, your school situation and how it was that you came to leave the country.
MR MASANGO: As I've said I was born in Mamelodi on that date you've just mentioned. I grew up like all other young boys in Mamelodi. I must also say that as I was growing a bit older, as Mamelodi was next to Silverton, next to Eastlynne, next to Meyerspark, as a schoolboy I used to go and work there as a gardener. That was due to the poor economic conditions of my family. My mother was a domestic worker, my father an ordinary night watchman.
It was there as I was growing old as a young boy, where I realised the disparities that were existing between us the black people and the white people. It was also at those houses as a gardener where I realised that white people were living much better than we were living.
However, I grew up right into 1976. I was conscientised into politics by then. Like all other students at that time I was in high school then. I was involved heavily in politics. I do not remember a single political incident that happened in Mamelodi at that time without my knowledge, without my participation or without me taking part in one way or the other.
You know it's during those times, shortly after 1976/1977, that a young man of Mamelodi, Solomon Mhlango as a member of MK and ANC, was arrested and eventually sentenced to death. I was in the committee in 1979 and prior to that, in the committee that campaigned to save the life of Solomon Mhlango. We campaigned and campaigned that his life should be saved.
I remember well on the 5th of April, the eve of Solomon's execution, we had a vigil there. We appealed again there that he should not be hanged and I've made a public vow that should he be hanged, that would have been the following day, should he be hanged I'm going to leave the country, join Umkhonto weSizwe and the ANC. Two weeks after his execution I did exactly that, I left the country.
MR BERGER: Can we just go a little bit back to 1976, when the riots started. You were a student at Mamelodi High, is that correct?
MR MASANGO: That is correct.
MR BERGER: Were you a student leader at that time?
MR MASANGO: I was, I was involved in politics, I was in the leadership of the students. There were others who were much higher than me, but I was involved in all the activities there. I don't know if I could describe myself as a leader then, but I was involved.
MR BERGER: And later in that year you came into conflict with the school authorities, is that right?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, yes.
MR BERGER: And as a result of that, what happened?
MR MASANGO: The principal of their school then, Jack Lekala, expelled me from school.
MR BERGER: Because you refused to disassociate yourself from politics?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, yes.
MR BERGER: Prior to Solomon Mhlango being sentenced to death, even before all of that happened you'd already come into conflict with the police, is that right?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, yes.
MR BERGER: And you'd also been detained?
MR MASANGO: Shortly, not for a very long time though, about two days, but there were police who were coming in before that, who were coming in to look for me and they would find me at not at home because during those times you rarely slept at home.
MR BERGER: Subsequent to the execution of Solomon Mhlango, you've already said you left the country after having made that vow at the night vigil. Where did you - that would have been April 1979, am I right?
MR MASANGO: That's correct, yes.
MR BERGER: Where did you go to after you left South Africa?
MR MASANGO: I went by train to Komatipoort and into Mozambique.
MR BERGER: Can you tell the Committee how it was that you came to join Umkhonto weSizwe?
MR MASANGO: Well as I've said there I've actually vowed before even having arrived in Maputo, that I will joint Umkhonto weSizwe after Solomon Mhlango's execution, but then in Maputo where we were staying then, we were first asked if we would like to go to school or any other place other than the army. I insisted that I want to go to the army. I remember Jacob Zuma was amongst the people who said to me that "you look very brilliant and wanted to take you to school", saying something like that: "why don't you go to school?", but I insisted that I should go to the army.
MR BERGER: Is it then correct that you went for training?
MR MASANGO: Ja, after some months I went to Angola for military training.
MR BERGER: Can you sketch briefly for the Committee how you moved through MK, from the time of your initial training until 1986, when the unit was formed. Well, 1985, in fact, when the unit was formed.
MR MASANGO: For Maputo, I think a month or two after my arrival there, I was tasked with gathering news for other comrades there, from the radio, from various radio stations. Then in the morning they will gather, I will read the news for them. I continued with that job of gathering news right into Vienna, that is in Angola, right in the camps during my training, until I was made a political commissar of a unit in the camp and the youth leader also there, in Pango Camp.
MR BERGER: Can you explain to the Committee what a political commissar was.
MR MASANGO: A political commissar in military terms would be the deputy of a commander, but then he's more responsible, he's responsible for other things other than a military, he's a political link between the leadership, the command and the unit, he's a political disseminator, he's a propagandist of that particular unit.
MR BERGER: Now in the camp where you were a political commissar, would your functions be any different?
MR MASANGO: No, not at all, that would be the same thing.
MR BERGER: You would still be disseminating information?
MR MASANGO: That is correct.
MR BERGER: Political information?
MR MASANGO: Political information, propaganda and all that.
MR BERGER: What were your sources of information?
MR MASANGO: All various applications. Well firstly, it will be a radio because I've worked with the radio for a long time, different radio stations as I've said, ANC publications, MK publications, Setchaba, Dawn and all others, newspapers in Angola that we were able to get in English. There were some newspapers that we were getting, old as they were, but we were getting some newspapers.
MR BERGER: And as a political commissar in the camps, were you responsible for any political education of the cadres?
MR MASANGO: Yes, as a news person there, a news disseminator, I would organise political discussions, news analysis, any relevant matter, any relevant development in the country or internationally that relates to South Africa. I'd organise such discussions, analysis, such debates and at times I would even ask the commissariat above us to organise maybe a leader or so to address us on a particular development, a particular topic or so you know.
MR BERGER: Now in June of 1985 there was a national consultative conference of the ANC, held in Kabwe, Zambia. Do you have any knowledge of that conference?
MR MASANGO: Ja, I do have because I was a delegate in that conference, representing MK from Angola, a delegation from Angola, MK delegation from Angola. I was one of the delegates there.
MR BERGER: Is it correct that that was the, that the national consultative conference before that one, the one at Kabwe in 1985, was in fact the conference at Morogoro in 1969?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.
MR BERGER: Can you tell the Committee what your recollections of Kabwe are, what was discussed as far as you can recall?
MR MASANGO: The Kabwe conference, it should be remembered that it took place, it was preceded by an attack by the SADF in Botswana, where some of our comrades were massacred. It took a form of a counsel of war. There were very many resolutions that were taken to intensify the campaign for solidarity, to intensify the campaign to recruit young people into MK and the ANC in general.
Amongst those resolutions taken there at that conference, was that the line between soft and hard target is going to disappear, that as our struggle, our armed struggle intensifies, whites will have to bleed as well. And with that I refer to white civilians.
MR BERGER: What was contained in the concept of a hard - I don't know if I've been off all the time, no just now. What was meant by the concept "hard target/soft target"?
MR MASANGO: Hard targets in those terms would have been, it was military installations, any person who is working with the system, who is associated one way or the other with the system, soldiers, the police. That would be hard targets. Soft targets would refer to civilians.
MR BERGER: I want to show you a document, it's a copy of the first - we managed to get 15 pages, of the August 1985 edition of Setchaba. Can you tell the Committee what Setchaba was.
MR MASANGO: Setchaba was the official organ, the official mouthpiece of the ANC, a political mouthpiece of the ANC.
MR BERGER: And you've already told the Committee that one of your sources of information was Setchaba. This particular edition, August 1985, would you have received this?
MR MASANGO: We as the staff of Radio Freedom, because at this time, August 19985, I was working with Radio Freedom, so there was no way that it could bypass us, going to any other body before it goes first to us and then it's possible that I might have read it. If I was in Radio Freedom at this time, which I was, I must have come across this, across it, ja.
MR BERGER: And you would then have had the task of disseminating the information or the policy line in this document to cadres of the ANC, cadres of MK?
MR MASANGO: At that time I was working directly with the cadres as such, but then I was in radio. But then we had contact with the commissars in the nearby camp like Vienna, who would come to us for discussions, for material and so, and then we'll always give over this material to them.
