CHAIRPERSON: ... with the amnesty hearing arising from the kidnapping and murder of Brian Ngqulunga on the 19th of July 1990. The Committee remains the same. Will those appearing please place themselves on record.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, P A Hattingh, instructed by Mr Hugo, appearing on behalf of Mr de Kock and Mr Simon Radebe.
MR BOTHA: Thank you Mr Chairman, Kobus Booyens on behalf of the applicants Bellingan and Baker, instructed by van der Merwe and Bester and on behalf of the applicant Botha, instructed by Strydom Britz.
MR LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, Lamey of the firm Rooth and Wessels. I appear on behalf of Mr Nortje.
MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, Jan Wagener, I appear on behalf of Gen I J Engelbrecht.
MR VAN DER WALT: Thank you Mr Chairman, for the family Ngqulunga, N van der Walt, instructed by de Wet and Fourie Attorneys.
ADV STEENKAMP: Steenkamp, Mr Chairman, I will be the Evidence Leader, thank you sir.
CHAIRPERSON: I understand Mr Steenkamp that all the implicated parties who are available, have been notified?
ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, indeed that is my contention and I submit that all reasonable steps relating to Section 19(4) were taken and all implicated people were duly notified. Thank you Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Gentlemen, have you decided the order that you are going to start in?
MR HATTINGH: We will start with Mr de Kock, Mr Chairman.
ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, if I may be so rude as to interrupt, I suggest it is maybe a good time now just to refer to a document which I received from one of the implicated parties. It is my contention, I am sure that the applicants will all be referring to this document, the statement of Mr van Rensburg which was made available to yourselves together with correspondence of his Attorneys, Goldberg and Vick. Sorry Mr Chairman, I would beg leave to hand the document in Mr Chairman, it was also made available to the victims' Attorneys, may it be marked as Exhibit A.
CHAIRPERSON: And to the applicants' Attorneys?
ADV STEENKAMP: And to the applicants' Attorneys, thank you Mr Chairman.
MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I have not received a copy, may I just have one.
CHAIRPERSON: That may have something to do with the fact, I gather, that you were not here, Mr Lamey earlier.
MR LAMEY: I apologise for that Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: I tried to read their letter, apparently dated, this was received on the 10th of September 1999, the second paragraph thereof
"... we attach to this a copy of our client's (I cannot read the next word) affidavit along with a copy of the statement."
What is that second document that they say they have annexed, which I haven't got annexed to my copy?
ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, maybe if I can help there, I think the difficulty arose when we received the first statement, the signed one, it was very unclear and unreadable and we have requested for a more clear copy, which is the second document which is just a duplication of the first statement. Unfortunately that one was not signed, I think the correspondence was referring to that.
CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on)
ADV STEENKAMP: Indeed, Mr Chairman, so the second statement, although unsigned is actually a copy of the first statement, thank you Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: It is slightly better, but not much. We didn't in the last hearing and I don't know if there is much purpose in me dealing with this sort of document, give it an exhibit number, which would be easily identified as the affidavit of Gen van Rensburg, I don't think there is need to give exhibit numbers to such documents.
MR SIBANYONI: Mr de Kock, for purposes of the record, your full names please?
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)
MR SIBANYONI: Please be seated. Sworn in Chairperson.
EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr de Kock, you are an amnesty applicant with regard to this incident, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Your application appears in the bundle beginning on page 2 and ending on page 11, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Do you confirm the correctness of the allegations embodied therein?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And then for the purposes of the record, with regard to this incident, will you once again confirm that you made an additional or supplementary affidavit regarding Vlakplaas which during the first two or three days of the hearing of the first cluster, was submitted?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Do you confirm the correctness of the allegations contained therein?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Very well, Mr de Kock ...
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can we clarify a couple of things now. I want to make it clear, I do not expect the whole of Mr de Kock's application to be affixed to each Bundle, but can we just place on record Mr de Kock, this portion that you have been referred to, page 2 to 11, that was originally part of your application, which you swore to, wasn't it?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, because there is nothing on these papers which show that it was part of the affidavit. And the other thing I would like to place on record at this stage is that your, I think, no, it is not - is the second affidavit part of this Bundle?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: No Mr Chairperson, are you referring to the Vlakplaas, the supplementary affidavit? It does not form part of the Bundle. There is another statement in the Bundle by Mr de Kock, which is virtually a repeat of what he says in the statement...
CHAIRPERSON: Oh, there, I had read it, yes, I just wanted to get the page reference, it is page 146.
MR HATTINGH: That is right, yes Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: It is almost word for word the original?
MR HATTINGH: Indeed, yes Mr Chairman. Mr de Kock, the deceased, Mr Brian Ngqulunga, was initially an askari who was connected to Vlakplaas, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And later he became a member of the South African Police?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Mr Ngqulunga was among others involved in the killing of Mr Griffiths Mxenge, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And it was one of the incidents which was investigated by the Harms Commission?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: When the Harms Commission heard evidence regarding Mr Griffiths Mxenge's death, Mr Ngqulunga was still employed at Vlakplaas?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And was he later transferred to Head Office?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Now Mr de Kock, what was Mr Ngqulunga's attitude before he gave evidence before the Harms Commission?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was a very tense person and at times he went out of control and I am referring as far back as 1993, or rather 1983, when I worked with Ngqulunga for the first time at Empangeni, where he wanted to commit suicide one evening and I removed his weapons. I was relatively new, I did not know why and one of the other askaris informed me that it had to do with a murder which had taken place in Durban in which Brian had been present and the person had been killed.
MR HATTINGH: Was this the death of Mr Mxenge?
MR DE KOCK: That was the death of Mr Mxenge.
MR HATTINGH: Was he prepared, was he consulted with in your presence for the purposes of his testimony before the Harms Commission?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. The evidence was orchestrated, it correlated and then there was also the situation if I might put it this way, where lessons were given as such, where Devil's Advocate was played with the persons who would give evidence, persons such as Mr Ngqulunga, myself and Mr Mamasela in order to equip us to deal with trick questions.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. And did Mr Ngqulunga give evidence in front of the Harms Commission?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Was it after that that he was transferred to Head Office?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I must just mention that at that stage, Ngqulunga, van Dyk, Bosigo, two other persons and myself were on special leave where we had to report to Head Office every day.
MR HATTINGH: When you refer to special leave, what was the reason for this so-called special leave?
MR DE KOCK: As a result of pressure from the public and then also the media, there wasn't any such special leave according to police regulations.
MR HATTINGH: Did it all boil down to a practical suspension?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: A suspension with paid salary?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And as a result of this pressure due to Mr Nofomela and Mr Coetzee's revelations?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: But you were still obliged to report to the Pretoria Head Office on a daily basis?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And how did Mr Ngqulunga's evidence before the Commission go according to your knowledge?
MR DE KOCK: As far as I know, it went successfully. I never read it, but it was sufficient for the purposes of the Harms Commission.
MR HATTINGH: And after that, was he transferred to Head Office?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. I cannot give you exact times, but he spent a short while at Vlakplaas and after that he went to Head Office.
MR HATTINGH: What was your contact with him after he had been transferred to Head Office?
MR DE KOCK: I saw him upon occasions at Head Office, but it was very infrequent.
MR HATTINGH: In which division was he involved when he was at Head Office?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was in the post section, the postal section. Let me just make that clear, it wasn't just a question of people fetching post or posting letters, it was an inter-Head Office function by which they would transfer top secret documents between the offices, even postal items which I didn't have clearance to read, for your eyes only type of documents which would go to the Generals.
MR HATTINGH: When you refer to the postal section, of which Unit was this?
MR DE KOCK: It was a Head Office Unit, I don't know if it was C-Unit or G-Unit, but there was a specific section.
MR HATTINGH: Did he deal with post which had to do with the Security Police?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, on a national basis throughout the country.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. Mr de Kock, after he had left you, apart from running into him every now and then, did you have any other dealings with him, did you have anything further to do with him in an official capacity?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And regarding you, was he a member who had been transferred from Vlakplaas and was no longer under your command?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Was there any information that you received while he was no longer at Vlakplaas which indicated that he was considering a change in allegiance?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. At a stage you were at Head Office where you became involved in a discussion with who?
MR DE KOCK: With Gen Nick van Rensburg and Gen Engelbrecht who was then a Brigadier and also the Head of the Investigating Unit for the Harms Commission.
MR HATTINGH: In whose office did this discussion take place?
MR DE KOCK: It took place in the offices of Nick van Rensburg on the 7th floor.
MR HATTINGH: And what was the topic of discussion during this occasion?
MR DE KOCK: The topic consisted of two aspects, the first being an attack on a PAC facility in Botswana namely the Chand residence where the Chands had been presented as double-agents.
MR HATTINGH: This is the incident which has already been heard by the Committee and has been finalised?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And then the second aspect was Brian Ngqulunga who had to be silenced, there was uncertainty regarding his loyalties. There was a level of dissatisfaction with his situation of confidence. Brian Ngqulunga's loyalty had diminished in the eyes of these two Generals.
MR HATTINGH: Who told you that he had to be eliminated?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was Gen Nick van Rensburg personally and he was supported by Gen Krappies Engelbrecht.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. And at that stage, did you give execution to this order specifically with regard to Mr Ngqulunga?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. I ignored it, however I began to attend to the Chand situation. I had no information surrounding the Ngqulunga situation, but I began to attend to the Chand incident.
