TRC Final Report

Volume 1

Chapter 11

Part OtherDepts

Subsection 4

Management and Operational Reports

INVESTIGATION UNIT

■ INTRODUCTION

1 One of the unique features of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Commission) was that, unlike commissions elsewhere in the world, it retained a permanent Investigation Unit as an integral component. Indeed, central to the endeavour of the Commission was its capacity to probe, enquire into and unravel the truth about the conflicts of the past. It is therefore not surprising that the Commission's founding Act made provision not only for the establishment of an Investigation Unit, but also provided a number of investigative powers to be used by the Commission in fulfilling the terms of its mandate.

■ STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF THE INVESTIGATION UNIT

2 The Investigation Unit was made up as follows:

a the head of the Unit, who was a commissioner

b a civilian component consisting of investigative journalists, researchers, human rights lawyers and members of non-governmental organisations (NGOs)

c a trained police personnel component consisting of secondments from the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA)

d an international component consisting of trained police personnel, information technology specialists (using Kortex and Analyst Notebook) and human rights lawyers.

3 The national director was directly accountable to the chief executive officer in respect of all managerial matters, and to the head of the Investigation Unit in respect of policies, strategies and their implementation. In addition, from March 1997, all investigations, including proactive amnesty investigations, were nationally co-ordinated by a deputy national director.

4 The regional heads oversaw staff, resources, communication, planning and operations. In these matters, the regional head’s primary line of responsibility was to the national director. The regional heads, however, were also required to keep regional management properly informed of matters relating to the effective functioning of the region.

5 The Unit staff included: current and former members of the police, magistrates, former members of the National Intelligence Service, former journalists and researchers, advocates, attorneys, public prosecutors, human rights specialists (including NGO workers, monitors and researchers) and international specialists. Thus, the Unit had a broad range of skills and expertise at its disposal.

6 The total staff component for the Investigation Unit was initially set at sixty members, excluding the national director and administrative assistant. It was envisaged that the staff complement would comprise forty-eight locally employed members and twelve international investigators (finally, sixteen international experts assisted the Unit). Staffing levels were determined on the basis of broad budget criteria and not in accordance with any assessment of staffing needs in any of the regions.

7 Of the sixty members of staff, forty-eight went to the regions. Each regional unit consisted of a regional head, nine local and two international investigators. Twelve staff members were assigned to the national office. These included four international and eight local investigators (five special investigators and three analysts, including an amnesty co-ordinator). There were also investigators from neighbouring countries.

8 The Investigation Unit, however, only reached its full staff complement at a later stage. In July 1996, it was at 85 per cent of its strength, with fifty-one persons appointed and an additional five SAPS members seconded.

9 When funding from the European Union became available in April 1997, the Investigation Unit was restructured and extended. Provision was made for the employment of twenty-seven corroborative assistants to accommodate the ever-increasing volume of work in the Commission. The principle behind the appointment of staff was to ensure a broadly representative balance, so that the Unit reflected the broad spectrum of South African society with the requisite skills and knowledge. Where advertisements had failed to secure an appropriate body of prospective employees, efforts were made to elicit applications from different sectors of the population and from persons with a range of political backgrounds.

10 In order to achieve the requisite staff mix, it was necessary to obtain the secondment of members from the SAPS. This process proved cumbersome, however, and many logistic support problems were encountered. There was a lack of interest from certain sections of the SAPS, as evidenced by the relatively small number of applications to the Investigation Unit. The process of secondment presented a number of problems.

11 In addition, it was decided at an early stage that the Investigation Unit's staff should comprise both formally trained investigators drawn from the SAPS and persons with other skills and expertise. It was felt that a ‘civilian component’ would provide not only a multi-disciplinary skills base, but would also lend a greater degree of credibility to the investigative process. This approach accorded with the Commission's overall commitment to be accessible and sensitive to the victims of gross human rights violations.

12 A number of European governments provided support and assistance to the Commission in the form of seconded staff. The Commission benefited from the expertise of personnel from the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Germany and Switzerland.

13 The international component of the Unit consisted of persons with a great deal of investigative and general police experience drawn from foreign police agencies. Invariably, the governments who provided assistance seconded very senior police officers whose expertise was not restricted to investigative work. In this regard, the internationals provided valuable input.