MR BERGER: Chairperson, could the document be marked Exhibit B please.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR BERGER: I want to refer you, Mr Masango, to the editorial of this document and in particular to the bottom of page 1, talking about the Kabwe conference. Do you see at the bottom of the second column numbered page 1, it reads
"The conference which took place on the 30th anniversary of the Freedom Charter."
Bottom right-hand corner.
MR MASANGO: Sure, that is correct.
MR BERGER: I want to read this to you and I want to ask you whether this correctly reflects what was discussed at the conference. It reads as follows, it says
"The conference which took place on the 30th anniversary of the Freedom Charter, rededicated itself to the ideals of the founding fathers of the ANC and endorsed the principles enshrined in the Freedom Charter. The conference assessed the developments since the Morogoro conference of 1969, and re-endorsed its decisions. From the reports given it became clear that the ANC has not only had contacts with the developments and organisations at home, but has been part of those developments and has grown with the struggle, at times giving guidance and advice, but at all times leading the masses in the right direction.
Deficiencies and shortcomings in this regard were also pointed out. The recurring theme of the conference was the need to intensify armed struggle. Some people favour the term "armed seizure of power", rather than "seizure of power".
It was this realisation which led to the decision that we must attack not only inanimate objects, but also enemy personnel.
This ANC conference which took the form of a counsel of war, decided that the distinction between "hard" and "soft" targets should disappear. This was not a new idea, it had been discussed like all other issues in the numerous continual regional pre-conference discussions which involved everybody, including all those who were not elected as delegates to the conference. In other words, the ANC membership as a whole was involved for the last nine months or so in discussions which took place at the conference.
The delegates were not representing their personal views or the jackets. The attack on South African refugees "very, very soft targets" in Botswana by the racists forces just before the conference, emphasised the need for our movement to bleed the enemy.
The question of intensifying armed struggle poses new challenges and responsibilities on the ANC and on the international community, which by the look of things and the nature of the violence of the enemy is going to more involved in that struggle for our liberation.
Another important decision taken at the conference was the question of opening ranks at all levels, inside and outside the country to all South Africans who have come to join the ANC. This was not a light decision considering the nature of the oppression of the Africans, but the conference felt that the ANC composition at all levels should reflect the South African society, people who are fighting and sacrificing for the national liberation of the blacks, especially the Africans.
By the way, those whites who join our ranks and make sacrifices, at times they sacrifice their lives, are fighting for black liberation which they have made their cause, but they are also fighting for their own liberation because apartheid oppresses us all. It is the taxes of South African people, black and white, which finance and maintain Bantustans and pay the salary of Matanzima, the most highly paid politician in South Africa, and the army of occupation in Namibia and Angola.
Those whites who might think that African and black problems have nothing to do with them, have to start thinking seriously.
The conference also took decisions to intensify the struggle in the field of the battle of ideas, a battle which is very sharp inside the country and becoming sharper. We have to participate more energetically in that battle."
I've read the whole section at length because it deals with decision taken at conference. Can you confirm that this is a correct reflection of decisions taken at the Kabwe conference?
MR MASANGO: Sure I do, that is correct.
MR BERGER: Besides the decision at Kabwe, that the line between hard and soft targets should disappear, was there any other indication for you in your experience in the ANC at that time, that suggested that the struggle was going to be intensified and that this line between hard and soft targets was disappearing?
MR MASANGO: Ja, I readily recall a visit by Moses Mabida, the late Moses Mabida, who was the member of the NEC, the ANC's National Executive Committee, was also in the Communist Party, the leader of the Communist Party, Moses Mabida. As I've said we were always organising as a commissariat there in the camp, organising some visits by the leadership.
In one of those visits Moses Mabida, as we were discussing this issue of soft and hard targets, he said to us that whilst we should mourn - I remember very well we had discussions about soft and hard targets in our camps, whereby the general members of the ANC there, the cadres, were also accepting that no, white civilians should be targeted.
We took people like Bo Andrew Zondo as heroes ...(intervention)
MR BERGER: Andrew Zondo was executed for his planting of a mine in Amanzimtoti.
MR MASANGO: That is correct, and I believe civilians were killed in that bomb. We sang about Andrew Zondo, we wrote poems about Andrew Zondo, we took him as a hero and I still do today take him as a hero.
MR BERGER: And when you say "we", was that the attitude in the camps only of the cadres, or was it the attitude of the leadership in the camps as well?
MR MASANGO: The leadership knew those songs, they read those poems, so everybody knew about that.
MR BERGER: And everybody regarded him as a hero?
MR MASANGO: Everybody.
MR BERGER: Now that was 1985, and you say at that stage you were working for Radio Freedom. But you left Radio Freedom after a while and you got involved with a unit, with the unit that we now know about. How did it come about that you left Radio Freedom and got involved in the unit?
MR MASANGO: Whilst I was in Luanda, working with Radio Freedom, I was approached by the late Chris Hani who said that the military has earmarked me for a mission in the country, but he said he's also learnt that, from the political department there, that I was also earmarked for Holland, for a journalism course. Then he asked me I want, still want to go to Holland or to South Africa, I said no, rather come here in South Africa than be sent to Holland for that radio journalism course. Then he told me that there is a unit that is being formed, that is going to be led by one, Freddy Legoka, that will be an elimination unit and would I be prepared to join that unit, then I agreed.
MR BERGER: You then left Radio Freedom?
MR MASANGO: I then left Radio Freedom for Lusaka.
MR BERGER: Now in Lusaka, was the unit constituted?
MR MASANGO: At that time it wasn't as such. That is where I met Jabu Masina. If I remember well I met Jabu Masina and we were told about the other members of that would later join us.
MR BERGER: What happened to Freddy Legoka?
MR MASANGO: He was in Botswana at that time.
MR BERGER: When was it that the unit was constituted, can you remember?
MR MASANGO: It could be about late, very late '88, '85 or early - no, no, it's very late '85, ja.
MR BERGER: Now you say that Chris Hani spoke about the establishment of an elimination unit, what were the instructions given to your unit, what were you instructed to do?
MR MASANGO: To eliminate a notorious policeman, to eliminate politicians or people we regarded as puppets and any high top government official, any other individual who was on the side of the enemy.
MR BERGER: You were also furnished with arms and ammunition, is that right?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.
MR BERGER: Which you then brought into the country. Could you describe the type of arms and ammunition that you brought into the country?
MR MASANGO: Other than the ordinary hand guns that one would use for an elimination purpose, there were also heavy material like landmines, like Bazukas and limpet-mines, handgrenades as well.
MR BERGER: Besides elimination of people, individuals, what were you supposed to do or what were your instructions in regard to the landmines, limpet-mines, grenades and so on?
MR MASANGO: Whilst our unit was an elimination unit, we were also given these arms whereby we were told that we could use our own discretion, that we could attack any target that we feel it's within the mandate, within the authority, within the policies of the ANC.
MR BERGER: Now your position in the unit was that of political commissar, is that right?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.
MR BERGER: And Jabu Masina was appointed the commander of the unit?
MR MASANGO: That is correct.
MR BERGER: It's also correct is it not, that you and Mr Masina entered South Africa in advance of the rest of the unit?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.
MR BERGER: When was it that you entered?
MR MASANGO: That was about in 1986, early 1986, could be February or March, round about there.
MR BERGER: Where did you go to?
MR MASANGO: I first - we first went to Winterveld, where we established safe-houses.
MR BERGER: At this time when you came into the country you were carrying the arms and ammunition that you've just described, is that right?
MR MASANGO: No, just enough for the two of us. The other material that I've just described was brought in with the other unit, the rest of the unit.
MR BERGER: What did you and Jabu Masina bring in, if you can remember?
MR MASANGO: We must have had one landmine, some few handgrenades ...(end of side A of tape) ... AKs, two pistols or three, just light armament.
MR BERGER: Now, the first operation that you were involved in as a unit took place in Mamelodi West or in Mamelodi, is that right?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.
MR BERGER: Can you tell the Committee what prompted you to undertake this particular operation and what it encompassed.