MR HATTINGH: When you say that you didn't have any information, do you mean by that that this has to do with the information that he could be considering a change in loyalties, was that the information that you received from Engelbrecht and van Rensburg?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: You didn't have such information yourself at that stage?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: So therefore you were attending to the Chand incident, you were doing the planning and you executed the operation as we have already heard?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Were you approached once again with regard to Mr Ngqulunga?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I was approached again. Gen Nick van Rensburg requested of me in his office, that we make a concerted attempt to silence Brian Ngqulunga and the silencing was not a question of us speaking to him and saying "look from now on, please keep your mouth shut". Silencing in this context meant very clearly according to the lines of the discussion, that he had to be killed, that he had to be silenced for ever.
MR HATTINGH: Once again upon this occasion, were any reasons furnished to you for the necessity of this action?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Gen van Rensburg made it very clear to me that Brian Ngqulunga had began putting out feelers towards the ANC, that contact had been established with the ANC. He did not elaborate on the nature of that contact. The statement was that sources within the ANC who were working for either the military or the police, had provided that sort of information, as well as our own sources at Head Office. However, I was not familiar with these sources, I can only say that one of the sources for example involved the tapping of telephone discussions from Head Office where a specific office had been established and there was something like 80 telephones which were being tapped simultaneously.
MR HATTINGH: Very well, as was anything said to you regarding his relationship with his wife upon this occasion?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this occasion or this discussion with Gen Nick van Rensburg occurred after Brian had shot his wife, Brian Ngqulunga shot his wife.
MR HATTINGH: He wounded her, she wasn't killed?
MR DE KOCK: No, but she was in the advanced stages of pregnancy, he shot her with an R1, a heavy calibre weapon, he shot her in the stomach, among others if I recall correctly, there was also an attempt to murder and a charge of aiming and firing a weapon.
MR HATTINGH: Did this have anything to do with a request that Gen Nick van Rensburg directed at you?
MR DE KOCK: No. I believed that the matter could be dealt with possibly as with all other assaults or shooting incidents, that control could be exercised, that there could be damage control. The situation deployed after the shooting, after the case was brought against him and this is when the situation ensued of him putting feelers out towards the ANC.
MR HATTINGH: Was this upon the information of Gen van Rensburg?
MR DE KOCK: That was told to me verbatim, by Gen van Rensburg.
MR HATTINGH: Was any mention made of the Griffiths Mxenge incident during this discussion?
MR DE KOCK: Not that I can recall immediately, but it was very clear because this is also what Brian gave evidence about. It would have brought the entire Harms Commission to a state of collapse along with the police.
MR HATTINGH: Yes. Please look at page 5 of your application, at the top you say
"... he admitted that he knew the true facts regarding the Griffiths Mxenge murder and that he wanted to expose these facts."
Is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Was this put to you or said to you?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I believe that it was said to me. I have also mentioned it here.
MR HATTINGH: Did you regard this as an exact order?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, because it did not only affect the SAP, it affected the entire Vlakplaas set-up and covert operations, along with the Harms Commission and the government.
MR HATTINGH: Did you accept the correctness and reliability of the information that Gen van Rensburg gave you?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And how did you yourself feel in the light of having accepted these facts?
MR DE KOCK: I felt that we would have to execute this operation. I did not feel personally that I felt like killing Brian, but we did not really have any other choice in that matter.
MR HATTINGH: Did you give an order for plans to be formulated for his elimination?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. I liaised with Capt Baker who was second in command at that stage and discussed the matter with him, upon which he displayed the same opinion as me, that we couldn't follow any other option. I requested him to select a group of people to execute this task and I then gave all the assistance that I could, from my side.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. Who was instructed to assist with this matter eventually?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Capt Baker and I involved Wouter Mentz, Pieter Botha, Riaan Bellingan and Mr Nortje.
MR HATTINGH: Mr Baker?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Baker himself, yes and then Mr Chate.
MR HATTINGH: And were you involved in the planning of this operation?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I was.
MR HATTINGH: And the plan was then put into action?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And without going into too much detail, because it appears in your application, the plan was that Mr Simon Radebe would then take Mr Ngqulunga to a certain place under some form of pretence?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. We handled Mr Radebe or involved him in a situation which was based on the absolute need to know principle. He knew the absolute minimum. He was handled on a peripheral basis so that there wouldn't be a reason later on which would lead to him becoming a danger.
MR HATTINGH: He didn't know why he was supposed to take Mr Ngqulunga to this certain place where the other members would meet him?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: And he took him to this certain place and the other members met Mr Ngqulunga and took him to a place in Botswana where he was killed?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Where were you during the events of this evening?
MR DE KOCK: Just to explain, we rented two vehicles from Avis, one was a kombi, a Volkswagen kombi and then we also rented a Mercedes. Then we took along a third vehicle, a Jetta vehicle, which had secret compartments. The Jetta vehicle also had a blue light, just in case my members who were executing the operation in Bophuthatswana picked up problems, we could act as an SAP vehicle and assist them. The other vehicle was hired in the event of the kombi breaking down and if there were any problems on ground level, either one of those two vehicles could be used to tow the other vehicle away. We had towing cables in the vehicles and we had radio contact with one another. I waited at Wonderpark with these two vehicles not very far away from the Bophuthatswana area.
MR HATTINGH: Was radio report given to you regarding the progress with the Ngqulunga matter?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And after that you met at a hotel here in Pretoria?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, we moved into the Holiday Inn, we left the two Avis vehicles there and locked them and then with our Secret Fund or State vehicles, we drove through to Johannesburg where we booked in at the Doornfontein Hotel for the purposes of investigation in Johannesburg. I have a very vague recollection, I may be incorrect, but somewhere we directed an Intelligence note that there was information about arms smuggling in Johannesburg which we had to attend to. This was merely to cover up.
MR HATTINGH: Yes, and the next day you returned?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, the following day we returned and this situation took place over a weekend. I think it was the Friday evening that we found Brian and during the following week, upon the first opportunity to contacting Gen van Rensburg, I think it was the Monday, I am not sure, Capt Baker and I personally went to Gen van Rensburg and I reported back in so far as it affected the execution and method of the operation and Capt Baker then informed Mr van Rensburg regarding what had taken place at the scene of the incident, because I hadn't been present at the scene itself.
The reason for that is because there had to be confirmation that the operation was clean, that there had been no problems which could elicit any suspicion of the police. It was for security reasons.
MR HATTINGH: Very well, and then after that, arrangements had to be made for the funeral of Mr Ngqulunga?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that is correct. Those arrangements were indeed made. If I have it correctly Capt Baker made the arrangements.
MR HATTINGH: And there were problems at the cemetery itself, there were youths who attacked those attending the funeral with stones, they did not want a person who they regarded as a traitor, to be buried in that cemetery?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was a messenger from the Civics Association who was there and the comrades were also there and they indicated that we could bury him there if we wanted to, but that they would exhume his body and burn his body afterwards.
MR HATTINGH: Was there any arrangement for Mr Ngqulunga to be buried on Vlakplaas itself?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, we made those arrangements, we blew a grave open with explosives because it was very stony ground and we buried him there in a ceremony.
MR HATTINGH: Did you attend the funeral ceremony?
MR DE KOCK: I was on the farm, but I did not attend the ceremony, I waited in my office.
MR HATTINGH: Is there any particular reason why you didn't attend the ceremony?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I knew Brian since 1983 and I personally didn't have the courage to go to the funeral, that may sound strange.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. This morning we received an affidavit from Gen van Rensburg which I have dealt with you briefly and there in he denies any knowledge. He denies that he gave you an order to kill Mr Ngqulunga and he says indeed that you entered his office on a certain morning and told him that you had bad news and that Brian had been taken out?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, that is false. Gen Nick van Rensburg is not telling the truth.
MR HATTINGH: He states further that he asked you who you suspected of having done this and you said that it was probably the MK members because the body indicated having been fired 30 to 40 times with AK rounds.
MR DE KOCK: No, that sort of information would have been conveyed by Capt Baker. In this case the truth is a stranger to Nick van Rensburg.
MR HATTINGH: Did you direct any requests at Gen van Rensburg with regard to the investigation of the death of Mr Ngqulunga when you reported to him that he had indeed been killed?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I requested that he attempt to organise or contact with the Pretoria Murder and Robbery Unit for them to send members to investigate the incident, because it would be strange if our own Murder and Robbery Division did not lodge an inquiry into the death. Vlakplaas could not investigate the matter because we were involved. As a result of the gravity of the matter, the situation was created to make it appear that the ANC had killed him and as far as I know, a member or two were deployed to liaise with the Bophuthatswana police's Murder and Robbery Unit so that any evidence which pointed at us or the SAP, could be dealt with.
MR HATTINGH: Did he comply with that request?
MR DE KOCK: As far as I know, he did.
MR HATTINGH: Do you know whether the investigation had any positive results?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, it did not.
MR HATTINGH: Would you bear with me a moment please, Mr Chairman. Just to clear this up, at page 5 at the bottom of the page, the last sentence, the paragraph there you say
"... following on this request you heard later that this request was not complied with."
Was this corrected later in the further statement which you had made? On page 148 at the top there you say -
"... I heard later that the request had been complied with."
