EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)
ADV BOSMAN: The applicant is properly sworn, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. You may be seated, Mr de Kock. Mr Hattingh?
EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr de Kock, you are also an applicant in this matter and your application appears from page 1 of the bundle, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Just before I lead you concerning this incident itself, can you just look at this application and when you deal with the incident itself you deal with it on page 7. You deal with this whole incident on one page, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Am I also correct that it was a very cryptical and short version of what your involvement was in this matter?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.
MR HATTINGH: At other matters you've testified about this, that you have a very large application for amnesty where you deal with literally hundreds of incidents, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And when you submitted your application you were in prison.
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And was Mr Hugo there as your legal representative? Did he have free access to you at all hours of the day?
MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And in that time while you were busy submitting your, or compiling your application, were you involved in other investigations?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: What other parties did you assist?
MR DE KOCK: It was the Attorney-General, it was also a section of National Intelligence Service.
MR HATTINGH: Did these people also make use of your time?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, a lot.
MR HATTINGH: The time that Mr Hugo wanted to spend with you for the purposes of your application?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And are you aware that in February last year there was a meeting between legal representatives of applicants and representatives of victims families, under the Chairmanship of Judge Wilson? Were you informed about this meeting?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And during that meeting your legal representatives were told that because of the time restraints that came from government level, these proceedings were supposed to have finished by August last year.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.
MR HATTINGH: And because of that reason the parties were informed that they will not be allowed to give very long evidence and if they wanted to speak ...(end of side B of tape)
... and were there once again problems with access to you concerning supplements that you wanted to make?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, there were various.
MR HATTINGH: And at long last the Committee decided not to continue with that decision and they then allowed applicants to supplement their written applications orally.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: When you compiled your application, did you have insight to documents that could assist you in helping you with your memory?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: Were you given the opportunity to consult with other members in order to assist you in your recollections?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: After you read the other applicants' applications and documents, was your memory then refreshed because of information contained therein? ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Were you approached to assist with an attack on Khanya House, in order to damage it?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Can you recall who approached you?
MR DE KOCK: It was Capt Kotze, and the facility had to be destroyed, either by explosives or fire.
MR HATTINGH: And who would have been involved in this?
MR DE KOCK: The Explosives Unit and members of Vlakplaas.
MR HATTINGH: And what about Mr WAL du Toit's unit or section?
MR DE KOCK: Well we co-opted them in terms of opening the locks.
MR HATTINGH: To get access to the building?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, and afterwards to also lock the doors behind us so that it does not seem as if somebody broke in.
MR HATTINGH: Was a reason given why it was decided to damage this building?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, yes, this building was used as a workplace, it was also used for actions against the then government.
MR HATTINGH: As a workplace by whom?
MR DE KOCK: By the Catholic Church.
MR HATTINGH: And according to the information that you received, who was working there then, who were these members?
MR DE KOCK: It is very difficult to say, I did not know who was there, but members of the Catholic Church, people attached to them or who worked for them and who also launched actions against the State.
MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any information concerning possible presence of activists?
MR DE KOCK: No, Vlakplaas' task was the destruction of this facility, it was more the operational side of it.
MR HATTINGH: Were you informed about who took this decision?
MR DE KOCK: I was informed that it was a Brig McIntyre, who was Head of Stratcom and I then contacted Brig Schoon and confirmed it with him. He told me yes, it is true, we must assist him.
MR HATTINGH: And did you then start planning the attack on the building?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, with Capt Kotze, amongst others, the fires question was, "what is the method that we are going to use?" We then decided on the fire or arson, because in the light of our previous actions at Khotso and Cosatu House one also saw what the destruction or the damage was, the debris and the spreading of it.
After the house was shown to me there was a hotel on the west side, or rather the east side or it, on the corner, lower down there was the old Continental Hotel that was used by the police. There were approximately between four and five hundred police members who resided there. We then decided not to use explosives because of the detonation a lot of debris could result in secondary injuries or deaths.
MR HATTINGH: Were you worried about the fact that there could be people who would be injured or killed in it?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, the same as with Cosatu and Khotso House, we attempted to prevent all injuries, apart from the problems around such a task especially in an urban area.
MR HATTINGH: What steps did you take to prevent people from being injured?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I did not know that there was such a place like Khanya House before it was identified to me, we did not work on Churches, but then we observed the house twice or three times afterwards. I could have used some of my members, I do not recall, but at one opportunity myself and one of the Kok brothers entered the terrain of Khanya House on the side of the church. You go through the church and a fence or wall and you get to the back door of Khanya House, and they were then able because of their technical abilities, to open all the locks. We ensured that there were no guards or dogs.
MR HATTINGH: This access, this time when you got access to the building, was it during the day or the evening?
MR DE KOCK: It was late that evening and we tried to arrange it in the time in which we would then act, so we could get the feeling of the flow of traffic and the movement of people that time of the night and what would accompany it then.
MR HATTINGH: At this opportunity did you then actually enter the house, when you did this reconnaissance?
MR DE KOCK: As far as I can recall we went into the terrain but I cannot recall that we went into the building. I stood guard at the gate, they went in. Our main problem was guards or if possible, dogs.
MR HATTINGH: Did you see any signs that this building was used, or that people lived in this building?
MR DE KOCK: No, not at all.
MR HATTINGH: And this reconnaissance that you did through observation, what time of the day did this occur?
MR DE KOCK: It was also in the evenings. I think it was twice before that we also observed the house. We attempted to move in once again to get the feeling of it and the nature of the flow of traffic and the movement of people and the direction of movement of people.
MR HATTINGH: You say that this happened more-or-less during the time when you launched this operation, can you give us an estimate of about what time it was in the evening?
MR DE KOCK: I think it was just after twelve, I think it was early morning.
MR HATTINGH: And during this observation with regard to the building, could you then see, were there any signs that people lived there, either temporary or permanently?
MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairperson. The knowledge that I had about this building was that it was a workplace and not a residence.