MR MASANGO: That was during the state of emergency and the townships, Mamelodi like all other townships was occupied by the SADF, and there was a call, a general call by the civic organisations, by the students' organisations, by the ANC itself, that the soldiers should be withdrawn from the townships. So we were shown - as we were seeing them, these soldiers, we were shown that they were also in Mamelodi and there was a spot where they like going to, so we decided to plant a landmine on the route that they were using, just on the outskirts, the little outskirts of Mamelodi towards the mountain there. We decided to plant a landmine there.
MR BERGER: We're talking about the area which is now covered by Moritela Park, is that right?
MR MASANGO: That is the place, ja, in that vicinity.
MR BERGER: Yes. Now the landmine that you planted was on a sand road, is that right?
MR MASANGO: It was on a sandy road, ja.
MR BERGER: Do you know what happened as a result of planting that landmine?
MR MASANGO: Ja, as I've said we were sure that it wasn't a route going outside Mamelodi, it was a route that was used by the soldiers, they had a base there or a camp there, where they were camping after their missions or so. So we learnt in the radios, in the media generally, that it has been detonated, detonated by a casspir.
MR BERGER: Do you remember the reports about what was happening at that time when the casspir detonated the mine? What was your information?
MR MASANGO: Well the people we asked about there told us that they've seen some helicopters coming to pick up the injured or the dead. We don't know if there were any people dead other than what we were told by the people, we've never seen how many people were injured and how many people were killed in that incident, but the people told us that they've seen helicopters going there and they've seen the casspir being towed away from that area, it was covered with a huge canvass.
MR BERGER: You have deposed to a sworn statement. If you have a look at the bundle, it's Exhibit A. Your statement runs from page 1 through to page 4, do you confirm that that is your statement and that is your signature at page 4?
MR MASANGO: That is my signature, that is correct.
MR BERGER: The incident that we are referring to now is dealt with in paragraph 8 of that statement. Do you confirm the contents of paragraph 8?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, I do confirm it.
MR BERGER: You say in paragraph 8.5 that you in fact informed the police who had arrested you about this incident, but nothing ever came of it, is that right?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.
MR BERGER: Now the next incident after that - well let's put a date to that incident. You say that that incident was early 1986, February or March 1986?
MR MASANGO: That's correct, ja.
MR BERGER: Chairperson, for the assistance of the Commission, I can tell you that in the further submissions by the ANC to the Truth Commission dated the 12th of May 1997, at page 86, there is an incident described there next to the date 16 February 1986, which simply reads
"SADF personnel Mamelodi, casspir severely damaged by anti-tank landmine."
That's the only incident that we've been able to point to which seems to accord with the evidence that you've just heard. It doesn't appear as though anyone was injured in that incident.
The next incident, and we have a date for that, that's the 16th of March 1986, is the death of Sergeant Vuma, and that you deal with in paragraph 10 of your sworn statement. In your own words could you tell the Committee why Sergeant Vuma and how did that incident unfold.
MR MASANGO: Obviously if one was to describe Sergeant Vuma, one would refer to him as Mamelodi's Shlube, the Shlube of Mamelodi. I've heard about Senki Vuma whilst I was in Botswana, from some new recruits there, some people who were going for further training and so, who were in Mamelodi, who knew Vuma, that he was harassing people there.
There was a massacre in Mamelodi the previous year, '85, in which Vuma was seen by many people to have been there shooting also at the people and harmed old woman who were marching against rent hikes. We have heard of stories where Vuma was torturing some activists in Mamelodi Police Station. And when we left Botswana, already we had in mind that Vuma was to be among the first that we were going to remove.
MR BERGER: Did you receive any specific instruction from the leaders or the leadership to eliminate Vuma, or was he one of the people who was killed in the exercise of your discretion, you decided who was appropriate, who was not?
MR MASANGO: Ja, he fell within the general instruction, the mandate of the unit. As a notorious policeman, as the enemy of the people he surely was to be our target, but we were not given a specific mandate, a specific instruction that we should go for Vuma, although after having eliminated him, we did report to the leadership in exile, in Botswana.
MR BERGER: And what was the response? Or let me put it this way, was there any negative response from the leadership in Botswana?
MR MASANGO: It was very, very welcome there.
MR BERGER: How did you go about killing Senki Vuma?
MR MASANGO: Well he knew also that he is a target of MK. It was very difficult getting him at his place, he wouldn't be there until very, very later at night. So as we were shown his house, we went to his house there on several occasions.
We were surveilling the house to see with whom is he staying, at what time is he leaving, at what time is he coming back. But since he knew that he was a target, he didn't follow a specific or just a common way of life, he would change. Today he would be in, the following day he would not be in. He would change cars like any other thing. But until such time that we realised that he normally comes on Friday evenings - that's what we established, that every Friday evening at least he would be there, and we laid him at his place there ...(intervention)
MR BERGER: Did you discover that he was living alone?
MR MASANGO: We also discovered that he was living alone. We heard that his wife was staying with his parents, with her parents or his parents, but he wasn't staying with him there.
MR BERGER: What other steps had he taken to protect himself?
MR MASANGO: As I've said, he knew that he was a target. The house, the yard there was covered with corrugated iron, there were broken bottles there, there were burglar-proofs. You know empty tins, anything that will make him, that would serve as an alarm should anybody come in that yard whilst he is asleep or any other time whilst there, he should be forewarned now that there's somebody coming in.
MR BERGER: Now on this particular Friday night?
MR MASANGO: Because we knew that he would be coming on Friday, that very Friday, we came in earlier with Jabu Masina and took up positions there ...(intervention)
MR BERGER: Was it just you and Jabu Masina?
MR MASANGO: It was myself and Jabu Masina only, ja.
MR BERGER: The same as with the anti-tank landmine in Mamelodi, it was just you and Jabu Masina?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.
MR BERGER: Alright. Is it because the other members of your group hadn't yet joined the unit, hadn't yet entered South Africa?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.
MR BERGER: Alright. You were saying that you and JABU Masina went to the house.
MR MASANGO: Ja, we waited until close to midnight when we heard a car coming in there. We were positive that it was Senki Vuma, because he was using one of the cars that we've once seen him with. He parked his car next to the door. He didn't come the way we expected him to be coming, where we were waiting for him, but however he did manage to go into the house.
I've heard something like a gun being cocked and then he went into the yard. I could see him through the window. There was a small window there that was burglar-proofed, but it didn't have a glass on there, only burglar-proofs there. I could see him moving about from the kitchen to his bedroom or so, until he opened his - I saw him opening his fridge, coming towards the room where I was standing. He sat down there. I think he was having in his hand a bottle also, or it might be a beer or wine, but it was a bottle with a glass and then he sat down. I could see him from - he was seated and I could see him there through the window and then I fired at him.
MR BERGER: You were outside looking through the window?
MR MASANGO: I was outside, ja.
MR BERGER: You fired at him with what?
MR MASANGO: And AK47.
MR BERGER: What happened to him?
MR MASANGO: I saw him falling against, you know hitting the wall and thereafter falling on the floor there. I kept on firing until the whole room was full of smoke from the AK, that I couldn't see him any longer and then we decided to leave.
MR BERGER: You say you reported that incident to the leadership in Botswana.
MR MASANGO: In Botswana, that is correct.
MR BERGER: Do you confirm the contents of paragraph 10 of your statement?
MR MASANGO: That is correct.
MR BERGER: The next incident ...(intervention)
ADV GCABASHE: Just before you go on to the next incident, just a small matter. The window through which you shot him, you said it just had the burglar-proofing, it had no glass pane.
MR MASANGO: It had no glass pane, ja.
ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.
MR BERGER: Thank you. Now the next incident relates to the death of Mr Lukhele and Mrs Dludlu and the injury to Mrs Lukhele. Before I get to this incident, I forgot to ask you whether you had any knowledge - you killed Senki Vuma on a Friday night and his body was only discovered on a Monday morning after he'd failed to report for work.