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, this would be a typing fault.
CHAIRPERSON: You read it before you signed it, didn't you?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that is so.
MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, following on the question that the Chairperson put to you, may I ask you to look at your application which had been heard previously and your application was drawn up in haste and under pressure and your whole application embodies a few volumes and what is now before me, is your whole application?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Did you have the opportunity to study this document carefully?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Did you have to read it in detention?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And until what time do you have light to read?
MR DE KOCK: Sometimes eight o'clock, sometimes nine o'clock in the evening.
MR HATTINGH: And this was completed at a very late stage, the whole application?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And then there were mistakes which we have picked up at other occasions?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And later, when you made the other statement, was it a statement which you made to the Attorney-General's Investigative Team?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And there you corrected this mistake?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr de Kock, I see according to the extract from the evidence in the Harms Commission that Ngqulunga gave evidence in June 1990, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: Times and dates are something that provide problems on occasion, but my clients say that Ngqulunga had already in 1986, had he left Vlakplaas for Head Office, is that possible?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he periodically at times went from Vlakplaas to Head Office and after a time, when it seemed that his nerves had calmed, he came back to Vlakplaas.
MR BOOYENS: So in other words you don't dispute the statement that from 1986 he had at least worked periodically at Head Office?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR BOOYENS: Very well, now I know you touched on the postal system, but I think we might have to complete the picture here. Actually the whole security surrounding the manner in which the postal items were dealt with or handled, was not of the best I understand. I understand how it would work was that for example as you have said, even an "for your eyes only" or top secret document would usually be placed into a pigeon hole and then people at the postal section where Mr Ngqulunga worked, for example it would go to Gen X or Brig A, it would be in his pigeon hole and the document which is in that pigeon hole, would be taken to the Brigadier or the General. I understand that is how it operated?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I can also mention that at many occasions I saw that a person, young person, black or white, and most of the time it would be in the lift, where you see that this person reads a top secret document and the cover page of the document, there is an annexure on the front of such a document which gives a list of names which only the document must read, every person who reads the document has to sign next to his name, and at times you see that there are only three names on the document, for example only Gen Smit and his Staff Officer and another General, and these people walk around the halls and they read it openly, just as they pleased.
MR BOOYENS: So there can be no doubt that if anybody who had worked in the postal division had a notion for example to read these confidential documents, that it could be done very easily?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, it would have been unnatural if they were not curious.
MR BOOYENS: Especially if he was curious with a reason, not just curiosity, but if he sympathised with the opposition, it was a golden opportunity to obtain information?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, there were rules laid down and in every exam from Constable to Lieutenant the question is asked about the handling of security information which has to be sealed in a doubt envelope and a pink coloured form is attached to it, the person who receives it, has to sign it and that document has to be given back to the person who delivers the message. This was not applicable here.
MR BOOYENS: It seems the people who had to be the most aware of security, were the least aware of security?
MR DE KOCK: That was my opinion Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: Mr de Kock, if you do not know then you can tell the Commission, but we do not hear any medical evidence in these matters and I think it may be important because I saw at a previous occasion when Mr Mentz gave evidence, that I think Commissioner de Jager made mention of the fact, something which emanated from the post-mortem that the person's tongue was missing and Mr de Jager wanted to know how that happened and I just tell you by means of background and in your career you had come across and seen what the affect of assault weapons when someone is shot at from a short distance, what the affect would be, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR BOOYENS: As far as you can recall, Mr de Kock, if you cannot recall please say so, what is the firing tempo of an AK on automatic?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, between 2 300 and 2 400 feet per second.
MR BOOYENS: Is that the velocity?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, if it fires on automatic.
MR BOOYENS: How many rounds per minute?
MR DE KOCK: Between 10 to 15 rounds a minute, between 650 and 800 rounds a minute.
MR BOOYENS: Mr de Kock, if someone would be shot at very close range with an AK47, would there be serious damage to the person?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, from a close range and I speak of between three to ten paces, with bursts of shots you could expect disintegration.
MR BOOYENS: So from your own experience and I know you are not an expert on this terrain, but you have practical experience, do you find anything sinister for example if the man's tongue was missing, do you find anything sinister about it?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. I had a personal occasion where a member of SWAPO aimed his firearm at me and I had an AK47, we then carried AK47's and I fired first and I hit him in between his head and his throat with a full magazine, we were approximately eight paces from each other and his head disintegrated.
MR BOOYENS: Mr de Kock, I would just like to return to the instructions which you received, or may I just mention something else, you recall you gave evidence with regard to the Chand matter in Botswana, that you had hurt your leg there?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: At the time of this incident, my clients tell me that you still had trouble with your leg?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I was walking on a crutch but the plaster of paris had been removed.
MR BOOYENS: So would it be correct that although you did not want to become personally involved, but it would not have been practical either?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, if it was not for the leg, then I would have probably been at the scene.
MR BOOYENS: Let us return to the instructions which you received from Gen van Rensburg now. You were continually when you received specific instructions from senior officers, I think you have testified to this previously in incidents where I was involved for other parties, you were cautious to the extent that you wanted to know why, I speak specifically of instructions where you had to act illegally, you would want to know why, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR BOOYENS: And it is because of this that Gen van Rensburg asked you why Brian, what did he do or did he tell you that? I would just like - please tell us as much as you can about this.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I just asked him why because Brian had already given evidence and he mentioned to me that he had tried to reach out to the ANC and he had made contact.
MR BOOYENS: The words putting feelers out in Afrikaans, if you use the word feelers, then he did not commit himself completely already, but it seems that the information was that he had already conveyed information to those people?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would concede that because he has to have a product to sell in order for the other side to accept him. It is a century old rule, if you do not have access and you do not have anything to offer, then they do not need you.
MR BOOYENS: And speaking more broadly, during that time period in 1990, police officers were still targets of attacks although there had been political negotiations, there had not been peace in the country, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Definitely not Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: I am entirely open to accept when you say that you cannot recall what Gen van Rensburg told you, but I will now ask you by means of deduction, from the fact that he was at Head Office and I understand that at some stage a document was sent around with regard to the protection of black members, that all officers were asked or all regions were asked with regard to particulars about their black members so that arrangements could be made for their security and if this arrived in the mail, it would arguably be something that Mr Ngqulunga could have studied if he was in the postal section at that time?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, it is possible.
MR BOOYENS: Because it has to be distributed.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, it has to be distributed.
MR BOOYENS: Is it possible that Gen van Rensburg may have told you on this occasion that this type of information which Mr Ngqulunga was giving out, could endanger police officers' lives, it could possibly lead to it that police officers had been killed or that other askaris' lives are endangered, all those types of information?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. I don't have an independent recollection of it, but that possibility did exist. My concentration was on the task itself, which was put to me.
MR BOOYENS: I will ask you why, I will tell you why I asked that, I know you are under pressure, did you for example study Mr Baker, Bellingan and Botha's statements or did you not have time?
MR DE KOCK: I paged through it Chairperson, but I did not study it as in like studied every word.
MR BOOYENS: Because their recollection is that you along with the team, that would include Baker, Bellingan and Botha, they are not certain whether Charlie Chate was there, he may have been there, but - and Wouter Mentz, that you went to a place by the name of the House of Coffees and apparently this place was known as upstairs in the House of Coffees, where you basically had a briefing or a motivation for the operation. Could there have been such a meeting?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: Because they all three tell me and I mean Mr de Kock, these people, the people's memories may not be so good, but what they recall of this is that you told them, or what you told them in essence, we do not speak of the exact words here, but it was to the effect that Ngqulunga had walked over to the opposition or he was in the process of walking over or had supplied information to the opposition, and that this information could possibly have led or have led to police officers, specifically on the East Rand that had been murdered, and that some of the askaris were in danger, as well. In general, without alleging that those are the exact words that were used, could you have possibly conveyed that information to them?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is possible Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: Mr de Kock, they tell me I took up this matter with Baker and Bellingan and they say that you did not feel so well about this operation because as them, you accepted that it was an operation which in the light of what was said to you, had to be executed but you did not feel good about this, because the man was a former colleague, is that correct, is that how you experienced it?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, as I have said, Brian had already given evidence and the Harms Commission did not earmark him as an incredulous witness and I believed at that stage, or a credible witness, and I believed at that stage that there was a matter of damage control, but with the knowledge that Gen van Rensburg had, he would not have directed that request lightly.
MR BOOYENS: I think it is clear, and we will not spend much time on this, if Gen van Rensburg would tell you Ngqulunga who now works at Head Office is a spy for the other side, did you or the whole Vlakplaas have any Intelligence capacity to research this type of think or were you dependent on Intelligence which were supplied to you by other people? I am not referring to Intelligence of Vlakplaas, but in this instance, the man was not working with you any more?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, in that case, what came to Head Office, would have come from Intelligence Units from right across the country and from the ANC offices itself, where we also had our sources, and more probably by tapping devices.
MR BOOYENS: So you yourself could not verify, you had to depend on the correctness and accepting the correctness of what was conveyed to you?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: And this was a senior officer, you trusted in him and you trusted in what he told you, was really what was going on?
MR DE KOCK: I think that whoever gave him the information would not disclose their sources to me, because those sources were too sensitive. Nick van Rensburg would have known who the sources were, but he would not have conveyed that to me.
