TRC Final Report

Volume 1

Chapter 11

Part OtherDepts

Subsection 10

■ STRUCTURES IN THE INVESTIGATION UNIT

Regional units

71 Because the Commission required only a relatively low level of corroboration of the violations alleged in the statements before it, the Investigation Unit structured the regional units in a way that would ensure that they had the capacity to conduct corroborative inquiries in a rapid and efficient manner.

72 In order to build a low level corroboration capacity, it was anticipated that the units would need to employ personnel who would liaise with various institutions to gather information to test facts raised in statements and with the national office, to obtain and share information, to access the databases when available and to manage the corroborative process.

73 There were, however, different understandings and conceptions as to what was meant by the term ‘low-level’ corroboration. It was not clear exactly what level of information the Commission needed in order to make a finding that a person was a victim of a gross human rights violation as described in the Act. The initial development of some corroboration ‘pointers’ and training were introduced to overcome this problem. correlation between political developments and gross human rights violations, if that could be established. The primary sources were the database, section 29 interviews, victim and perpetrator statements to the Commission, political party and other institutional and individual submissions, amnesty applications, investigation reports and research notes.

Database

74 The timely development of a comprehensive database, based on the information gathered from statements made by victims and their relatives, was central to the successful implementation of the information management system. There were, however, delays in setting up the database in the early stages.

■ LINKS WITH OTHER STRUCTURES

75 Access to information from government and non-government agencies was an important part of the investigative process, and from an early stage, the Investigation Unit made efforts to establish lines of communication with a variety of agencies and institutions.

76 Early discussions between members of the Commission and various government ministries resulted in the establishment of nodal points – an approach preferred by the SAPS and the Department of Defence.

77 Nodal points consisted of appointed officials whose function it was to facilitate communication and access to information sought by the Commission. All requests and responses were to be channelled through these nodal points.

78 The rationale for this approach was founded on the notion that the government department was best placed to utilise its internal communication systems to access the necessary information and respond appropriately. In the case of the police and the military, the documentary holdings were vast and not necessarily sufficiently well organised to allow for easy access. In addition, certain holdings contained information which was irrelevant to the work of the Commission or not for public disclosure.

79 This nodal system generated a great deal of tension, as there were real concerns in the Investigation Unit that the Commission’s access to information was being ‘managed’. Indeed, the Investigation Unit's initial experiences suggested an attitude of non-co-operation from sections of the SAPS and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The Commission, however, continued to rely upon these structures, and as the Commission became a fact of South African life, many initial obstacles were overcome. In addition, Commissioners and senior members of the Investigation Unit worked relentlessly and persistently to open doors.

80 Structures with which the Investigation Unit developed lines of communication included:

The South African Police Service

81 By agreement with the Ministry of Safety and Security, a nodal point for facilitation of communication between the police and the Commission was established. Although its initial function was to deal with the secondment of police to the Commission, it was recognised that it would play a broader role in facilitating access to information required by the Commission.

82 It was agreed that the Commission’s investigators would request dockets and documentation held by the police from the police facility which had originally dealt with the matter. If the information was not available or a concern was raised regarding the Commission’s access to the information, the matter would be considered by a regional liaison officer appointed in the office of the regional Commissioner of Police. Only if the matter could not be finalised at that level would the national nodal point be activated.

83 Implementation of this agreement proved very difficult. At various stages, the police chose to ignore the agreement and in some regions adopted differing approaches. In the Gauteng region, for example, the sheer volume and type of information requested resulted in a very slow rate of response to the requests. In this region, the police insisted that requests be directed via the national nodal point office, which further complicated relations and resulted in long delays.

84 In view of difficulties experienced, the regional investigation units (in accordance with the agreement) adopted a direct approach and sought information from individual police stations after having informed the nodal points of their request. Whilst this occasionally resulted in tensions between the Unit and the police, it proved the most effective means of obtaining the information needed to conduct investigations.

85 Notwithstanding problems experienced by the Unit as a whole, regions experienced different and varying degrees of co-operation from the SAPS. In some regions, investigators enjoyed total co-operation and assistance, while elsewhere the work of the investigators was made onerous by an overly bureaucratic and uncooperative attitude.