TRC Final Report

Volume 6

Section 3

Chapter 3

Subsection 8

Vigilantes

62. A key technique of counter- revolutionary war was the mobilisation of sections of the community who were regarded as loyal to the government and could be expected to resist pro-ANC groups by force. In some cases such elements were armed, as with the provision of arms and training to Inkatha. In others, vigilante forces were created .^{1 7 6}

63. IFP member Mr Conrad Bheki Magoso [AM4014/96] applied for amnesty for a number of offences related to a conflict between IFP supporters residing in an informal settlement in Richmond Farm near KwaMashu and ANC supporters residing in K-section, KwaMashu in the late 1980s and early 1990s. According to the applicant, members of a known criminal gang of dissident former UDF supporters, the ‘AmaS i n y o r a’, became an integral part of the IFP group. The conflict was sparked by arson attacks on the border between the two areas, culminating in the alleged ‘ neck lacing ’^{1 7 7} of an elderly man by ANC supporters. The applicant was granted amnesty for a number of arson attacks and four killings [AC2001/054]. The Amnesty Committee had great difficulty in tracing some of the victims of these attacks due to the applicant’s poor memory and the lack of documentary evidence.

Special Constables

64. Similar measures included the deployment of Special Constables. These included some of the 200 ‘Caprivi trainees’ trained by the SADF in support of Inkatha. Several hundred Inkatha supporters were sent for Special Constable training at K o e berg during 1987. One hundred and thirty of these were Caprivi trainees.

65. At the end of 1987, the recruits were summoned back to Ulundi by Mr M Z Khumalo, at that time personal secretary to the Chief Minister. He informed them that, in view of the escalation of violence and the killing of Inkatha members in the Pietermaritzburg area, they would be sent on a six-week SAP Special Constables training course. They would then be deployed to the troubled are asin and around Pietermaritzburg .

66. Special Constables were first recruited in the Upper Vulindlela area near P i e t e r mari t z burg in 1988. They were recruited on the recommendation of the local tribal authorities. The main criterion for recruitment was not education, standing in the community or reputation but simply membership of Inkatha.

After a brief training, they were attached to the Riot Unit of the SAP in P i e term a ritz b u rg under the command of Major Deon Terblanche.

67. Mr Mduduzi Remember Ndlovu [AM1632/96; AC1998/0092] was a Special Constable in the KZP based at KwaMashu and a member of the IFP. Together with his late brother, Mr Thabani Ndlovu (chairperson of the Mpumuza branch of the IFP Youth Brigade), Ndlovu had killed Mr Sibusiso Gumede (a reserve constable of the KZP) on 16 April 1991 and removed his HMC sub-machine gun. The weapon was later found at the Ndlovu house after a fire. Ndlovu was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for the murder. Whilst the Amnesty Committee noted that there were inconsistencies in Ndlovu’s testimony, it was satisfied that the applicant had made full disclosure on all material facts and did not act out of ill will or for personal gain. Ndlovu was granted amnesty.

Esikhawini unit

68. Offensive actions by the Caprivi Trainees continued under the cover of the KZP f o rce in the early 1990s. The Esikhawini hit squad, based near Empangeni, was composed of individual trainees and was controlled by a local committee of IFP leaders and senior KZP officers. The hit squad carried out a large number of attacks on ANC and COSATU individuals, resulting in many deaths. It was allowed to act with impunity and the KZP commander, Brigadier C P Mzimela, ensure d that its activities were covered up. The few KZP officers who attempted to investigate its activities were either murdered or intimidated from acting.

69. Key figures in the KwaZulu government at Ulundi, including a cabinet minister, Prince Gideon Zulu, and the Secretary of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Mr M R Mzimela, provided logistical support and direction to the hit squad. This was also a finding made by the Supreme Court in the M b a m b o¹⁷⁸ matter for purposes of sentence. The state of affairs in Esikhawini in the early 1990s was similar to that in other areas.

70. T h e modus operandi of the Esikhawini unit emerged in cross-examination of Mr Daluxolo Luthuli at the amnesty hearing of Gcina Mkhize and others:

MR WILLS: As I understand this military structure, or military struggle, certain people received training like for example Mr Mkhize was trained in Caprivi and in Koeberg and at Mkuze camp and at various other camps, by various people, the S A D F ? MR LUTHULI: That is correct . MR WILLS: The SAP at Koeberg? MR LUTHULI: Yes, that is corre c t . MR WILLS: And by Inkatha people at Mkuze camp? MR LUTHULI: That is corre c t . MR WILLS: But the policy of the IFP was that these people must be transferred into various townships and they must gather loyal and staunch younger IFP persons and give them similar training? MR LUTHULI: That is corre c t . MR WILLS: So when both Mr Mbambo and Mr Mkhize give evidence later to the effect that they were involved in setting up of another hit squad and specifically trained other persons and specifically people like Mkhana Lipo, Matenywa, Ben Mlambo, Lucky Mbuyasi, that these activities were done in the full knowledge and they were in fact part of the IFP policies at the time? MR LUTHULI: That is corre c t . MR WILLS: That wasn’t against any policy or orders of the IFP? MR LUTHULI: N o . MR WILLS: And again, this was well known by the leadership and encouraged by the leadership? MR LUTHULI: That is corre c t . MR WILLS: N o w, unfortunately I am not in a position to know how high that leadership went, but to be specific, I know for example or I am told for example that this was encouraged by persons like BB Biyela and Mrs Mbuyasi in e Sikh awin i ? MR LUTHULI: That is corre c t . MR WILLS: The way certain specific targets were identified, was also varied, but you mentioned something that Mr Mkhize alludes to in his affidavit, and I refer you to page, I refer the Committee to page 231 of the bundle. That is to the effect that the IFP leadership on the ground, would determine who the problematical UDF persons were? (Durban Hearing, August 1997)