MR BOOYENS: Just a further aspect which I need to clear up, or there are still two aspects, when Griffiths Mxenge was murdered in 1991, you were still in South-West Africa?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: So you had nothing to do with that?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: That was Dirk Coetzee's story?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: Then another statement which was made in the affidavit of Gen van Rensburg which was handed up, you have already before this same Presiding Officer, you gave evidence in the Zero detonation incident?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: Is it true that the Zero detonation, once again it was the Security Branch East Rand's operation which was authorised at the highest level, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR BOOYENS: You did not play a leading part in this? You were only involved, if I recall correctly, in the transport of the handgrenades and you helped here and there, but you were, Vlakplaas itself, you and Jack Cronje were not involved with the exception of Joe Mamasela?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: And as far as you know, was Ngqulunga involved with the Zero detonation story?
MR DE KOCK: Not at all Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: So the Zero detonations could not as it was suggested by Gen van Rensburg in his affidavit, could not have been the reason why the person had been killed?
MR DE KOCK: No, not at all Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: If the Committee would just bear with me, Mr Chairman. I have no further questions, thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS
CHAIRPERSON: Can I just deal with one matter while I remember it, it does not arise from this application, it arises from another one where you gave evidence to the effect that you did not like using telephones at Head Office, even the General's telephone, because they were all tapped? Is that so?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, Lamey on behalf of Mr Nortje. Mr de Kock I would - Mr Booyens put questions to you about it and with regard to the context of that time, with regard to the Harms Commission, in the Nelspruit incident you will recall that evidence was given about this, after the unbanning of the ANC nothing had changed from the viewpoint of the Security Police and Vlakplaas with regard to the struggle as it reigned at that time?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: I am multiplying that statement and I would just summarise it in a nutshell, the unbanning of the ANC during that time caused the struggle to get even heavier with regard to the influx of banned persons, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: The Harms Commission caused great tension in the circles of the police, specifically Security Police?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: And I think you have previously mentioned that, or gave evidence about it that at a high level, damage control had to be applied after the revelations of Nofomela and Coetzee?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: And by implication and logically following, one could think that if any credibility could be given or attached to the evidence of Nofomela and Coetzee, it would have a devastating affect on the Security Police and then seen in the broader sense, the government's armed wing to oppose the struggle of the ANC and the PAC?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: Brig Engelbrecht was appointed as the Chief Investigator with the Harms Commission?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: Do you know whether he continually monitored the evidence and events and persons who gave evidence during the Harms Commission?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR LAMEY: So we can accept that he also did the same in the case of Ngqulunga?
MR DE KOCK: Can you repeat that?
MR DE KOCK: Can we accept that he was an observed in Ngqulunga's evidence?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, definitely Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: We already have the picture that Ngqulunga had previously had been a man who was troubled by his nerves?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: And then furthermore as another factor, he was involved with a shooting incident with his wife?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: And we have a further factor that there was the risk of prosecution with regard to this incident?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: And at that stage, in the back of one's mind, I ask the question by means of implication which one could assume would have been in the minds of van Rensburg and Engelbrecht, by means of logical deduction, that Nofomela made his revelations because of prosecutions, it was before he was to be executed?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: So, if one summarises all of this, then one would not be wrong to say that there was a great fear that Ngqulunga could be a second Nofomela, specifically because he was involved with the Griffiths Mxenge matter?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: Did you also accept that despite the fact that Ngqulunga had given evidence and that he had denied his involvement and the damage control with regard to his evidence went well, that Gen Engelbrecht who was an observer of his testimony had reason for concern because of his nerves or Brig van Rensburg and that this person created a risk?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, I cannot give evidence on their behalf, but I believe that they could have felt that way, we would have to hear from them.
MR LAMEY: I ask by means of inferences under the circumstances then.
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, it is possible.
MR LAMEY: And then the further information was as you have said, that he had already leaked information and put out feelers to the ANC and this was after his evidence?
MR DE KOCK: That was the information from Gen van Rensburg, Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: Was the information also that the evidence that he had given, regardless of the fact that it went rather well, had been an additional aggravating factor when it came to his mental state of mind?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, among others he abused alcohol to such an extent that he wrote off a State vehicle for example, which I had given him to travel with and a second vehicle that was given to him, was also involved in an accident caused by him, and these privileges were then taken from him and I think all of these things had an effect on him.
MR LAMEY: Very well Mr de Kock, your own hesitation and discomfort with the execution of this order was due to the fact that Brian Ngqulunga was also close to you as a colleague, but the order if I may put it as such, within that context and that time, still made sense to you and that is why you continued with the planning and the execution of the order and the issuing of instructions to your members?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: Then just with regard to your evidence regarding Mr Radebe, isn't it correct that Mr Radebe had been given the order to move closer to Mr Ngqulunga and to take him into his confidence and to make friends with him a short while before the actual execution of the order?
MR DE KOCK: It is possible, but I knew that they had always enjoyed good liaison with each other.
MR LAMEY: This is my instruction from Mr Nortje that this was indeed the case, that he was supposed to get closer to Ngqulunga because Radebe would have to drop him off ultimately and the members who were to execute the operation, would then at that point, abduct him, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: I don't have an independent recollection of Mr Radebe's order, but it would have been in line with such an approach for the execution of such a task, so I would concede to it.
MR LAMEY: Very well. Mr de Kock, I don't wish to belabour you with all the detail in Mr Nortje's statement, have you had the opportunity to study his affidavit?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I have scanned it, so to speak.
MR LAMEY: Very well. Let me just determine whether or not there is anything else that I may have omitted. Very well, I don't know whether you dispute this or not, but I just want to know from you, Mr Nortje's recollection is that because you did not want to commit the act yourself and Mr Nortje confirms that you were not very pleased with any personal involvement in the matter and that is why you decided to involve other members such as Mr Baker and Mr Bellingan?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. It is a question of trust.
MR LAMEY: Yes, but one of the reasons why you specifically involved Mr Baker was because he had not previously been involved in such a form of elimination?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, all the members who were selected with this matter, was seasoned operatives and had drawn blood if I may put it as such.
MR LAMEY: Yes, in other operations, but this one was different in some respects?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the nature of the execution was precisely the same whether you shot Brian or somebody else with an AK, it was one and the same thing.
CHAIRPERSON: Didn't it matter that this was someone who had been an askari, someone who had worked at Vlakplaas, didn't that make any difference to you, it was just one and the same thing, was it? I thought that you had said that you did not want to take part because it did make a difference?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, what I meant Chairperson, and I perhaps stated it beyond context or misunderstood the question was that there may have been various reasons why one would execute an operation, but the execution, the physical deed itself, would remain the same. One would use a bomb or a weapon and the results would usually be the same. I may have been misunderstood when I made that statement.
MR LAMEY: I just want to ask you, had Vlakplaas been divided at that stage?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR LAMEY: Were you still at Vlakplaas? I don't have a recollection of what my instructions are with regard to this?
MR DE KOCK: It is correct.
MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I just want to ensure that there are no further instructions. I have no further questions, thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Jan Wagener, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, my client, Gen Engelbrecht does not formally oppose the application of Mr de Kock or any of the other applicants here. He does however put in dispute parts of the evidence, specifically the evidence pertaining to himself and therefore I have been instructed Mr Chairman, that with your leave, that I do ask certain questions from the present witness as well. If I may proceed, thank you. Mr de Kock, you have previously given evidence that the members of the Security Branch were a very closed group, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: And that you strictly adhered to the need to know principle?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR WAGENER: In fact Mr de Kock, it has previously been your evidence that within the Security Branch itself, you did not necessarily speak to each other openly?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, it occurred as such.
MR WAGENER: I can recall that you gave evidence here during the Chand matter for example, that your second in command, Mr Baker, had not been previously informed by you regarding the operation in Bophuthatswana, do you know about that?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR WAGENER: What would you say Mr de Kock, what was the reason why the group in which you moved, clung so desperately to this need to know principle and in so doing, restricted knowledge to a minimum of persons?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, so that it would not endanger one's operation so that when one arrived at the point of execution of actions, it would not already be known to the opposition. Then it was also about certainty in general.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, wasn't it also about protecting yourself in certain cases?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, not only ourselves, but the Generals and the Ministers as well.
MR WAGENER: We know now Mr de Kock that you and your men committed various crimes during your period of service, and from that comes your amnesty application which runs into almost 1 000 pages?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, for the State.
MR WAGENER: That is why I ask once again, was part of the motivation for the application of the need to know principle that knowledge of such crimes committed by you and your men be restricted to a minimum of people?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR WAGENER: For example Mr de Kock, if you had committed such a crime which in the normal course of policing would then lead to a police investigation, one would normally have expected the Detective Branch or the Detectives to investigate the matter?
MR DE KOCK: No, not normally, also the Security Branch if it appeared to be an act of terrorism which was committed in such a fashion that it pointed in the direction of the ANC or the PAC. I refer among others to COSATU House and Khotso House for example.
MR WAGENER: Yes, I understand your answer, but in some cases, one could have expected the Detective Branch to undertake the investigations?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that possibility existed.
MR WAGENER: Now, in such a case Mr de Kock, the Investigating Officer would be a Detective with regard to the example that I have just mentioned, would you then go to the Investigating Officer and say "Mr so and so, or Detective so and so, I am Mr de Kock from the Security Branch and I committed this act" and would you then inform him thoroughly of the where, the how and then when and request to be a member of the cover up of further investigation?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR WAGENER: In fact that would have been extremely foolish, wouldn't it?