MR HATTINGH: Were you under that impression when you launched the attack?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Did you accept that this operation was necessary after the instruction that was given by Brig McIntyre and the information that he conveyed to you?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, I did not doubt it and it was also furthermore confirmed by Brig Schoon, who told me to go ahead. In other words, I had no doubt that he knew about it, and we will then later hear in evidence why I say so.
MR HATTINGH: In other words, you had the authorisation of your Commander to go ahead with this operation?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Very well, Mr de Kock. Where did the final planning take place?
MR DE KOCK: It was at Vlakplaas.
MR HATTINGH: Can you tell the Committee, apart from the applicants whose names appear in the documents, were there any other members of police units who were involved in this incident?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I looked at the names, I do not want to implicate anybody but I think there are maybe three or four people who did not apply for amnesty. It could be even more.
MR HATTINGH: Are these people from other units or are they from Vlakplaas?
MR DE KOCK: No, they're from Vlakplaas but I do not want to just name names.
MR HATTINGH: You've mentioned a few names to me of people who you think were also involved in it, please name them although you're not even sure about it.
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I'm quite sure that Capt Snyders was involved, Lieut van Dyk, he could have been a Captain, I've also got a suspicion that there was a person with the surname of Morkel. That is my recollection concerning them. I do not want unnecessarily implicate people.
MR HATTINGH: But apart from Vlakplaas members, do you know if there were members from other police units who were involved in this operation, who did not apply for amnesty?
MR DE KOCK: No, not what I can recall now, no.
MR HATTINGH: Can you recall the amount of people who actually took part in this?
MR DE KOCK: For such an operation we needed a lot of people, but what we tried to do was to build in some kind of defence system or mechanism, so if there were problems and we encountered problems at the scene, there would some type of backup.
MR HATTINGH: So you did the planning at Vlakplaas, so everybody who was involved was at Vlakplaas?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And from there you went to Khanya House to execute this operation.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.
MR HATTINGH: At Vlakplaas, during the planning, were there any possibilities mentioned that you would plant weapons in the building?
MR DE KOCK: Because it was a Stratcom operation, because we are going to act against this group who acted against the State, I on my own initiative decided to leave a few devices at the scene, of a Russian make.
MR HATTINGH: If you talk about devices, what kind of devices?
MR DE KOCK: Explosive devices.
MR HATTINGH: Such as, Mr de Kock?
MR HATTINGH: Like limpets. I hear they talked about handgrenades, I cannot recall it, but if they say so, it was so.
MR HATTINGH: And what about magazines for AK47s?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, yes, I also gave the instructions or permission that they had to add a few AK47 magazines and that this must be left at the scene.
MR HATTINGH: To create what impression?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, it heightens the value of the Stratcom operation and it creates further embarrassment for this group of people who then creates embarrassment for the State.
MR HATTINGH: While you then decided not to make use of explosives to destroy the building, why did you decide to then place limpet mines there?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, it would have created the impression that people were assisted from that house, assisted people from the ANC or assisted people who acted against the government in a violent way. So that just heightened the whole sense or the issue.
MR HATTINGH: So this building will then be burnt down?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, but the devices were not prepared with detonators, in other words they were burnt out. In previous experiences and also in north of Ovamboland, I also worked with landmines that did not have detonators in, so they do burn out with only the container left.
MR HATTINGH: And we can see in Exhibit D, page 2, paragraph 3 you say emphatically that the landmines and handgrenades were placed there without detonators. Did you give instructions that they must ensure that whatever is placed there must be without detonators?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: That is to prevent them from going off?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: You say that you have personal knowledge of landmines that if they were exposed to heat and if they did not have detonators they will not explode but they will only burn out.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct. I'd like to just explain. If you've got a detonator in your hand, it can also become so hot that it will detonate, that's also one thing that you teach people who work in mines, that even the heat of your hand can detonate the detonators.
MR HATTINGH: And if they did have detonators in and were exposed to that heat, they would have detonated and you wanted to prevent that?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Can you recall who took the landmines and whatever was placed there?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I would have given instructions to my people, I do not know who I gave the instructions to. I had the keys for the storerooms, so I would have given the person the keys as well. I can accept that we wouldn't have walked in there with it in our bare hands, we would have placed it in some container.
MR HATTINGH: You do not know who took it and who placed it there?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: And did you accept that your instructions would be followed?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, definitely.
MR HATTINGH: And it also then seemed that such items were found at the scene.
MR DE KOCK: That's correct.
MR HATTINGH: Very well, Mr de Kock. It was now discussed at Vlakplaas, you now depart to go to Khanya House to execute this operation.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Would you have according to the planning, entered the building yourself?
MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairperson, I would have remained outside, moved around there, not on the terrain itself, but on the side of the road. I had to observe the guard unit's building.
MR HATTINGH: Can I just make sure, the guard unit is the unit of the - the unit who stayed at this hotel that was used as police quarters?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, people who also then guarded some of the Ministers or the President.
MR HATTINGH: You then observed them.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, and we had to be very careful that nobody contacted radio control that there's a group of, or a suspicious group. Because of the time of the evening and the nature in which we had to execute it, it could have drawn attention and in the end it did. In the way in which I moved, I moved in a vehicle with two or three other members and I moved around as a member of the Diamond Branch. I had a blue light in the vehicle and my identification.
I would have been the first line of defence if the police were to arrive at the scene or any other group, to then prevent them to get to my people who were busy dousing the house.
MR HATTINGH: In other words, you and two members were moving around, were there other people who were to remain outside of the building?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I had a second vehicle which transported members. I think it was under the command of Mr Bellingan and he then had to look out for the firearm and the provincial library. He had to remain in that area and if I warned him or needed him, he would have been able to come to assist. We were in radio contact.
Then I cannot recall if it was two or three, I pointed them to remain at the access gate, or let us say at the back door of Khanya House, I placed them there, who would then protect the backs of the operators in the house. I'm sure I armed them. If somebody passed them they would have had to deal with the next group.
MR HATTINGH: Let us just stop there. At Khotso House, did you receive any instructions concerning what you should do in case you are surprised by outsiders while you were busy with the operation? ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR DE KOCK: Yes, we were told to use violence or use the weapons.
MR HATTINGH: If you talk about violence, what are you talking about?