MR MASANGO: Yes, that is correct, ja.
MR BERGER: Did you have knowledge of that?
MR MASANGO: Ja, because I - we did have knowledge of that. We were also surprised - we were sure that we shot him on Friday, then on Saturday we listened to the news, the papers, from the radio, the papers, there was nothing. On Sunday as well. We only started hearing about it on I think Monday evening, that they did finally find his corpse there.
MR BERGER: And is it correct that you heard about the fact that they'd only found out about his death on Monday morning? You discovered this during your trial.
MR MASANGO: No, not during the trial.
MR BERGER: Was it before?
MR MASANGO: We heard it before the trial, ja, whilst we were still operating.
MR BERGER: Okay. Let's move now to the next incident. What did you know about Mr Lukhele?
MR MASANGO: I didn't personally know the late Mr Lukhele, but as we were operating in Mamelodi, I came across a pamphlet, a pamphlet that was signed by his, or signed in the name of his Party and said to be from his Party and himself.
In that pamphlet amongst other things, was that Kangwane should be incorporated into Swaziland and that the police, in that pamphlet, the police should continue detaining, arresting the youth there until some of his demands that Kangwane - the police should remain in the township, arresting those youths there, detaining them, until Kangwane is incorporated into Swaziland. I took this pamphlet - there were many of them, they were distributed there in Mamelodi, I showed it to some members of the unit, that we should do something about him.
MR BERGER: Now he was involved in Kangwane politics, you knew that.
MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.
MR BERGER: Did you know about the involvement of Mr Enos Mabuza as well?
MR MASANGO: Mr Mabuza was a friend to the ANC, he would lead delegations to Lusaka for meetings with the ANC leadership, so we were sure that we were having a friend in Mabuza and we felt that Lukhele might be promoted, might even be made to take over from Mabuza.
MR BERGER: Did you know that Mr Mabuza' Party and Mr Lukhele's Party were in opposition to one another?
MR MASANGO: Mr Lukhele's Party was an opposition Party in Kangwane.
MR BERGER: Now after you discussed Mr Lukhele with other members of the unit, did you take a decision there and then that Mr Lukhele should be eliminated?
MR MASANGO: We didn't do that, we said it might be possible that Lukhele perhaps might be also the friend of the ANC, because the ANC had also, some of the people who were regarded as puppets, but who were very close to the ANC, who were co-operating, collaborating with the ANC, so we were not sure if we should take such a decision ourselves to eliminate Lukhele. We sent a message to the leadership, our commanders on Botswana, gave them the pamphlet and told them about Lukhele, who is Lukhele.
We said we were interested in him, we wanted to eliminate him, but we were asking for permission if we could do that because we are not sure exactly who is Lukhele, because we were afraid we might be killing our own person. They said they will give us, they will come to us in a week or so. After two weeks they gave us the green light to go ahead with the mission to eliminate him.
MR BERGER: Alright. How did you go about the operation?
MR MASANGO: I was not involved personally in the operation itself, but it was discussed amongst the members of the unit that Neo Potsane and Jabu Masina would see to it as they were staying in Mamelodi and we were in Soshanguve and Winterveld.
MR BERGER: You knew that Neo Potsane and Jabu Masina were going to embark upon a mission to kill Mr Lukhele.
MR MASANGO: That is correct, I knew.
MR BERGER: In fact you were party to that decision.
MR MASANGO: That is correct, yes.
MR BERGER: You also knew that, or did you know - let me ask you this, how Neo Potsane and Jabu Masina would be armed?
MR MASANGO: I knew obviously that they would be armed with AK47s or so. That I have known.
MR BERGER: And did you know that it was possible that other people could be killed in the attack on Mr Lukhele?
MR MASANGO: That was a general knowledge, that in whatever operation or target we were going for, it is generally known that some other people might be injured, but concerning this incident it was only a question of going for Lukhele. That's what we know, that we're going for Lukhele. We didn't know about what will happen after that or before that.
MR BERGER: Yes. In going for Lukhele, you say that it was generally known on all operations that other people could be killed in the process, other people could be caught in the crossfire? Was that generally known?
MR MASANGO: That was known generally, not specifically for this one.
MR BERGER: Yes. And if an AK47 was used, would the same still apply, that it was generally known in operations where AK47s were used that other people could get caught in the crossfire?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.
MR BERGER: And you knew that at the time when Neo Potsane and Jabu Masina embarked upon this mission to kill Mr Lukhele?
MR MASANGO: That other people were going to be injured?
MR BERGER: Not were going to, but it was possible that they could be injured or killed.
MR MASANGO: Generally I did know, not in that specific incident, that there are going to be other people injured in that, but it was a general knowledge.
MR BERGER: Yes, it's a general knowledge which you had at that time?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.
MR BERGER: And that never deterred you, it never made you think well perhaps they shouldn't go on this mission?
MR MASANGO: It never came to our mind at that time if there were going to be people. If we knew that there are going to be people who are going to be injured, then another position would have been taken, but at that time we never thought of any other people.
MR BERGER: No, my question to you is this, seeing as though he had the knowledge at that time, that it was possible that other people could be killed or injured in the process, would it be correct to say that that never stopped you from sanctioning this mission?
MR MASANGO: Sure, the possible injury of people who were not targeted would not necessarily deter us from carrying out that operation.
MR BERGER: It would not deter you?
MR MASANGO: Yes, that's correct.
MR BERGER: Were you involved in any reconnaissance mission around the home of the Lukhele's?
MR MASANGO: I only knew that he stayed somewhere in the east. It was not per se my operation, Jabu and Neo were to look into that.
MR BERGER: When were you informed about the results of that operation?
MR MASANGO: It was surely after it was carried out. I'm not sure if it was the following day or it was the same day, but I did learn of it immediately after they have done it. I can't just tell whether it was the same night, the same day, the following day, but I did learn after.
MR BERGER: You talk about this incident in paragraph 9, at page 3 of your statement and you refer to Mr Potsane's statement. Mr Potsane deals with it at page 9, and he says in paragraph 8.6 on page 10, that
"Having ascertained that Mr Lukhele was at his home on the day in question, Masina, Masango and I decided that I would move into his house and kill him with my AK47 rifle."
That the three of you decided that that would happen.
"Masina accompanied me to Lukhele's house, but did not enter the house with me."
Do you confirm the contents of that paragraph in relation to you?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, I do confirm that.
MR BERGER: The next incident is the limpet-mine which was placed at the Silverton bus stop. Can you tell the Committee how it came about that a decision was taken to plant this limpet-mine at the Silverton bus stop.
MR MASANGO: I think I should start off by saying that I have grown in a situation whereby I have considered whites to be on the side of apartheid. Apartheid was designed not only to deny us our general rights, it was designed to protect white people, it was designed to privilege white people at the expense of black people. The white people of this country have taken sides with apartheid.
The Nationalist Party Government was not imposed on them, they have voted in their increasing numbers for all the successive years, in all the successive elections, for the Nationalist Party with its apartheid policies. And by that I believe that whites were also on the side of apartheid.
MR BERGER: What did you think - let me ask you this, why did you choose that bus stop?
MR MASANGO: It was a symbol of apartheid, it was a symbol of our oppression ...(intervention)
MR BERGER: Why?
MR MASANGO: It was a whites only bus stop, whereby black people were not to be near it, or I mean to board buses there, they were not allowed to do that. It was a symbol of apartheid, a symbol of oppression, that is why we chose it.
MR BERGER: What did you think or what did you hope would be the result of a bomb exploding there and killing or injuring white civilians?
MR MASANGO: The Nationalist Party Government, the apartheid government at that time prided itself of having the support of the majority of white people. It was also at the time when we were told to take the struggle into white areas.
We also wanted to isolate the supporters, the electorate of the Nationalist Party Government, we also wanted to conscientise then to the situation in our townships, not only our townships, in South Africa generally, that there was a war going on, there was one section of the population that was oppressed for their privileges. We wanted them to be aware of that political situation.
