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TRC Final ReportPage Number (Original) 265 Paragraph Numbers 23 to 27 Volume 5 Chapter 7 Subsection 3 23 In yet another context, in the section 29 hearing into the violent activities of the Mandela United Football Club, Ms Winnie Madikizela-Mandela repeatedly denied, in the face of allegations of her awareness, that she had knowledge of events: I knew nothing about these activities. I did not monitor them when they were in and out of my house. I did not know who recruited who into the Mandela United. I knew nothing about who took what decision. I had nothing to do with the activities of the boys. 24 The gap between leadership and foot soldiers, particularly amongst the youth, was also described in the United Democratic Front (UDF) submission to the Commission. A gap of this sort means there were possibilities of misinterpretation that led to atrocities on the part of youthful activists. In this context, many activists interpreted statements by the UDF and its allies making reference to the breaking down of apartheid to mean that this should be done by means of violence. 25 Regarding questions about the brutal enforcement of labour, consumer and student boycotts that involved gross violations of human rights, the UDF submission argued that such acts should be seen against – … the background of emergency when most of the UDF leadership was in detention or on the run. The acts were committed by youths acting on their own, even though some may have believed that this was being done in the interests of the struggle. 26 Similarly, within the ANC and MK, although for different reasons (not least of which was the physical distance between leadership in exile and operatives within South Africa), there was recognition of a gap, a distance, between top and bottom. In this case, it is not expressed as a denial but as a concession of problems caused by this gap. An MK leader testified at an amnesty hearing as follows: There were long and insecure lines of communication, command and control. Many of the established MK units had been allowed a degree of initiative in executing operations, as long as these remained within policy guidelines. In contrast with the conventional military force in which planning takes place at headquarters levels, in guerrilla warfare most of the detailed planning takes place at the lowest level … There is no so-called hot-line to higher structures to ask for guidance. Communication could and at times did result in deaths, given the degree to which communication lines were monitored. 27 Overall, across different parties in the conflict, the above quotations indicate that, although particular contexts varied, a common problem existed in terms of a distance between top authorities and field soldiers, supporters or followers. Atrocities, it is suggested here, emerged precisely because of this gap, opening up possibilities of miscommunication, misinterpretation and possibly, as Mr FW de Klerk suggested, male fides. 4 E de Kock, A long night’s damage: working for the apartheid state. Saxonwold: Contra Press, 1998, p. 227. |