MR DE KOCK: Well we had Uzzis with silencers and in the case of Khotso House we also took a 40mm grenade launcher with us, which I think was handled by Mr Hanton. ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR HATTINGH: Who gave you this instruction to use violence if somebody would surprise you?
MR DE KOCK: At Khotso House it was Gen Gerrit Erasmus. MR HATTINGH: He was also an applicant in that matter?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Why was it necessary to act against people who surprised you and then using weapons?
MR DE KOCK: Well first of all, we are an operational unit so everything that we do in that sense, or approached, would have been operational in nature. We do not know what can happen, we do not know what would happen if they pass me first of all, who they were, what the nature of it was and if they killed any of my members. And right through the world with Special Forces, the operators do, their lives come first and whoever attacks them comes second.
MR HATTINGH: What about the secrecy concerning your participation in operations like these, would that have played a role?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, secrecy was paramount, we compromise concerning this.
ADV BOSMAN: Mr Hattingh, can I just interrupt you, I think I've lost Mr de Kock and I'd just like to fill in the gap.
Mr de Kock, your Advocate asked you who told you to use weapons in case you were interrupted and you said in Khotso House it was Gerrit Erasmus, but what about in this specific incident?
MR DE KOCK: I gave the instructions because I was appointed to take this operation further as the operational Commander, so I took all the responsibility.
ADV BOSMAN: Thank you, you've clarified it, I was just not certain. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr Hattingh.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson.
And for those two reasons you gave an order that if necessary weapons be used?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And you said that you reckon that the two or three persons that you placed at the back entrance should be armed and you gave them the order for this.
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: The other members, were they armed? That would be those who were supposed to enter the building.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, they had a cosh, which was some from of a leather baton which one could purchase in stores. They were armed with that and as far as I know we also had shock devices which were hand held and can also be purchased in public. We had a number of those devices among the group.
MR HATTINGH: Can you recall how many of the members who were involved in the operation would indeed penetrate the building?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would say that it would have been approximately eight to nine members, because I think that we had ten cans of petrol, 20 litres worth of petrol which we took in with us. I vaguely recall that we may have mixed the petrol with pieces of rubber or soap powder and I'm not certain if we also used steel wool to add to this. It was like metal, but it glowed and it would increase the temperature.
MR HATTINGH: And these persons who were supposed to penetrate the building had to douse the building with the fuel and set it alight?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. Furthermore I must state, I don't know if I'm going too fast, but after the completion of this operation and my report of it to Mr Schoon the following morning or upon the first available occasion thereafter, Brig Schoon attack me quite furiously regarding the fact that explosive devices were left in the building. All that I can infer from that is that it wasn't part of the Stratcom plan. In other words, what I did, did not fit in to whatever Stratcom's plan was. He didn't have a problem with the arson, the break-in and the unlawful entry, but he was concerned about the devices which were not part of Stratcom's plan.
MR HATTINGH: Did he reprimand you quite severely regarding this?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he wasn't the sort of man to use cuss words, but that morning he certainly did.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. You heard the section from Exhibit E which my learned friend, Mr van der Merwe read out, the section which appears on page 5 where Brother Jude states
"It seems the arsonists were under the impression that there was no-one in the building, as they moved around fairly freely on the ground and first floors."
He said that during a press conference shortly after the attack. How does that rhyme with the impression that you had?
MR DE KOCK: It was my belief that there would not be people in the building.
MR HATTINGH: Did you give any order to your members to work gently, so that they would not disturb anybody in the building?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, they went in and they themselves went in with the belief that there was no-one in the building.
MR HATTINGH: Did you inform them as such?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And Mr de Kock, let me ask you this first, if one examines the amount of fuel that you used, it would appear that you wanted to determine and ensure that the building would burn.
MR DE KOCK: Well that was our task.
MR HATTINGH: And was it the idea to burn the building down?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: If you had known that there were elderly persons higher up in the building, would you have continued with the attack?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: You state in your application that you were severely shocked when you noted that there were indeed persons in the building shortly after it started burning. It's at the bottom of page 7 where you state that.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I state that because the golden rule that I always observed and always held to and which was broken for the first time with this, was that one would never return to a place where one had just executed an operation, one wouldn't even return a day later or a week later, one would never return.
And as we all know, C1 would visit a place once and once only, because afterwards there would be nothing to go back to. But in this case I did drive back and that is why I say I think that Lieut van Dyk was with me as the driver, and the fire brigade was already at the scene and I saw that an elderly woman, who was one of the nuns, was being brought down one of the ladders and to me it was a reasonable shock because my unit was aimed against armed persons or terrorists, with the exception of all the other tasks, and this was not our line. It wasn't part of our task description. It wasn't part of our task to attack nuns.
MR HATTINGH: How do you feel today about the fact that you set a building alight and that you undoubtedly created much fear and anxiety for those who were occupying the building?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would like to say to those ladies who were climbing down the ladders, that I'm tremendously sorry because it wasn't part of the plan. Our task description was to burn the building down, it was not to kill anybody. And particularly with regard to the fear and the humiliation that they suffered, I'm particularly sorry.
MR HATTINGH: Let us return. The people penetrated the building, you were securing the building from all sides and then you noted eventually that the building was indeed burning.
MR DE KOCK: I didn't notice it immediately, as the people started withdrawing and reporting back to me that everybody was back in their vehicles, because one would have to make sure that no-one was kept behind or trapped, as the vehicles reported that everybody was accounted for, they drove away and I departed last of all. We turned back, returned to the building and saw that it was burning, but by that stage the fire brigade was already there. Apparently the fire brigade station was situated approximately 80 metres away from the building.
MR HATTINGH: It has been put by previous witnesses that the section of the building where the printing press was housed, was actually a small building as it is indicated in a photograph on page 7, were you aware of that?
MR DE KOCK: No, because I didn't move around on the premises itself and I didn't enter the premises.
MR HATTINGH: On the photo of the building there is a caption which states: "The Remains of Khanya House Print Unit", do you know what the nature of the print unit was, to which is referred here?
