Special Hearings

1A PROCEEDINGS RESUMED 1997/08/07

APPEARANCES AS BEFORE

CHAIRMAN: We will start this morning with further evidence from Mr Gcina Mkhize, and evidence will be led from him relating to activities in - around Esikhaweni Township, and thereafter counsel will be given an opportunity to cross-examine him. I'm not going to go through the same issues that I went through yesterday and on Monday, save to emphasise the following, that we will not permit extensive, long-winded cross-examination and we will not permit hectoring or harassment of witnesses. We would expect counsel to place their clients' versions on record in so far as these versions differ from the witnesses' version and also to raise what they consider to be factual inaccuracies in the witnesses' evidence, and I would ask counsel to please bear those remarks in mind.

MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman, will you grant me a few moments, please? There is a matter which is of some concern to us. Overnight I have received instructions that Mr Varney, who testified yesterday, is a paid consultant of the TRC and we request clarification, please, as to whether Mr Varney is or has at any time been employed by the TRC, the capacity in which he was so employed, if he was, and the remuneration that he received, as well as his status as an employee of the TRC, if that is so. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you. We will respond to that at a later stage. We won't interrupt the proceedings at this stage. Mr Wills, I will swear your client in again, because this evidence relates to different issues. Are you Brian Gcina Mkhize?

MR MKHIZE: Yebo.

/BRIAN GCINA MKHIZE

1A

BRIAN GCINA MKHIZE: (Sworn states) (Through Interpreter)

CHAIRMAN: Mr Macadam.

MR MACADAM: Mr Mkhize, when you concluded your evidence on Monday, you informed us that you had been through the normal police training at the KwaZulu Police College in Ulundi and had been attested as a fully-fledged member of the KwaZulu Police. --- That's correct.

And you were given the rank of constable once that training had been completed? --- That's correct.

Now, is it correct that you were posted to the Esikhaweni district headquarters to perform your duties as a member of the KwaZulu Police? --- Yes, that's correct.

Now, in what capacity were you employed? What type of duties did you perform at that stage? --- I was employed and I worked in many units and I ended up at the reaction unit.

What were the reaction unit's duties, primarily? --- The reaction unit is the unit which is considered as the powerful unit to prevent crime. It doesn't stop there. It also was in charge of raiding, road-blocks. However, it is the unit which normally reacts to reports. For example, if there has been some shooting or fighting, it is the first unit to be called and it must be the first to arrive at the scene of crime. However, as a member of the police, you can be given any task without any orders from the unit in which you are based.

And you told us earlier in your evidence that you were a staunch IFP supporter. That is before you were taken to the training in the Caprivi in 1986. --- That's correct.

/And now at

1A And now at the stage when you were posted in Esikhaweni, had your political affiliations changed at all? --- No, it didn't change.

Did you have any contact with local politicals and leaders in the Esikhaweni area while you were posted as a policeman there? --- Yes, I had contact.

With whom did you have contact? --- Are you referring to people in Esikhaweni only?

Yes, in the Esikhaweni area, where you were employed. --- I had contact with the councillors, which were councillors for the KwaZulu Government, and there were also other leaders of the Inkatha with whom I had contact. Those which I used to contact them so often amongst the Inkatha leaders it was Mr B B Biyela, who is presently a Mayor at Richards Bay. At the time he was the Mayor at Esikhaweni only. I also had contact with Mrs Lindiwe Mbuyazi, who was one of the councillors at Esikhaweni, and who was occupying a high position within the Inkatha. I also had contact with councillors like Zunsa, councillors like Mr G M Mkhize and councillors like Mrs Mtshali and others, but those which I had serious contacts are the two which is Ms Lindiwe Mbuyazi and Mr B B Biyela, who was the Mayor.

And in 1991 was there any political violence in the Esikhaweni area? --- Yes, it was intensifying, the violence.

Could you briefly and in broad terms sketch the nature of that violence? --- It was very frightful violence, because houses were burnt and you would discover a corpse lying on the road, not knowing what was the cause of the death, and people were running away from their

/respective places,

1A respective places, and some were injured, getting shot, and others died because they had been attacked and others were attacked on the streets, in their houses and even in meetings. It was a kind of a violence which had intensified, especially between the two organizations, the IFP and the ANC.

Sorry, Mr Mkhize, what year was this? 1991 - okay, so it was the ANC and not UDF, thank you. Now, from that last answer you said that the ANC and the IFP were involved. Were there any other parties involved in this violence? --- Amongst the political organizations, I don't know of any other political organization which existed at Esikhaweni, except the two that I mentioned. Even if they were there, they were not known.

I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I take it this was political violence between the two organizations? --- That's correct.

And, from your own perception, did you hold any of these organizations responsible?

INTERPRETER: Please may you repeat that question.

MR MACADAM: From your own perception, did you believe that one or either of these organizations was actually to blame for this violence? --- I wouldn't like to try to be a political analyst to say which organization was right and which organization was wrong. However, violence erupted between the two organizations. I personally, as a person who took part and aligned myself with one of the parties and it was known that I was an IFP follower or supporter, I won't be in the position to judge who was right and who was wrong.

And did you at any stage, over and above your duties

/as a police

1A as a police officer, administering law and order in that area, become personally involved in this violence? --- Can you please repeat that question?

Over and above your duties as a police officer at that time, did you, in a personal capacity, become involved in this violence which you've described to us? --- No, I didn't get myself involved in the violence. However, in continuing with my statements it will come to light as to how I got involved in the violence around Esikhaweni.

Could you proceed to move to that point and tell us how that happened? --- It was during 1991, even if I don't remember the exact month and the days, I had been approached by Madlanduna - Daluxolo Luthuli - to inform me that I had to go to Ulundi to meet the leaders - leaders like Captain Langeni and others. However, he didn't mention the names of the others. The person who he mentioned to me was Captain Langeni, who was a captain at that time. I didn't doubt, because I did work with Langeni after my training at Caprivi. I believe that in my past evidence I explained how I worked in Port Shepstone, where I worked under Captain Langeni for about three months with him on the South Coast. Even if he was a KwaZulu Police, we were doing the Inkatha work at that time. Therefore I didn't doubt, I took the steps to go to Ulundi to see Captain Langeni. Madlanduna has already explained to me that there are some serious cases which have to be solved and myself, as a person who was trained earlier to be an Inkatha soldier, and I knew the connection between the KwaZulu Government or the KwaZulu Police with the Inkatha. Therefore I had to go to Ulundi.

/I went there

1A I went there to see Captain Langeni.

And Madlanduna, when he approached you, what position did he hold at that stage? --- Madlanduna had two positions. He was a political commissar to the Caprivi's. He was also a commander. His office was at the head office of Inkatha at Ulundi at A Section.

And what transpired when you arrived at Ulundi? --- I arrived at Ulundi. I parked my car at the LA and I went to Captain Langeni's office. We greeted each other peacefully and he told me to wait for a moment because there was a serious meeting which we had to conduct. He left me in the office. After that, Mr Robert Mzimela entered the office. During that time he was a secretary of the KwaZulu Legislature. And then a man by the name of Prince Gideon Zulu entered too. During that time he was the Minister of Pensions in the KwaZulu Government. Thereafter Madlanduna came. After some time we sat there and talked. They called - they made a call to M Z Khumalo. We waited for him. He ended up arriving, and the meeting started. They told me that they are getting reports from Esikhaweni and the surrounding areas that the Inkatha is getting eliminated, as they are getting killed by the ANC people. In other words, we were losing support at Esikhaweni and surrounding areas as Inkatha. Because the way the war was waged, it became clear that people have went to hide their heads under an organization which could protect them. That was because they could see the organization which was winning at the time. Therefore they complained that - the local leadership of the IFP in Esikhaweni and surrounding areas was complaining that the Ulundi leaders are not doing anything to help them to

/avoid the loss

1A avoid the loss of support, the loss of lives of our members, because it became clear that we were getting defeated, and that was the theme of the meeting. I was also reminded that I am an Inkatha soldier. As I have explained in my evidence before the committee about my training - my past training - that I was also trained to be a policeman. I was reminded that even if I was in the Police Force it doesn't mean that I'm no longer a patriot and I was told that the time had arrived for me to use the skills I acquired at Caprivi. I also put forward my views in that meeting. There were many things which I wanted to know before I commit myself or agree that I will employ these skills which I had. I asked about the things that I wanted to know and everything was clarified to me and I got all the answers, which satisfied me. In other words, these answers made me to agree that I will do the task that they are asking me to do. I don't know if I should continue to explain what are the things that I wanted to know before I commit myself to do the task.

Yes, if you could explain that. --- Firstly, I wanted to know whether the work that I was supposed to do is the work that can put me in a dangerous situation - things like losing my life or getting injured or getting arrested. Those are the three things which I wanted to know. I was given the assurance that with respect to my life it's not up to them, it's up to me, because I was trained so I should be able to protect myself, and I was told that with regard to arrest I don't have to worry because there is a brigadier who was a DC at Esikhaweni - it was Brigadier Khomo Mzimela - I was told that he would do all the preparations to make sure that I was safe in

/cases where

1A cases where I find myself having committed crimes. I was told that I shouldn't worry as to how he is going to do his job. He knows what to do. I then continued to ask about the arms which I would use to do the task, as to where I was going to get them. Although I had two firearms issued to me from the police - a 9mm Z888, I had the G3 rifle - I was told that I don't have to worry, because I will be provided with the necessary arms. I also enquired as to whether I would be doing the work alone or not. Maybe I should take one step back. They had already clarified to me that there were elements from the ANC and those were the people who were creating problems and they said that they are very influential people in the area and those are the people we are supposed to start with, to eliminate them. They made that clear to me. However, they never mentioned any name at that time. What they said was that I was going to do the work in secrecy and I would be working together with the local leadership at Esikhaweni. Among the local leadership they mentioned two people. It was Mrs Lindiwe Mbuyazi and Mr B B Biyela. As to who was going to help me, Madlanduna suggested that there are some other Caprivi's who are within the KwaZulu Police at Esikhaweni. He was right, because they were there. However, I came with the suggestion that if I was to do this difficult or serious job, which required the necessary secrecy, because people are going to be killed, I won't recommend that they should give me Caprivi's who are working in the Esikhaweni Police Station to work with me. I had my own reason, which made me to think it won't be easy for me to work with them. Firstly, they were heavy drinkers. Secondly,

/they were

1A they were people who like women and they had many women. In my training which I got at Caprivi, it emphasised behaviour. It was emphasised that once you find yourself socialising with women or like women a lot you will know that the secrecy of the organization could be leaked out, which - this could be dangerous for the organization up to leadership level. These are the reasons which made me to refuse to work with these people.

Sorry, Mr Mkhize, I may have missed a portion of your evidence. Could you just confirm for me whether anybody suggested that you should use the Caprivians in this enterprise or not?

INTERPRETER: May you please repeat the last part of your question.

MR MACADAM: Whether anybody suggested to you that you should, in fact, use these Caprivians as part of this enterprise which you were going to embark on. --- I will repeat. No one suggested that I shouldn't work with them. It's myself who complained, giving those reasons which I have already mentioned. I explained that I didn't want to work with them, because I suspected that we will not succeed if I had to work with such people. I know the danger of the work that I was supposed to do.

MR WILLS: Sorry, Mr Evidence Leader, I thought your question was if anybody suggested that he should work with the Caprivians and his evidence was clear to the effect that Madlanduna made that suggestion.

MR MACADAM: As I said, there was an interruption on my -and I didn't catch a portion of the evidence. I just wanted to get clarity on that point. Mr Mkhize, if you could proceed on further with your evidence. --- After

/we have agreed

1A we have agreed that I will undertake the task, I suggested to them that since we don't have the solution as to who is going to work with me, can't they bring other Caprivi's, not the ones who are working at Esikhaweni, and I asked them why can't they bring them and I know I will be working with people whom I trust. There were young men like Hlani Mpumatenjwa, Lucky Mbuyazi, Syabonga Mbuyazi and others who were just young men, who were still growing up. They didn't have any military training. I will tell the truth before the committee that I knew that they could hit at the ANC. I knew that they were there and they were the people that were right in front of the fight in the Inkatha group, which was fighting against the ANC at Esikhaweni. At the time when I refused to work with the Caprivians who were at Esikhaweni I knew that they were not helping these young men and it looked as if they have lost that inspiration to be part of the organization. They didn't have the hopes and the beliefs that the party should succeed. I knew that the young men were there and were fighting against the ANC and the fact that there were people who would proudly say that they were Inkatha members at Esikhaweni is because these young men were fighting the ANC. Therefore I brought it out at that meeting that I should at that time work with these young men, and they accepted that, and I was told that I was going to be given the next instruction, and I was let to go. They insisted that I will be working with Captain Langeni and Madlanduna directly. Those were the people with whom I have to keep in contact at Ulundi. At Esikhaweni I had to work timeously with Lindiwe Mbuyazi and Mr B B Biyela. I left the meeting and that's how it

/ended.

1A ended.

And after that meeting did you return to Esikhaweni? --- Yes, that's correct.

