TRC Final Report

Volume 3

Chapter 3

Subsection 34

■ 1990–1994

Historical overview

216 The political transition to democracy in South Africa, heralded by the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990, was marked by a renewed escalation of civil strife in the province. One of the major expressions of this was the so-called ‘Seven Day War’ in the lower Vulindlela and Edendale Valleys south of Pietermaritzburg at the end of March 1990 (see below).

217 In July 1990, Inkatha was formally constituted as a political party – the IFP –and embarked on recruitment campaigns in KwaZulu and Natal. At the same time, many UDF activists and affiliates were engaged in open political campaigning as members of the now unbanned ANC.

218 The political climate in the province during this period was characterised by a gross political intolerance and growing enmity between the ANC and the IFP. This was particularly true of areas known to be party strongholds, where efforts to establish freedom of political activity and association often resulted in violent clashes and forced dissenting individuals to flee with their families. The battle for territorial control led to frequent and widespread outbreaks of conflict and violence in the province. Tens of thousands of people were affected by the violence, suffering death, injury, maiming, bereavement and displacement on a large scale.

219 Youth were in the front line on both sides of the conflict. While whole families were drawn into the violence, the evidence before the Commission indicates that most of the casualties of war were in the thirteen to twenty-four years age group, followed by the twenty-five to thirty-six years age group. The traditional notions of the relationship between old and young had shifted perceptibly. Many parents told the Commission that the political conflict had mobilised their children beyond the reach of the parental protection they needed. Ukuhlonipha [respect], the cornerstone of African cultural and social life, had broken down substantially.

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220 Parents and elders living in the tribal areas had had little if any exposure to the ANC and/or UDF and chose to stay with what they knew – the IFP. As a result, many families were divided along generational lines. Some parents disowned their children; others were attacked for failing to control their children and allowing them to join the ANC. As a result, many young people took to living in the forests and bush. They were unable to attend school for fear of being attacked.

221 While two sides were clearly perceptible in the political conflict and violence, allegiances were at times complex and ambiguous. Inkatha had an independent existence and support base, but was seen by the state as an essential ally in its attempt to withstand ANC/UDF resistance. At least one ANC leader who rose to considerable power and prominence in the Midlands was later exposed as an informer for the security police and became associated with the activities of a prominent Inkatha warlord in the area.

222 The theory of a ‘third force’ involved in the unfolding conflict was often used to explain and analyse events in this period. The term, however, came to carry a multiplicity of meanings. ANC president Oliver Tambo had used it earlier to label non-ANC opposition groups, especially those associated with Black Consciousness and Africanism. By the mid- to late-1980s, it came to be used in the province to refer to various activities that seemed to fall outside the conflict between the ANC and Inkatha. At times, it was used to refer to activities with chains of command running all the way up to ministerial or even presidential level. At others, it referred to the local police who took sides in incidents involving Inkatha and the ANC. It was even used to explain purely criminal activity. Amnesty applicant Captain Brian Mitchell said that the special constables deployed in the Midlands in the late 1980s were the ‘third force’, created by the SAP and deployed specifically to destabilise UDF areas and kill UDF supporters.

223 The Commission received reports of partisanship and intolerance displayed by traditional leaders, IFP-supporting township councillors and the KZP, preventing the ANC from making inroads into their areas. Indeed, the first ever ANC gatherings to be permitted on the North Coast (in Ngwelezane and Esikhawini) were in March 1993, some three years after the organisation’s unbanning. At worst, ANC supporters became the targets of violent attack.

224 In 1990, an amendment to the Natal Zulu Code of Law virtually legalised the carrying of dangerous weapons and the arming of the amaKhosi. The Chief Minister’s department could issue G-3 semi-automatic rifles to chiefs and headmen for the protection of KwaZulu government property, thereby circumventing normal weapons licensing regulations. State functionaries were able, by way of permits, to issue these weapons to ‘tribal policemen’ or ‘community guards’. By law, these weapons were to be used to protect KwaZulu government buildings and property. However, evidence points overwhelmingly to the fact that they were also used in clashes between ANC and IFP supporters.

225 Evidence has also emerged that the IFP was receiving arms and ammunition from right-wing organisations and sections of the security forces. Statements made to the Commission by both victims and perpetrators contain many allegations of SAP and security force complicity with IFP supporters. In July 1991, a Weekly Mail investigation revealed that the security police had secretly funded Inkatha rallies held in November 1989 and in March 1990 to the tune of R250 000. The government admitted to the allegations and said that secret funding to Inkatha had ceased after March 1990. This was disproved in November 1991 when the Weekly Mail published evidence that security police had funded an IFP rally in Umzumbe (South Coast) in January 1991. The security police admitted to funding this rally.