MR DE KOCK: I didn't see it myself, but I heard that there was indeed a printing facility there. What the nature and size of it was is unknown to me.
MR HATTINGH: Was that part of the target?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I must state, as a result of the Cosatu House incident, with that incident one of the Scandinavian countries had established a printing unit there and that was part of the target when Cosatu House was targeted.
MR HATTINGH: Why was that so?
MR DE KOCK: Because it was used to publish literary documents which were aimed against the State policy, or which criticised State policy.
MR HATTINGH: And was this also the information that you received with regard to this printing unit which existed in Khanya House?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that was part of the information.
MR HATTINGH: Very well, Mr de Kock. After everybody withdrew, you also withdrew and where did you go then?
MR DE KOCK: We went straight to Vlakplaas and from that point onwards we ensured that none of us had left any of our equipment behind. We gave a brief session of feedback. Among others, Mr Bellingan reported to me that he had experienced problems with the police. While we were still at the scene he heard on the radio that things appeared suspicious.
I myself had also been encountered by members of the uniform branch and I told them that we were busy with a trap and that they had to depart, which they did.
MR HATTINGH: I think it may be in Mr Ras's application where mention is made of the fact that Brits allegedly stole a television.
MR DE KOCK: No, there wasn't any time for that. What Mr Brits did tell me at Vlakplaas and what he brought to me was a portable computer or sorts. He made this decision on the ground level, to take the computer because it might contain information, which is why he withdrew it from the scene.
I took it from him and we gave it to Radio and Technical, to a Captain there, so that they could then draw whatever information they could from it. I didn't hear if there was any information on it and I never saw the computer again.
MR HATTINGH: Do you know who was appointed to investigate the incident on behalf of the police?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I only know that approximately three or four weeks later, he was then a Colonel, I think, or he had just become a Brigadier, it was Engelbrecht who arrived at Vlakplaas.
MR HATTINGH: Would that be Gen Krappies Engelbrecht who testified here yesterday?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. And he had two identikit photos with him, two photos of two people and he asked whether or not we recognised these persons. He said the one looked like Bellingan. I looked at the identikit photos myself. I knew that we would not be able to recognise Bellingan from there. Both of these photos were placed on the braai grill for us to view. Why he came directly to Vlakplaas is something that only he will know, none of us knew. By nature of the situation we all denied it.
MR HATTINGH: Someone in the documents stated or put it to Mr Engelbrecht that one of the identikits resembled you.
MR DE KOCK: There was no identikit which showed a person wearing glasses. Neither of these identikits had a face which wore spectacles, in fact the one face has freckles and none of the members had freckles.
MR HATTINGH: Did he ask if any of your members were involved?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, he did and we said that we didn't know anything.
MR HATTINGH: And do you know if there was any later information which indicated the chances of an arrest?
MR DE KOCK: No, not with regard to the Khanya House incident.
MR HATTINGH: Do you know whether anybody was prosecuted regarding the incident?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: You request amnesty - just a moment's indulgence, Chairperson, conspiracy, damage to property, accessory to those crimes and transgressions regarding the Arms and Ammunitions Act, as well as the Explosives Act, arson.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And then any lesser offences which may emanate from the facts pertaining to this incident.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And then you also request for any civil liability which may emanate from the incident.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And then also attempted murder, although at that stage you did not know that they were in the building, but you later were informed of the presence of persons in the building.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson, nothing further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
CHAIRPERSON: Not even dolus eventualis would ... (indistinct) in such a situation, would it?
MR HATTINGH: I think not, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Okay, thank you. Pardon?
MS CAMBANIS: No, Chair, I'll leave it for argument.
CHAIRPERSON: Oh, thank you. I don't know what it is, I'd rather listen to it in argument.
MS CAMBANIS: What it is, Chairperson, is that this is the first time that Mr de Kock has now added attempted murder on to what he asks for. It doesn't appear prior to this. Thank you, Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
Mr de Kock, have you read the other applications of your co-applicants in this incident?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, all I read was the summary in the front. There is a summary in the front and that is all that I read.
CHAIRPERSON: And that is not precise if you have read this, the summary is not precise. Have you noted that?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, with the sentence that I have, they might as well just add it on if it's so important.
CHAIRPERSON: No, but what I heard you there to say Mr Brits came with a computer there when you were at Vlakplaas, when you withdrew to Vlakplaas.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I think that I have stated here for lesser offences as well, what the nature of that may be. It was the offences which were committed in the course of action where people used their initiative in the operational context. I do take responsibility for that automatically, and of course I also approved it and we did take the computer further to see whether or not there was any information to be gleaned from it. So as far as I'm concerned, it is all part of the operation.
I could give you an example, we could attack a house in Swaziland where we were informed there would be six terrorists, but then there are nine, there would be decision that would have to be taken in the heat of the moment as circumstances dictated it.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr van der Merwe?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you, Mr Chair.
Just one question, Mr de Kock. You were not certain of one of the Kok brothers, it is my instruction that it was Japie Kok who was with you.
MR DE KOCK: I will accept it as that.
MR VAN DER MERWE: No further questions, thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DER MERWE
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Nel?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.
Mr de Kock, just one aspect. My client, Mr Larry Hanton, recalls in his application which is on page 153 of the bundle, that you were one of the person who entered and from your evidence it would appear to be clear that he is mistaken.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I was definitely on the outside. In fact, I went so far with the planning which affected my role on the outside. I contacted Radio Control in Pretoria that night and asked for the rank of the Service Officer, so that I would not be apprehended at the scene by the officer on duty in Pretoria that night and that his rank would be higher than mine.
In this case I had to be certain that my rank would be higher and that I could give orders and tell to leave my people alone. We didn't want to have any fight ensuing because of the ranking system while we were busy with an operation.
MR NEL: Thank you, Chairperson, nothing further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR NEL
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Nel. Mr Wagener?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, on behalf of Brig Schoon, he states that at the time of this incident he was on leave.
MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson, because I know that he was furious regarding the fact that I had taken a decision to leave explosive devices at the scene.
