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TRC Final ReportPage Number (Original) 663 Paragraph Numbers 80 to 88 Volume 6 Section 5 Chapter 3 Subsection 10 Environment in the townships during the period in question80. In the period following the unbanning of the ANC, the townships were in turmoil. The stakes were high for both the state and its surrogate, the IFP, both of whom were opposed to the ANC taking power. Township residents were constantly under attack by surrogate forces of the state, which included members of the IFP, renegade forces and members of the rightwing who were, in many instances, armed by the state. 81. The violence affected particularly Gauteng and KwaZulu/Natal. It was against this backdrop of state-sponsored violence that the activities of the SDUs took place. Findings in respect of SDUs82. In assessing whether the findings that were made in respect of the SDUs remain relevant in the light of the evidence emerging from the amnesty process , the Commission needed to confirm the following: a Was the ANC responsible for the creation and arming of the self-defence units ? b Was the Commission’s finding that there was not an adequate command structure correct? c Whilst acknowledging the state’s role in sponsoring the violence, did SDUs take the law into their own hands and perpetrate gross human rights violations? d Did all of this contribute to the violence of the 1990s? The ANC’s role in the creation of self-defence units83. The SDU’s were created amidst the spiralling violence of the negotiation period. The former state engaged in a strategy of negotiating with the liberation movements on the one hand and fomenting violence on the other. This meant that supporters of the ANC were left vulnerable to attack by dark surrogate forces, which later became known as the ‘Third Force’.66 After a mass funeral in Soweto in 1990, ANC P resident Nelson Mandela publicly pledged the ANC’s commitment to the formation and training of SDUs. In addition, at its consultative conference in Durban 1990, the ANC resolved to take steps to defend itself with all the means at its disposal and to create people’s self-defence units as a matter of urgency as it came under increasing pressure at local level to intervene and respond to the violence. 84. In its attempts to manage and control the process, the ANC released a document called ‘For the sake of our lives’, which attempted to prescribe and regulate the structures and activities of the SDUs. The thrust of this policy document was that SDUs should operate in terms of a political rather than a military strategy and that the long-term goal should be peace. It was envisaged that SDUs would be well trained and highly disciplined. 85. The document envisaged that, although MK members would play a role in the establishment of SDUs, it was imperative that they be controlled from within communities because of the past history of informally established units. It was also envisaged that the units would receive political instruction of some sort. Local MK members were granted permission to participate in these structures. MK involvement took the form of recruiting and training of SDU members and supplying weapons. In some instances, individual members of MK participated in the clashes and skirmishes that took place. 86. ANC policy required that selected units supplied certain SDU units with weapons. A special unit was set up within the ANC to assist with the arming of SDUs. These included Ronnie Kasrils, Aboobaker Ismail, Riaz Saloojee, Muff Anderson and Robert McBride. All of these applied for amnesty for supplying weapons and assisting SDUs. In the KwaZulu/Natal area, Jeff Radebe, Ian M u n ro Phillips and Sipho Joel Daniel Sithole were involved in the supply of weapons and assistance to the SDUs. 87. It is important to note that the ANC was not the only supplier of weapons. In most instances, the SDU units had other sources of supply. 88. There is no doubt that the ANC played a major role in establishing SDUs in both the Transvaal and KwaZulu/Natal areas. 66 See Appendix to Section Four in this volume. |