MR BERGER: What did you hope whites would do after seeing that this war in now affecting us, what did you hope they would do?
MR MASANGO: I can recollect an incident in Angola when white young boys were killed in Angola, white mothers protested that no, let their sons come back. So an operation like Silverton would also sensitise then to that situation, it would make them to realise that no, no, no, we can't die for apartheid, we can't injured, we can't bleed for apartheid, let it end. Because they've always voted for that Nationalist Party Government and there's no single election that was delayed, that was stopped or whatever because whites didn't want to participate in those elections because of the exclusion of black people. So we thought by that, that will bring to ...(indistinct) that no, there is such a situation in South Africa.
MR BERGER: Did you believe - and when I say you, I mean you and your unit, that you were authorised by the ANC and MK to carry out such an operation?
MR MASANGO: I don't think, I don't even think our unit would have done anything that will not be approved by the ANC. There was an implied mandate, there was an implied authority that we can go on, we can do such an operation.
MR BERGER: On what did you base that implied authority?
MR MASANGO: From the statements that white civilians can be targeted, that the distinction between the hard and soft targets should disappear and on the fact that there were other incidents prior to ours, whereby we've never heard a single leader of the ANC or even the ANC leadership in general, condemning such an act. So we thought that such an act will be welcomed by the ANC.
MR BERGER: Subsequent to the explosion, did you report your participation, your units participation in that bombing to the leadership of the ANC?
MR MASANGO: Ja, if we thought it is something that would not have been approved by the ANC, we wouldn't have reported it, but we did report that.
MR BERGER: Why do you say "if we knew that it wouldn't have been approved, or didn't carry the approval we wouldn't have reported it"? What do you mean by that?
MR MASANGO: We were sure that it was going to be approved by the ANC, that similar incidents were approved.
MR BERGER: What could have happened to you if you had performed an act which did not carry the approval of the ANC?
MR MASANGO: There are various forms of punishment as an offence. We would have been recalled, that would have been one of them and ...(indistinct) know what would have happened to us in the camps, we would have been demoted and sent somewhere in one of the camps there to stay there. But we were not recalled, we were not reprimanded or any other thing.
MR BERGER: Were you aware at that stage of the military code of Umkhonto weSizwe?
MR MASANGO: Yes, we were aware.
MR BERGER: And were you aware of the punishments for unjustifiable homicide?
MR MASANGO: We were aware of that.
MR BERGER: And you say that if you had believed that what you had done did not carry the approval, you wouldn't have reported it?
MR MASANGO: We wouldn't have reported it, yes, that's correct.
MR BERGER: Let's go to the incident itself. You say this incident, the planning was discussed by the unit as a whole?
MR MASANGO: That is correct.
MR BERGER: The four of you, but it wasn't carried out by the four of you, am I right?
MR MASANGO: Sure.
MR BERGER: Who participated in the actual operation?
MR MASANGO: Makhura, Joseph Makhura was actually the person who placed the limpet-mine in the dustbin there whilst I kept guard.
MR BERGER: You deal with the incident in paragraph 7 at page 2 of your statement.
MR MASANGO: That's correct, ja.
MR BERGER: I just want to make one correction. If you look in paragraph 7.2, you deal with the Kabwe conference, you say there "June 1995", that's a typographical mistake, it should be June 1985, am I right? Middle of 7.2.
MR MASANGO: I don't understand what would be wrong.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Berger, where do we get the charge sheet?
MR BERGER: Yes, I do Adv de Jager, it's charges 20 to 37, page 81, which are the attempted murder charges and 38 to 49 are the malicious damage to property. And then it's dealt with again ...(intervention)
ADV DE JAGER: ...(no microphone)
MR BERGER: It's 20 to 37, bottom of page 88 through to page 89 and then 38 to 49, also on page 89 is the damage to property charges. And the incident took place on the 4th of July 1986.
Mr Masango, I had confused you. I was referring to paragraph 7.2, where you said:
"I was present at the Kabwe conference in June 1995."
MR MASANGO: '85, it's supposed to be.
MR BERGER: Yes. Besides that change, do you confirm the contents of paragraph 7?
MR MASANGO: Sure, that's correct, ja.
MR BERGER: The last incident for which you're applying for amnesty is the incident in Soshanguve, which took place on the, well the bomb exploded on the 21st of July 1986. You deal with that in paragraph 6 of your statement, at page 2, and you refer to Mr Makhura's statement. Can you in your own words explain to the Committee why it was that it was decided to place a bomb in Soshanguve and how you went about it.
MR MASANGO: Soshanguve was also at that time under the state of emergency, just like in Mamelodi. The same soldiers that were occupying Mamelodi were also there in Soshanguve and there were same calls made, that they should withdraw from that township. It was also existent in Soshanguve. So it was in that context that we placed this landmine in Soshanguve.
MR BERGER: Mr Makhura describes in his statement how the landmine was placed in a heap of soil across the road that was blocking a road, do you remember that?
MR MASANGO: I do remember that very well because I was there. ...(indistinct) in the car. They did tell me immediately after that how did they plant the bomb there.
MR BERGER: Why was it decided to plant the bomb in that heap of soil?
MR MASANGO: We have learnt that the military vehicles were able to surpass, to surmount that heap of soil. We then thought this is a safer place because there is no civilian car or ordinary car that will go over that heap of soil. We have seen also that it was police vehicles that were passing there, casspirs in particular. That's how we decided on planting the limpet-mine at that heap of soil.
MR BERGER: Mr Makhura says at page 6, paragraph 6.4 of his statement, that the night when you went to plant the bomb, that it was you, Mr Potsane, Mr Makhura and a man by the name of Mandla. Do you recall that Mandla was present?
MR MASANGO: I do recall very well.
MR BERGER: Who was Mandla?
MR MASANGO: Mandla was also a member of the unit who later, who was recalled in Zambia and who later disappeared. Up to now we don't know what happened to him. But he was the member of the unit also, a trained MK cadre.
MR BERGER: In 6.5, Mr Makhura says, as you've already told the Committee, that you remained in the car whilst they planted the bomb.
MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.
MR BERGER: Do you have knowledge that the bomb wasn't detonated for two or three days?
MR MASANGO: Ja, that is correct, I do have knowledge of that.
MR BERGER: What happened after that?
MR MASANGO: After two days, after we realised that - on the third day when we realised that the bomb was not going off, so we were surprised as to what was happening because we were sure that the casspir would pass over that place.
Then on the third day we decided that no, that's a busy place, people on foot do pass there. We feared that it might end up being discovered and then we decided that we should go the same evening, on the third day, go and remove that. We discussed that during the day. But now the same afternoon we learnt over the radios again that that landmine has been detonated by a bulldozer or a road grader or whatever, as they were constructing the road there.
MR BERGER: Do you know if anyone was injured in that explosion?
MR MASANGO: No, no, no, we don't know, though we've heard that the driver - after we were arrested we heard that the driver was thrown on air, but we were never told if he was injured or what.
MR BERGER: You say you were afraid that someone might discover the mine. Did you have any fear that someone could be injured by the mine, someone walking over that heap of soil?
MR MASANGO: No, it could only be detonated by a weight of over 120kgs, so a person walking on foot over it, it would cause any danger to him. It's only a vehicle that will detonate it. It's an anti-tank landmine, it needs very, very heavy weight to be detonated.
MR BERGER: Heavier that 120kgs?
MR MASANGO: Ja, it should be heavier than 120kgs.
MR BERGER: No, the reason - you said 120, but I can think of some people who weigh 120kgs.
MR MASANGO: There could be - oh, they are very, very rare, it could - unfortunately a person over 180, it could be unfortunate if you will pass over that place and then it could detonate, though I doubt still that we have so many people in that area, in Soshanguve.
MR BERGER: What you're saying really is that this was an anti-tank mine and it needed an incredibly heavy weight to set it off.