And what did you do then? --- I continued with my normal police duties. The contact with the local leadership is something that has started long ago, from the time that I arrived at Esikhaweni, so I continued with such contacts, even if there wasn't anything that I did or things that I did to show that I was active. It went on up to a stage where I was telephoned. The call was from Captain Langeni himself, and he said he wanted to see me at Ulundi, and at the time the car that I normally used was used for a trip to Dundee, so I went to Mr B B Biyela and I told him that I had been summoned by Captain Langeni to go to Ulundi. I asked him to borrow me a car to go to Ulundi, and he gave me a Ford Meteor, which was white in colour, and I used it to travel to Ulundi to see Captain Langeni. I found him. He was about to go for lunch and he said I should accompany him and we'll discuss these matters at his place, and we went to his place. We arrived there and we had discussions, even if I can't be able to remember some of the things we talked about, however certain points were things like where I was supposed to get ammunition and arms.

[Break in recording] --- Yes, equipment - I mean everything, not only the ammunition, together with the arms. I went to those places which he told me about. He said I should go to Dunford. At Port Dunford there was an Inkatha camp in the bush areas next to the KwaZulu Government Offices. There was this house which looked like a home for a white man. It had two rondavels. And

/he told me

1A he told me that I will find a Caprivian at that place. The person was known as Thomas Buthelezi and I knew him from Caprivi, because we trained together. However, when we went to train as police, he didn't join us. He only had the Caprivi training. I did as the Captain told me. From Ulundi I drove to Empangeni. From there I drove straight to Dunford and I continued into the Inkatha camp which was there. At the gate I hooted. The man by the name of Thomas came and he told me that he was waiting for me. He took out those arms - the firearms together with the ammunition and, if I remember well, he gave me an AK-47 and some ammunition. I am making a mistake. He gave me some magazines which didn't have bullets. The bullets were inside a plastic. They were mixed - bullets for AK-47, for shotguns. He also gave me a stainless steel gun which can lodge 12 bullets ... (intervention)

The witness is saying it's a 12-bore gun. It's a particular kind of shotgun. Is that correct, Mr Mkhize? --- It's a calibre. It's the calibre of a shotgun. He gave me those bullets which are normally used on shotguns. I took the arms and left. It's from that time that I contacted the young men whom I have mentioned before. However, I didn't go to attack with them. I was just helping them to give them information about things, in order to make sure that they do their work well, and also that they are able to protect themselves when those people whom they were attacking retaliated. I didn't even specifically give them an instruction to attack anyone. They were working freely, doing their own operations, since they also had that aim to fight the ANC. Some of them had already left school because of the violence

/coming from

1A coming from the ANC. It continued till the end somewhere of 1991. After some few months, it was somewhere at the end of 1991, it became clear that, even if the young men were working, they were not effective because the ANC was attacking the people. I went back to Captain Langeni and Madlanduna and I told them the work is not going well with these young men. There is someone whom I have seen who became police, who had just completed their training somewhere at the end of 1991. This was someone whom I knew. I knew that he was brave. Even if he didn't have the Caprivi training, he has been trained to be a policeman. The reason why I liked him and wished that I could work with him, I knew how he loved Inkatha. He was a very good friend of Siphiwe Mvuyane. Maybe I should clarify or give a clear picture of Siphiwe Mvuyane before the committee. Siphiwe Mvuyane was a well-known person within the community. He was known as a killer. However, he will killing a particular type of people. He was killing ANC members and those who were sympathising with the ... (intervention)

Sorry, Mr Mkhize.

MR LASICH: Mr Chairman, I don't see this person's name on the section 30 notices.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, that's because he's dead, Mr Lasich.

MR LASICH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR MACADAM: Please proceed. --- I am trying to give a picture to the Commission as to what made me to trust this man and give me the strength to go that he should be included with the people who were supposed to work with me. I knew about his bravery. His name was Romeo Mbuzo Mbambo. He was intelligent. He was physically fit and he

/was a person

1B was a person who exercised daily, and he was a quiet person - not talkative - and I knew that he would be able to maintain the secrecy, and he wasn't a man that would just go around with women and he didn't drink. Even today he is not drinking. I realised this is the kind of person I would like to work with, and he loved Inkatha a lot, and I could see that he was a very strong man and he could be effective. Even when you look at his chest you can see that he's a hefty man and a big man and brave. Then I went to Captain Langeni and asked him to be given permission to approach this man and tell him the truth. I mean the truth which transpired between me and the people who had the meeting with me, the previous meeting. Captain Langeni asked me as to how far do I trust this man and I told him it can't be possible that he's so closely related to Siphiwe Mvuyane. If he is an ANC member it would be difficult for him to be close like that to Siphiwe Mvuyane and I thought that he was a real Inkatha supporter. Captain Langeni and Madlanduna asked me to bring him to them, so that they can see him. I told them it's not that easy. I can't just bring him. I had first to go and try to ask him to come or to find out whether he will agree to undertake the kind of work that we wanted him for. However, they warned me whether I knew that if I tell him the secret and he refuses to join us it's possible that we might find ourselves sold out and therefore it became clear to me, because I didn't think about that. However, we agreed that if he refused, after having divulged the whole truth to him, we will be compelled to take care of him. I went back. I tried to get closer to him. After a time where I had to approach

/him directly

1A him directly and I told him everything. He didn't doubt a lot. However he wanted to know how much backing we have behind us and I said to him I won't tell him. However, I will take him to the seniors. After that I called the seniors, telling them that I will be coming with Romeo and they said that's possible, I can come with him. We took a car and we left to the seniors. I don't remember the date. We went back to Captain Langeni's office at Ulundi. It was an office at the Legislative Assembly. We had a discussion with these seniors whom I've just mentioned, and I introduced Romeo to them. It was a very short meeting, because they were in a hurry because they had other work to do. However, even if we didn't get into deep details Romeo was satisfied because they told him that I will tell him - I will give him the flesh. However, they promised in my presence that he would be safe and we left and went back home. After that we developed a good relationship, with the same aims and objectives. As they promised, Madlanduna sent Israel Hlongwane to me to come and stay with the Mayor, B B Biyela, because I didn't have a place to accommodate him. They also sent Zweli Dlamini. Zweli Dlamini was one of the Caprivians whom I knew. We trained together at Caprivi and he grew up in front of me at Mpumalanga, together with Hlongwane, while I was a leader in Mpumalanga, where I was in charge of 12 wards, and I knew them as people who have grown under the wing of Inkatha Youth and we taught them a lot of things about politics, and I knew the two very well. I have already stated in my evidence yesterday about Israel, that we also went to training together at Cape Town. Therefore I was ready to

/work with

1B work with them. I also introduced them to Romeo and he knew them, and we started working as a syndicate. While at Esikhaweni it was myself, Romeo, Hlongwane, Zweli, Mrs Mbuyazi and B B Biyela. There was someone by the name of M R Mkhize, who was in charge of the regional office at Empangeni and we also used to work with him at some time, but we were not very active with him in most cases. As I have already mentioned then we continued the task of fighting against the ANC. However, I kept contact with Captain Langeni and Daluxolo. We had many ways to contact them. Sometimes I have to go to Ulundi or call them, and they used to call me or Daluxolo would come to me at Esikhaweni. So we kept that contact timeously and I also had to submit reports to Captain Langeni, because he was the one who was giving instructions to me directly. Sometimes they were the type of instructions which I knew they were coming because most of the time they would be suggested by the local leadership - the same people with whom I was staying at Esikhaweni. The local leadership couldn't give me instructions as to what I can do. The instructions should come from Captain Langeni. However, the contact with the local leadership made it clear to us as to what was happening. I'm trying to explain that if we knew that particular person whom I was told that he should take the first bus, I knew the reasons why he should take the first bus, and I will also get the reason, because when I take the report back to report that we have found the person, Captain Langeni would always tell me that, "You did your work very good because that was personally very dangerous because for this and that reason". That made me to be in a position to know the

/reason why

1B reason why a particular person was eliminated, and that's how we worked at Esikhaweni.

Could you just explain to us this term, "Take the first bus". What did you understand that to mean?

INTERPRETER: I didn't hear you. I think there's a communication problem.

MR MACADAM: The term, "Take the first bus", what did you understand that to mean? --- This is a term which is normally used because we have to use telephones. We knew sometimes that the telephones might be bugged by the white people or the enemy. This was a code name which was used to make sure that even if you hear us discussing about this you will never understand what we are talking about. This means that you have to kill the person. So we didn't have to say, "Kill him", we had to say he must take the first bus. However, we knew very well that person has to be killed.

And what I want you to do now is to just briefly comment on certain specific cases and, in this regard, on the questions I ask you and not to in detail describe everything blow by blow. This is simply to enable your evidence to be heard in the time that is available to this Commission to hear it. Firstly, I want to put it to you that a person, Taliwe Mkhwanazi, was murdered in the Esikhaweni area and I want to ask you whether you have any knowledge of that person and his death. --- Yes, I do.

Can you, firstly, tell us who that person was? --- I got the instruction that that person should take the first bus as soon as possible.

From whom did you receive that instruction? --- From Captain Langeni, and I did that, together with my

/other members.

1B other members, and I discovered later that the reasons behind his killing it was because he was involved in the smuggling or supplying of firearms, which were given to specific members of the ANC. I discovered that the ANC had people who were taken from Esikhaweni for training time to time and they would leave for about a month or two months and come back to operate within the community. Those were the people whom Taliwe helped to supply arms and ammunitions, and he was the one who united the ANC people who were fighting at Dlangezwa with those who were at Esikhaweni, and I discovered that Taliwe is the one who started a way to protect the ANC members. They bought two-way communication radios. They were patrolling Esikhaweni all over the night, protecting their people, and I found out that he is the one that did all these arrangements and he also organized firearms, bringing them inside so that the Inkatha people should be killed. We decided we should stop that and in order to stop it we have to remove the source or close the source. Those were the reasons of which Taliwe had to be killed.

After he was killed did you report that fact back to any person? --- Yes, because I have to make a report after the work was completed. Therefore I had to inform Captain Langeni.

And do you have knowledge of an attempt to kill a person, Welcome Mthimkulu? --- Yes, I do.

What do you know about that attempt? --- I also got an instruction from Captain Langeni and I had to do the reconnaissance. I remember that, while talking about my training yesterday, I mentioned reconnaissance. However, this is the way of tracing him to find out where

/he stays and

1B he stays and where he works and his time of going to work and also his normal routes. I had to make a trunk call, 1023 number, to find out his work telephone number. After getting the number of the firm I called the firm and I was connected to the switchboard and I asked them to put me through to his department and telling them that I wanted to talk to him. They put me to the extension where he was working and I discovered that he was not at work at that time and I asked them when is he coming to work. They said he would be coming at ten the following day at night. I went back to my syndicate and I told them that he would be going to work at 10 o'clock the following evening and we tried to make some arrangements. I think it might take some time to tell about these arrangements. It was on that particular day, the following day, when he had to go to work, that we attacked him.

It's not necessary for you to go into any detail about the arrangements. If you can proceed then. --- We ended up attacking him. We later discovered that the time when we were attacking him, he was about to go to work. We attacked his car and he wasn't inside the car and we found that someone else was driving the car. There were some women in the car. Even if we didn't get a chance to see that there were women in the car because it was at night, none of them was killed, only the car was hit and some of them inside were injured. No one was killed.

Why was this attempt made to kill this person? --- I later found that he was very active at the firm where he was working. He was always against Inkatha and he was said to be bad when it comes to propaganda and he was a

/very influential

1B very influential person. They said if he had to blacken Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi he will blacken him in such a way that this is a very bad person. He couldn't continue to support or follow Inkatha if he did get a chance to listen to Mthimkulu campaigning for or mobilising for his party. So he destroyed Inkatha. To add, Mthimkulu was in front in the structure which was used by the ANC to sow within the KwaZulu Police. When referring to sowing in the KwaZulu Police, the ANC had KwaZulu Police, which it used within us at the police station. They were used to collect information regarding the hit squads. They were used as a source of ammunition and they used to attack us with our own ammunition. Maybe I will deal with that as soon as I get into the involvement of other police. However, Mthimkulu was right in front of the whole strategy.

And do you have knowledge of the killing of a person by the name of Nathi Gumede? --- Yes, I do.

Did you actually hear my question? --- I didn't.

Do you have knowledge of the killing of a person by the name of Nathi Gumede? --- Yes, I did.