MR DE KOCK: If one went to the Investigating Officer, he would have had to arrest one.
MR WAGENER: Exactly. So in that sense Mr de Kock, a division such as the Detective Branch was basically almost an opponent as such?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: An opponent in the sense that you committed a crime, you and your men, the Detective Branch was investigating the matter and you had to ensure that the Detective Branch would not determine the true facts, because then you would be arrested and charged?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson, but here we had the Head of the Detective Branch who was correlating the evidence of the Harms Commission, who was keeping us up to date with questions and answers, he would not have been the Investigating Officer in the Ngqulunga matter for example, he would have been able to control it from his position of authority.
MR WAGENER: Yes, but we all know that you wish to tackle the Generals and that is why you are running ahead to my client. We will get to that. The questions that I am asking you now have absolutely nothing to do with Gen Engelbrecht and you will have ample opportunity to attempt to tackle him as you have so often done. My questions are not about him specifically, about general facts.
MR DE KOCK: Well then in general I could mention the Motherwell bomb incident. Somewhere there the Detective Branch wanted to enter the investigation and there was some or other negotiation from the Security Police's side, I am not precisely sure what it was, but it was a similar situation.
MR WAGENER: Now we know already Mr de Kock, that Gen Engelbrecht was a Detective from 1969 if I recall correctly, he had been a Detective for longer than 20 years at the time of this incident.
MR DE KOCK: I suspect so, I cannot give evidence about that.
MR WAGENER: Yes, and we have already studied affidavits given by him in which he states that up to and including October 1989, he had very little contact with the Security Branch, do you recall that?
MR DE KOCK: Is that what he says?
MR WAGENER: Yes, that is what he says, those are my instructions.
MR DE KOCK: He will have to give evidence himself Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: Can you dispute it?
MR DE KOCK: No, I don't dispute it.
MR WAGENER: My instructions are that before that date, October 1989, I refer to October 1989 because that is when Nofomela's revelations ensued and various developments took place, so when I refer to October 1989, you are with me, before that date, he recalls only one occasion that he met you at Vlakplaas and that he had enjoyed no further contact with your or any other members at Vlakplaas, would you agree with that?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there may have been more occasions, but the Vlakplaas aspect was when he investigated the Khotso House bomb and he wanted to know from me who had been there, but Security Branch members were with him, Warrant Officer Mostert among others. At first I did not want to allow him at Vlakplaas, but later Mr Schoon said that we could speak to the man. I gave my name, but refused to divulge the names of the others. This was all part of a cover up action and the Shirley Gunn situation, which he had to submit information about it to the Ministry and there was someone at John Vorster Square who was his point of liaison at that point.
MR WAGENER: So therefore the short answer is that you cannot dispute it?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot dispute it that he was at Vlakplaas for those reasons.
MR WAGENER: And that he had had no other contact with you before then?
MR DE KOCK: I don't have an independent recollection.
MR WAGENER: Perhaps I should just ask you now because once again you have thrown in the word "cover up action" here, that is your favourite word when you speak of Gen Engelbrecht, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I have given evidence or mentioned the facts and I don't see anything about that incident in our clusters here, but Gen Engelbrecht also arranged his own murder at a stage and I am prepared to divulge the details of that if you would ask me anything about that.
MR WAGENER: We will get to that Mr de Kock. Did I hear you correctly that you have just said that before or that this visit that Engelbrecht paid to Vlakplaas, was part of a cover up action?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR WAGENER: Or that you recall it being a cover up action?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, because I told him that I had blown up Khotso House and he didn't arrest me and he was at Vlakplaas where I had initially refused him entry and I told him that I had blown up Khotso House and he didn't arrest me. Neither did the Security Policemen who accompanied him and then on a later occasion, he arrived there and he was investigating Khanya House and he arrived there with two identikits saying that one looked like Bellingan and we said that that wasn't so and I told him that I had burnt Khanya House down, and he still didn't arrest me.
MR WAGENER: Are you saying that he visited Vlakplaas twice not once?
MR DE KOCK: Well, Khotso House and Khanya House took place some time apart and he visited Vlakplaas after Khanya House had been burnt down.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock my instructions are the he visited Vlakplaas only once and it didn't have anything to do with Khotso House.
MR DE KOCK: I think Mr Engelbrecht is misleading his legal representative.
MR WAGENER: Would you agree that Gen Engelbrecht in 1989 was a Brigadier in the Detective Branch?
MR DE KOCK: That may be so Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: Would you concede to that?
MR DE KOCK: It is possible Chairperson, perhaps Gen Engelbrecht will be able to testify about that, I cannot give evidence about that.
MR WAGENER: He was not a Security Policeman?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, but every day he was in Gen Nick van Rensburg's office from where he managed the Harms Commission's situation.
MR WAGENER: So he wasn't a member of the Security Police?
MR DE KOCK: No, he was not.
MR WAGENER: Furthermore my instructions are that he was not the Investigating Officer of the Harms Commission?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, he was there every day, he and Col du Plessis were the two main persons along with Nick van Rensburg, who formed the team who dealt with the investigation of this Commission.
MR WAGENER: According to the Commission it was van der Westhuizen and Wright?
MR DE KOCK: No, I did not see Brig Wright once, later he left his position due to personal problems. I did not see him at all. Brig van der Westhuizen or Gen van der Westhuizen, I think I saw him once, I flew down to Cape Town with him once, but we did not discuss this. The two Generals that we saw were Alwyn Conradie and Joubert.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock is it your evidence today that Gen Engelbrecht at the time of the Harms Commission, during 1990, which is basically the same time regarding which this Ngqulunga incident is about, are you saying that he knew about all your crimes?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, because they had to see where they could cover things up, or remove pieces of evidence, and so also he flew to London to assist there and to investigate.
MR WAGENER: Who would have told him about all these things according to you?
MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, we who had been initially involved and had to make affidavits.
MR WAGENER: Are you saying that you involved Mr Engelbrecht or informed Mr Engelbrecht regarding all your crimes in 1990, is that what you are saying?
MR DE KOCK: No, this was before the time.
MR WAGENER: When was that?
MR DE KOCK: I don't have a fixed date, but he was involved, he was informed about it. I know among others, it didn't necessarily have to do with me, but there was a situation during which Mamasela and the others had been identified at a border post and these details had to be covered up.
MR WAGENER: No, but the question is, did you inform Engelbrecht about any of the crimes that you had been involved in, yes or no?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I did, among others the Maponya incident.
MR WAGENER: Are you serious when you give that answer, Mr de Kock?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: I sat here in this very same venue, a month ago when you gave evidence under oath and said that you never told him the truth, do you recall that?
MR DE KOCK: > Chairperson, as far as I know I told him the truth.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, I asked you a question during the Japie Maponya matter, I asked you whether you told Gen Engelbrecht the truth or not and you conceded that you had never told him the truth and that you had deceived him. Are you changing your evidence?
MR DE KOCK: No the deception took place with the Harms Commission, that aspect was misleading. Those affidavits were misleading, but he knew the truth.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, you have evidence here under oath and stated that you never told Mr Engelbrecht the true facts surrounding Japie Maponya, now my question to you is, are you changing your evidence?
MR DE KOCK: No, I will stand by my evidence.
MR WAGENER: Very well ...
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you go on, could you supply us at a later stage or during the adjournment, could you supply the Leader of Evidence with the details so that he can make arrangements if necessary, to obtain a transcript if it is not already available.
MR WAGENER: I will do so Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Are you going onto something else now?
MR WAGENER: Not necessarily Mr Chairman, but I will be a while yet, so maybe this is a convenient moment.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: (continued) Thank you Mr Chairman, during the tea break, Mr Steenkamp has indicated that he has requested the part of the Japie Maponya record that I have referred to. Unfortunately I don't have it myself, so I have been told ...
CHAIRPERSON: When it does come, I trust that it will be made available to you and to Mr Hattingh.
MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I don't think it was the cross-examination that Mr Wagener has referred to, was done during the Maponya hearing, I think it was done during the hearing of the Vlakplaas.
ADV SANDI: That is my recollection as well, Mr Hattingh, the first week when we started here, about two months ago?
MR WAGENER: Any way Mr Chairman, I will see to that and I will bring it to your attention the moment I can. Mr de Kock, before the adjournment I asked you whether during 1990 you had sat down and told Gen Engelbrecht about all the crimes that you had committed and if I recall correctly, you said that you told him about Japie Maponya, and that is more or less where we stopped at the point of the adjournment?
MR DE KOCK: As far as I recall, yes Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: Now I would like to ask you further on the same point, did you tell him about any of your other deeds?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, we referred to Khotso and COSATU and Khanya House, were referred to the shooting of Zwelibanzi Nyanda in Swaziland. This was one of the aspects which Nofomela revealed and which had to be addressed and there was a variety of others.
MR WAGENER: When you say we, do you mean you or when you say we, do you mean you and other persons, or other persons, who are you referring to?
MR DE KOCK: These would be the other persons who were also involved, who had been mentioned by Dirk Coetzee and Nofomela.
MR WAGENER: Now to which incidents did you refer to, you, Mr de Kock?