MR MASANGO: A heavy weight, ja.
MR BERGER: Mr Masango, it was subsequent to this explosion in Soshanguve that you were arrested, is that right?
MR MASANGO: Sure.
MR BERGER: You've heard what I said before Jabu Masina was called to give evidence in my opening address this morning.
MR MASANGO: Ja.
MR BERGER: Do you confirm that what I said was true and correct?
MR MASANGO: It was true and correct, yes.
MR BERGER: That you maintained throughout your trial that you had acted in respect of all the incidents with which you were charged, as a soldier of Umkhonto weSizwe?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.
MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BERGER
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Berger. Mr Booysen, any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYSEN: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairperson.
Mr Masango, you gave evidence regarding that Setchaba meeting, that white persons must bleed, is that correct?
MR MASANGO: Could you come again please?
MR BOOYSEN: In your evidence you testified about the Setchaba meeting and your own words you said that white people must bleed, is that correct?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.
MR BOOYSEN: What about coloured people, Mr Masango, and black people, where did they stand? Should they have also bled?
MR MASANGO: No, in this incident - this was aimed at white people, it was at a whites only bus stop. It is unfortunate that coloureds and blacks were there at that time.
MR BOOYSEN: Okay. Earlier you testified you were born in Pretoria, you were brought up in Mamelodi, is that correct?
MR MASANGO: That's correct, ja.
MR BOOYSEN: Silverton is next to Mamelodi, is that also correct?
MR MASANGO: That's also correct.
MR BOOYSEN: You knew Silverton?
MR MASANGO: I knew Silverton very well, ja.
MR BOOYSEN: You also know that now still today there's a Checkers about two or three metres from that bus stop, is that correct?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.
MR BOOYSEN: If necessary, people will come and testify that there were always many black people and coloured people walking around there, can you deny that?
MR MASANGO: I agree there were many people there.
MR BOOYSEN: It's a very busy area, there's lot's of shops in that - it's Pretoria Road, I think.
MR MASANGO: That's correct, ja.
MR BOOYSEN: So you knew there could have been black people and coloured people as well.
MR MASANGO: We placed that limpet-mine at a spot which we recognised, which we believed at that time, at that particular time when it explodes, there will be at least a number of white people around it as it was at the bus stop, a whites only bus stop.
MR BOOYSEN: So you said as long as we get five blacks, never mind - five whites, never mind if 10 coloureds or two black people die as well? - even if their political views are the same as yours.
MR MASANGO: We have placed that limpet at a place which symbolised apartheid, a place we should believe that several whites, more than what we actually were thinking of, would be there.
It is unfortunate that blacks at that time, coloureds at that time, or any other person who passed at that time, the limpet whom it was not intended against was injured. It is unfortunate.
MR BOOYSEN: Yes, but still you said okay, the black people and coloured people can be injured? Never mind that, they must be injured, they could even have died. Because that bus stop, Mr Masango, was about five metres from Checkers, it was in a busy place, everybody was walking around there, even black and coloured people. Never mind that there was a bus stop for white people, black and coloured people walked around that bus stop to get into Checkers and other shops as well, and you said it's okay they must also die then.
MR MASANGO: I don't remember myself saying that it's okay any other person can die.
MR BOOYSEN: But surely ...(intervention)
MR MASANGO: Otherwise we would have put it right in Checkers, if that was the case.
MR BOOYSEN: Ja, but surely there could have been coloured and black people in Checkers as well. There was no apartheid from Checkers, everybody went there to do some shopping.
MR MASANGO: That is why we placed that limpet at the bus stop, a whites only bus stop.
MR BOOYSEN: Did you, before you placed that bomb there, make any observations on that site? How long before you placed the bomb did you plan this bombing?
MR MASANGO: I didn't really need to take over many days because I knew Silverton, I knew that that bus stop, many white people were using that bus stop.
MR BOOYSEN: No, surely you couldn't have planned this, Mr Masango, because you know Silverton, you know Checkers and you knew there were many black and coloured people, but still you went on and you placed the bomb. You must have felt nothing for black people and coloured people that could have had the same political objective that you had.
MR MASANGO: They were not our targets.
MR BOOYSEN: Ja, but you knew they were going to be injured or killed, is that true?
MR MASANGO: We didn't intend it.
MR BOOYSEN: How could that be, Mr Masango? I've sketched a whole scenario for you and still you want to deny and say they couldn't have been injured. You saw there was lots of people, the bomb was placed five metres outside of Checkers, on the pavement where many people walked.
MR MASANGO: I have never ...(intervention)
ADV DE JAGER: I know you're conversing in English, but they've got to translate it for the benefit of other people too, so you should kindly go slower.
MR BOOYSEN: I beg your pardon, I seem to forget. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Can we come back to that one again, Mr Masango, because your explanation is not good enough. There are black people and coloured people sitting here - luckily nobody was injured - nobody was killed, and they need to know why did you not think of them at the time of the bombing.
MR MASANGO: Who wants to know, the black people?
MR BOOYSEN: Well some of my clients are coloured people and there's black people here as well. I'm not representing them, but some of my clients are coloured people.
MR MASANGO: That bomb was not intended for them, it was intended for white people.
MR BOOYSEN: Mr Masango, don't you think the leadership of the ANC, although they adopted their policy to white, to soft targets that were supposed to be white people, they would have wanted you to be more serious or be more direct to white targets? I think they - wouldn't you think they would have wanted you to eliminate black or coloured people getting hurt? Don't you think they would have wanted you to be more thoughtful before you acted in such a way?
MR MASANGO: Obviously, but when I recognised, when I've identified a target and then - I've said earlier that it was stated as a whites only bus stop and it's unfortunate that blacks and coloureds were injured. And I've said that if I have to go on as we did with that operation, the injuries of some of the people ... the bomb was not intended against, wouldn't deter us from going ahead with that operation.
MR BOOYSEN: Mr Masango, why did you risk being reprimanded by the MK for the bombing instead of obtaining their approval prior to the bombing? Would it have been better to obtain it prior to the bombing and give them a site where you're going to do it and an explanation of how many people are there?
MR MASANGO: At times that would be the wise thing to do, but we didn't always operate that way. We felt this was within the general mandate of the ANC of the unit, so we were also tasked to use our own discretion. So we didn't need to go outside to go and find clarification for each and every operation we wanted to do.
MR BOOYSEN: Okay. You only testified, Mr Masango, that there were previous approvals of this sort of action by you, is that correct?
MR MASANGO: Not by us, not by us as the unit, but other MK operatives.
MR BOOYSEN: Okay. Can you tell us was that also a bombing of soft targets?
MR MASANGO: Ja, in my view some of those were also soft targets, like the Silverton siege for instance. These were civilians who were held hostages there.
MR BOOYSEN: Was there any policy on civilians being held hostage by the ANC?
MR MASANGO: The policy of the ANC at that time was that whilst you can be targeted in whatever form, after Kabwe it was said that they could be targeted in whatever form, it could be hostage taking, it could be whatever.
MR BOOYSEN: Because I see it wasn't specified here as hostage taking. So you concluded that hostage taking was one of the objectives?
MR MASANGO: If as a soldier you are told that now you can attack whites too, you'd use your own discretion as to how are you carrying out that instruction. It would be up to you whether you do it by hostage taking, by limpet mines, by whatever means.
MR BOOYSEN: Mr Masango, did you ever consider the pain of innocent people, black, white or coloured, after the bombing of their relatives, the pain of having losing somebody or the pain of the victims themselves? Did you ever consider that before placing that bomb?
MR MASANGO: We were not murderers, we were not murders. We knew that the taking of life is not an easy thing, but we had a war, we had a struggle to wage.
MR BOOYSEN: Thank you, Mr Masango. One last question, can you tell us why are you applying for amnesty today?
MR MASANGO: Like all people who fought for this freedom that we are enjoying today, I've applied for amnesty that, particularly for this incident, that those people who were injured should understand that we were involved in a war, people were killed at that time, people were detained, some were in exile, people wanted to come back home. It was in that spirit. We are now free, all of us.