MR WAGENER: Yes, I will come to the subsequent discussion that you have mentioned today for the first time. But he states that at the time of the incident he was on leave and that he was not previously notified of the process, that he did not know about the operation.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I would not have been able to take the order from Mr Kotze, I did not speak to Mr Hattingh and I didn't liaise with Brig McIntyre. I cleared it with him, he told me to go ahead.
MR WAGENER: Brig Schoon maintains that he himself has submitted a comprehensive amnesty application for very serious cases, even more serious than this case, if he was involved in it, he would have requested amnesty for it, that is why he did not ask amnesty for it.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, the denials of the hierarchy are legendary by this stage. I will not comment any further on that.
MR WAGENER: Just so, Mr de Kock, upon that statement of yours, your false evidence is just as legendary by this stage.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, when it comes to falseness, then I think that with regard to Gen Engelbrecht, with the Khotso House situation, he also came to Vlakplaas as a full Colonel of the Detective Branch, along with Mostert from Johannesburg. He visited Vlakplaas and he wanted the names of the members who were involved with Khotso House. I only gave my name and I did not give the names of the other members. So when it comes to liars in this case, Mr Engelbrecht would be first in line.
MR WAGENER: I am still busy with Brig Schoon, we will deal with Mr Engelbrecht later. Brig Schoon maintains that your memory has failed you in this respect and as I have listened to your evidence today, you have conceded to many aspects as to not having a recollection of it, as to not being certain of it, as to having limited memory and Brig Schoon says that your memory has failed you with regard to his involvement in this operation.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the scale of my application is of such a nature that for the sake of completion I could not, at that stage, have given specific attention to every minor aspect. All I wanted to ensure was not to involve people unnecessarily and in so doing destroy people lives and the lives of their families. I did not want to create any injustice.
MR WAGENER: Lastly, with regard to Brig Schoon, the evidence today regarding his reaction upon the feedback situation is new evidence, I do not have instructions regarding this, I cannot take it any further. His instructions were that he was not at his office at the time of the authorisation for this operation.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I recall the incident very well.
MR WAGENER: With regard to Mr Engelbrecht, his instructions are that immediately after the incident there were already the initial accusations in the media and in the public that the police may have been involved in this incident. Do you remember this?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I cannot recall what the media had to say.
MR WAGENER: And that the matter enjoyed a high level of prominence from the very beginning, particularly with the Department of Police. Perhaps I could just complete the statement, it led to the fact that a senior officer, Jaap Joubert was appointed to be the overall Commander or person in charge of the investigation.
MR DE KOCK: Well I cannot recall Jaap Joubert, he never came to Vlakplaas, Col Engelbrecht did, but it would probably have been for the purposes of a cover-up.
MR WAGENER: Gen Engelbrecht's instructions are that he was requested to assist with a team of investigators in this particular investigation, under the overall command of Gen Joubert.
MR DE KOCK: Well I simply know that he arrived at Vlakplaas, that's all. ...(end of side A of tape)
MR WAGENER: ... collected during the investigation that persons in the vicinity of Khanya House were seen that night and that they pretended to be police officers. It appears to be in line with your evidence and the evidence of Mr Bellingan, which we are still to hear.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was such an incident, it was foreseen and it was for this purpose that we made those preparations.
MR WAGENER: And based upon this, the investigating team received certain identikits. You have also referred to the identikits. That is correct.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I believe they did because they arrived there at Vlakplaas with two of these identikits.
MR WAGENER: Furthermore, Mr Engelbrecht tells me that he didn't go directly to Vlakplaas as you said that he did, you weren't that high on his priority list as you claim to have been, they went to many places with these identikits, based upon the evidence that there were persons who appeared to be policemen, but that they did arrive at Vlakplaas in the process of their investigation with these identikits.
MR DE KOCK: I said it was approximately three to four weeks later, so quite apparently we were not that high on the list of priorities.
MR WAGENER: In conclusion he states that he showed the identikit to persons there but he cannot recall who these persons were and that it was said to him that the persons who were depicted in the identikits were unknown.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, he convened everybody who was there. We were under the "lapa" where the functions were usually held and everybody looked at the identikits.
MR WAGENER: And then in conclusion, for the sake of interest, it might not be directly relevant, he says that at a later stage he received a statement which basically led to a confession by Mr Barend Strydom, the notorius "Wit Wolf" who was in detention at that stage and that he confessed towards Mr Engelbrecht that it had been he and his unit, or the Wit Wolwe then, who were responsible for burning down Khanya House.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that wasn't the only one, Gen Engelbrecht boasted about it because this Strydom also accepted responsibility for the explosion of Khotso House and Mr Engelbrecht took that statement with great speed, because it would keep the police clean. I know about it because he told me about it, and it was with much amusement.
MR WAGENER: I've got no further questions, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WAGENER
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Wagener. Mr Joubert - oh, Mr Jansen first.
MR JANSEN: Thank you, Chair. Jansen on record, no questions.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Joubert?
MR JOUBERT: Thank you, Chair, I have no questions.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR JOUBERT
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr de Kock, the submission of Vlakplaas is already on record, I'd just like to as they say in English "recap" on a few aspects that comes out of the submission and also out of the submission of Gen van der Merwe. ...(transcriber's interpretation)
In the functioning of Vlakplaas, it was an operation unit of which you were the Commander and you had the operators under you. Sometimes you got requests from Head Office or branches, other branches.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: And as Gen van der Merwe also said in his submission, it happened very often that it is not possible for the operative on grassroots level to really find out what is the political motive behind a certain action.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, they were always informed about what we are going to do and where we're going to do it so that they can have a choice to withdraw or not, because you do not want to take somebody with you if he doesn't feel physically or otherwise ready for it, but they knew what they were doing all the time.
MR LAMEY: Let's talk about this incident, you get an instruction or a request, you did some groundwork that led to the decision to go ahead with this operation, if there was a really urgent reason not to go ahead because of certain information, and then question this information this information that came from Head Office and then maybe in the lower ranks you would, if you know that you received the information or the instruction, that you will assess the situation and then trust you in terms what you knew.
MR DE KOCK: No, they wouldn't have questioned it, and I also take responsibility for my members and all the other members who were there that evening and who were under my command.
