TRC Final Report

Volume 1

Chapter 11

Part OtherDepts

Subsection 31

■ STRUCTURES

12 The Commission’s safety and security structure functioned at two critical levels, namely at the strategic (policy formation) level and at the operational (day to day) level.

Strategic level

13 The safety and security standing committee oversaw policy formation and national co-ordination. It had thirteen members, including the two national coordinators of SAPS and the national nodal point commander. This committee reported to the chief executive officer who was responsible for overseeing the safety and security efforts of the Commission.

Operational level

14 The co-ordination of operational safety and security occurred on three levels.

a The first level involved day to day, tactical safety and security issues and national co-ordination. A separate, ‘functional’ safety and security committee was established to deal with this. It consisted of nine members, including the national co-ordinators and the national nodal point commander, and was chaired by the chief executive officer.

b The second level was regional co-ordination. This involved a partnership between the regional managers, the appointed provincial co-ordinators of SAPS and the national nodal point commander.

c The third level was area co-ordination. This involved a partnership between the Commission’s logistic officers, the assigned provincial area co-ordinators of SAPS and the national nodal point commander.

15 The above structure was established after a national ‘brain storm’ involving the chief executive officer, the national safety and security co-ordinators, the nodal point commander, representatives of SAPS in all nine provinces, the four regional managers of the Commission and their logistic and support officers.

■ THREATS

16 Threats to the Commission were not unexpected and, from its inception, precautionary measures were put in place to protect both personnel and assets.

17 These measures included: lectures to staff on personal security; security surveys of buildings and the commissioners’ and committee members’ residences, and continued threat analysis in respect of commissioners, committee members and the Commission as a whole by the SAPS Internal Security Division and the NIA. 18 Verbal and written threats were registered against the following members and events of the Commission: a Archbishop Desmond Tutu (Chairperson) b Dr Alex Boraine (Vice-Chairperson) c Revd Dr Khoza Mgojo (Commissioner) d Dr Wendy Orr (Commissioner) e Mr Dumisa Ntsebeza (Commissioner and Head of the Investigation Unit) f Ms Kate Pitt (Staff member) g Ms Virginia Gcabashe (Human Rights Committee member, Durban) h the Commission’s first hearing in the Eastern Cape i the Commission’s first Western Cape hearing j Archbishop Tutu at the Commission’s Bloemfontein hearing.

19 Another security issue concerned security of information. Each commissioner and staff member was required to take either an oath or affirmation of secrecy. Despite this precaution, there were a number of information leaks that were investigated by the functional safety and security committee. These included: two leaks relating to amnesty applications, one relating to a section 29 investigative enquiry and two from meetings of the Commission.