We are all South Africans and the past should remain what it is, the past. There should be that reconciliation. We should go forwards with our lives and try to build together South Africa. That's why I basically applied for amnesty.
MR BOOYSEN: Okay. I just want to get this clear, there's a rumour and there's no substance for that, that you applied for amnesty because you can't get progress in your jobs. Is that true or not?
MR MASANGO: I can't what?
MR BOOYSEN: Because there's no progress and promotion for you in your job, is that true?
MR MASANGO: I doubt if there will be any job here in South Africa that will deny you. Actually, should they see that I was involved in such types of operations and such types of ... should they realise that I was an MK cadre, I will immediately be taken, given one of the top jobs there.
MR BOOYSEN: Okay, so that's not the truth, that's not your objective in applying for amnesty today, is that correct?
MR MASANGO: No, no, no.
MR BOOYSEN: Will you do something like that again, Mr Masango? Would you like to do something like that again?
MR MASANGO: I'd wish we wouldn't have such a situation that will force me to do such things.
MR BOOYSEN: So what you're basically saying is you're glad it's over?
MR MASANGO: I'm glad it's over, ja.
MR BOOYSEN: Thank you, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYSEN
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Booysen. Mr Rammutla?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RAMMUTLA: Thanks, Mr Chairman.
Mr Masango, coming to the incident of the killing of Mr Lukhele, Mrs Dludlu and the injury to Mrs Elizabeth Lukhele, did you take Mr Lukhele to be the enemy of the African National Congress?
MR MASANGO: Yes, he was professing, he was promoting political ideas that were opposed to the general ideas, political ideas of the ANC. He was what we refer to as a puppet. He was working within the structure of apartheid.
MR RAMMUTLA: Mr Masango, was Mr Lukhele perhaps involved in the murdering, the torturing and the acts of similar nature against members of the ANC, or perhaps was he just only puppeting in the distributing of information which was anti-ANC at that time?
MR MASANGO: We don't know of any act, I don't know of any act whereby he was involved and whereby people were killed, in which he was involved. But the struggle at that time was not about who was killing who, that should be killed, it was also on which side, political side were you on.
MR RAMMUTLA: Coming lastly to you, Mr Masango, you took Mr Mabuza, Enos Mabuza to be the sympathiser and the friend of the ANC, was that so?
MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.
MR RAMMUTLA: But in the same breath - how do you reconcile this Mr Masango, in the same breath taking Mr Enos Mabuza, your sympathiser, the person who was leading a homeland, who was upholding the laws of the previous government, the government which was oppressing you, but on the other hand you go about killing the others who were leaders of the homelands? How did you reconcile that?
MR MASANGO: Mr Mabuza was becoming a friend of the ANC and we felt that he should not be removed from Kangwane, as a leader there because obviously he was against Kangwane being granted full independence or so. But we have somebody like Lukhele who was opposed to all that, who wanted actually that part of Kangwane, that that part of South Africa be incorporated into Swaziland. We have policemen, we had policemen who were working for the ANC.
I mean that in relation to Mabuza working for the system at that time. We had policemen who were working for the ANC, but still being policemen. So we would have had people who worked within Bantustan system, as our friends.
MR RAMMUTLA: So lastly, Mr Masango, are you feeling sorry and you are saying you are sorry for the murdering of Mr Lukhele, Dludlu and the injury to Mrs Lukhele?
MR MASANGO: I am not a murderer, generally I am always sorry for all the murders, that the eliminations that have taken place. That will be a general answer, but then even before the TRC became fashionable, during our trial we said we were sorry, we apologise for the unintentional killing of, and injury of the two ladies, Mrs Dludlu and Lukhele's wife. That we have said long before the TRC became fashionable.
MR RAMMUTLA: Okay, thank you, Mr Masango, thanks a lot.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR RAMMUTLA
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mtanga, questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS MTANGA: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr Masango, in the light of the evidence of the bus stop where you planted the limpet-mine - sorry, it's the limpet-mine next to Checkers, in the light of the evidence that you were aware that there were people of mixed races moving around that area, did you take any steps to ensure that people who were not white wouldn't be injured?
MR MASANGO: There was one person there who saw me around, a black person, and I did tell him to tell his friends there, his other black friends to move away from that spot.
MS MTANGA: In similar incidents - if you had the same similar operations where you would have people, people of the public moving there, what other warning could you have given to people that you were not targeting, other than the way you have with it in that situation?
MR MASANGO: Unless if you are given a similar situation as that one, that there wouldn't be any other way of warning them to go away otherwise you would be arrested before that thing explodes.
MS MTANGA: Okay. Would it be correct to say that you did foresee that people who were not whites could be killed in that bomb blast?
MR MASANGO: Obviously people will always be caught in a cross-fire in any situation.
MS MTANGA: And what was your attitude about that?
MR MASANGO: We had a struggle to wage, we had struggle to wage really.
MS MTANGA: So are you saying you just thought they would be caught up in that fire, in that cross-fire and that was it for you?
MR MASANGO: Ja, I've said that such an incident we didn't ...(indistinct) to stop an operation.
MS MTANGA: You've also testified that after each operation you'd report back to the leadership in Botswana. What I want to know is, in your reporting, would you account for the victims in each incident and in that accounting would you specify the race of the people, especially in the background that the ANC never targeted black people and coloured people.
MR MASANGO: Well we reported to the ANC, we said that you know it has exploded and then white, black and coloureds were injured.
MS MTANGA: And what was the response you got from your organisation?
MR MASANGO: The response was only that we should clearly define our target.
MS MTANGA: And then you also, in all the incidents you stated that you were reporting to the leadership in Botswana, who was the person responsible for reporting in Botswana, in your unit?
MR MASANGO: Tengwe Mtinso(?)
MS MTANGA: Was he also a member of your unit?
MR MASANGO: She was our commander, but based in Botswana. She must have been, maybe a commander for other units as well.
MS MTANGA: And who was the person in South Africa reporting to Tengwe in Botswana?
MR MASANGO: The unit commander, Jabu Masina.
MS MTANGA: Okay. Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS MTANGA
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Mtanga.
Mr Masango, what time of the day was it about when you left the limpet-mine at this bus stop?
MR MASANGO: It could have been midday, but it exploded long after that.
CHAIRPERSON: And what was the delay on the detonation of the limpet-mine, how long was it between placing it and the explosion?
MR MASANGO: It was supposed to have exploded between 20 and 30 minutes of our placing it there.
CHAIRPERSON: Now when you placed it, were there any people at this bus stop?
MR MASANGO: There were one or two white people I saw there, exact like the, at the bus stop, at the shelter of the bus stop.
CHAIRPERSON: They were waiting for the bus?
MR MASANGO: Ja.
CHAIRPERSON: Have you had any idea about the timetables of the buses that were supposed to use that route?
MR MASANGO: No, no, no, we didn't have any timetable.
MS MTANGA: So it wasn't planned to explode at about a time when there was supposed to be a bus at the bus stop?
MR MASANGO: No, it was just set to explode 20 minutes after we had placed it there, there wasn't a particular time, a specific time when people would be there or when the bus would be there as such.
CHAIRPERSON: So you were not sure whether there would be a bus or whether there would be people waiting for a bus?
MR MASANGO: It was a bus stop, we were sure that there would be some people who were waiting for the bus there.
CHAIRPERSON: But you'd assumed that, you hadn't factored it into your planning, you hadn't looked at the, for example at the timetable to see that there would be a bus say at 12H30, and therefore you would place the limpet at 12 o'clock and set the detonation for 30 minutes afterwards, that type of thing? You didn't do that kind of planning?
MR MASANGO: No, but the previous day when I was there, the time at which we placed that bomb, the previous day, there were many people there the previous day.
CHAIRPERSON: At about midday?