MR DE KOCK: I believe that there would have been various, a number. I don't have an independent recollection of precisely which cases or in what sequence, but I have just mentioned some of these cases.
MR WAGENER: Can you recall what you said to Gen Engelbrecht?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this is ten years ago, it would hardly be possible to recall precisely what I said to him.
MR WAGENER: Are you sitting here and saying to yourself "I think I said this to him", but you don't really know?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I informed Gen Engelbrecht upon various occasions where statements had to be rewritten, and supplements had to be made, so he was informed.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, do I understand, I am getting a little confused by this, that this was all in response to what had been made public by Coetzee and Nofomela, that after that was public, you went and explained to Gen van Rensburg what had happened in those incidents?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was Gen Engelbrecht or then Brig Engelbrecht. The run up of this investigation or these inquiries leads to confusion, because Schoon was then in charge of C1. First Mr McNally entered and Alwyn Conradie and I think a month or two later, Brig Schoon went on pension and Gen Nick van Rensburg took over, and there was then a replacement from the Detective Branch's side because Daantjie van Wyk came in and he left and then Engelbrecht came in. This leaves it open for confusion.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, yes, I don't want any misunderstandings about this, is it your evidence that you, Mr de Kock during 1990 sat down and told Gen Engelbrecht about the crimes that you had committed at Vlakplaas, in the hope that he would then cover it up? Is that your evidence here today?
MR DE KOCK: Not with the hope that he would cover it up, that was his job.
MR WAGENER: But you didn't know, you could have said to the man "I committed a murder" and he could have seen to it that you were arrested immediately?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, but that was not Gen Engelbrecht's function. His function was damage control, the protection of the police and particularly the Security Police and then also the Unit.
MR WAGENER: Who issued this function to Engelbrecht?
MR DE KOCK: I can only accept that this came from higher authority, from the Commissioner, the Chief of Security, this was not something that he could do on his own volition.
MR WAGENER: Did you have this order?
MR DE KOCK: No, I was lower down.
MR WAGENER: Aren't you speculating Mr de Kock?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, because the then Brig Engelbrecht could not appoint himself to deal with these aspects.
MR WAGENER: No, but you are saying that his function was to cover things up, so I am asking you from where this order came, who issued the order to him, where did you ever see this order?
MR DE KOCK: It could only have come from a higher authority, there is no other way in which this order would have been issued.
MR WAGENER: So you don't know?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I don't have specific names.
MR WAGENER: I put it to you that there was never such an order to Engelbrecht, there was no such cover up order and this is just a very convenient excuse for you as you are sitting here?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, it is not excuse.
MR WAGENER: How many meetings or occasions occurred during which the death of Ngqulunga was discussed and now I refer to the time before his death, when his death was discussed, during which Engelbrecht was present?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I know about the occasion upon which Gen van Rensburg spoke to me and that was the one which included the Chand situation. I have a vague recollection but I don't wish to rely upon it, that there was another occasion upon which Engelbrecht encountered me in the passage on the 6th floor, but as I have said, I don't wish to rely upon this recollection, because it is very vague.
MR WAGENER: Therefore there were two occasions?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, according to my recollection.
MR WAGENER: Wasn't there a prior occasion before the first occasion to which you have referred, during which the Chand incident was discussed?
MR DE KOCK: Well I know about the Chand case when Brian's name was mentioned, if there was another case, it is something that I cannot recall.
MR WAGENER: Can you recall that during your criminal trial you gave evidence about one such further case?
MR DE KOCK: I mentioned a situation Chairperson, as I have said I have a vague recollection of it and during this time I encountered Engelbrecht in the passage and this situation once again emerged.
MR WAGENER: No perhaps I have been unclear Mr de Kock, during your criminal trial you gave evidence of a previous occasion upon which six or seven persons were present and you discussed the killing of Mr Ngqulunga, and among others Gen Engelbrecht was also present there. What occasion was that?
MR DE KOCK: I don't have an independent recollection of that, I think Joe Mamasela gave evidence to that effect.
MR WAGENER: Yes, and you confirmed it under oath, that such an occasion had indeed existed.
MR DE KOCK: As far as I can recall, I cannot remember that Brian's death had been discussed at that point already.
MR WAGENER: So when you testified to this, Chairperson, that is page 13055 of the criminal record, when you testified to this, you were not telling the truth, is that what you are saying?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that is not what I am saying, what I am saying is that that was my recollection at that stage.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, perhaps I should assist you, you gave evidence upon this occasion to which I have referred you to, that you discussed the death or the killing of Mr Ngqulunga, are you saying that that never happened?
MR DE KOCK: No, I am not saying that, I am saying that I don't have an independent recollection thereof, but that it is indeed possible.
MR WAGENER: Who were these six or seven persons who were in attendance upon that occasion that you gave evidence about?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot remember.
MR WAGENER: Was Mr Paul van Dyk present?
MR DE KOCK: It is possible.
MR WAGENER: Perhaps I should just put this clearly once again, was there ever such an occasion?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was a myriad of occasions upon which we convened in various groups who were involved in certain incidents and when discussions were held which took on the form of a workshop so to speak.
MR WAGENER: So you are saying that it is possible that such an occasion did occur upon which Engelbrecht and other members were involved, approximately six or seven of you and during this time, you discussed the killing of Brian Ngqulunga?
MR DE KOCK: It is possible Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: Then why didn't you say so in your amnesty application, or are you not certain?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, there were many cases that I had to mention, and the cases which are mentioned here have to do with grave human rights violations, and there are many other cases which do not have to do with human right violations, which still had to be set up. Therefore it might be a question of incompleteness.
MR WAGENER: In 1990, during the time of the Harms Commission, you were probably involved in many discussions during which many other people were often present?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR WAGENER: And today it is impossible for you to recall all those individual discussions, including those who were present there and what exactly was discussed?
MR DE KOCK: As I have said, this took place approximately 10 years ago, but there were a great deal of these discussions.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, my instructions are that there never was such an occasion that you gave evidence about this morning, during which Gen Engelbrecht was present, when Gen van Rensburg would have said to you "make a plan with Brian Ngqulunga", are you not mistaken in that regard?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, because that was when Gen Engelbrecht mentioned among others that he wanted to go along with this operation to the Chand residence.
MR WAGENER: And we all know that that was an absurd proposition, if that had ever been the case?
MR DE KOCK: No, it is not correct.
MR WAGENER: You gave evidence this morning Mr de Kock, among others that Gen Engelbrecht would have begun to doubt the loyalty of Brian Ngqulunga?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: And what do you base that evidence upon, why do you say that?
MR DE KOCK: Gen van Rensburg would have informed him about the same aspects that he informed me about with regard to such a request.
MR WAGENER: So do you know or are you guessing?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot give independent evidence about it, it would be an inference.
MR WAGENER: Well, then the short answer is that you don't know what Gen Engelbrecht knew and what he did not know because you did not tell him?
MR DE KOCK: No, I did not tell him.
MR WAGENER: Where you refer to this conversation in the elevator, are you sure that there was such a discussion with Mr Engelbrecht?
MR DE KOCK: It is possible.
CHAIRPERSON: The passage I think, it was, Mr Wagener. The passage on the 6th floor, I think it was, Mr de Kock said.
MR DE KOCK: Correct Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: I beg your pardon, it was in the passage on the way to the lifts, that is the evidence that you gave during your criminal trial?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR WAGENER: Are you sure about this?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I have a recollection there of. As I have told you, it is vague, but I do have a recollection of it.
MR WAGENER: What would the General have told you there, in the passage?
MR DE KOCK: It was a confirmation of Gen van Rensburg's request that there was a problem with Ngqulunga.
MR WAGENER: And that you had to kill Ngqulunga?
MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, that had already been discussed when van Rensburg and Engelbrecht were in the office. It would not have been a reference to anything else essentially.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, wasn't it a tremendous risk on the part of Gen van Rensburg to issue such an order to you in the presence of an outsider?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, because van Rensburg and Engelbrecht at that stage, or at least Gen Engelbrecht wasn't really an outsider, he was in the office on a daily basis and in either event, this was a case during it was the word of a Lieutenant-Colonel against the word of a Brigadier and a General, and we all worked on that need to know principle, so here we had two senior managerial managers.
MR WAGENER: Exactly the need to know basis, as I understand it, it was that you did not convey information to anyone unless it was absolutely vital, that is how I understood the principle?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, but the Brigadier would have to support the General and say that the Colonel is lying.
MR WAGENER: May I just ask you Mr de Kock, please tell me once again, why Brian Ngqulunga had to be killed, according to you?
MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, that was the request or the order from Gen van Rensburg, that he had already put out feelers to the ANC, that there had been contact, that it would jeopardise the Harms Commission and by nature of the situation then, the entire Security Police and C1.
MR WAGENER: And we all know that Gen van Rensburg denies this order?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR WAGENER: And we all know that Gen van Rensburg has applied for amnesty, did not apply for amnesty in this case?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR WAGENER: He did request amnesty for a number of deeds which include various murders, if I have it correctly?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR WAGENER: Can you think of one good reason why then, if your evidence is correct, he would not have requested amnesty for this case?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think that we should measure this in terms of the Motherwell bomb incident during which van Rensburg also denied that he knew anything about it, that he went as far as committing perjury with an interdict in the Cape Magistrate's Court for his person not to be involved in the incident, and then ultimately he applied for amnesty for the Motherwell bomb after the convictions had been made of certain policemen. So for Gen van Rensburg to commit perjury, is a daily dish.