MR LAMEY: I do not know if you are an applicant in that matter, and I also do not know if you have knowledge of it, the so-called Vryburg incident, where a press or something similar was destroyed in a fire.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was the National Union of Mine Workers incident, and I also applied for amnesty for that matter.
MR LAMEY: I represent an applicant who is under the impression that it was also a church building, but I will leave it there.
Was it your impression then, right or wrong, that this Catholic Church was part of the South African Council of Churches?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I focused only on terrorism, either the prevention of the executing of it. I never worked on trade unions or churches, these were two fields that I never touched and I was led by the needs, the operational needs of other sections.
MR LAMEY: Very well. Were you and your members aware of the South African Council of Churches, in the sense of their solidarity with other liberation organisations?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, maybe it's not that important, but in my time of service in the former Rhodesia, we were informed about what the role was of churches and missions. For example, in Ovamboland at a certain stage, myself and my unit members killed members of SWAPO in an attack and we got information that pointed to the Finnish Mission and we also found chevron tracks that came from the same batch. We did not take any action against them. But you cannot really blame them because somebody that arrives there with the gun is at that stage the boss. But at the same time people from those church groups did not report it back to the police, which was approximately three kilometres from that area. So there was some kind of solidarity with the liberation movements. I cannot take it any further because I did not study it.
MR LAMEY: But what was important in this case, apart from the organisation who owned this building, we are from a South African context where - and the point is that this facility or this building was used to promote the liberation movement.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, well that was the information that we received, and I did not doubt it all.
MR LAMEY: And that is what you dealt with most of the time, and that is the fighting of the liberation movements.
MR DE KOCK: If this was part of it, Mr Chairperson, then I will agree with it, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: No, but here these people were inside the country, they were merely being vociferous and that wouldn't have fallen within your ambit, because you were just concerned with those people you named terrorists.
MR DE KOCK: Yes Mr Chairperson, as I said, this was about the destruction of the facility and not a specific member of the Catholic community. If the facility was used for activists or by activists, it would have fallen in an operational category, although Vlakplaas dealt more with active combat situations.
MR LAMEY: This is not the typical case in which Vlakplaas would operate in, but it is one of the cases like Cosatu and Khotso House, where you were called in and requested to provide cover and support, which is not quite part of your main function but was a request from other institutions or sections.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.
MR LAMEY: Then I'd like to ask you, some of the applicants whom I represent, do you know if they had a desk concerning churches?
MR DE KOCK: Well at Head Office they had the central desk, but some of the sections and some of the branches, or every Security Branch also had a church section or desk and a trade union section, etcetera. Even on the grassroots level in the branches itself there would a desk for trade unions and churches and from there it went to the section, Head Office and then from there to headquarters.
MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, I've got no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Lamey. Mr du Plessis?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, just one or two questions.
Mr de Kock, will you agree with me if I put it to you that Capt Kotze and Lieut Hammond did not have weapons with them in the execution of this operation?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I will accept it.
MR DU PLESSIS: And can you recall - or you say that you went out two or three times to go and observe Khanya House, to do reconnaissance, can you recall, and I specifically refer to the time when you actually entered the terrain, if Capt Kotze accompanied you?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot. I know one of the Kok brothers accompanied me and I still think that we were three or four.
MR DU PLESSIS: If he is going to testify that he did accompany you, you will not deny it?
MR DE KOCK: No, I will not.
MR DU PLESSIS: And this vehicle that you used when you saw the female climb out of the building and who was assisted by the fire brigade, ...
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, because you ensure first of all that all your men have left the scene, that they are not being followed and in other words, that they are freely on their way and that all the members are present.
MR DU PLESSIS: Can you recall if Capt Kotze was in that vehicle?
MR DE KOCK: No, I cannot.
MR DU PLESSIS: If he is going to testify that he was, will you deny it?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr du Plessis. Mr Cornelius?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.
Just there short questions. You worked on a need-to-know basis, that's the footsoldiers.
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR CORNELIUS: And there was no doubt on the side of the footsoldiers that this operation was authorised through Head Office.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes, they wouldn't have doubted it at all.
MR CORNELIUS: Especially with all the other policemen who worked together?
MR DE KOCK: And also in the light of Khotso and Cosatu House.
MR CORNELIUS: This was not a frolic of Vlakplaas.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR CORNELIUS: And then in conclusion, I also represent Blackie Swart, I realise that you did not mention him in the list of people who did not apply, but it is my instructions from him that he was not involved in it.
MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairperson, he wasn't.
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Ms Cambanis?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chair.
Mr de Kock, was anyone wearing disguises or balaclavas during the course of that operation?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there may have been persons wearing balaclavas, I know that I didn't wear one.
MS CAMBANIS: Would you have expected some of them would have done that? Would it have been part of your orders?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because it would break the facial line and that could also then create confusion with possible identification.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr de Kock, I can't find it in the bundle, but there's reference in the bundle to a kombi, a motor vehicle, they give the licence number place, I don't really expect you to remember, DNW 8452, someone will find it, which turned out later to be a false number plate. There was a kombi used that night with false number plates, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. What sometimes occurred was that we had prepared a whole series of number plates, not only for this particular operation but for many other operations. I'm just explaining that to you for the sake of clarity. We would go and view vehicles which were of the same make, model and year and colour and then we would take that vehicle's number and then we would go the official printers of the police which issued annual third party discs, we would have these printed and keep everything together. So yes, it would have been false numbers, it wouldn't have been able to be traced back to the us.
MS CAMBANIS: Thank you. The person who refers to this kombi says that there were persons sighted inside, which included black people.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we did not take any black members with on this operation.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr de Kock at page 119 of the bundle, Jacobus Kok will give evidence, or he has said that it was his instruction to open all the doors on the first floor so that the Vlakplaas operators could search the place. It's at 2.4.4.
CHAIRPERSON: What's the page, Ms Cambanis?