And can you tell us what your knowledge of that person's death was? --- Yes. As I have explained before, the violence between the ANC and the IFP in that place intensified, so some means or strategies had to be devised so that each or one of the organizations should defeat the other. I want to make it clear that the ANC knew exactly its target within the Inkatha people, as we also knew the people who were attacking us from the ANC. And it was possible that you wished the particular person should be hit by a car and die, because he was a

/troublesome

1B troublesome person. You wished that if there was a way to bewitch him you could bewitch him so that bees can come and sting him and he dies. Therefore, the two organizations have to use whatever means possible to destroy the other, or the enemy. Nathi Gumede was used in the ANC strategy to destroy our syndicate and specifically to arrest us and put us in prison, to expose the formation that I've mentioned before. Nathi went out and created lies, saying that Romeo had robbed him of his car. I don't know if I'm making a mistake. I don't know whether he said he robbed him of his car or that Romeo had robbed another person of his car, and the car was given to Nathi, and we knew that this was a lie - it didn't happen. We showed that it doesn't involve Romeo. However, we knew that they were very much afraid of Romeo and they were very much afraid of us because they knew that we were the people who were hitting them. After Romeo was charged of this crime he had to be suspended from work. This was a charge of robbing a car. Most people got angered of this, because we knew that Romeo didn't rob any car. They were framing him as they also framed me, saying that I killed someone at the railway hostels, and I knew that I wouldn't just kill a person. This was something that I wouldn't have done. They were just trying to get me arrested. When they started using this strategy, maybe we were not going to be serious about this. Romeo was suspended from work after his arrest. It became clear to us because they are not in a position to kill us, they will finish us using the strategy of framing us, because we would all end up in prisons. Because each and every time they would frame someone, they had enough evidence to make sure that

/we would be

1B we would be convicted for such crimes - crimes relating to robbery and other things. Unfortunately, we are not involved in such kind of crimes. We went to report this matter at Ulundi to Captain Langeni. Captain Langeni asked me about this Nathi, as to who he was and what we knew about him. We explained to him that we don't know Nathi. It became clear that he is an ANC member, who is furthering the aims and objectives of the ANC. The first instruction that we got with regard to Nathi was that we, as police, we should go and investigate, to find out the root cause of this, to find out where he comes from, to which organization does he belong, because we didn't even know his affiliation. We did that. We had to contact different and many sources of information. One of them was Andile Cele, who has passed away. We ended up cracking the root cause of knowing Nathi. We found that he was a member of the ANC and even his relatives were working for organizations like COSATU, who were aligned to ANC. At times, when we went there, we would find cars which we knew belonging to Bongani and other members of the ANC. They were at his home, and we came to realize that he's really doing something, not that the arrest of Romeo is not just the kind of job that he did, the only job that he did. I personally - Captain Langeni sent me alone as to whether maybe they were fighting over a woman and I discovered that there wasn't such a thing. After having discovered this information from Andile Cele about Nathi's involvement and discovering as to the aim to eliminate our syndicate, which was going to disturb the Inkatha power, a time came when we had to be called to Ulundi with Romeo. We went to Madlanduna. We didn't

/start with

1B start with Madlanduna, we went to houses known as Emofloteni, where the Legislative members stay, and we met Mrs Mbuyazi, who was at Ulundi at that time, and she was working at Nongoma as a teacher. We took a small car from her, which was a Toyota. We used the car to go to Daluxolo Luthuli. Although it was not usually said, His Highness wanted to see us. That was Prince Gideon Zulu. At that time he was the Minister of Pensions. Madlanduna called the Minister and the Minister recommended that we should come to see him. I, together with Madlanduna and Romeo, went to his house and, to be brief, I will say that at the Minister's house we had a meeting. We were outside the house, not inside. We were just on the lawn. In that meeting there was Umtwanakaminyo - that's Prince Gideon Zulu - his driver by the name of Nyawose, Romeo, Madlanduna and myself and Prince Gideon's son. I don't know his name. He was there. That's where we discussed the arrest of Romeo. The Minister got angered by this and he said that this ANC, even though we try all ways to frighten them, they don't get frightened. Therefore, he suggested that Nathi should take the first bus, and he was angry, saying, "Why did you leave him for such a long time?", and Madlanduna also turned against us in front of the Minister, saying, "I don't know why these guys are so relaxed, doing nothing". We explained that Nathi is not staying at that place. He is now staying in Durban, and we don't have cars to go and do the work and we can't use our own cars. The Minister said he'll organize a car.

Sorry to interrupt you at this stage. When you say the Minister said he would organize a car, can you just tell us which Minister that was. What portfolio did he

/hold? ---

1B hold? --- He said he's going to organize a car. That was Prince Gideon Zulu, the one that I've already explained was a Minister of Pensions and Welfare in the KwaZulu Government. After having told him about the problem of transport to Durban, he said he will personally organize a car for us to go to Durban, in order to make Nathi to take the first bus. He got into the house and made a telephone call. He said he was going to contact Mathe to find out if he can't organize a car. When coming out from the house he didn't say we should go and collect a car from Mathe, he said we should go to Robert Mzimela's house. Robert Mzimela was a Secretary of the Legislature in KwaZulu. He said he had already talked to Mzimela and he will give us a car. Before we leave he said we have to combine this task of eliminating Nathi with another task which we were supposed to do at Eshowe. He said Eshowe, in the place called Gezinsila, it's rotten because of one person who is a male nurse with the surname Nxumalo. He mentioned his name. However, I don't remember. I only remember the surname, which he said it was Nxumalo. He said he himself, together with Nyawose, are getting attacked at that place because of this one person who was a male nurse with the surname of Nxumalo, and he said we have to go to Eshowe and we'll be given information there from one of his sons, and he said we were going to collect a firearm from his son at Eshowe. However, we didn't get such a firearm at Eshowe. We left and went to Robert Mzimela's house. Nyawose was present, together with Madlanduna. Mzimela gave us ... [end of tape] ...

2A ... saying that we should handle the car with care and he said he knew that police can drive and, when driving cars,

/they drive as

2A they drive as if like they are driving vans. We promised that we won't drive this one as though we are driving a van and we will treat it with care. We drove the two cars, went back and dropped Madlanduna at his house and we took the car to Mrs Mbuyazi at the flats. We got into the Monza which was given to us, and we left, and we made it possible to kill Nathi, using that very same car which was given to us.

If we can proceed further, what did you then do? --- The someone from Eshowe, this Nxumalo, the male nurse, we tried to attack him. There was violence at Gezinsila. Soldiers were deployed in the area. The SAP were deployed in the area and also the KwaZulu Police, and the Nyalas, which were armoured vehicles, and we discovered that the whole place was patrolled by securities. Therefore unlawful firearms like AK-47 we couldn't smuggle then in and out of the place easily. We had to go and leave them with one teacher with the surname of Mbambo at Gezinsila. We drove and met him. He was driving a blue Corolla. He was driving towards the hospital and he had some young boys inside the car. We dropped Hlongwane and Israel to run to the front of him. I would say he was very lucky because at that moment soldiers came and the whole mission was ... (inaudible) ... and we left him and went back to - went to Nathi, and that was at night. We found Nathi. We took him. We came back with him. We found him at Brickfield in an Indian area. However, we had a problem on the way, because on our way it was difficult for us to ask him as to who was involved in the structure, as to who did this and who came with the suggestions, so we couldn't get information from

/him. We

2A him. We were not able to ask him this because at the time when we took him from Brickfield we had to hide from him that he was going to be killed. We told him that we are investigating in which he was involved. It was a case which involved a car and a case or the place where it happened it was at Esikhaweni. We told him to take the logbook and he took the logbook, and we left with him, and under that impression we left with him while we knew that we had our own intentions, and it so happened that we had to ask him on the way about his strategies.

INTERPRETER: Sorry, he's saying they didn't get a chance to ask him because he was thinking that they were police. --- We thought that as soon as we approach our own area out of Durban or out of the way we were going to make him board the first bus. We said we would be able to ask him questions in the forest - ask him to give us the whole information, because we intended that as soon as he gives us the information all the people who were involved in the plot they should also be made to board the first buses. However, it didn't happen that way, and when he saw us getting into the bush area down at Port Dunford he realised that we were going to kill him, and then he started to struggle and fight. He was fighting seriously and you'd think we were fighting against three men. During the fight so we had to shoot him. He wasn't armed. However, he would grab one of us and use that person to fight against us. Therefore it was difficult for us to shoot him, because it was possible that we could hit one of us. However, we managed to overcome him. Unfortunately we didn't get the details which we wanted from him and since he was fighting we had to kill him as

/quick as

2A quick as possible, and we left him there. When we were getting into the car, I don't remember among us who suggested that we should do the very same method which is employed by the ANC, the method of burning our people, so that when they found him they shouldn't suspect that it's Inkatha who killed him. They will think it's the ANC, so let's burn him as they also burn our people and necklace them. Therefore we drained petrol from the car and we poured sand over him and we also poured petrol over him. We burnt him and left him.

MR MACADAM: Was there any reason why this could not have been done in the Durban area, where you first kidnapped the deceased? --- We were afraid that if we were to kill him in Durban this case will not be investigated by us if they happen to discover his corpse. It was to be investigated by the South African Police and we knew that Brigadier Mzimela is the one who is supposed to do the cover-ups for us, that in whatever we do we shouldn't be arrested. Therefore Mzimela wouldn't have the access or the jurisdiction in Durban to do the cover-up's. Therefore we have to take him to our own jurisdiction, where we knew that the case would be investigated by the KwaZulu Police, and we thought that was the safest way to do it.

What position exactly did Brigadier Mzimela hold? --- He was a District Commandant. His offices were at Esikhaweni and he was in charge of five police stations - the KwaMsane Police Station, Bongilwane Police Station, Sundumbili Police Station and Esikhaweni Police Station and also Damanani Police Station.

And moving on to another aspect, do you have

/knowledge of

2A knowledge of an Inkatha Freedom Party rally, which took place in the Esikhaweni area and which was disrupted by members of the African National Congress? --- You mean an Inkatha member?

[Break in recording] --- Oh. Yes, I have information.

Can you tell us what transpired there? --- I don't remember when it was in 1992 and there was a rally. It was an Inkatha rally. One of the speakers who was present was Gideon Zulu. During that particular day I was on duty and I was wearing camouflage uniform and we were doing the vehicle patrol and we heard people shouting from the stadium. There were sounds of guns and it was rapid firing from automatic weapons. Even our dignitaries have to crawl on the ground on their stomachs.

Can you tell us who the dignitaries were? --- The leaders were there, but those whom I want to mention it's Gideon Zulu, Prince Gideon Zulu, and also the chiefs were there, Inkosi Mathaba from Inyoni, and others. Two young men entered the ground. They were ANC men, and they started shooting at those people who were there. People started running away. Some were injured on their legs. Some were running and falling into the pits as they were being fired at from behind. Therefore this angered the Prince. We ran to the place, myself and other policemen, and we couldn't find anyone because the young men ran away. Even up to today they have not been arrested. Umtwanakaminyo said to me that we should take drastic steps with regard to this incident. While saying this he was brushing his big tummy after having woken up from the ground where he was crouching, and he said that this has

/angered him

2A angered him and he said we have to change our strategy. He said we shouldn't concentrate on these missions where we have to eliminate one target and they said we should do exactly what they did to us. We have to hit them at bus stops, at their meetings, inside buses, if we knew that they were ANC people and they were going to a particular place, so that they can stop what they were doing, because they disrupted the meeting or the rally which then didn't continue.

Who exactly was this person who said these things? --- [No audible reply]

Can you tell us what position that person held or what his full names were. I might have been mistaken, but I thought you just used one word as a name for this person. --- It is Prince Gideon Zulu. He was the Minister of Welfare of KwaZulu Government and he was also from the KwaZulu Kingdom. He was a member of the central committee of the Inkatha.

If you could proceed now to tell us what you did after these things were said. --- Mrs Mbuyazi said, "Mageba, we are going to have a meeting tomorrow". We had that meeting at the council chamber in Hlanganani Hall, which is in Esikhaweni. In that meeting we were trying to devise strategies as to how we strategise, therefore it so happened that his words - I'm referring to Gideon Sifiso, that we had to change our strategy, and we agreed that we have to change the strategy. We are not only going to attack prominent leaders, so we will be hitting at random and hit anyone - anyone who is associated with the African National Congress. It was said that we have to eliminate them. And his words helped us in our strategy and it came

/into operation.

2A into operation, and we agreed in that meeting, which was attended by Mrs Mbuyazi and Mr Biyela. During the course of the evidence I will be able to - or the others will be able to give flesh to what I've said.

And we move on to another matter. Sergeant Khumalo of the KwaZulu Police was killed. Do you have any knowledge of that case? --- Yes, I know.

What happened there? --- The reason why Sergeant Khumalo was killed is because he used to steal dockets at the Esikhaweni Police Station - dockets containing information - or I will put it in this way - dockets which were opened and relating to the deaths of ANC members, who were killed by our hit squad. As I have mentioned before that the ANC have sown it's own police within the KwaZulu Police, they had people who they would use as their contact, who worked in disguise. They were people whom we used to chat and laugh with and we were not able to find out about their involvement. It so happened that we discovered what was happening. Khumalo was one of those policemen who would take particulars or information and supply it to the ANC. However, the main reason why he had to be killed was because of the dockets he stole and took them to the ANC leadership. Those were serious documents, because they were relating to our work - our syndicate or hit squad. They were dockets involving the death or covering the death of ANC people. So he tried to steal them and he gave them to certain members or leaders of the African National Congress. I would like to lie before the committee to say how we found out that Khumalo was involved - was doing what I have explained. However, it must be remembered that we had a structure called BSI. In

/the BSI

2A the BSI - the people in the BSI were dealing with things like this, because they were trying to find out information and to protect, so it was a kind of an underground movement and they were dealing with sensitive political issues. I remember one day, while I was with Romeo at Ulundi we decided to disagree - we disagreed about Khumalo's issue because we didn't believe that he could do such things. He was a trusted person and we trusted him and he acted as if he was an Inkatha member. There were no signs which could alert us that he could do such bad things. However, we ended up confirming that it was possible that he could do such things or he did such things, because Khumalo had whispered or told in secret to Captain Masinga, who was the man in command of the CIDs and Romeo was attached to the CIDs. He was an investigator under M A Masinga. Masinga told Romeo on a certain day that he should be careful, "Romeo you should be careful. Khumalo has told me that you must wait. The big fish are going to be arrested. There are big fishes who are going to fill up the prisons and included you, Romeo, among those big fishes", and that frightened us a lot, in such a way that Romeo had to come to me, because I wasn't there. He told me this story. He left to Mrs Mbuyazi. We discussed this issue. Mrs Mbuyazi said we should call Langeni. We left and went to the council chamber, the three of us. Israel was with us. If I remember well, Israel was there. However, he wasn't there where we were discussing the issue but when we were in the car going to Hlanganani he was with us. We arrived there and Mrs Mbuyazi went to one of the offices and made a call. We didn't enter once she was on the phone.

