TRC Final Report

Volume 6

Section 3

Chapter 3

Subsection 7

Caprivi trainees

54. Mr Daluxolo Luthuli [AM4075/96], grandson of Chief Albert Luthuli, was trained in the Caprivi by members of the SADF. He applied for amnesty for twenty-one incidents of murder and attempted murder in KwaZulu/Natal and admitted to giving orders to ten other applicants who were involved in a total of 165 human rights violations. It emerged in his testimony before the Amnesty Committee that he was the political commissar and commander of hit squads that had been trained in the Caprivi in 1986 and at Mlaba camp in 1993.

55. Mr A Stewart, who represented Luthuli and some of the Caprivi trainees, argued b e fore the Committee that structures had already been put into place for the deployment of the trainees once they returned from the Caprivi:

It was clear, in my submission, that on the Caprivi trainees returning to KwaZulu Natal there were structures in place, there was quite a sophisticated idea at least as to how those structures should work. The Caprivi trainees were split up into different groups, as the Committee is well aware, the offensive group, defensive group, contra mobilisation, and so on. And they were each supposed to have their own roles, and they were commanded, below Luthuli, by particular people, and there was the planning committee with the ongoing liaison between the IFP people responsible on the one hand, being chiefly MZ Khumalo and Mr Luthuli, and on the other hand the SADF and the SAP. (Pinetown Hearing, 8 March 1999)

56. Luthuli gave evidence about the first planning meeting he attended on his return f rom the Caprivi:

I was then taken by M.Z. Khumalo who asked me to go with him to a meeting. We went to 121 Battalion. The people whom I remember present there were Brigadier Van Niekerk, Louis Botha from the Special Branch, J.P. and Jerry. The last two men mentioned were also instructors at Caprivi.

What we discussed was that the trainees were back. In what way were they going to work and their safety was also an issue because they would be working covertly. How were they going to be protected?

This was discussed in detail. We then discussed that they should get contra-mobilisation and then we decided that we should open bases for them all over KwaZulu Natal so that they would be working in collaboration with the defensive group that used to pick up all troublesome individuals in the community. Secondly, the offensive group was supposed to stay in a particular are a , because it wasn’t supposed to meet with the other groups, because it was only used for attacks. We found a base for them at Port Durnford where they stayed. We then dis cussed that since they had no identification, I was then asked with M.Z. Khumalo to talk to Brigadier Mathe, so that identity cards or documents could be made for those trainees. (Hammarsdale Hearing, 11-14 August 1998)

57. Mr Stewart noted that this method of operation worked initially but then began to change.

And at that time it seems that there was an attempt to implement those struct ures, and ensure that those groupings worked in the way in which it had been planned that they would work.

And the KwaMakutha massacre which took place relatively shortly after the re turn of the Caprivi trainees, and which was perpetrated in, initially at least, a model way inasmuch as it, there was prior surveillance, there was a reporting back, there was proper planning, there was a proper liaison between the military and military intelligence and SAP security branch on the one hand, and the Caprivi trainees on the other, and then the move in to hit the house. It turned out that it may have been the wrong house, but certainly it turned out that it may not have been planned that so many uninvolved people were murdered . But prior to that it seemed that it was implemented in the fashion that had been intended.

But we also know that, from what Luthuli has told the Committee, that he became, on re turning from Caprivi and attending the first planning committee, and seeing the involvement of the SADF through military intelligence, and the SAP through the security branch, he became concerned about the extent to which, as he put it, the Boers were directing things, and the extent to which Inkatha was dependent on the Boers. And he then didn’t attend planning committee meetings thereafter, save for one which he was called to, to attend to explain a certain incident.

And so right from then the channels of command started to disintegrate, and although we have statements in the affidavits and on record about how things w e re intended to happen, and how things were intended, and how orders were intended to be relayed, that as time goes on we see that those structures were operating in the initial planned fashion less and less. There was a level of dis integration, there was a level of informality, whereas at the beginning, for example, reports to MZ Khumalo were done only through Luthuli. It happened fairly soon after the KwaMakutha massacre, for example, that some of the Caprivi trainees w e re reporting directly to MZ Khumalo themselves. They were going direct to MZ Khumalo themselves to get weapons. (Hearing at Pinetown, 8 March 1990)

58. Many of the Caprivi trainees were then deployed indifferent units within the SAP or KZP and given appointment certificates.