MS CAMBANIS: Chair, it is 119, paragraph 2.4.4 at the bottom of that page.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, by nature of this task and the circumstances pertaining to the high density of force members so close to us, the building wasn't even 50 metres away from the unit and it was a question of entering and exiting as swiftly as possible. For example, the petrol cans were made out of plastic so that we didn't have to take it out again, we could just leave at the scene where it would burn. The plastic cans would burn in the fire.
We tried to deal with the operation as quickly as possible, so that we could go in and get out as quickly as possible.
MS CAMBANIS: And across the page at 120, paragraph 3.3, he says that he carried out the instruction and he in fact did open all the doors on the first floor.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, they had to open the locks.
MS CAMBANIS: And all you are saying is that it was not for the purpose of search?
MR DE KOCK: There wasn't time for a search.
MS CAMBANIS: What would be the point of opening the locks to all the doors?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I know that upon their exit they would have to lock the doors again, so that it wouldn't look as if entry had been gained. It was just a question of sowing more confusion.
MS CAMBANIS: Sorry, Mr de Kock, I'm misunderstanding. He refers to unlocking doors on the first floor, he's not referring to gaining entry into the building. I understand what you're saying, but what Mr Kok is saying, he's referring to doors inside the building. That's how I read it.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it would be a question of going in as silently and as quickly as possible. Mr Kok and the others were highly capable to the extent that it would take you longer to chop a door open with an axe than what it would take them to go in.
MS CAMBANIS: Sorry, Mr de Kock, if you can just read the whole, his evidence at 3.3
"After everyone had obtained safe entry to the building complex, I executed my order and opened the doors on the first floor."
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it could be that they also doused that area with petrol. I wasn't in the building, so I cannot give evidence about that, I don't know.
MS CAMBANIS: Well Mr de Kock, actually the doused the building, the second and third, all the floors were doused with petrol, not just the first floor.
MR DE KOCK: Well then that must be why they opened the doors.
MS CAMBANIS: And you dispute that it was to check - it's not to check what was happening in the rooms? To check, for example, if people were there?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, because there was no reason for us to believe that there was anyone there. All we had to do was douse the building with petrol, set it alight and get out. We had no doubt in our minds that the building was indeed empty.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr de Kock, I think you've given this evidence, I didn't hear. Jakob, the other brother Kok, at 135 his evidence is that you entered with him previously into the building. I think you've said that that's, you dispute that.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I know that he was present when the outside door was opened and they entered, but I waited there so that we would not be surprised from the back. I have never been inside Khanya House itself, I would not even be able to give you a description today, because if I had been there I would have described it to you, I would have told you if we turned left or right, along which passages we walked and so forth.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes Mr de Kock, I think he's not talking about - you're talking about a previous recce, is that right? Are we on the same wavelength?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I wasn't inside.
MS CAMBANIS: You dispute that evidence that he will give?
MR DE KOCK: He might be mistaken.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr de Kock, and then it will be the evidence of Mr du Plessis, I understand, at page 208, that he says
"We conducted thorough observation of the place"
And that is what you're referring to, to the two or three times previously during the night when surveillance was carried out?
MR DE KOCK: For the period that we did it, it was thorough.
MS CAMBANIS: And it is your evidence that on none of those occasions was there any indication that people were in the building, that is was used as a residence, if I can put it that way.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.
MS CAMBANIS: Now Mr de Kock we've heard your evidence regarding the use of force, can I just ask you, do you refer then to the use of force if you were attacked? Not you, or you or your operatives were attacked?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: You refer to a self-defence situation.
MR DE KOCK: I beg your pardon?
MS CAMBANIS: You're referring to a self-defence situation.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, not only self-defence, but also a situation of defence, because the operatives were inside the building, so if there was an attack from outside there would have to be sufficient persons to be able to defend or protect themselves.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes, Mr de Kock, I'm being obtuse, the point is that there wouldn't be unnecessary killing of civilians, that's all I'm trying to say.
MR DE KOCK: No, definitely not.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes. If you look at page 265 of the bundle, Mr Leon Flores, in his application he says in the second paragraph
"We received information while we were busy with the operation that there nuns on the top floor in (he refers to Kagiso House, we accept that he's referring to Khanya House) who were apparently resident there."
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, definitely not. Then he might have been at Kagiso House, then it wasn't I who was there.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes. I think he carries on to say
"We decided to carry on with the operation notwithstanding the fact that they were in the building."
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it is my belief to this very day that when we entered that building there were no people inside.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes. Could you just explain, what would be the rank or position of Mr Flores?
MR DE KOCK: He was Sergeant at that stage.
MS CAMBANIS: Did he fall under your command?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MS CAMBANIS: Would he be able to take a decision like this without your authorisation?
MR DE KOCK: Could you repeat please.
MS CAMBANIS: Would he be able to make a decision like this
"We decided to carry on with the operation notwithstanding the fact that there were nuns on the top floor"
MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, I cannot say that he would have done this or that, but I believe that he would have withdrawn if there were people and so too my other members, and then we would not have executed the operation.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr de Kock, let me just understand, what you are saying is that as you understood from the people under your command, they wouldn't have carried through with this operation had they known?
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson, and I also wouldn't have gone and burnt people to death.
MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I have nothing further, but I would like to please consult with the persons that I represent just before I keep quiet.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I would allow Ms Patel to continue with her cross-examination and you'll give us an indication if you've got further questions to ask after the consultation.
MS CAMBANIS: So I should be excused?
CHAIRPERSON: I'm excusing you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS CAMBANIS
CHAIRPERSON: Ms Patel?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.
Mr de Kock, was there a report-back made to you immediately after the operation had taken place?
MR DE KOCK: Is that at Vlakplaas?
MS PATEL: Yes.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, all of us came together and then every person would simply state - it was a long time ago, but basically every person would state that he was not identified or that he was not injured or that he hadn't lost any of the equipment and so forth.
MS PATEL: Can you recall if Mr Flores had mentioned at any stage during that report-back or sometime thereafter, that there were in fact nuns in the building at the time it was set alight?
MR DE KOCK: He didn't report anything to me, Chairperson. I drove back - when my people were free and away, I was the one who turned around and went back, upon which I saw a woman climbing down the ladder.
MS PATEL: You've stated that generally with Vlakplaas operations that you never returned back to the scene.