/However, while

2A However, while she was busy talking on the phone, she called me and she gave me the receiver and said, "Here is Langeni" and referred to him as Njomani and said I must talk to him. Njomani, it's an explanation of a surname meaning Langeni. Captain Langeni said as he have already told us about Khumalo we have to confirm ourself how dangerous Khumalo could be and he asked us whether we knew what might happen if our hit squad could be exposed. Whether we are aware that they will arrest us up to our leader, prominent leaders, and I agreed, saying that, yes, I can see that. He said we have to find a way - establish as to where the documents were and also the amount of information which has been leaked out. However, we should leave this with him and he said what we have to do as soon as we left, we should make sure that as soon as possible Sergeant Khumalo should board the first bus, before he destroys a lot of things. I took that as an instruction that Khumalo should be killed, and we ended up killing him.

Madlanduna, did he have any knowledge or involvement in this case? --- I'm not sure. I wouldn't like to say something which I don't know.

Can I just take you back to the previous incident - the attack on the bus after the IFP rally. Are you in a position yourself to describe briefly how that attack on the bus took place? --- The bus attack came as a result of the instruction given by Prince Gideon Zulu, that we should stop hitting single targets. Because of his involvement we should direct our attacks at groups of people. We should hit their buses which they used to go to meetings or rallies. We should hit them at their

/streets. Let

2A streets. Let me put it like this before the Commission. At Esikhaweni there were demarcations. The place was divided into areas. Therefore Inkatha people couldn't go to an ANC area and it was known that the boundary it's along that particular area and this area for the ANC and that other area is an IFP area only. And because of the war you always know that this particular person belonged to this particular organization. So when the Prince said, Umtwanakaminyo, the Prince, we should attack them at their bus stops, we knew that the stops at that particular area belonged to the particular organization and we knew that this particular shop the only people who go there to buy are these people from particular organizations and also the shebeens we knew that members of a particular organization frequent that particular shebeen, and we knew that those shebeens were belonging or were used by a particular people from particular organizations. People were divided in such a way that you have to ascertain whether you were drinking with your people from your own side or you are travelling with people in buses from your own side or not, so you have to be careful. So that's how the place was divided, and also the sections were divided. This made it easy for the ANC to know that if they attack J2 section, even the cat that is going to be killed belongs to Inkatha, and we also knew that if you attack a particular place - for example, there was a place called Emakhlandeleni, you wouldn't find any person belonging to any particular group except the ANC members. The strategy which has been started by Umtwanakaminyo had to work and it was going to be effectively employed because we knew the areas where the ANC people live and we also knew their

/bus stops and

2A bus stops and our bus stops too.

Are you in any position to indicate how many people were killed in this process that you've described? This random retaliatory attack. --- Do you mean the attack on the bus?

Yes. --- Not many people died there. We discovered that only one person died and the others were injured. We didn't have enough equipment to use. We only threw a hand grenade into the bus and we shot at the bus two rounds and we left. We were standing on the sides of the road at the stop called KwaGundani. ANC members, when they got injured, they were not going to report to the KwaZulu Police because they knew that if they go to report at the KwaZulu Police we will be happy and they also knew that they would lose their support, because that will be rumoured that they have been hit. Therefore they went to report the matter at Empangeni. However, we discovered that many people were injured and one person died.

Finally, at a certain stage you came to be arrested by members of the South African Police for certain of your unlawful activities. --- That's correct.

Did you or anybody else make any attempt to be arrested at all? --- Yes, that's correct. After I left the course - we had a course at Tongaat - it was a police course. After completing the course, I went back to Esikhaweni. I was told that as a fact from Neville Melville. I don't remember well, but I think he was a police reporter at that time. He had arrived at Brigadier Khomo Mzimela ... (intervention)

This person you referred to is Mr Neville Melville, who was the police reporting officer. Thank you. ---

/Thank you.

2A Thank you. The Brigadier told me that he is the one who sent the fax which stated that the Brigadier should transfer me as soon as possible and remove me from Esikhaweni because there is an investigation regarding my involvements - it was involving the death of people. I tried to refuse for the Brigadier to transfer me, and he said, "If you don't want to move then you will expect more things to happen. Maybe if you were to agree and go away things are going to be better", and he said I don't have to worry, I should agree to be transferred and I should agree and they would continue with the investigation, and he asked me which police station do I prefer. Since I had a house at Dundee which I had just recently bought and which Dundee doesn't have the KwaZulu Police Station, the nearest was Nqutu, and I will be able to work at Nqutu and sleep at my home. I asked him if he would transfer - it's better to transfer me to Nqutu. I was transferred at night at about 12 o'clock and that was the first time for me to see a transfer being arranged at 12 o'clock. I took my few belongings and left. After some few days, working at Nqutu - I don't remember how many days, maybe five or six - a call came from the murder and robbery, Empangeni. It came through to the station commander's office. The station commander at Nqutu at that time was Lieutenant E N Masinga. He called me and said there was a call for me, after having talked with the people on the phone himself. In that conversation I had to speak to a white sergeant. He introduced himself as Sergeant Croucamp, Sidney Croucamp. He said he is working under the murder and robbery unit at Empangeni.

The South African Police Murder and Robbery Unit?

/--- Yes,

2A --- Yes, that's correct. He said he had a docket which was opened with regards to my involvement in the killing of people. He said he will be coming to Nqutu to talk to me. I asked him when was he coming and he said he will be coming on the very same day or on the following day, and it was a Friday. It was August 1993. I told him that he shouldn't come on that particular day, which was Friday and also he shouldn't come on the week-end because I had some plans. There was something I had to go and do at my home. We agreed that he would come on the following week. I left the station commander's office. The moment I was getting out of the office, just outside and I was moving towards the barracks I came across Constable Mbambo - Constable Patrick Mbambo was stationed at Ulundi. He was in the LA Protection Unit, which was under Captain Langeni. This constable was an ex-Caprivi trainee. He was also present when we were training to become police. I was also surprised to see him at Nqutu, because I knew that he was based at Ulundi. I tried to greet him, but he said I should go straight to the gate. It came to my mind that there is something and he said, "You should rush to the gate and you will find Nicky". Nicky was a code name, which was used by the Caprivians, referring to Madlanduna. As I was approaching the gate, I saw Madlanduna coming towards me - slowly walking towards the police station. He didn't enter. He was passing the gate, going towards the garage - the filling station which was near the police station. Our eyes met and he signalled to me that I should turn to the left and proceed towards the filling station. I did that without having communicated with him verbally. When I arrived at the garage, to which I was

/instructed by

2A instructed by him to go I found a Sierra which was blue in colour. It was written - it's registration number was ZP555 - and I realised that he was referring me to that car. As I was approaching the car, I could see inside that there was Constable Isaac Shobe ... [end of tape]

2B ... at the KwaZulu Police. However, he was stationed at Ulundi at the time I was stationed at Esikhaweni. As I was approaching this car, he signalled to me and - he has since died. He signalled to me to get into the car and I entered the car. Madlanduna also came and he got into the car, and also Patrick Mbambo. We drove away. We took the main road in the direction to Ulundi. Madlanduna said the white people are behind me and it's possible I will be arrested as soon as possible, and he had been sent by Captain Langeni to come and fetch me in order to decide what they were going to do about my matter. I said, "Are you just going to pick me like this?". He said, "Yes, we have to go". I said to them, "I haven't made any arrangement. I thought I will be going to my birthplace during the week-end", and the way I was dressed I had nothing. I don't know when I'm going to come back. Madlanduna said to me, "You know the life of a soldier". I tried to insist that we should turn so that I can take some few things - clothes and some toiletries. They agreed and made a U-turn and went back. I went to Lieutenant Masinga and I stayed there since there was place for me at the barracks, because I was only to go to Dundee maybe at the week-end. I went in, took some street clothes and toiletries. I got into the car and we left - went straight to Ulundi and we went to Madlanduna's office, which was in A. Madlanduna made a call to Captain

/Langeni. Captain

2B Langeni. Captain Langeni was in the Legislative Assembly. They talked on the phone and agreed that we will meet in the evening. On that very same evening I, myself, with Madlanduna, with Mbambo - I am not referring to the Mbambo who is here today, I'm referring to Patrick Mbambo - we went to look for Captain Langeni in his office. We were told that he had already left and we didn't find him. We had to call him. However, on that particular night we agreed that we are going to meet at Constable Mbambo's house. It was in D, if not C Section. I would say it was in D Section, because the houses were near each other. It was dark, somewhere around 7 o'clock, and we left with Madlanduna. We saw a car which was approaching and Captain Langeni was standing somewhere there and we proceeded to Captain Mbambo's place and we entered. The car followed us. Inside the car he was with Minister Mzimela. Not the Mzimela to whom I referred as a District Commander at Esikhaweni. It is this Mzimela who was the Secretary to the KwaZulu Legislature - his name was Robert Mzimela. They entered Patrick Mbambo's house, and we had a meeting there regarding my matter. A suggestion came out that I should be taken to hide - I'm not going to refer to Inkatha hidings, because the witness yesterday mentioned the hidings at Venda, Mkhuze and other places, where they could have hid me. I could say even at Johannesburg, where they once hid Madlanduna there. I refused to go into hiding. I said I'm not prepared to run for the rest of my life, running away from the police. I told them I am also police. I also told them that the Government has all my information. Therefore I can't leave on the run. I knew that I couldn't stay away from

/my children

2B my children or without them, although I now came to realise that it's possible as I am in prison now. So I refused - vehemently refused that I should go for hiding and we agreed that we should make an alibi, so that when the police come to investigate I will be able to deceive them, because Captain Langeni told me that at that time they were looking for me in connection with the murder of Nathi Gumede. I remembered that the alibi that we created we agreed that I would say that the Opel Monza which we used to go and fetch Nathi, to kill him, was borrowed to me by Nyawose, which was a State car and they said that I should agree that I borrowed it from my friend, and now the question was what was I going to do in Durban if my jurisdiction was Empangeni. I said I have two children in Durban. I could say I was going to visit my children. They said, "However, but they will need the reason why were you visiting your children". One of them said I should say that one of my children was ill and I got a call that I should rush to the place and I didn't have transport and we agreed on that point, and we created so many strategies to do a cover-up when the police arrived to investigate. We built a concrete alibi and I was also confident that it was going to work. However, I didn't fully picture the success of it. Captain Langeni then said we should together with Madlanduna go to Lindelani to a man by the name of Tshabalala, who was known as a, "Muti" man. We remembered that he got acquitted in a case where it was said he killed seven children and Langeni told me about this case and he said we should get some, "Muti" from Mr Tshabalala, and he said he's on good terms with Tshabalala and he won't refuse to give us the,

/"Muti". The

2B "Muti". The following morning - it was on Saturday - I myself, with Madlanduna, drove to Lindelani, look for Tshabalala to give us the, "Muti", because Captain Langeni told us that he will talk to him on the phone and we will just get to his place. We got to Lindelani and his wife told us that we left him at Nongoma. He was not at home and we passed through Hammarsdale. From Hammarsdale we left in the evening and we went to Pietermaritzburg and we came back late that night and we drove back to Ulundi. We reported to Captain Langeni that we failed to get to Tshabalala or find Tshabalala. Langeni promised that he would trace him. After that there had been some cases at Esikhaweni where firearms were found at Mrs Mbuyazi and we have to come to Durban during a week-end with Mrs Mbuyazi and we have to go back to Ulundi.

We are sitting very long - yes, no, I thought the witness was going to finish with arrest, and I expected to finish at about 1.15. If we could take the adjournment. The evidence is longer than I anticipated.

MR WILLS: Mr Chairman, could I suggest that Mr Macadam lead the witness to cut to the chase. We've got long stories about, "Muti" and things like that, but I gather the evidence is going to say that certain persons helped him evade arrest and things like that. Perhaps we could cut to the chase after the adjournment. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN: We will adjourn till 2.15.

LONG ADJOURNMENT

/

ON RESUMPTION

2B

ON RESUMPTION

BRIAN GCINA MKHIZE: (Still under former oath)

CHAIRMAN: Mr Macadam is just going to help you complete your evidence now.

MR MACADAM: Mr Mkhize, is it correct that despite these attempts to evade arrest and conviction, you were nevertheless arrested, taken into custody, tried, convicted and sentenced for certain of your hit squad's activities? --- Since I ended up trying to create an alibi, I later got arrested because I decided to hand myself to the police. I went back to Nqutu and I waited for them. They came and they arrested me and they brought me back to Empangeni, where the trial continued.

I have no further questions, Mr Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MACADAM

MR (?) : I have just one clarifying question to ask. I heard you in the beginning say that your participation in these activities was not a voluntary one. Is that what you said? --- I was trying to explain that I didn't on my own decide to kill people at Esikhaweni. I'm saying this because of what I've said before, that Madlanduna came to me, telling me that I am wanted at Ulundi.

