BUTHELEZI, (first name not given)

... Justice BEKWA, Mfanafuthi BEKWA, Ntombizakhe Constance BEKWA, Thulani BEKWA, Zalisile Langa BELAWENI, Sibiya Jeremia BELE, Headman Phakamile BELE, Nothimba BELE, Nyangilizwe BELEBANE, Templeton Mangaliso BELEBESI, Puleng BELEHE, Michael BELING, Neville BELLE, Mbulelo Heathcourt BELO, Solomon ...

... homeland structures could easily be dismissed as puppets of Pretoria, at the time of its formation and for almost a decade afterwards, this was not said of Inkatha. 1979: The London meeting 207 During the latter part of the 1970s, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi became vocal in his opposition ...

... of those they had killed. Former members of fragmented MK units, who had operated on a need-to-know basis with few written records, could not always assist the Commission in this task. 70 Combatants were not the only victims, however. Human rights activists, academics and ideological ...

... to the statutory obligation imposed on it by section 4(e) of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (‘the Act’), not based on factual and objective information and evidence received by the TRC. There is no rational connection between the evidence and material ...

... main source of information came from the ‘twisted’ confessions of people seeking amnesty who had told the Commission what it wanted to hear. He noted with regard to the Caprivi and Esikhawini hit squad operatives: This distortion clearly happened in the testimony of discredited witnesses and ...

... of his organisation’s express or implied authority. Finally, the Committee accepted that Buthelezi had made full disclosure of events and had not acted out of malice or for personal gain. Armed robberies committed by APLA 23. The Amnesty Committee received applications from thirty-nine ...

... findings contained in the Commission’s Report – which implicated them in gross human rights violations, criminality and conspiracy – could not have been based on factual and objective information. The Applicants also contended that the Commission had failed to comply with fair procedures ...

... 207 In the same 2 May 1990 memorandum, Van den Berg recorded that Inkatha’s Mr MZ Khumalo (codenamed Reeva) indicated that “he had not yet given up on his idea of an armed force, or at the least ‘cells’ which could take out undesirable members.” 208 In the Wartburg area ...

... IFP REQUEST FOR INFORMATION4 9 33. As a result of its investigations and hearings in terms of section 29 of the Act, the Commission served notice on the IFP and its leader, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and other members of the IFP, of the contemplated findings it intended to make against ...

... and became directed at those who were advocating alternative structures and thus threatening its power-base. 234 The South African government not only welcomed but also actively promoted this covert alliance with Inkatha, as it fell squarely into its response to what it saw as the total ...

violence to Inkatha or its Leader. In making its findings the TRC had ignored the absence of any causal link and has incorrectly adopted an extended notion of accountability. Prince Buthelezi served simultaneously as President of the IFP and the Chief minister of the KwaZulu government and during ...

... the control of the South African Government in respect of all matters relating to its deployment, training, promotion and operational c o n t rol. Nothing in the TRC Report or in any credible evidence before the TRC detracts from the fact that Prince Buthelezi never ordered, authorized, approved ...

... in contravention of the express policies of the organisation. Some of the individuals responsible have applied for amnesty arguing that, although not formally under orders of the ANC, they believed they were acting in accordance with ANC strategic objectives at the time. Such acts included the ...

... A CONSIDERABLE VARIANCE BETWEEN THE TRAINING CONTEMPLATED IN PARA 24. C.I, AND II OF THE LIEBENBERG REPORT AND THE ACTUAL TRAINING RECEIVED. IT CANNOT BE ASSUMED THAT IT WAS AT THIS STAGE THAT THE HIT SQUAD ACTIVITIES WERE FORMULATED. IT IS CLEAR FROM THE MILITARY DOCUMENTS OF 16 APRIL 1986 THAT ...

... Government. I never spoke of the Chief Minister as president of Inkatha… It was the view that existed at that stage. In practice, however, I did not realise one could not distinguish between Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government. It was basically the same organisation. 200 Former Inkatha ...

... Gasa. The court found that Gasa had conspired to killed Dube, and that he had hired two men from the Transkei to carry out the murder. Inkatha did not publicly sanction or rebuke Gasa and his accomplices or condemn their actions in killing Dube. Hambanathi 219 On 31 August 1983, the South ...

... found in 1989 that it was possible that David Ntombela and five others “were in some way responsible for the deaths”. To this day, the case has not gone to trial. 171 On 31 January 1988, David Ntombela was among a number of people who addressed a large Inkatha rally at Mpumuza in ...

... state witnesses, being members or the SADF Military Intelligence, were directly involved in planning and execution of the operation. The court was not able to find who had provided backing for the attack. Paragraph 248 is amended as follows: The Commission heard evidence of the involvement of ...

LIST OF DISAPPEARED AND MISSING PERSONS The following list is a list of the persons currently listed as disappeared or missing. It is possible that not all missing persons are recorded here, although every attempt has been made to capture all names. Similarly, it is possible that there are ...

... KZP Commissioner During wrote a letter to Buthelezi dated 18 March 1994 in which he pointed out: that the deployment of these trainees who have not had, even remotely, sufficient training in law or exposure to police procedures, could lead to extremely serious repercussions for which I, as ...