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.
MS PATEL: Why did you choose to do so in this case?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know, I'm not one to entertain mysticism, but I must have seen it somehow. I don't want to take it any further than that.
MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson, one can certainly not take that any further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Patel. Advocate Bosman?
ADV BOSMAN: I have no questions, thank you Chairperson.
ADV SANDI: I've got no questions, thank you Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: I'm loathe to excuse you until we hear from Ms Cambanis.
MR VAN DER MERWE: Excuse Mr Chair, maybe I can help, I've just got two aspects which I want to clear up with Mr de Kock.
CHAIRPERSON: Are you helping her out?
MR VAN DER MERWE: I'm helping you out with the time that no-one was here.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR VAN DER MERWE: There are just two aspects I want to take up with Mr de Kock, with your permission.
CHAIRPERSON: Okay, you may proceed, Mr van der Merwe.
FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you, Mr Chair.
Mr de Kock, on page 119, paragraph 2.4.4, my learned colleague asked whether or not it wasn't possible for you to find these persons in the building, but the word "offices" were used, so it was clear that sleeping quarters was not something that was allowed for.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR VAN DER MERWE: And then on page 135 of the record, Mr Japie Kok's statement, if one were to read his paragraph one would see
"A few days later, Lieut-Col de Kock, I and another member did a reconnaissance mission. We obtained access"
but no further reference is made to you, which is not necessarily an indication that you were inside the building.
MR DE KOCK: I agree with that, I was not inside the building.
MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you, Chair.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS VAN DER MERWE
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Yes Ms Patel, you want to say something?
MS PATEL: Seeing that we have a few moments at hand, Honourable Chairperson, may I take the opportunity to place on record that the report in respect of the missing docket has in fact come through. I have given Ms Cambanis a copy of it and she is satisfied with the report, Honourable Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: She's not here to confirm.
MS PATEL: Oh yes, alright.
CHAIRPERSON: We can stretch our legs for a few minutes, we definitely need that.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)
FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chair.
Mr de Kock, on the ground floor was a documentation centre and it's my instructions that that documentation centre was not as damaged as the rest of the first floor, it appears as though petrol wasn't put into that part of the building. It's also my instructions that on the top floor, that floor was not as soaked as the other floors. Did you get any information that people had to withdraw before they had finished the task? A report I mean, sorry.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, not that I can recall. I could only ascribe it to haste, possible condensation because petrol is that kind of substance, but I did not receive any kind of report that they had to run.
MS CAMBANIS: Because one of the people who were present, Bishop Verstrate, he on awakening, found that his door had been opened although he had gone to sleep with it locked.
MR DE KOCK: I don't know about that, this is the first time that I've come to hear of it.
MS CAMBANIS: And if that is so, then it would have been one of your operatives that in fact unlocked the door and saw the Bishop sleeping. It must be.
MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson, because they did not report to me that they found or saw somebody there. The observation that I conducted and the first time that it came to my knowledge that some of the staff members were there or that there were people sleeping there, was when I returned and saw the lady coming out on the ladder. That was the first time that I became aware that there were persons in that building.
MS CAMBANIS: Who were the people that distributed the petrol mixture throughout the building?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we will have to ask them, I cannot recall how I divided them into groups. There would have been reasons why certain people went in and others waited outside. We will have to ask them.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes. How many groups, do you remember how many groups would have been tasked with that?
MR DE KOCK: I had Bellingan on the outside and another two or three persons. He also transported the greatest number of persons with petrol. And then I had two or three persons at the most exterior door or the back door of Khanya House, so to speak, it would be an access door to the premise, and then there was me.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr de Kock, what I was referring to is the people that were tasked with pouring the petrol inside the building, was that one group of more?
MR DE KOCK: It was only one group and I think that it comprised eight to nine members in total.
MS CAMBANIS: And what did they report to you afterwards? Did they have any incidents?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they did not report anything regarding incidents, so they didn't experience any resistance there or experience something which bothered them or which was disturbing.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr de Kock, I don't know if this is your field, but if there were wire taps or monitoring, electronic monitoring going on at Khanya House, who would be responsible for doing that?
MR DE KOCK: It would have fallen under the Security Branch of Pretoria, but I don't want you to exclude the possibility that National Intelligence Services and Military Intelligence Services could also not have had any kind of tapping device there.
MS CAMBANIS: And at this hearing, who would know about that? In this application.
MR DE KOCK: There is no-one from the Security Branch here. Demolitions wouldn't have worked with it, neither would we have, it would have had to be somebody specific from the branch, from their division.
MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chair.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS CAMBANIS
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Cambanis. Mr Hattingh, any re-exam?
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Just one question, Mr Chairman.
Mr de Kock, my learned friend, Ms Cambanis, has examined you regarding Flores's allegation that they determined that there were people there and that they decided regardless to continue with the operation. You've already stated in your evidence-in-chief that you informed your members that there was no-one in the building.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Did you also tell them that you had made certain that there were not any people inside the building because you didn't want any injuries?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: You've already stated that he was a Sergeant, if he had determined in some or other way that there were occupants in the building, would he have possessed the capacity to decide upon his own initiative to continue with the operation or not?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: So if any of the members who entered the building to cause the arson, would they have had any capacity to make such decisions?
MR DE KOCK: No. Let me just qualify. Perhaps Mr Flores, due to the fact that he worked under my command, had been involved in quite a number of operations, it is possible that he may have mistaken himself or that he may have deviated from the regular course of action.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson, nothing further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh. Thank you very much, Mr de Kock, you are excused.
MR DE KOCK: Thank you, Chairperson.
WITNESS EXCUSED
CHAIRPERSON: Anything further, Mr Hattingh?
MR HATTINGH: Not as presently advised, thank you Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair. There's a possibility that I might proceed with Mr Brits and I think that we can use this time fruitfully.
CHAIRPERSON: I was thinking about that, to use the term fruitfully.
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair. There's a document placed before you which I drew, it's the application of Brits. You would note that the application which is bound into the bundle of folio 46, is a very, very ...(indistinct) version and this will represent his testimony. I beg leave to call him.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