In other words, you participated willingly and volition and because of your loyalty to IFP? You were not at any time under pressure to participate from your superiors? --- I would say this in two ways, as I have explained before. What could happen to a person who is given full information, a person who has been informed about the hit squad's activities or clandestine activities as we call them, as to what will happen to that particular person if he doesn't respond positively, as an ordinary

/person I had the

2B person I had the very same fear.

Thank you, I just wanted to clarify your volition in this matter. Thanks.

CHAIRMAN: There will now be an opportunity for counsel to put questions to Mr Mkhize. I understand that amongst you you have decided who should be proceed first.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, yes, I was busy last - I only have a few questions. Perhaps I should just go ahead with your permission.

MR WILLS: Sorry, Mr Chairman, before the cross-examination starts, there is just one area that ... (intervention)

CHAIRMAN: Sorry, Mr Wills, I meant to refer the matter to you first. If there's anything that you want to clarify.

MR WILLS: Thank you. The one area I just want to ask on is, Mr Mkhize, if, after you had commenced in these operations, these covert killing operations, you had decided that you had had enough and you wanted to leave, would you have been free to do so? --- Can I respond? No, it wasn't going to be possible, because I would be putting my life into danger. I don't think I was going to leave with the much knowledge that I have, taking into consideration that many people have been killed and there were also cases which had been opened and people were to be arrested. Therefore I don't think that I was going to be able to continue with my life as I wished. Even if I had a wish to leave, that wasn't easy because of the reason I have just given.

Thank you. No further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WILLS

/

CHAIRMAN

2B

CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Wills. Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Mkhize, I am not going to deal with the conflicts which arise from your evidence itself. I'm just going to ask you a few short questions. Is it correct that when you talk about changing your identity or taking an alias or being hidden, as you put it, it was to hide from the South African Police, not the KwaZulu Police? --- I was running away from arrest. Whether we had to be arrested by security guards or whoever, an arrest is just an arrest.

[Break in recording] ... strikes me as strange. I had better repeat that. I want to put something to you that strikes me as strange. We were given to understand during these hearings that the Caprivi trainees went to be trained and that at least a part of them were trained as an offensive group and that having a special meaning, namely to be hit squads. Do you follow that? --- I did not hear the question. The interpreter started the question in the middle. Could you please repeat the question?

Thank you. I will repeat the question. The perception has been given during the hearing of this committee that the Caprivi trainees, or at least a part of them, were trained as an offensive element, namely to operate as hit squads. Did you hear that evidence? --- Yes, I do know that we were divided in the middle. There were some for counter-mobilisation, defensive, as well as offensive and VIP guards. I am well aware of that.

Let me ask you specifically. Do you say that in your opinion you were sent to the Caprivi to be trained as hit squads? --- That is true.

/All 200 of

2B All 200 of you or only the offensive group? --- All the 200 who were sent to Caprivi. There isn't even a single one of them who is not capable of killing and there isn't a single one who hasn't been specifically trained to do the same job that I was doing.

So I understand your answer to mean you were all really trained as hit squad operatives. Am I correct in assuming that? --- That is correct.

Will you please explain what the purpose then was to divide one group into a group called, "Offensive unit"? --- I have already explained. I think I said that yesterday. I think it was mainly for flexibility, so that if you come across a situation that needs you to be well-dressed and be a gentleman and mobilize people or be a public speaker you can be able to do that, as well as canvass members for your political group and if the situation called for you to represent your group when there are newspaper reporters, you can be able to answer certain questions or specific questions that tend to favour your political group. And with regard to the intensive training that I referred to yesterday, it was done to equip the people with the necessary knowledge so that they could be able to counteract certain situations that they found themselves in, so that they could be able to defend themselves and fight, and protect themselves as well as other members of that group if they were needed to do that. That is the defensive.

I am sorry, I didn't ask you to go through the whole evidence again of explaining the different groups. I'm simply asking you one question. What is the purpose of having had an offensive group if there was no difference

/among the

2B among the various groups as far as your main purpose was concerned, and that was to be hit squad operatives when you came back? --- If you are asking me specifically with regard to the offensive I will not be able to answer that question because I was not trained to be on the offensive side. I was on counter-mobilisation.

Yes, that's indeed the best answer you could have given. You were a member of the contra-mobilisation, Mr Mkhize. We know that. --- I wish to explain something. Counter-mobilisation is something that I did or went through for one month - only one month - and that was my last month of the training in Caprivi, and out of the six months that I was being trained in Caprivi I spent the other five months being trained, so you can ask yourself as to what I was being trained to do.

For the evidence that you were sent, all 200 of you, to be trained as hit squad operatives to make any sense, Mr Mkhize, I'm putting it to you would be that when you came back that the 200 of you would have immediately commenced with your hit squad activities. Don't you agree? --- Could you please repeat the question? I don't think I understand you.

Let me put it in another way. How many of the 200, according to your knowledge, participated in hit squad activities? --- I do not have that knowledge, but according to me during that situation, that is the fight between Inkatha and the African National Congress, that number was far too small. It was minimal. Inkatha was supposed to train a lot of people if they were to fight the ANC.

Well, the suggestion on the papers had been made

/that apparently

2B that apparently ten of the offensive unit might have participated in hit squad activities. I'm speaking under correction, but I'm referring to Mr Varney's document, Mr Chairman. It referred to the figure of 33 members, which was later reduced to ten, he says. I should have perhaps asked him for clarification, but that's the inference I drew. But let us assume that it is 10. Would that be a figure that you would agree with? --- I have absolutely no knowledge. I don't know how many there are and I cannot answer that.

Let's put it in another way, Mr Mkhize. When you were requested or ordered to start a hit squad activity, the strange thing that happened is that you chose people who were not Caprivi trainees. Is that correct? --- Yes, it is true, but I did explain the reason before this Commission as to why I did that or what made me do that. Whether you accept it or you do not I do not think that concerns me, but I have specified the reasons that made me find myself in that situation.

Mr Mkhize, you are not seriously suggesting that the other 199 members were all womanizers and drunks? Are you suggesting that?

MR WILLS: With respect, Mr Chairperson, if I could interject. My clear recollection of the evidence at that point in time was that Mr Mkhize referred specifically to the Caprivi trainees other than himself who were stationed at the Esikhaweni Police Station. He alluded to a conversation with Luthuli, saying that they must bring Caprivi trainees in from another area. He was specifically referring to those at Esikhaweni Police Station, not the other 199. His subsequent evidence was

/to the effect

2B to the effect that later as he was - he used the word, "Promised" a certain other Caprivian by the name of Zweli Dlamini, who was sent, came to join them. On that basis I think the question is unfair.

MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Visser, if you would ... [break in recording] ... so we can see exactly what you're getting at. Just put it directly. I mean, you know, circles within circles doesn't work in this kind of forum. So ... [break in recording].

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I was thinking rather that I was putting it to him directly. The fact of the matter is that in practice on your evidence the hit squads that we found operating were not Caprivi trainee hit squads. They consisted, inter alia, of Caprivi trainees, but they were not exclusively Caprivi trainees. Isn't that correct? --- Yes, Mr Visser, I did explain it to you. When I initially explained I said not all the people within the 199 were deployed at the Esikhaweni Police Station. They were all over KwaZulu/Natal, and maybe the people I'm referring to were Caprivi trainees, but they were stationed at Esikhaweni. There could have been 3, and the 199 that you are referring to could have been deployed in other areas, but I'm speaking with regard to the 3 people that I know of.

Mr Mkhize, I want to put it to you. I'm not sure whether I'm coming through, Mr Chairman. I want to put it to you that I'm also confining it to the Esikhaweni hit squad, which you testified about, and on the basis of your testimony I'm going to suggest to you that the reasonable inference to be drawn from how your squad was made up is that you would have done what you did whether you went for

/training or

2B training or not. Isn't that the truth of the matter? --- Where would I have acquired the skills from to do the job that I have explained to this Honourable Commission, had I not been trained or specifically trained?

May I answer your question with another question? Where did the persons who had not been trainees, where did they receive that training from? It's easy to fire a firearm, Mr Mkhize, anyone can do it. --- Yes, that could be so, but Romeo was a policeman and he was trained in the use of firearms. Israel Hlongwane will also explain to you as to where he acquired the necessary skill, because if you remember quite well I came back from Caprivi and I was posted to Port Shepstone in 1986 and up till 1991 I have never killed a person, because I had never been directed to do so. I only started killing people in 1991, after I had been asked to use the skills that I had acquired in Caprivi, and I would ask Mr Visser to ask himself as to why from 1986 till the time that I was trained as a policeman - that is 1991 - that I had never ever done anything.

In deference to you, Mr Mkhize, I will tell you. It's because you were not asked - on your own evidence. I am going to give you one more opportunity to come clean on what weapons you were trained on in the Caprivi. I suggested to you on the first occasion when I asked you questions that you were trained in the use of G3s and Browning pistols and HMCs in the Caprivi, and you disagreed with that. You said that happened when you were a KwaZulu Policeman. I'm asking you again, did you receive training on the use of those weapons which I have

/mentioned in

2B mentioned in the Caprivi? --- Mr Visser, what made me deny that was that you mixed weapons, different weapons that I got trained thereon on different occasions. I told you about the G3 that I did basic training in Caprivi but the HMC I was trained at the time that I was being trained at the Police College.

And Browning 9mm pistols? --- From the Police Force at the Police College.

I just want to put it to you, Mr Mkhize, you made a statement which was handed in at the Goldstone Commission, in which you gave different evidence. I'm not going to take it any further. Mr Chairman, that's all I want to cover, thank you. --- May I answer that one? I'm prepared to. Mr Visser, it is true when you say that I made a statement different from the one I'm making today, that is to the Goldstone Commission, and I am happy that it was the Inkatha advocate who told us to make those statements. Mr Visser will remember that at the time we were with M Z Khumalo, as well as Advocate Visser himself, when we were at the conference room at the Legislative Assembly, Mr Visser was with his secretary, who was having computers which they used to type the statements. You will remember that he stressed - that is Mr M Z Khumalo - as to which guidelines or principles that governed us when we gave the statements. That is that of denying everything. We had to deny that we were trained on mortars. We denied that we were trained in the use of AK-47s, as well as other ammunition and weapons that I countered yesterday. The only thing that we admitted in those statements was that these weapons - we were trained so that we could be able to identify the weapons, that is

/the only purpose

2B the only purpose of the training. I wish to remind you on that aspect that you yourself were involved in trying to make us give false information to the Goldstone Commission. We did that because we were scared for our lives. Even besides that we were paying our alliance to the group to which we were affiliated.

CHAIRMAN: Please don't laugh or talk amongst yourselves.

MR VISSER: Are you quite finished? Mr Mkhize, you've just proven yourself to be a downright liar, to your knowledge. Let me set the record straight. First of all, the person who was with me was my attorney. Second, I never met you together or in the company of Mr M Z Khumalo at any time. Third, the purpose of our visit to Ulundi in January, February 1992 was to obtain the facts and prepare statements of as many of the Caprivi trainees as we could find. Am I wrong so far somewhere? --- In Zulu I wouldn't say you are lying, I would say you are mistaken, but what is important is that your conscience, Mr Visser, you are still on that mission, the same mission of hiding the truth away from the public.

CHAIRMAN: Please don't interrupt the witness.

MR VISSER: I hear your opinion, Mr Mkhize, but let me tell you that I now know and you know that what you're now saying is not true, but I will leave it at that. The record will speak for itself. The fact is you made an affidavit before the Goldstone Commission, in which you gave facts totally and entirely different from what you have told this Commission. Is that correct? Is that correct? --- I would like to request Mr Visser to remember that we are talking about people's lives - lives that have been lost, people who have been parted from

/their families

4B their families or who have lost members of their families and it is high time, Mr Visser, that if you are thinking about reconciliation you should start speaking the truth, as is ... (intervention)

I didn't ask you that question, Mr Mkhize. With all due respect, you are making political speeches here and it's got nothing do to with the questions I'm asking you. Are you ... (intervention)

MS SOOKA: Sorry, Mr Visser, I just want to interject. I think that you have asked the question and, in fact, it has been answered. I think Mr Mkhize did say that he had given the Goldstone Commission a statement which was different to what he is actually telling us here and I think that this kind of debate between witness is not really seemly.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MS SOOKA: Mr Mkhize, could you also refrain from continuing in that vein?

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman, I'm compelled to agree with that. This is taking us nowhere. We've made the points we wanted to make. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman, for the record, it's Sam Maritz. I've only a very few brief questions and it will relate to - can you see me, Mr Mkhize? Sorry, I'm hidden here in the back. Here I am. --- I can see you now.

Thank you. These are very rough figures. I don't have them exactly, but I imagine that there was something like about 30 VIP protection group trainees, some 30 defensive and some 30 offensive, and the rest of them, including yourself was contra-mobilization. Does that

/accord with

2B accord with your recollection? --- Yes, I did say that I don't have the exact figures as to how many there were in each group, but you are at liberty to create your own figures.

Now, I mention the figures, because my recollection is that there were about 100 trainees who eventually fell into the contra-mobilization group. Is that correct? --- This is the second time I'm hearing about this. Yesterday I heard about 114 or the day before yesterday. This is my first time to hear this number. I don't know about tomorrow. Maybe I'll hear a different number as well.