MR WAGENER: Well, I must tell you Mr de Kock, I hear what you are saying, but I don't think I really understand your answer. Mr de Kock, my instructions are as they have been on previous occasions, that Gen Engelbrecht was a Detective during July 1990, would you agree?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR WAGENER: He was an outsider regarding the Security Branch, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: That is Mr Engelbrecht's evidence.
MR WAGENER: That he didn't know about this series of crimes which had been committed by you and your Vlakplaas members and that in no way whatsoever was he involved in any order or suggestion that Brian Ngqulunga had to be murdered by you and your Unit. And that if you had received an order from van Rensburg, then Engelbrecht has no knowledge of it. That is my instruction. I assume that you will stand by your version?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
MR WAGENER: Thank you Mr Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WAGENER
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER WALT: Thank you Mr Chairman, van der Walt, for the Ngqulunga family. Mr de Kock, is it correct that the incident during which Mr Ngqulunga was to have wounded his wife, really took place in January 1990?
MR DE KOCK: It is possible, I don't have a precise date for that.
MR VAN DER WALT: My instructions are that it was indeed during January 1990?
MR DE KOCK: Then I will not dispute it.
MR VAN DER WALT: You mention this incident if I understand it correctly, in order to indicate that it is indicative of the instability of the deceased, Mr Ngqulunga, at that stage of his life?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, well, it would be according to my lay opinion.
MR VAN DER WALT: So at the stage during June 1990, when he gave evidence before the Harms Commission, these inherent risks already existed for the Security Police, his instability and the fact that he was going to be examined regarding the Mxenge murder?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR VAN DER WALT: And despite that from the perspective of the Security Police, he was a satisfactory witness?
MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, that is my opinion, I cannot express an opinion about what Gen Engelbrecht or Gen van Rensburg thought, it is my opinion.
MR VAN DER WALT: And if I understand your evidence correctly, the reason why he was murdered can be ascribed to the fact that he had put out feelers to the ANC?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, that is the information that I received.
MR VAN DER WALT: The ANC would then be an organisation which at that stage, had already been unbanned?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR VAN DER WALT: Mr Ngqulunga was a colleague of yours, and you have already given evidence that you were somewhat reticent about this order, that you didn't really adopt this order with eagerness?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR VAN DER WALT: Did you attempt to gain information which would indicate precisely how he would have put out feelers to the ANC, what exactly his offence would have been?
MR DE KOCK: No, I had no doubt in Gen van Rensburg's judgement regarding the development of his information which he had received, or his management of such information, the inferences that he drew and the detail that he possessed.
MR VAN DER WALT: Despite the fact that this was a colleague that you had worked with, you did not feel the necessity to obtain further information?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, coming from Gen van Rensburg, I did not take it any further.
MR VAN DER WALT: This decision with regard to the method in which Mr Ngqulunga would be killed, who took the decision?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I took the decision.
MR VAN DER WALT: I beg your pardon, please continue. Did you also take the decision regarding the amount of ammunition for example which would be used?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, but I left it on ground level, if I recall correctly, it had to be appear to be an ANC revenge attack, because he was a defector and a collaborator and I also accept responsibility for what the operatives on ground level did.
MR VAN DER WALT: Is it correct that approximately 30 to 40 rounds were fired on the deceased, according to the information that you gathered after the incident?
E KOCK: I don't think they told me how much ammunition had been used, I also didn't count the ammunition afterwards, because we destroyed the weapons and so forth, but I would accept that to be the amount of shells which were found.
MR VAN DER WALT: That which you wanted to achieve through the method in which the deceased was killed, could have been achieved in another method, isn't that correct?
MR DE KOCK: There were many other methods, but if I recall correctly it had to appear to be an ANC revenge attack, among others, just for the sake of completion I would like to mention that during the Harms Commission, an ANC document was submitted. This document was a pamphlet which was distributed throughout the Republic in which the faces of six or eight askaris had been printed, with their names and their real names and then on the back in English and in four black languages I think, mention was also made that these persons whose photo's and names appeared on the pamphlet, were impimpis who were working with the Boere, who were prolonging the struggle or leading to further loss of life of MK members. Also based upon that, it would have appeared that the ANC in this regard, had taken action against Mr Ngqulunga.
CHAIRPERSON: Is that part of this Bundle?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I didn't find it when I paged through the Bundle. I am not certain, but I think that during my criminal trial, such a document was submitted, somewhere during my criminal trial the document was submitted.
MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I think I can get hold of it, in Mr Bellingan's total application, his big application, I seem to recall that document was there.
CHAIRPERSON: I seem to recall it is in one of the applications that we are going to hear, if it is not in this one, in one of the applications that we are going to hear the week after next. I recall there pages with photographs on them.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was such documentation.
MR VAN DER WALT: Mr de Kock, if we accept this to be the case, the point remains that the objective could have been achieved through other methods, for example by firing a single shot with an Eastern Block handgun, which would also have led people to believe that the ANC was involved, why was it necessary to fire 30 or 40 shots at the deceased?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in many shooting incidents during which ANC members had been involved, they fired automatic rounds. I refer for example to the attacks on police stations among others, there was no such thing as a single shot, it was about flattening a target and a magazine containing 30 to 40 rounds, would be empty within three seconds.
MR VAN DER WALT: You are talking about targets which were buildings, such as police stations, I am talking about a target that was one person.
MR DE KOCK: I am referring to an askari who initially had been a policeman in the Transkei, when he fled the Holomisa regime and joined us. I think that 35 shots were fired at him in his car, they would usually open up full automatic, we tried to stay in line with that modus operandi which was used by the ANC.
MR VAN DER WALT: Mr de Kock, earlier you were examined about the content of the post-mortem report, and I know that it does not necessarily fall within the framework of this Committee, but I do have specific instructions to examine you about it. After the death of Mr Ngqulunga, did you see his body?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR VAN DER WALT: You cannot say pertinently that the fact that his tongue was missing can be ascribed to a shot or shots which were fired in the face?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot give expert evidence about it, but I can testify according to personal experience from 1968 onwards when I performed my first border duty, that sometimes with a single shot, one would remove one half of someone's face or head. That is just one case, I am surprised that anything of his upper body remained if he was shot at in the upper body because I didn't see the photo's.
MR VAN DER WALT: With this in mind, was this method not a particularly brutal method of getting rid of the deceased?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, any method of killing is brutal. If it is violent, then any method is brutal, whether it is by means of a knife, a panga or a bullet, all of them are equally gruesome.
MR VAN DER WALT: Mr de Kock, with regard to this incident, you were found guilty and sentenced in the High Court, specifically with regard to this case, what were you sentenced to?
MR DE KOCK: 20 years, Chairperson.
MR VAN DER WALT: Just a final aspect, do you have knowledge of where Mrs Ngqulunga was injured by the deceased, do you know about that?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know who dealt with it, I think one of my members addressed it. I think it might be Capt van Dyk, but I speak under correction, I do not want to depend on that.
MR VAN DER WALT: Without going into the detail there, I have specific instructions to put it to you that Mrs Ngqulunga was not wounded with an R1 or a semi-automatic weapon, but with a pistol, a hand weapon?
MR DE KOCK: I would concede that Chairperson.
MR VAN DER WALT: I thank you Mr Chairman, I have nothing further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DER WALT
MR VAN DER WALT: I have nothing further, Mr Chairman.
ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP
MR SIBANYONI: Mr de Kock, I refer you to page 149 of the Bundle, paragraph 5, in the middle of the paragraph, this is a statement by Joseph Tsepo Mamasela, known as Joe Mamasela, he says
"... Major Eugene de Kock then suggested that Brian must be eliminated."
In other words he says it is you who came up with the suggestion that Brian should be eliminated?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, Joe Mamasela himself had on occasion had the idea that he was afraid that Brian would not last, and I on the contrary used some of my calming tablets which I used, I gave it to Brian, I gave him two strips with Lexotan, that is what the Doctor prescribed for my nerves. I requested of Brian not to use it in conjunction with any liquor, but there was nowhere a situation where Joe Mamasela was present when something like that was discussed.
MR SIBANYONI: Another issue, Joe Mamasela makes the statement saying that he attended a meeting which took place in the office of Gen Krappies Engelbrecht and then where Brian Ngqulunga, where there was concern about Brian Ngqulunga, do you recall any such meeting?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, something like that could have happened, I don't have an independent recollection thereof, I cannot say that it did not happen.
MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.
ADV SANDI: Thank you. Mr de Kock, I am afraid I think I must ask you to say exactly what Mr van Rensburg said to you about Ngqulunga, did he say Ngqulunga had actually approached the ANC or did he say he was, it is not very clear to me what your evidence is, or did he say he was making an attempt to contact the ANC, which of the two did he say?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, when one puts out feelers to an organisation, then you make contact. It is not a matter of being in the process of wanting to make contact, one makes contact with somebody there, you try to find the right person with whom you can liaise eventually.
ADV SANDI: Did he tell you who that person was?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.
ADV SANDI: Did he specify as to whether whoever had been approached by Ngqulunga was inside the country or outside the country?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, he did not. What I would like to mention for the sake of completion is that all three South African Intelligence Services had sources in Shell House at that stage.