MR MASANGO: At about midday, ja. The time at which we placed it.
CHAIRPERSON: Were those white people waiting for the bus at the bus stop?
MR MASANGO: They were at the bus shelter there, Sir, they could have been waiting for the bus.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you keep observation on the bus stop for a while the previous day, or was it purely coincidental that you were there at about the same time and saw that there was all these people?
MR MASANGO: Not for long. I didn't stay long, I just saw some white people at that time and I just looked at the time and said no, at this time around there are many of them and then I left. I didn't stay long.
CHAIRPERSON: I don't have a personal knowledge of this area, but is this a main route, is it a busy sort of route?
MR MASANGO: Ja, it's along the main road there.
CHAIRPERSON: If you still have - was there any indication of the sort of relative numbers of people that were injured between white and black? We have a whole list of complainants in regard to this particular explosion, it's a whole string of attempted murder charges, which give some indication, but I don't know if you have an indication still as to what ratio there was eventually.
MR MASANGO: We did see that list of victims. I did see it and then I did realise that white, blacks and coloureds were injured.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. And you didn't - if you can still recall, from the reports at that time or even from that, have you formed any idea about the ratios, white/black?
MR MASANGO: Well since the names were released a day after that explosion we did see that there were, the ratio was not equal, was not balanced, there were more blacks injured than the intended whites.
CHAIRPERSON: Is that what in fact happened eventually, were there more blacks injured than white people?
MR MASANGO: By blacks I'm including coloureds as well.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR MASANGO: Ja.
CHAIRPERSON: And from the, possibly from the trial or from the subsequent reports, was there any indication of anybody, of the nature of the injuries? Were there people sort of killed at the bus stop waiting for the bus or seriously injured and say others in the vicinity injured by shrapnel or debris or that kind of thing? Have you formed any idea about that sort of thing?
MR MASANGO: Before placing the bomb?
CHAIRPERSON: No, no, afterwards.
MR MASANGO: Ja, we did discuss that, we did analyse that and then when there were so many we said to ourselves it can't have been so many black people who were at the bus stop, obviously they were hit by shrapnel or so, they might be some metres away.
CHAIRPERSON: So have you concluded that the bulk of the people were injured through shrapnel and debris and so on?
MR MASANGO: That was our ...(indistinct), because we said to ourselves there's no way that we could have had so many blacks, coloureds and Indians standing at - I mean coloureds and blacks standing at that whites only bus stop, they might have been caught metres away from that place.
CHAIRPERSON: Was that the sort of conclusion that you came to, that there were fewer, let's call them direct victims at the bus stop, fewer of those than victims of people in the vicinity who got injured through all this, flying objects and so on?
MR MASANGO: That was the conclusion of course, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Masango.
ADV GCABASHE: Mr Masango, just one really, about planning as a unit. Did you say Mr Makhura was the unit leader?
MR MASANGO: Masina.
ADV GCABASHE: Masina. Did you all live together or you just saw one another occasionally, how did that work?
MR MASANGO: They were staying in Mamelodi, whilst we were staying in Winterveld. We would phone one another, discussing some of the things, not serious things over the phone, but for meetings or so. But we'll always drive to Mamelodi or they will drive to Winterveld, where we will meet and discuss, or we'll meet anywhere in town and discuss whatever question we were discussing.
ADV GCABASHE: Did any one particular person have the duty of identifying targets, or how did you go about identifying your targets?
MR MASANGO: Anybody could identify the target.
ADV GCABASHE: And then bring that into the discussion and you would all talk about it?
MR MASANGO: Sure, but in this instance I identified the target and then I talked to Masina, because we had to be given the go-ahead by Masina, whatever operation we are carrying out.
ADV GCABASHE: And did you all tend to agree on your targets each time you discussed the various ones?
MR MASANGO: We've always agreed. We might perhaps differ on how the operation must be carried out, but on that it should be attacked, that it should be done, we would always agree on that.
ADV GCABASHE: Over what period of time did you execute these particular operations, in terms of months or weeks?
MR MASANGO: All of them together?
ADV GCABASHE: Yes, just the general period.
MR MASANGO: That could be about seven - until the time we were arrested, that could be from February to September because we were ...(indistinct) in September.
ADV GCABASHE: Okay, thank you. Thank you, Chair.
ADV DE JAGER: Why didn't you choose a different bus stop further down the road, not within two or three or five yards from Checkers, where all the people would assemble?
MR MASANGO: It could have been at any other bus stop, but we decided that should be the one. It was the most busiest than all other bus stops, because it was almost at the centre.
ADV DE JAGER: Yes, so that was also the bus stop where black people and coloured people would be in the vicinity of Checkers, because that's the main buying place for people in Silverton, isn't it?
MR MASANGO: The limpet mine was much closer to the bus stop, the shelter, than even to the Checkers itself, though I do admit that shrapnel would have reached Checkers as well.
ADV DE JAGER: Yes, and you knew it, you've learnt to work with limpet-mines, didn't you?
MR MASANGO: Sure, we did.
ADV DE JAGER: And you're a person planning and identifying the spot, so you must have foreseen that you would kill other people or injure other people too, not only whites?
MR MASANGO: Ja, when a limpet is placed at a bus stop, directly at the bus stop, the shelter, obviously from any, any military person would know that a person who is away, metres away will also be injured, but whilst the actual target is exactly at the bus stop it goes without saying that the people metres away will also be injured, but the aim of the target, the target where it will be, that is what is important at that time.
ADV DE JAGER: But this bus stop is on the pavement where all the people are moving up and down going to the shops and coming out of the shops.
MR MASANGO: That is correct, yes.
ADV DE JAGER: And the dustbin was even nearer to the shops than to the street, wouldn't it be?
MR MASANGO: It was nearer to the shops than the street.
ADV DE JAGER: Ja. So in fact you didn't take care of other people being killed or injured, black people that may be members of your own Party.
MR MASANGO: If we were to carry an operation and then some people like blacks and coloureds will also be injured, that wouldn't deter us necessarily from carrying out that operation.
ADV DE JAGER: No, I can understand that, but if there's an obvious choice you could have chosen the next bus stop which wasn't so near to the shops where black people, maybe people of your own Party would have been involved.
MR MASANGO: A different bus stop as I've said was smaller than that one because that one was in the centre, it would have had very little political impact.
ADV DE JAGER: Just another aspect, it's not really important, but I see you're using the word "eliminate", "we've been instructed to eliminate this person". Was the word "eliminate" actually used, the very word, for killing?
MR MASANGO: It was a military term meaning to kill.
ADV DE JAGER: So it was a known military term?
MR MASANGO: It was a military term, ja.
ADV DE JAGER: Ja, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, any re-examination?
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Just a few questions, Chairperson.
Mr Masango, you said that a smaller bus stop would not have had, would not have been politically significant. What did you mean by that?
MR MASANGO: Each and every operation that we were doing was supposed to have a very wide, a very serious political impact. So a bus stop down the street there wouldn't mean anything, people would know about that, but it wouldn't mean much as a bus stop that is in a centre of a city.
MR BERGER: Did you want people to know that this was a bomb that was being placed by MK, to make a point against segregated bus stops?
MR MASANGO: Exactly.
MR BERGER: Did you have any desire to target black or coloured people?
MR MASANGO: Not at all.
MR BERGER: Could that have served the interests of the ANC or MK, in any way?
MR MASANGO: Not at all.
MR BERGER: Was that your understanding at the time?
MR MASANGO: It was our understanding at the time, ja.
MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BERGER
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Berger. Yes, Mr Masango, you are excused.
MR MASANGO: Thank you.
WITNESS EXCUSED
CHAIRPERSON: We have come to the end of the day. There obviously are a few witnesses left in these proceedings, so there's no reasonable prospect of conclude it today, we'll have to postpone it until tomorrow. This and another partly-heard matter that stood down are the only remaining matters on the roll for this Panel, so we proceed with this matter tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock. We're adjourned and we reconvene here at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