[Break in recording] ... exact numbers. I'm just trying to get parameters. I'm not fighting with you. I just want to understand whether you appreciate that the contra-mobilization group was by far in the majority - at least half of all the trainees. Is that correct? --- That I know explicitly well and I have explained it to this Commission.

You've already testified that when you returned from the Caprivi from your training, you were deployed to go and do exactly the job for which you were trained, namely contra-mobilization. Correct? --- That is correct.

The other members of the contra-mobilization group, do you know whether they were also deployed in the manner that you were? --- No, I don't know their whereabouts.

[Break in recording] ... their whereabouts. Do you know whether they were deployed. --- I was only deployed with four others. We were four in number. Two of them are alive, but one has since died.

And I gained the impression, when Mr Visser was

/asking you

3A asking you questions, that you referred to the fact that the Caprivians were deployed all over the KwaZulu. Was that impression correct? --- I think that's a right picture you have, or impression, because it has been explained to this Commission that the offices were put or were structured all over KwaZulu/Natal, so people were sent to those various offices throughout KwaZulu/Natal.

I'm just taking it a bit further and it's this. Can you say, even if it's hearsay, from knowledge that you gained in the years or the months or for ever how long you did this work that the other fellow-trainees in the contra-mobilization who were deployed were deployed precisely to do contra-mobilization as you had been instructed to do? --- From 1986, when we returned from Caprivi up till 1988 where I was moved from contra-mobilization duties to infiltrate the SAP. You will remember that I had explained that I was train in Cape Town. The order was over of working according to the skills of contra-mobilization. From Cape Town I was deployed in Pietermaritzburg and I was functioning under different orders from the contra-mobilization, up till the time when I was trained as a police and then I was working according to standing orders of the SAP, of the police, and I was deployed in Esikhaweni under the police order, up till 1991, when I was given another order, the second one now, which did not need the skills of the contra-mobilization, but the skills that I gained when I was receiving the intensive training.

Please understand, I'm not quarrelling with you. I heard the evidence. I'm not quarrelling with it. What I want to know is in the few months before you went for your

/training at

3A training at Koeberg, when you were deployed to do contra-mobilization, all I'm asking you is whether you know or whether you suspect or whether you heard from other people, then or now or later, it really doesn't matter, whether all your fellow trainees, who were trained in contra-mobilization, were deployed in KwaZulu, as you were. That's all I am asking you, nothing else. --- You mean deployed at what time or when?

When you were deployed. Look, you were in the region of 100 people that were trained in contra-mobilization. You've already explained that when you returned you were deployed precisely for that purpose, to do contra-mobilization. All I want to know is do you have any knowledge at all - whether it's acquired knowledge or personal knowledge - that the other members of the contra-mobilization group were similarly deployed in KwaZulu for the same purpose? --- Your Honour, you were not quite clear, but I just said that offices were structured in different areas of KwaZulu/Natal and those members of contra-mobilization were deployed to those respective offices. That's the question I thought I had already explained to you.

I'm just taking it a bit further and that is this. Were they then deployed, as far as you know, for the same purpose that you were deployed, namely to go and do contra-mobilization? Not some other job. Not murdering people, but to go and do contra-mobilization? --- That is true.

Now, can you assist this panel at all in regard to the offensive group ... (intervention) --- May you please repeat that question?

/The question is

3A The question is this, can you assist the panel at all in the initial deployment and I am still in this same period, that's before you went to Koeberg but after you came back from the Caprivi, can you assist this panel as to what happened to the offensive group and the defensive group, whether they were deployed - in which manner they were deployed? Do you have any knowledge about that? --- I don't have any knowledge as far as other groups are concerned or were concerned.

Now, I think it's also no secret and I just wish to know whether you know this or not, is that very shortly or immediately after the return of the Caprivians to KwaZulu, the VIP protection group were immediately employed for that purpose. Do you know about that? --- That much I don't know.

Mr Chairman, bear with me one moment, please. Yes, maybe there's just one question. In 1991 when you were recruited, if I can put it that way, to join - and which for practical terms I'll call the war that was raging at Esikhaweni, I gain the impression that you and your colleagues and officers, or whatever you wish to call them, were very careful to avoid the armed forces of the then Government. Then I'm talking specifically of the South African Defence Force and the police. Is that impression correct? --- That is correct.

Mr Chairman, thank you very much

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MARITZ

MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairperson, it's Mr van Zyl for the record. Mr Mkhize, the training which you received in the Caprivi was that the only military training which you ever received? --- I have explained already with regard to

/the training

3A the training that I received from other groups, like basic training. There is intensive training as well and specialised training. The other military training, I received it when I joined the Police Force.

What I actually meant, Mr Mkhize, was this. Earlier in your evidence you distinguished between police training and military or Defence Force training, similar to the training which you received in the Caprivi. Is that correct? --- No, I think you are being confused here. I have never said to this Commission - said about anything about Army training, because I don't know - have no idea as far as that is concerned. Only the doctor who was giving evidence here who explained thus far. I only distinguished between the training that I received in Caprivi for six months and the training I received from Police College for six months. I have never, therefore, addressed anything in so far as soldiers - military training - is concerned.

Let me put it to you, the training which you received in the Caprivi, the whole of the training which you received there - in other words the basic training, the advanced and then also the specialist training - that consisted of ordinary prescribed Defence Force training, which any other member of the Defence Force at that stage and even today - and here I specifically refer to infantry training - would have received. The training which you received there in no way differed from any training which other members of the South African Defence Force received at that stage. Would you like to comment on that?

MR LAX: Sorry, before the witness comments, Mr van Zyl, Dr Williams made it clear yesterday that by and large the

/training was

3A training was more or less the same, but there were certain special force elements in that training that were slightly different to what an ordinary infantry person would undergo. He made that quite clear. He felt some of it went beyond the normal infantry training, to sort of special course training, so the way you are putting the question is a bit misleading to that extent.

MR VAN ZYL: With respect, Mr Lax, Mr Chairman, Dr Williams did, in fact, testify that. He has not been challenged. He has not been cross-examined on that. That might also be put to him. I put that to the witness on the basis of what my instructions are.

MR LAX: Well, then I think you have to put it on that basis to him and make it clear that that's the basis you're putting it on. Because the way it's appearing is that that's on the evidence heard so far and I don't think that's fair.

MR VAN ZYL: I will do it so. What I'm putting to you then, Mr Mkhize, is that my clients who was involved with the training will testify or submit to this Commission, if necessary, that the training was similar to what I already put to you. Would you like to comment on that? --- They will have to explain that, so I will get to understand the kind of training they will be talking about. For me to understand the kind of training they are talking about they will have to be given or afforded the opportunity to explain, as I have already explained as well, and there should be some assurance that they don't get themselves trapped into the same trap I fell into.

Mr Mkhize, the role that Mr Luthuli played whilst you underwent your training, what exactly did that entail?

/--- He

3A --- He was the political commissar.

[Break in recording] ... briefing and information and lectures which you received regarding politics, Marx, Stalin, etcetera, were these lectures which Mr Luthuli gave you? --- Not him alone, but also from other instructors who were there present.

What was Mr Luthuli's attitude towards violence during your training, especially with reference to violence against the ANC? --- I think an attitude goes hand in hand with the beliefs of a person. I don't think I will be in a position to explain Madlanduna's beliefs.

Did he never convey this to you? --- Telling us about his attitude? Is that your question?

[Break in recording] --- I don't recall - I don't have any recollection of that - Madlanduna telling me about his attitude.

I would then like to say the following. You testified that during the training you were told that the purpose of the training was to kill the ANC and all my clients who were involved in the training will deny that. --- It's fine even if they may repudiate all of that, but that won't shake me from what I've told this Commission so far. This is what I will even tell my God.

Mr Chairperson, I'm just reading through my notes, to see if there are other aspects that I still need to cover. The training which you received, and more specifically the first two phases thereof, as you testified just now, and which would enable you to kill a person, I would like to agree with you that anybody who had received that training would be able to kill somebody else, but that that was never the objective of the

/training, that

3A training, that it would be specifically applied on your return to Natal to kill people at random. --- Is that a question?

It's a statement. Would you like to comment on it? --- You've said everything right. You see, the training I received had equipped me enough to kill people and if I hadn't received that kind of training I wouldn't be where I am today.

What methods did you employ and the people who accompanied you and participated with you from 1991 onwards when you started killing people? What methods did you use? How did you do it? --- I will have to go back to explain how we killed people and who killed who. Is that where you want me to go? I can explain, but is that what you want me to do? To go back and explain all the details?

No, Mr Mkhize, I don't want to waste time unnecessarily. If you could perhaps give the Commission an indication. Was there a specific modus operandi followed by yourselves or did you, for instance, go to people's homes and shoot them there or did you lay in ambush for them? How did you actually operate? Is it possible to give us a summary of your methods? --- Yes, there were operations where we applied ambush methods, as I have told you about the incident where we attacked a bus - where a bus was attacked with ANC people on board. There were some operations where we used house clearing, as this Commission will ultimately get to know how Sergeant Dumisani Dlamini died. The incidents defined varied as well.

Now whilst you are referring to the house

/penetration issue

3A penetration issue, the training which you received in the Caprivi in that regard, here I would like to put it to you that that training had the following effect. When a building was penetrated or entered the sole purpose was not to kill everybody inside that building or house. --- We will be given a certain target and we will know our target, so there was no need to shoot indiscriminately, even killing people we were not instructed to kill. At times we will find other people, like Mrs Dlamini and the children who were present, but we left her and we hid when she was passing. We left her alone. We did not even kick her, for that matter, because we knew who we wanted. We wanted Dlamini, until we got hold of Dlamini.

For clarity, I would like to put it to you that although it was mentioned during the training that house clearance or house penetration - that the training in this regard wasn't specifically aimed at entering into a home, but actually entry into a building and not exclusively penetration of a home. --- Why would we penetrate a building? Maybe you have a reason why you think we will penetrate a building, but I don't get it. Why would we penetrate a building? If you differentiate between a building or a home or a house.

At some stage you testified that you received police training and it is also so that a policeman's duty is the protection of members of the public and it is also the duty of a soldier. Would you therefore agree with me, Mr Mkhize, that it isn't possible to protect members of the public or buildings properly against attacks - attacks against life or property if the person fulfilling this protective role is not able to act properly and forcefully

/against these

3A against these attackers, and to be able in certain circumstances so to act as to kill them? Would you agree with that? --- It's not clear. The question was not quite clear.

I will repeat the question. In order to fulfil its protective role properly, such as for instance a function to be fulfilled by a policeman or a soldier or any person utilised for that purpose, namely to protect people or buildings from attacks, to protect them from attacks against their lives or their property, that these protective agents should be able to act properly and effectively, in order to prevent these attacks and this could mean that they should in certain circumstances have the capacity to kill the attackers, otherwise they wouldn't be able to perform this protective duty properly. --- What is your question, Sir?

I'm making a statement. I'm making a statement and you can comment on it. Would you agree with the gist of my statement? --- If Inkatha knew that there were police who were trained to protect the community or people I do not think that there would be a need for Inkatha to train its own people.

No, I'm no referring here to Inkatha. I made a statement, the gist of which is this. In order to be able to protect lives and property properly the person doing this protective work must have the necessary capacity to enable him to do so properly and effectively and this capacity includes the capacity in certain circumstances to kill people. Would you agree with that? --- No, I wasn't trained to protect. The kind of house penetration that I was trained on I explained it to this Commission.

/That's the

3A That's the kind of penetration where we would approach a house where we know our target is in to kill, not to protect. I'm not talking about rescue here. I'm talking about going to kill a person who is inside the house. I have explained that explicitly clear to the Commission.

Mr Mkhize, I wasn't referring to you, and I was also no referring to any of the Caprivi recruits or trainees, but let us try to solve the problem differently. Your testimony was to the effect that the training that you received would not have been to the benefit of the community. Why did you make that statement? What was the reason? --- That is quite true. The community was not going to benefit. Only the IFP group would have benefited from that, because we would have destroyed the entire ANC and conquered it. But as for the community, not the entire community would have benefited, except for the IFP.

And the entire ANC would have been destroyed by these 200 members, of which about 100 did counter-mobilization in offices? Is that what you're saying? --- If you may remember from yesterday, Madlanduna, who was my commander then, did say that according to his knowledge the training was still going to go on, but I don't want to dwell on that, whether it did continue or not, but I don't have any knowledge as to how many were going to be trained by IFP or whether they were trained, because if you remember quite well or if you know and follow the politics of this country, there were camps in Mlaba and Mkhuze. I don't want to embark on that, because that has nothing to do with what I'm talking about. I'm just giving you as broad a picture that you should be in a position to know that 200 people were not that much.

/Yes, Mr Mkhize.

3A Yes, Mr Mkhize. In conclusion I would put it to you that in respect of this training and the purpose of the training and bearing in mind the circumstances, namely that you were trained in counter-mobilization during the specialist training phase and subsequent to the training you then did counter-mobilization work for about two years and that if it wasn't for the call which you received from Mr Luthuli you wouldn't have sat here today. You are now in a position that you want to blame the training that you received in the Caprivi for your murderous actions three years later and that is why you are trying to put such a slant on the position. --- No, I did not say I am blaming the training. I blame the fact that I was misused.