ADV SANDI: Did he tell you what the reaction of the ANC would have been to his approaches?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, he did not.
ADV SANDI: Did it appear that whoever from the ANC was approached by Ngqulunga, believed that he was being honest and that he should be trusted, what was the reaction from the ANC? You cannot tell us about that?
MR DE KOCK: Unfortunately not, Chairperson.
ADV SANDI: Yes, but if Mr Ngqulunga was involved in any mischievous scheme with the ANC, is it not a bit odd that when he testified at the Harms Commission, he did not use that opportunity to spill the beans and talk about all these things he had been involved in at Vlakplaas?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not as easily. I also gave evidence here and the control from above, and if I refer to above, I refer to the higher hierarchy and particularly Gens van Rensburg and Engelbrecht, it was particularly strict. We were handled very well, if I may put it as such.
ADV SANDI: Before this incident, was there any, before your discussions with Mr van Rensburg, was there any operation in which you had been involved with Ngqulunga?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, Mr Ngqulunga did not have knowledge or if he knew of my operations, it was just speculation. He did not undertake any operation along with me, which could have created a problem for me.
ADV SANDI: In other words, you personally were not in a position of fear or concern that there were certain things pertaining to you personally, which he could expose?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, not at all, under no circumstances.
ADV SANDI: Thank you Mr de Kock, thank you Chair.
MR SIBANYONI: If the operation was for the State, defending the State, why would you keep it a secret to Gen Engelbrecht, why would you lie about the operations to Gen Engelbrecht?
MR DE KOCK: I don't understand Chairperson, if you could repeat.
MR SIBANYONI: Let me maybe repeat it again, you are saying what Vlakplaas was doing, was for the benefit of the State?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR SIBANYONI: My question is, arising from the statement of Gen van Rensburg and also arising from cross-examination from Mr Wagener that they deny any knowledge about the Brian Ngqulunga incident, if this Brian Ngqulunga incident was done for the benefit of the State, to protect the State, the police, etc, why would you as Mr de Kock, not have told them the truth about this incident?
MR DE KOCK: But I did tell them the truth Chairperson, Capt Baker and I directly reported back to Gen Nick van Rensburg himself. There was no beating about the bush, it was a reporting back about the death of Brian Ngqulunga and the detail surrounding it. There was no lie about that.
MR SIBANYONI: Can you think of any reason why they are now denying knowledge of it?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it works on the same principle as in the Harms Commission when we denied everything from Dirk Coetzee's time, including Griffiths Mxenge. The whole system in Intelligence Service is one of deniability. There it is denial, they make it impossible for one to implicate anybody, evidence is destroyed, later there is disassociation, there is more denial, so it is part of that system.
MR SIBANYONI: But today we have got an Act in terms of which if you tell the truth about what happened, then you get amnesty for that. Why do you think they don't take that opportunity?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have my own theory about this, it is absolutely my own theory, but I might be entirely wrong. I think it may have emanated from 1994, or even before that, but I may be wrong, that there is some or other, there was a situation where it was said that up until 1989 there would be amnesty, but not afterwards. There was some speculation to that, and I personally attach it to that. I don't understand why they do not use it, it is beyond my comprehension because we had a situation like in the Motherwell bomb where three policemen and an askari were killed, also on the instruction of Gen Nick van Rensburg, and he did not apply for amnesty for that, and in the end he was forced to apply for amnesty, after the sentencing of Nieuwoudt and other members. So he then used the amnesty in the Motherwell incident, because he could not escape that situation.
MR SIBANYONI: Lastly, initially when I read all the statements in here, the application, I was under the impression that you put the emphasis for the reasons for the killing of Brian Ngqulunga on his emotional state, in other words that he was emotional, as a result he was a great risk to disclose, whereas on the other hand, the other applicants put the emphasis on the fact that he was putting out feelers, he was sending feelers to the ANC.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I may have had that extra information because I was involved personally with the Harms Commission and the other members not. And I would have regarded it as one of the reasons why he would have put out his feelers, we had an unbanning of the movement, and one would not know what his real motives were, that he became afraid and wanted to turn back. That is just a matter of my perception.
MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.
CHAIRPERSON: One point, I don't know if I've got it down wrong, there is one point I would like to clarify if clarify is the right word. I think you said Mr de Kock, that after you had been approached, you discussed the matter with Capt Baker and he agreed that you would have to proceed?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: And you then said according to my note
"... I selected a group of people, Mentz, Botha, Bellingan, Nortje, Baker and Chate."
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Because you see in your application, you mentioned that you discussed it with Baker and that he would be satisfied with the help of Bellingan, Mentz and Botha. This is page 5, and in your supplementary affidavit, at page 147, you again said that you asked Baker if he would be satisfied with the help of Bellingan, Mentz and Piet Botha. At neither of those places do you mention Nortje or Chate, are you sure about them, that they were part of this?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, because Nortje was my driver, because I had trouble with my leg at that time, he was my driver, and he also made the arrangements for the vehicles from Avis. Chate, I had a vague recollection of Chairperson, and I did not want to involve people here and in reading the other people's statements, it jolted my memory and I cannot dispute that Chate was there.
CHAIRPERSON: But you did not remember it when you made your own application or your own affidavit?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson, because I knew there was another person because Nortje and I drove in one vehicle. There was a second vehicle and I did not just want to implicate people here, I did not want to just mention a name and then it is not so.
CHAIRPERSON: And Nortje in his says at page 263
"... my involvement with the incident was to hire a kombi vehicle which would be used by the members, which was instructed by de Kock to execute the task. I was also not at the scene."
Is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, with regard to the scene of the shooting, Nortje was not, but Nortje also hired a Mercedes Benz vehicle which he and I first reconnoitred the area. I think it is the road between the Marula Sun and Letlhabile and we drove out on that road as well. So right from the start, he was part of this operation.
CHAIRPERSON: If you will bear with me for one moment.
MR LAMEY: Chairperson, may I just, sorry Chairperson, I just want to come in here. We, Mr Nortje, would also testify to that, that he did know of the plans, but what he intended to convey was he wasn't part of the actual execution of the killing plan, I think he will elaborate further on that he was involved in hiring the vehicles, also the Mercedes Benz, I think he said in his initial statement also that he was involved with the kombi and the Mercedes Benz at Avis, and as far as Mr de Kock testifies that they also did some observation, he will also testify to that, it is not disputed. As it pleases you Chairperson.
MR SIBANYONI: Mr de Kock, do you know at what time did this incident take place, the killing?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if I have to judge, Chairperson, I would say it was between eight and eleven in the evening, but I say that with uncertainty, I think it was between eight and eleven or seven and eleven, somewhere around there. Actually not only the killing, but the abduction of Brian Ngqulunga, the execution of his murder and their return, somewhere in that vicinity.
CHAIRPERSON: Is this person Chate, Charlie Tait?
MR DE KOCK: No, he is Chate, C-h-a-t-e. The one you are thinking of is John Tait, Mr Chairman, like ...
CHAIRPERSON: The one I am thinking of is Charlie Tait, at page 29 who was waiting at Wonderpark to get the weapons after the operation.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, we waited with him there Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: So he was driving the other vehicle?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, the one with the blue light if we needed it.
CHAIRPERSON: That is Charlie Tait?
MR DE KOCK: Charlie Chate.
CHAIRPERSON: Charlie Chate?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, Charles Chate.
CHAIRPERSON: At various places in this Bundle, he is apparently spelt as Tait.
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr de Kock, just singular aspects. You have mentioned that you were uncertain with regard to names and that you did not want to involve other persons is you were not certain whether they were involved or not, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: In your supplementary application with regard to Vlakplaas from page 1 thereof, you deal with this problem that you experienced, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And you say there that as time has run its course and you have read in the media and what other people testified and as you had opportunity to discuss with the applicants, your memory was joggled with regard to certain incidents and events?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And you were also asked with regard to Vlakplaas' task after the unbanning of the ANC and with regard to the Nelspruit, we addressed that in its completion, but for purposes of this Committee's knowledge, I would like to refer you to page 72 of the same document, there under the heading Vlakplaas After the Unbanning of Certain Political Organisations, you completely describe there what Vlakplaas' task was after the unbanning of the ANC?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: You mentioned a set of photo's of askaris which were circulated by the ANC, do you know whether Mr Ngqulunga was amongst those photo's?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I would also like to check the record of what was, what Mr de Kock testified under cross-examination by Mr Wagener, my Attorney and I have had a discussion about it, our recollection was, it now is that that cross-examination took place during the hearing of the Chand incident. I don't know if the record of those proceedings is available.
CHAIRPERSON: We are getting the one record, let's check that one first, if it is not there, then Mr Wagener may have to find it somewhere else. At the moment he has put it to Mr de Kock and he says it comes from a certain record which we will hopefully have later this afternoon, or certainly by tomorrow morning.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: You can reserve any questioning on that.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, then I have no further questions, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would just like to mention finally, as I have done right from the start, that I take full responsibility for my own actions and what flowed from there, and I also want to take responsibility for the members under my command, black or white, for the actions which they have executed under my command, despite the fact that these instructions came from the General. I do not take responsibility for higher up, but I take responsibility for all the members under me, as it becomes an officer, thank you Mr Chairman.
WITNESS EXCUSED