T here was an attempt to offer the Caprivi trainees some sort of cover under the auspices of the KwaZulu Police by the issue of appointment certificates, and even by the stationing of certain of the Caprivi trainees at KZP police stations.

Mr Mkhize, my learned friend Mr Wills’ client, being stationed at the police station in Esikhawini, for example. And then, we saw an attempt, and now I use the word integrate, to integrate the Caprivi trainees into the special constable forces of the South African Police, and we have that particularly from Mr Khumalo and Mr Dlamini. Mr Khumalo explains how they were trained at Koeberg, they returned to Pietermaritzburg, they had certain duties there, but in respect of themselves and some of those that were with them, that only lasted a month or two and then they became disgruntled and they left. But all of that is an indication, in my submission, of this lack of formality in the lines of command, and the cross over in areas of responsibility between the formations of the South African Government on the one hand and the formations of the KwaZulu Government and the IFP on the other. (Mr A Stewart, Argument: Hearing at Pinetown, 8 March 1990)

59. The Commission’s Final Report contains a summary of the incidents for which the Caprivi trainees applied for amnesty for training and assisting the IFP-aligned Black Cats gang to kill UDF/ANC supporters.^{1 7 5} Mr Israel Hlongwane applied for amnesty for incidents in Ermelo. He was questioned by his Counsel about the interest the IFP political leadership showed in the activities of the Black Cats.

MR WILLS: N o w, you’ve indicated in your affidavit, whilst the Black Cats were being trained in Mkuze they were visited by certain person from Ermelo. Can you just tell us about those persons? MR HLONGWA N E: Yes, they were visit by Noah Mqobakazi. MR WILLS: And who was he? MR HLONGWA N E: Noah Mqobakazi was the chairperson of the IFP and also Mkhonza. Mkhonza was the mayor of Davel. MR WILLS: When you say Noah was the chairperson of the IFP, what area was he the chairperson of the IFP of? MR HLONGWA N E: In Ermelo and the surrounding areas. (Hearing at Ermelo, 14 September 1998)

60. The nexus between the Caprivi trainees and the state and KwaZulu Government continued, despite the fact that many of them were dispersed into other structures. In Luthuli’s amnesty hearing the following emerge d :

MR STUART: T h e re was a time when you were sent into hiding by the Planning Committee, do you remember that? MR LUTHULI: Yes, I do.

MR STUART: We re you called to a meeting of the Planning Committee? MR LUTHULI: Yes, that is true. MR STUART: W h e re was that meeting? MR LUTHULI: The meeting was in Durban, in one of the hotels although I cannot remember the name of the hotel. M.Z. Khumalo, Louis Botha of the Special Branch, Van Niekerk, JP and Kevin were present. It was discussed that because the trail was not going well, or this charge was not good, I wouldn’t go back to report at Webber Police station as per bail arrangements. I was to be taken into hiding. In the meantime they would be trying to destroy this charge, to get rid of the charge. MR STUART: What did they fear would happen if the charge against you persisted ? MR LUTHULI: It would emerge that the IFP possessed AK47’s that would lead to the disclosure of the Caprivi training. MR STUART: Whereabouts did you go into hiding? MR LUTHULI: I was taken into hiding in the mountains at a place called Cathkin Peak, towards Estcourt, in the mountains of Lesotho. There was a base that was controlled by the Military Intelligence. At this base I found the following people, the Lesotho Liberation Army that was trained there, but I was going to go under cover as a person from Rhodesia, Ndebele. (Hearing at Durban, August 1997)

61. Key members of the Caprivi group, such as Daluxolo Luthuli and Zweli Dlamini, did not testify at the so-called ‘Malan’ trial and told their story publicly for the first time at the Commission’s Caprivi hearing. Their Counsel argued on their behalf:

Members of other Amnesty Committees that have sat, have on occasion refused amnesty where clearly those were cases where someone’s been convicted of something, they try and dress it up in political clothes in order to try and get out of prison. These in respect of those applicants that I represent, that doesn’t apply. And in respect of most of the incidents, or certainly many of the incidents that they’ve been involved, they have been the only sources of information in the hands of the State, broadly speaking about these incidents. It’s not as ‘though they faced imminent prosecution. They’ve come in a genuine effort to tell their whole story. (Hearing at Durban, August 1997)