By Mr Luthuli? Were you exploited by Mr Luthuli? --- No, Mr Luthuli is right next to me as I'm speaking and he testified before this Commission the truth and the truth only that I know very well. The ones I'm blaming are the ones that have sent you, as you are sitting there, that you should come to the Commission because they don't want to come themselves in person. That you should come and debate with me to prove the fact that all what I'm saying is blatant lie and convince the Commission that I'm telling you lie. Those are the people I'm blaming. The ones who have been afforded opportunity, that all the organizations should reveal its view, but they refuse to come in front of the Commission and today it looks like all what we are saying it's a blue lie, but they forget that we are talking about lives here and one day they'll have to answer to God Almighty.

Thank you, Chairperson.

/NO FURTHER

3A NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN ZYL

MR DE VOS: It seems to me I'm next. Thank you. Mr Mkhize, you told us everything. You told us how you were trained in the Caprivi and you gave us a broad perspective of the different type of things that you were trained in. Now, can you tell this Commission, when were you trained to kill your opponent by burning him? --- The speaker's mike is not on.

Let me take it a little bit further then. At the time when you were recruited to join this special training in the Caprivi, approximately 200 people came together and I suppose from all over KwaZulu/Natal. Is that correct? --- That is true.

You didn't go through any selection process. Is that right? --- That is true.

And the only claim to fame was that you should be members of Inkatha? --- That is correct. There was a certain criterion that was used in the selection process.

MR LAX: He also mentioned yesterday that you were healthy or a fit person or something like that.

MR DE VOS: Now, Mr Mkhize, what I don't understand if you take 200 people from all walks of life and you bring them together to train them as hit squads then there's an inherent danger in doing just that, because you don't know who might refuse to be a member of a hit squad. You don't know who is going to talk out about the whole thing. Who is going to disclose the facts. Do you agree with me? --- Do you mean to tell me that all the people that are working for the SADF are from one place? Is that what you are trying to imply? That all the people who crossed the border to be trained by the MK in outside countries were

/from one

3A from one place?

I didn't say it, Mr Mkhize. All I'm saying is now you are bringing 200 people together. They think they are going to become policemen, according to your own evidence, but in the meantime you're going to be trained to become murderers, because that's the story you're telling this Commission, and the two things don't come together. --- The bonds between the people would not be created by the fact that they come from the same place, but it comes - it stems from their beliefs as to what they believe as individual. It brings them together and it creates a link. If they are loyal to Inkatha, even if they can be from different places - Newcastle, Johannesburg - as long as they know the principles that govern Inkatha they will do what the Inkatha demands of them as members of the Inkatha. The bond is not created by being from the same place. It's their beliefs that govern them.

Sorry, in other words it's the beliefs of Inkatha that will determine their actions. Is that correct? Am I correct? --- Could you please repeat the question?

It is the beliefs of Inkatha, the organization, that would determine their actions? --- That is correct. Each and every organization changes from time to time. At that time Inkatha was what was called, "Cultural liberation movement", and it has since changed. It is a political organization. It is a party, an opposing party. Because an organization is dynamic. It changes from time to time. It grows and it changes its ideologies. People who were loyal to Inkatha are the ones who are going to go along with the principles and ideals of the Inkatha as to when the leaders change or whether they do change, in

/fact, the people

3A fact, the people who are loyal to the group are the people who will always abide by the rules and regulations of that particular political organization.

Thank you, Mr Mkhize. Mr Mkhize, I don't disagree with what you are saying and I also don't disagree that there was a war inside the country that involved many role-players, but I am here on behalf of a couple of clients who are all members of the old South African Defence Force and the main reason why we are here is because it is alleged that we foresaw the possibility, we were actually in cahoots with Inkatha, planning as a broad strategy eventual murders on people belonging to other political groups. Now, I want to put it to you, and that is my instructions, that that was never my clients' intentions. They thought that they were requested by Chief Minister Buthelezi to supply him with some para-military capability in order to give protection to Chief Minister Buthelezi, senior VIP persons, leaders of Inkatha all over KwaZulu/Natal, and that's why they supplied this para-military capability to Inkatha. Do you agree with that? --- I do not agree with what you've just said, the reason being that if the aim or the objective for Chief Buthelezi was the one that you've just explained, during that time Chief Buthelezi at that time was the Minister of Police within the KwaZulu Government. Why didn't he take the KwaZulu Police and give them an advance course? Why did he have to specifically fetch members of Inkatha and why did they specifically have to use this criterion of using Inkatha members and loyal members who were going to be able to keep the Inkatha secrets? Why didn't he choose amongst the KwaZulu Police if that is

/what you are

3A what you are implying?

Mr Mkhize, I don't want to debate it, but as I understand the whole problem, Mr Buthelezi was actually sitting on two chairs. On the one hand he was the Chief Minister and on the other hand he was the Inkatha leader, and whenever he went into the Inkatha areas he couldn't take the KwaZulu Police with him, because, on the one hand he didn't trust all of them. Secondly, they didn't have a proper capability to protect him and some other people and, thirdly, he wanted it to look as if he and the organization has got the capability to protect himself and various other important people. Do you understand? --- I don't understand what you're telling me. Maybe it would be better if I was talking to people who are concerned. What puzzles me is as to why don't they want to come before the Commission and clarify their objectives, their reasons. Why don't they come before the Commission as well as the public and tell the public and the Commission as to what their reasons and objectives were? They have sent a person like you, who talks and says, "I am representing certain people. I have heard them saying this. I have heard them saying that".

Mr Mkhize, let's be honest with each other. You are presently serving a gaol sentence. You applied for amnesty and you want to get back home. Is that right? And go on with your life? --- Yes, that is true, I have applied for amnesty, but there is something I would like to explain to you. Even if I am not granted amnesty to me there is nothing much more important that whatever I have done before, which is in my conscience, I have today divulged it to you. I have told the people of what

/I have done

3A I have done and that on its own gives me peace of mind and peace within myself. What is important is the situation under which I was living at that place where I was living and I had this blood of people on my hands, as well as their souls. Now what is important is for me to reinvoke my conscience once more to tell the people. I feel some sense of relief.

Thank you, Mr Mkhize. Mr Mkhize, what you are saying to this Commission, you actually not pleading on your own behalf but on behalf of all the Zulus in KwaZulu/Natal to come to an agreement so that there can be peace. Is that right? I'm not confronting you. I'm just trying to summarise what you're saying. Is that right? ... [end of tape]

3B

MR NTSEBEZA: ... That it is not - even if he never gets out of gaol, if he never gets amnesty, he is only undergoing this exercise because it is self-healing for him. Now where do you get this thing that all the Zulus are saying the same thing, when he has said previously to that that what concerns him is that there are people here who should be coming here to this forum and taking advantage of this. I just don't understand you.

MR DE VOS: Yes, can I help you, Mr Commissioner? Maybe I can help you out of the misunderstanding. If the other people must also come forward then it means that they must also come and tell their story and the whole story. That's what you're saying. They must apply for amnesty and therefore there can be reconciliation. In other words, they're going for peace. That's the question I've put to you. Am I right? --- I'm happy that you've pointed that out, because there can be absolutely no

/reconciliation

3B reconciliation without the truth, because that would be highly superficial. Therefore everybody should come forward and tell their side of the story. There could be true reconciliation thereafter.

Could I then go back to my original questions? The Defence Force or let me be more specific, a certain Captain Opperman and Cloete, according to the evidence led last year, was involved as liaison officers here in Natal for the 200 Inkatha trainees and, according to Mr Opperman's statement that I've checked just now, he was transferred in November 1989 out of this post. In other words, then it's also the time that the Army's involvement stopped in Natal. Now, the only point I want to make, and I put it to you, is that the Esikhaweni murders happened apparently, according to your evidence, round about 1991. Do you agree? --- From 1991 up to 1993, when I was arrested on August, the 18th.

At that stage you were under the command of the KwaZulu Police? That's when the murders occurred. --- Yes, I was working as a policeman.

Now, why then - maybe you can help us out of the predicament. Why is the Army then being blamed for the Esikhaweni murders?

MR MACADAM: I don't want to interrupt, Mr Chairperson, but can the witness be entitled to comment on that? This surely should be a question that should go to Mr Varney. He was the person who made a submission between the link of the former South African Defence Force and the activities of hit squads in KwaZulu/Natal. --- Can I answer?

MR LAX: Mr Mkhize did say if it wasn't for his training

/he wouldn't have

3B he wouldn't have been where he was today, so in a sense he does link the murders that he carried out to his training by the military. --- I wish to explain to this Commission that I've never said that the soldiers were killing people. I've spoken about myself, as well as the syndicate which was under my control, as well as the local leadership of Esikhaweni, superiors in Ulundi, the group with whom I was killing people. I have never spoken about the soldiers.

MR DE VOS: You see, Mr Mkhize, what I also don't understand from your evidence, you were trained in the Caprivi to become members of the KwaZulu Police Force. That's the basic departure of your whole story.

MR WILLS: Sorry, that wasn't his evidence at all. Sorry, whose statement? He said in his evidence that he was told he was going to join the KwaZulu Police and that's the basis on which he agreed to go from Nhlungwane camp to the Caprivi, but he didn't say that when he was in the Caprivi.

MR DE VOS: I expressed myself wrongly then. The point I'm trying to make he was all out throughout under the impression that as soon as he's finished with his training he's joining the KwaZulu Police.

MR LAX: That's also not quite correct, because his evidence was that when he got there and he realised the nature of the training they started asking questions of Mr Luthuli and then Mr Luthuli was forced to explain to them the real purpose of their training and they then covered it up by referring to the private security company that was training them, that whole side of the thing, so there's that whole side of it as well. So that's been his

/evidence so far.

3B evidence so far.

MR DE VOS: I'm referring to paragraph 3 of his statement that was handed to us, where it is stated - he's telling about the man that he spoke to, "And he told me there were vacancies in the KwaZulu Police and they had received instructions from the President of the IFP to recruit loyal and faithful supporters of the IFP for KwaZulu Police. At that stage I did not know exactly what the job entailed, save that it was a job for the KwaZulu Police." That's the basic departure point of his evidence.

MR LAX: Yes, but that changed when he got to Caprivi and that's common cause at this stage. Everyone understands that. That's been the evidence so far.

MR DE VOS: Yes, but what happened between him and Mr Luthuli does not necessarily imply that it came from the SA Defence Force instructors. That's the point I'm working towards.

MS SOOKA: Mr de Vos, put that to him then.

MR DE VOS: Mr Mkhize, what transpired between - at that nightly meetings when Mr Luthuli discussed various things with you and told you certain things does not necessarily imply or mean that the SADF - South African Defence Force instructors who were present at that base knew what Mr Luthuli was telling you. Will you agree with that? --- Which instance are you referring to, when I was speaking to Mr Daluxolo Luthuli? Where and when? I don't understand what you're talking about. Which meeting are you referring to between me and Mr Luthuli?

Mr Lax has just referred me to your evidence where he says that you explained that Mr Luthuli explained to you while you were up there the real purpose why you were

/being trained.

3B being trained. Did you hear that? --- The objective or main aim of the training was always explained to us by the instructors. It was never hidden from us as to why we were being trained. They told us that we were being trained to fight the ANC. I did explain that and I think I did clarify it.

Can you help me with another thing? If I understand you correctly, you were also told to hide from the police - you were told you should hide from the police, the police shouldn't find out about your identities and things like that. Is that correct? --- I've never said that.

In Caprivi. You did say it. --- There were no police at Caprivi so there was no need to hide anything.

Sorry, maybe we misunderstand each other. I thought you said you were trained up in the Caprivi - you were trained, you were told, "Look, when you come back to KwaZulu you should not be detected by the police. You should hide". Is that right? Is that what your evidence was? --- How were we were going to survive if our names were not known, because we were living and working within our own communities? What I said was the secret with regard to the training, not with regard to identities. Maybe Luthuli is the one who spoke about the changing of the names, because the instructors changed their names to JJ, Kloppies, as well as Kevin. I never talked about our own identities being changed.

Maybe there was a misunderstanding. In other words, you should keep quiet about the fact that you received training in Caprivi. That was the main purpose why - it shouldn't be disclosed? Is that right? --- Yes, that was a secret. That is the place at which we underwent the

/training, as

3B training, as well as the aims of the training. These were the most important things. Even the type of kind of training that we received when we were at the Caprivi Strip. These were the two main things that we were supposed to keep out of the reach of other people.

[Break in recording] ... there's no question about the fact that your training was legal because at one stage Brigadier Mathe also visited you up there. Am I right?

MR LAX: Sorry, Mr de Vos, that doesn't make it legal, with all due respect. The fact that the General might have visited them there doesn't make the training legal at all.

MR DE VOS: We've been through this the whole year last year. There's a court finding on this point. It is legal. There is nothing prohibited in this.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Stewart.

MR STEWART: Mr Chairperson, there is no reason why this witness should be expected to be an expert in law and know whether something is legal or illegal because of the presence of someone there or not.

MR LAX: Mr de Vos, maybe it would be helpful to really get to the point. What are your clients' version? Are they saying it was perfectly lawful, etcetera? If that's the case, put it to the man. We don't have to go round and round in circles and then try and put the sucker punch, so to speak. [Break in recording] ... a number of times.

MR DE VOS: Yes. Mr Mkhize, the safety of KwaZulu/Natal and the protection of the people here in a certain sense still lay with the South African Government in terms of the Acts of that time, and I put it to you that the whole

/training up

3B training up in the Caprivi was legal. It was lawful. They were entitled to give you this type of training. What do you say about that or can't you comment? --- I've got absolutely no comment. I think you know more about the South African law, but I can just be brief and tell you this that it comes as a surprise to me as to why we had to carry AK-47s in South Africa, because, according to my knowledge, as well as the police training that I received, was that such ammunition was not allowed at this time.

Yes, Mr Mkhize, I put it to you your training was lawful in the sense that the aim of the training was in a protective sense. In other words the whole aim of your training was to give protection to certain people in Natal and may I add the next aspect, the AK-47s you're referring to was handed to you at the time when you were in the KwaZulu Police. It was handed by the police to you - KwaZulu Police, not by the South African Defence Force. What do you say about that? --- It's not like that. I deny that. I've never said that the Police Force gave me AK-47s. I'm referring to the AK that I was given during my training in Caprivi, but in terms of the Arms and Ammunition Act the AK-47s were not allowed to be carried, whether you were rendering defence or you were on the offensive side. I want to know whether that law had changed at some stage.

Mr Mkhize, the long and the short of the story is the South African Army can train anybody with the arms they've got available. It does not fall for that purpose under the Arms and Ammunition Act. Do you understand that? --- You say that we were trained to protect.

/

MR NTSEBEZA

3B

MR NTSEBEZA: Is that your client's instruction?

MR DE VOS: That's my client's instruction.

MR NTSEBEZA: Let me get that clearly for the record. Are you instructed on the clients' version about what arms they were instructed about? He has said to us the way they were given only AK-47s there. Now are your instructions that only AK-47s can be used to train people or were available at the time, which is why those were used? Are those your instructions?

MR DE VOS: That's not my instructions.

MR NTSEBEZA: What are your instructions?

MR DE VOS: We were not there. None of my clients was in the Caprivi involved with the training. We were the higher echelon at that stage. It was delegated to some other people, some other groups, to do the training with the available weaponry they had at that stage. We didn't plan the training itself. We were only involved in the top structure to say that people should be trained.

MR NTSEBEZA: Are your clients conceding that AK-47s were used there or are they contesting that?

MR DE VOS: We are not contesting that but we say that various other weapons was also used.

MR NTSEBEZA: So what is your point?

MR DE VOS: The point is simply this, if the whole procedure had to be secret, that was requested by Mr Buthelezi and that was also their orders, then the whole training, everything, shouldn't be able - nobody should be able to trace it back to the South African Government. You've listened to this witness's evidence. He said they didn't know where they were. Somebody said they were in Israel, but that was for security reasons,

/and for no

3B and for no other reason whatsoever.

MR NTSEBEZA: So can we accept in this Commission, as your clients' instructions, that they deliberately used AK-47 rifles for the training in Caprivi because it was for security reasons and that is why they supplied AK-47s and AK-47s only.

MR DE VOS: I never used the word, "Deliberately". I said they were not even there. We say that we don't deny that they were trained in AK-47s but ... (intervention)

MR NTSEBEZA: What are you testing then? What are you testing with your questions?

MR DE VOS: With all due respect ... (intervention)

MR NTSEBEZA: Are you denying - are you saying that did not happen? I don't want an exercise for point scoring there, Mr de Vos, with respect. What are your instructions? Are your instructions that no weapons were used in that training course or are your instructions that no AK-47s were used in that training course? Or are your instructions that your clients deny that AK-47s were used? And if they were not used, what then were used? What sort of weapon was used?

MR COETZEE: If I may say something as also part of the legal representatives that appear on behalf of the clients, I think it is highly irregular and unfair that counsel be cross-examined on what their instructions are and on what basis cross-examination should take place.

MR NTSEBEZA: With due respect, I'm not cross-examining counsel.

MR COETZEE: I'm not finished my submission, if you don't mind. I take the exception to the manner that this is being dealt with. This is not fair proceedings to make

/the allegation

3B the allegations and cross-examine senior counsel when they are trying to put cross-examination to a witness.

MR NTSEBEZA: Have you finished?

MR COETZEE: I am finished, thank you very much, Mr Chairman.

MR NTSEBEZA: Now, now that you have finished, I say I need to know. I am not sitting here because I enjoy sitting here. I need to know what the case is that the senior counsel is putting to the witness. I have a duty to make sure also that what is being put to the witness is not confusing and misleading the witness. That's all I seek to know. I still insist to know what are your instructions.

MR DE VOS: Can I respond to that, if I may.

MR COETZEE: Mr Lyster, if you want to say something ... (intervention)

CHAIRMAN: No ... [break in recording].

MR COETZEE: I don't want this to turn into an unfortunate debate and I don't want any animosity between me and the panel. I am trying my best to contribute to these proceedings to the best of my ability. I definitely don't want to land up in a situation where there's any animosity between me and anybody on the panel. I am ... (intervention)

MR NTSEBEZA: What is your point? Just make your point, please.

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairman, am I now being told how much time and ... (intervention)

CHAIRMAN: No, you are not. Please let's hear what you have to say.

MS SOOKA: Mr de Vos, I think there isn't a question of

/cross-examining

3B cross-examining counsel, but I think what we want to understand is what exactly is the version your client is putting. I am rather confused myself, because, you see, I think the position or the submission that was made by Mr de Vos is that the Defence Force can train anybody in any arms that they wish and I'm not quite sure if that is what he said, and then later on he followed that with a submission that his clients at the top delegated this task to someone else so if we can just get some clarity on that, so that we can get a clear understanding of the perspective as well.

MR DE VOS: Thank you. I am indebted to you. May I suggest at this stage, we've received notice that the KwaMakutha trial and exhibits will be handed in. Can I make a suggestion, that this Commission adjourns now, reads the record, because we've been in court for eight months, come back and then do it on the same basis, because I've got an awkward situation. It's been dealt with - training has been dealt with - evidence has been led. Everything has been dealt with. Now we are sitting in a situation that we must start afresh. With all due respect, it's not fair. It's not fair in the sense that this Commission must make a decision that will affect the history of the country. You are trying to - and I mean I've got very great respect for what you're trying to achieve, to reconcile the people, to establish the truth, everything, but we are sitting in a predicament. For a week or two we are going to hear evidence from one side. You are not going to hear any evidence from us. You can't hear complete cross-examination from our side. It's - I think, personally - unfair to ask me, "Put instructions to

/a witness",

3B a witness", whereas I'm still busy cross-examining, determining things. In other words, what are we doing here? We are curtailing the proceedings because of the time limits and other aspects. It's not your fault and I'm not accusing anybody in that sense, but I've got a problem to put my clients' case properly before you and there are all these restraints that we are suffering from. It's only a suggestion I can make. I don't know how many of the Commissioners have read, say, for instance, Judge Hugo's judgment or studied all the documents, but it's necessary because we've heard Mr Varney's evidence on that point. He virtually wrote a doctor's thesis on the whole subject. Then we've the got - the whole question of training was discussed, evidence was led by General Groenewald, about a day or two, I think, by General Oelschig, approximately a day or two by General Liebenberg, by General Geldenhuys, where all these things have been dealt with.

CHAIRMAN: Mr de Vos, we are aware of that. We have access to all that evidence. We've read summaries of the evidence and the judgment and I think at the outset of these proceedings I said that this witness, for example, has put a particular version on record. He said that his training in the Caprivi was for a very specific purpose. That's how he understood it. That he understood that he was to be trained in deadly skills and that he was to return to this province and he was to kill people and I think it would help us if you put to him that your instructions from your client are totally contrary to that, that they understood that they were doing something of a secret nature at the request of Minister Buthelezi,

/in order to

3B in order to train them to provide protection for himself and his VIPs, as other members of counsel have done, because I don't see your line of cross-examination is really taking us much further. The witness is confused and we are also becoming confused. It seems to me that there are two very different opposite versions taking place here on either side of us and it would help us if you could put to him a version and ask him whether he agrees with it or not.

MR DE VOS: Mr Chairman, maybe it can save time. I've got my computer here. Maybe I can try and extract from last year's trial record. A lot of explanations were used with the AK-47s. It's going to save a lot of time. And then I can continue tomorrow morning with that on that basis.

MR WILLS: Obviously this affects my client. Possibly there's a misunderstanding as well, with the greatest respect to you, Sir. My client isn't up here as an expert on what South African Defence policy is. He's not an expert on military strategy. Basically, he's here because he has the urge to tell, to the best of his knowledge, what occurred in his own lifestyle and so, with the greatest respect, I don't think that he can take the issue as regards the higher strategy any further, and with the greatest respect to his evidence so far, I don't think he's attempted to do so. He's made one allusion or one - he's alluded to something which might have been responsible for the confusion, where he said that because of his training he wouldn't be sitting here, but I don't think his intention in that is to say that because of that the South African Defence Force is or is not responsible.

/It's just

3B It's just a factual situation which has occurred in his life, but clearly he cannot take the matter of higher strategy between Ministers and Generals any further at all and I don't think he intends to do that. I think in his evidence, the whole of his evidence he has related to people who are pretty low down in the command chain.

CHAIRMAN: Mr de Vos, I think anything that relates to why they were trained in the use of AK-47s as far as your clients were concerned should be best put to us by way of a submission, as you've told us you will be doing in due course. I don't think the witness can throw any light on that really. He would just be speculating as to why they were trained in those weapons.

MS SOOKA: In any event, I think it's Mr Varney's submission that, in fact, he draws that kind of link and I think you are going to address a memorandum that sets out your clients' position in respect of a lot of those issues and I think that's where it could properly be dealt with in terms of a higher strategy.

MR STEWART: Mr Chairperson, if I may address the panel. As you know, I represent two of the witnesses in these proceedings and they are due to be cross-examined in due course - perhaps tomorrow and the days following. As I understand it, the panel has been asked for some sort of ruling as to whether those people here representing people who may be implicated by the evidence should put a version or must put a version and it seems to be intimated, by some of my colleagues at least, that it's illegitimate that the panel ask them to put a version and I'd like to make this representation on behalf of my clients, which is this. They've come here to tell their story. In certain

/respects it's

3B respects, it's being said that they're lying and they are in an impossible position, where they don't know in what respects it's said they're lying. If those people who are here, representing those who are implicated do not in some way put a version and say what their case is, my clients don't know where they are. They are left with a series of questions - some sort of TV game show - with no substance to the proceedings, with no sense of in what respect is it said that they're wrong, in what respect is it said that they're lying, only, as Mr Lax has put it, circles within circles. My submission would be then not only is it entirely proper and common-place that counsel be asked what their instructions are and what their version is. Not only is it entirely common-place and proper, it should be asked in this instance. That is what these proceedings are about. If people are here and not able to put a version then they shouldn't be here at all, in my submission.

CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr de Vos, I stated right at the beginning of these proceedings that that is how limited cross-examination should and will take place, that we put a version to a witness and ask him whether he agrees with it or not and I agree with Mr Stewart and this is no news to us, as the panel, that that is what we expect them to do and it is certainly not improper to suggest to you that you should put a version and we expect you to put a version.

MR DE VOS: May I then also request this Commission adjourn so the Commission first reads the KwaMakutha trial record?

CHAIRMAN: No, Sir, we will not adjourn. We will carry

/on with the

3B on with the cross-examination now, and please don't clap.

MR DE VOS: Mr Chairman, may I further place on record the reason why we are here is that we received notice and there is an allegation being made against us. It reads as follows,

"You were party to the provision of an offensive military capacity to Inkatha. This capacity was utilised offensively against the political enemies of Inkatha. You anticipated that the offensive para-military capacity would be used to carry out pro-active or pre-emptive attacks, which would result in death and injuries."

That is the allegation made against my clients and the whole of the SA Defence Force. Now, may I now continue with my cross-examination?

CHAIRMAN: Yes, please.

MR MACADAM: Sorry, Mr Chairman, I don't want to unduly interrupt, but prior to the commencement of today's proceedings there was a meeting between myself and counsel where it was agreed that we would adjourn at 4 o'clock this afternoon. I was informed by Mr Wills, who represents the witness, that on the strength of that undertaking he made firm business commitments at 5 o'clock involving work itself in Pietermaritzburg. Furthermore, there was an agreement that the proceedings would be adjourned tomorrow at 1 o'clock. There is another complicating factor in that Mr Stewart, who acts for the witnesses, Dlamini and Luthuli, is only available tomorrow and furthermore the two witnesses whom he represents are

/loaned to the

3B loaned to the Commission from the Department of Justice and for a cost - matters of finance - it would be desirable that they - evidence will possibly be finalised this week as additional expenditure will be incurred if they have to come back next week. With all these factors, may I propose that, firstly, the cross-examination of Mr Mkhize, who is available locally, who can be brought to these proceedings without any difficulty, stand over until Monday. Secondly, that tomorrow the witnesses, Luthuli and Dlamini take the stand. I want to put on record I have no further new evidence from either of them and possibly, since these two persons are not in custody, that these proceedings commence tomorrow at 9 and not 10 o'clock. This would resolve a number of practical difficulties which may arise.

CHAIRMAN: Mr Wills, are you happy that your client be called again on Monday?

MR WILLS: My client has no objections.

CHAIRMAN: If there is no serious objection to that and I will invite serious objection only, then I suggest that that is the way that we go. Any serious objection? 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED TO 1997/08/08

/PROCEEDINGS RESUMED